SEEING IS BELIEVING: MARX’S MANIFESTO, DERRIDA’S APPARITION

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WHAT’S IN A WORD?

To begin at the beginning: Why *Manifesto* of the Communist Party? Why not 'programme', 'platform', or 'declaration of principles'? Why not 'decree' or 'proclamation'? The noun 'manifesto' has the currency it enjoys today, and not just in English, largely because of Marx’s own choice of the word. Even though he did not invent it (he is likely to have adopted it from an important source, Sylvain Maréchal’s 1796 *Manifeste des Égaux*), it is Marx who bears much or even most of the responsibility for putting the word on our lexicological map.

Not just in English: this gives us an important clue. *Manifestation* in French means 'demonstration' shading over into ‘protest’. *Manifestant* is the French (or German), *manifestante* the Spanish or Italian, for 'demonstrator'. 'Manifestant' was sometimes used in English after the 1860s, but was duly supplanted (by the 1880s, according to the OED) by the word 'demonstrator' or 'protester'. The German verb *manifestieren* means ‘to declare’; the Italian nouns *manifestazione* and *manifestino* mean 'performance' and 'leaflet, pamphlet or broadside' respectively.

Thus far 'manifesto' seems to mean that which makes manifest, or demonstrates – demonstrates in the additional sense in which a scientific truth is demonstrated, by being made public or visible. A manifesto, that is to say, can have nothing arcane or recondite about it. It has to be accessible. One could of course say the same about decrees or edicts. Yet a manifesto cannot be equated with a proclamation or ukase because it is not necessarily issued from a pre-given position of power. To the contrary, demonstrations or manifestations are generally protests, public protests, against what those in positions of power get
up to, or away with. They involve that we make our voices heard, and that we be willing to put ourselves, out bodily safety, on the line. Manifestus in Latin literally means 'struck by the hand' (fendere means to strike’) but came to have the meaning of ‘evident, clear or plain’. But this is only part of its meaning in English too, as a glance at historical dictionaries will reveal. My Webster's gives us for the verb 'to manifest' the following, to be sure: 'to reveal, make appear, show plainly, make public, disclose to the eye or understanding'. (The word 'make' is important and stands out here, for reasons I shall get to presently). Webster's goes on to give us 'to reveal, show, exhibit, display, declare, or discover'. (In keeping with this, the only non-obsolete usage of 'manifest' as a noun in English means a list of a ships cargo, an invoice that is to be shown or exhibited at the customhouse). Accordingly, the OED adds to Webster's inventory of meanings of the verb 'to manifest' these others: 'to be evidence of, prove or attest; to expound or unfold; to display, to give evidence of possessing, to reveal the presence of, to evince'. Yet, intriguingly, these apparently anodyne listings are not the synonyms of 'manifest' they might appear to be at first glance. To see this we must turn again to Webster's characterization of 'manifest', this time as an adjective: 'What is clear can be seen in all its bearings; what is plain can be seen by any man without study or reflection; what is obvious lies directly in the way, and must be seen by every one; what is evident is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation in the mind; what is manifest is evident in a very high degree, striking upon the mind at once with overpowering conviction'. This hits the nail on the head. If anything is to be manifest, it has to be made manifest (as in the Biblical English of the King James Bible). And making manifest is precisely what Marx is up to in the Communist Manifesto, as we shall see, in a variety of different, though interdependent, senses. Making manifest, so understood, is not just a form of words, or what the French call a façon de parler. It is a kind of action – as Marx, I shall argue, was perfectly well aware.

WHAT'S IN AN OPENING LINE?

First we must undertake a detour, for there is another understanding of 'manifestation,' not touched on above, that has enjoyed some recent intellectual currency for all the wrong reasons. This is its understanding as 'apparition'. In some ways regrettably, it has become impossible to write about Marx's Manifesto during the 1990s without invoking Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx, which is itself an
invocation of Marx. But not the Marx I am writing about. Derrida, to be brief, wants the 'spectre haunting Europe' in the *Manifesto's* (probably mistranslated) opening line to be haunting Marx too – as an instance of the uncanny or of *das Unheimliche*, much as Freud had understood the term. The reasons why Derrida wants to make this move, indeed the reasons why *das Unheimliche* has become so suddenly fashionable for the first time, can only briefly occupy us here. Derrida wants the spectre haunting Europe to be haunting Marx too for reasons having much more to do with 'spectrality' as such than with Marx. Derrida gives 'spectrality' a great deal of work to do; he believes that a world purged or cleansed of 'spectrality' – much as he assigns this understanding of 'spectrality' to Marx – would be a world of pure presence, immediacy, materiality, objectivity, facticity, a reified world of things that lack a past dimension. (Such a world would correspond to Fukuyama's notorious 'end of history', which Derrida nicely, and correctly, terms 'apocalyptic'). Without 'spectrality', Derrida claims, philosophy would be displaced by a bland Anglo-American anti-speculative positivism and empiricism. Whether or not 'spectrality', so understood, is the legitimate counterpart to the very tendencies Derrida is surely right to detest depends on whether more is made to hang on the hook of the concept of 'spectrality' than it can reasonably be expected to bear. Overload seems distinctly likely: but over and above this question, a fairly obvious interjection – one which seems not to have occurred to Derrida – imposes itself. This is that twentieth-century 'spectrality' can be imposed by technological means. The Walter Benjamin that Derrida invokes calls upon us to preserve and sustain a 'weak messianic' power in dark patches of our history, but we should remember that this same Walter Benjamin also wrote 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', for reproduction these days can, and commonly does, include the reproduction of 'spectrality' itself.

Derrida, for reasons outlined above, reads Marx's *Gespenst* as what the French term a *revenant*, that which comes or comes again from beyond the grave to haunt and horrify the living. While this interpretation – and all translation is interpretation, as Derrida is only too well aware – enables Derrida to inscribe Marx within a 'hauntology' by which Derrida himself is evidently ensorcelled, there are problems with it.

The first is that Marx's spectre or *Gespenst* may not be a *revenant* in the above sense at all. It is noteworthy that the most recent, and most accomplished, translation into English of the *Manifesto* (that done by
Terrell Carver for Cambridge University Press in 1996) renders Marx's *Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa* in much the same way as had the original English-language rendition in George Julian Harney's *The Red Republican* in 1850: 'a spectre stalks the land of Europe'. 'Stalks' as a verb of motion is a much more likely translation of the German verb *umgehen in* than is 'haunts', and was so in Marx's day as in our own.4

In view of the entire, immense superstructure Derrida erects on the basis of a much less orthodox translation of Marx's celebrated opening line (which he claims – disingenuously? – he had forgotten), we must outline a second problem. Who is supposed to be afraid of Marx's spectre? Marx himself immediately specifies the 'holy alliance', the real-life Holy Alliance of the 'Congress System', 'of Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police'. While these may have recoiled in various degrees of horror, feigned or otherwise, at the spectre they themselves had invented and invoked, it is more to the point that they were bent on seeing to it, with every power at their disposal, that others should quake in their boots at the onset of this apparition. The Holy Alliance, after all, was not made up of holy innocents; not to mince words, they were an instance of full-fledged reaction, with blood on their hands. If 'all that is holy is profaned',5 why should the self-proclaimed Holy Alliance, of all people, be exempt? The 'spectre of communism' was one they conjured up to make people afraid of it.

**ON SORCERY AND WITCHHUNTS**

To what end, after all, was the Holy Alliance allied in the first place? For the sake of a 'witchhunt'. Carver's translation should once again give us pause. We all know that witchhunts always find what they are looking for. Witches may never have existed – they too were 'apparitions' – but witchhunts invariably found them all the same. Witchhunts accuse others, those their perpetrators call witches, of conjuring up evil spirits; but, in a neat ideological inversion, witchhunts themselves conjure up witches as evil spirits. They willfully mischaracterize the objects of their concern to the point of inventing them out of thin air, or of calling them into being.

We also know that witchhunts and communists go together, that these indeed have gone together ever since (and, as we shall see, even before) we could speak of 'communism' at all. 'Where is the opposition that has not been smeared as communist by its enemies in government?', asks the *Manifesto* – a question that sounds like a
minute-bell through twentieth-century, let alone nineteenth-century, history. Witchhunts had needed witchcraft to the extent of inventing it, of calling their adversaries, witches, into being. So too anti-communist witchhunts, their heirs and successors, need their own spectral communists, to the point of finding these where none exist, producing real victims who are likely to be guilty of nothing at all. Examples, sad to say, abound.

Marx, whatever Derrida may think, is unafraid of the spectre the Holy Alliance and its lackeys had conjured up. His object in the Manifesto is in large part to dispel such fears. 'It is high time for communists to lay before the world their perspectives, their goals, their principles, and to counterpose to the horror stories of communism a manifesto of the party itself'. Most translations of the Manifesto into English give us 'nursery tales' for Carver's 'horror stories,' which can occlude the fact that in 1848 – especially in 1848! – there was no hard-and-fast distinction between nursery tales and horror stories (think of Hans Christian Andersen and the brothers Grimm) and with it the fact that those who recounted the latter did so with the wish of instilling fear among their listeners (and, less often, themselves too). But fear is the last emotion Marx wished to instill – which means that if the spectre stalking the land is spirit not made flesh, this is to be understood as meaning spirit not yet made flesh. It is unsubstantiated, perhaps, but this is to say that it awaits its substantiation, a substantiation that only Marx and his readers can give it.

To put the same point another way, Marx's spectre does not hark back to anything that came before it. It doesn't come from beyond the grave to plague or torment us. It is not a reminder of some past or primordial existence. It is meant to point forwards, projectively and prospectively, not backwards and retroactively. And this is to say that there is, quite simply, nothing uncanny or unheimlich about it at all, whatever Derrida and others may think. Quite to the contrary, Marx's spectre sets us the task of finding it a home or making it a home in the world. It is not dreadful save to those who have prior cause to dread its advent. To the rest of us it is a tocsin, a call to action. As Frederic Jameson has pointed out, the Hamlet Marx's spectre suggested to Derrida was itself 'not a ghost story'; 'it did not merely tell about some grisly hold of the past on the present ... but rather showed the apperition of the past in the act of provoking future action and calling for retribution by the living'. To extend Jameson's point, the 'spectrality' of the future differs in kind from that of the past (or of the revenant). While it too may not be at one with the present, this is the
case only to the extent that 'its blurred lineaments ... announce or foretell themselves'. Because Marx's *Manifesto* is in this sense proleptic in its argumentation, the spectrality Derrida misprises is in fact a 'form of the most radical politicization ... far from being locked into the repetitions of neurosis and obsession (like the *unheimlich*), it is energetically future-oriented and active'. And in this way, as Jameson proceeds to indicate, 'the spectrality of the future ... answers to the haunting spectrality of the past, which is historicity itself.'

**ON THE SPECTRAL AND THE PREMONITORY**

The deeper question begged by all this is, of course, whether an emergent social phenomenon's lack of visibility is 'a sign of its inescapable spectrality' (as Derrida seems to think, but which seems preposterous) or, instead, in Malcolm Bull's words 'a historically significant indication of the nature and location of positive values in contemporary society?'. Inescapable spectrality is emphatically not the register of the *Manifesto*. To appropriate an intriguing observation from Bull (who is, I think, right to perceive a pattern here), beliefs of the kind that are calls to action have often been 'everywhere condemned and nowhere to be found'. Fervent denunciations of the evils of atheism, for instance, predated, preceded and (in a sense) provoked the appearance of real, self-professed, flesh-and-blood atheists on the historical stage. These duly manifested themselves in the flesh once their adversaries had prepared the way, invoked them and (as it were) told them what they'd have to do. Moreover, 'just as the invention of atheism had taken place without anybody actually advocating the position', so too 'the invention and repudiation of anarchism occurred without the intervention of any anarchists. No-one espoused an explicitly anarchist position until William Godwin, and no-one used "anarchist" in a positive sense until Proudhon. However, that did not prevent anarchists from being roundly abused' at every turn. Similarly, later in the nineteenth century, 'there was no-one claiming to be a nihilist, just a chorus of outraged moralists arguing that nihilism was an outrage'. The temper of the times is often a complex business. Atheism, anarchism, nihilism – these form what Bull calls a 'series of spectral negations' each of which 'is not so much unrealizable as temporarily disembodied'. Those who duly came to embody the positions in question are not spectres or revenants but people who felt capable of acting out positively a role that others were bent on condemning, out of hand, as unthinkable and outrageous.
Marx, when he wrote the Manifesto, was clearly one of these people. But in saying this I must make my sense clear. I have no wish to reduce Marx's communism to Bull's patterning; if ever a political document proved premonitory and outlived the circumstances of its conception, the Manifesto is that document. Even so, Bull's patterning can cast significant light on what Marx was up to in the Manifesto (and elsewhere), and can (as has become necessary) give the lie to Derrida into the bargain. The spectre circulating, then in Europe and later elsewhere, may have been in a certain sense wraithlike — but not, surely not, in the sense of being a revenant or reminder. It was then something originary and unprecedented. It seemed wraithlike and threatening because the Holy Alliance and its minions, in their outrage and condemnation, could not give it form, could not even see or identify it clearly, but their rhetoric created a space in which Marx could etch his notoriously bold outlines. Why else could Marx have insisted so brazenly that people were 'compelled to face with sober senses'' something that, to others (who lacked, and needed to lack, the perception) presented to the world as sheer delirium or nightmare? The disembodiment of Marx's spectre (pace Derrida) is purely provisional; it awaits the embodiment that the Manifesto — that the Manifesto's very language — proceeded, with no small flourish, to give it. In its pages Marx is openly, publicly, ostentatiously, brazenly declaring himself and his collaborators to be communists; in so doing he is naming communism itself, identifying it as a doctrine, movement and method of social analysis. He is pulling it together, fusing and synthesizing tendencies which, but for his efforts, might have remained fissiparous or even contradictory. He is seizing the time, giving substance to something that appeared to the cowed and craven to be frightening as mere form. Marx's writing the Manifesto of the Communist Party was an act of unexampled and audacious theoretical originality.

In advancing so ambitious a claim I am only too uncomfortably aware that the temper of our fin-de-siècle times, as I write, seems to be decidedly arrayed against Marxism in general and thus against its distillate, the Manifesto, in particular. The considerable intellectual éclat of Derrida's Specters of Marx (which bucks a trend and ostentatiously refrains from disparaging Marx or his Manifesto) can have no other explanation. Even the extant secondary literature on the Manifesto (if this generalization is permissible), which is also generally admiring, effectively damn it with faint praise all the same — by parading an admiration for its eloquence or forcefulness without
explaining either of these characteristics. And this in turn can be a way
of extracting it from the body of Marx's thought and action, of
consigning the Manifesto, not to oblivion (for who in truth could
remain indifferent to its forcefulness?) but to the mid-nineteenth
century, as though this were a bygone, long-forgotten era. To do so is
to make of the Manifesto a mere pièce de circonstance, which is exactly
what it is not. Every word it says about capital and wage-labour
explains why the nineteenth century has not yet really been surpassed,
(except by the calendar).

Here I am only too happy to buck the same trend as Derrida bucked
in 1994, albeit for different reasons. My sense is that what Marx
accomplished in the Manifesto is almost immeasurable. (Without
retracting what I've said against Derrida, I must add in fairness that he
too, in what has to be his most engagé book to date, senses its immea-
surability). But the dimensions of Marx's accomplishment cannot be
gauged or even approached if we isolate the Manifesto, as though it
were a set-piece, from the body of Marx's thought and action as a
whole. Far from wishing to underestimate or misprize one of Marx's
most engagé writings under the impress of current events, I propose to
raise the stakes of my argument by proposing that even a hundred and
fifty years after its composition, we have not even begun to think
through the enormity of what Marx achieved as a theorist when he
wrote it.

Marx, to get this argument into perspective, may have been guilty of
a certain hubris when he wrote in The German Ideology that 'where
speculation ends, in real life ... real, positive science begins.' My
point is that Marx's claim had a real content to it, and that having
advanced it he did not rest content, 'blissfully satisfied with his own
construction'. He proceeded to act it out, to put it into practice, and
pace Derrida) to give it bodily form. Marx's insight was simply
simply! – that theory, to be effective, can no longer rest content with
producing empty, abstract nostrums of the kind that would put the
world to rights by virtue of their very elaboration, or their intellectual
elegance. If people fail to act on the basis of their beliefs – as Marx
proceeded to act on the basis of his – they might as well be whistling
in the dark in propounding or expounding such beliefs, or indulging
themselves in what Marx had already, archly (but not at all unfairly),
called 'theoretical bubble-blowing'."

What is most unforgiveable and ironic, Marxologically at any rate,
about Derrida's Specters of Marx is that he sees a connection between
The Manifesto of the Communist Party and The German Ideology, a
connection that really is there to be made, but he draws it out in a way that could not be more misleading – or more fatal to his own argument. He reads back his misprized notion of spectre as revenant from the Manifesto to The German Ideology. So unwarranted a misreading results in confusion considerably worse confounded. The longest section of the manuscript Marx and Engels left 'to the gnawing criticism of the mice' deals with Max Stirner. Derrida thinks that because Stirner's Spuk, Marx's spectre and their common ancestor, Hegel's Geist, are all revenants, the figure of the revenant is the 'common stake (inciting) the polemic'. The trouble is that Marx, for his part, set out to ridicule and deflate what he sees as Stirner's quintessentially Young-Hegelian, i.e. too-Hegelian obsession with spooks, spectres, apparitions and the like, categories which Stirner according to Marx takes far too seriously! For Stirner, 'history becomes a mere history of pseudo-ideas, a history about spirits and spectres, while the real empirical history that is the basis of this ghostly history is only utilized to provide bodies for these spectres . . . (Stirner) writes an undisguised ghost story (Geistergeschichten). Stirner takes not the world, but only his 'delirious fantasy' about the world as his subject. Derrida thinks Stirner 'poached' the spectres of Marx, spectres that were never there to be poached in the first place; Marx for his part thinks Stirner poaches 'snipe existing only in the mind'. His point is one that Derrida would have done well to take on board: that attempts to achieve concreteness by the conjuring away or exorcism of spectres, ghosts, apparitions, und so weiter, attempts that are effected, that is to say, on the basis of deficient principle, will result only in re-enchantment, the construction of an even more imaginary entity than one started out with – an insight that, as Marshall Berman has memorably pointed out, Marx extends in the pages of the Manifesto itself, where the bourgeoisie are explicitly portrayed not as ghostbusters but as sorcerers' apprentices, unable by their very nature to control the forces that they are obliged to conjure up.

The question raised by all of the above is, of course, that of how concreteness is to be achieved amidst the welter of illusions that Marx is concerned to puncture, not just in the Manifesto but in The German Ideology (and The Eighteenth Brumaire) too. A full answer would entail exceeding my brief, which is to write about the Manifesto after a century and a half, and my needlessly repeating arguments already made elsewhere. Yet it is germane to the enterprise at hand to indicate that the Manifesto, if it is looked at 'with sober senses', contains and even embodies what are more than hints at what an answer involves.
That knowledge of history can enjoy a premonitory status is a leitmotif of the *Manifesto*. As Jerrold Siegel remarks, ‘central to the historical vision that Marx offered [in the *Manifesto*] was the theme of revelation: modern life revealed basic features of history that had previously remained mysterious or hidden.’

This is a claim not just about history but about knowledge of history, knowledge that is necessarily theoretical in scope. Yet this is theory of the kind that overreaches and exceeds the 'given' boundaries of theorizing or of empty, arid speculation of the Hegelian or Young-Hegelian kind – as Georg Lukács recognized. It is the proletariat's theoretical sophistication, and not the sheer weight of its numbers in a world where 'Communists direct their attention chiefly to Germany' (where the proletariat was comparatively meagre in number) that is finally to count or be crucial. The importance of this point invites and yet resists overstatement. Marx, Sheldon Wolin has pointed out, 'founded a new conception of politics, revolutionary in intent, proletarian in concern, and internationalist in scope and organization.'

This new conception of what politics could, and should become involved a new conception of theory with which we still need to come to terms. The point here is not that Marx was alone in devoting his life to a revolutionary cause he regarded as an urgent agenda. The merest glance at the wonderland of nineteenth-century revolutionary theorizing would show that Marx did not lack for company, or even companionship, in this quest. Yet there is something singular about Marx's project that lodges in the mind. In 1857 we find him writing to Engels: 'I am working madly through the nights so that, before the deluge, I shall at least have the outlines clear.' This has to stand as one of the most extraordinary statements about theorizing ever made. It's not Louis XIV's notorious, but oddly complacent, 'après moi le déluge' so much as 'because of what I can do – the deluge', a deluge that is not, like Louis XIV's, going to happen anyway but a deluge that isn't about to happen if Marx's principled argument finds insufficient takers. Small wonder, perhaps that Prometheus was the most inspiring 'saint' on Marx's calendar. But it is a matter, surely, not just of Prometheus, the bringer of fire, but also of Archimedes: Marx views theorizing as a lever with which to move the world. And whatever we may think of the movement he effected, it did move the world.

But how, in the end, are we to assess his accomplishment? It is customary, or at least admissible to portray Marx as having stood at the point of intersection of three intellectual tendencies, which were also political tendencies: the plebeian revolutionary radicalism that had
surfaced in the course of the French Revolution, under the influence of Rousseau's insistence that social rank and moral worth during the ancien régime were inversely related; the cognate Hegelian insistence that mankind redeem the world of philosophical speculation, instead of wallowing in it self-indulgently, by recognizing itself in a world it had consciously made; and the then-new 'science' of political economy that had surfaced most markedly in Scotland and England and had had more than a glancing effect on the French and German Enlightenments. All well and good. Yet Marxian theory should on no account be reduced to merely occupying the point where these meridians intersected for the first and only time. Marxian theory transcended their intersection in a way that anyone doing intellectual labour should find inspirational. At the very least it raised the possibility that the much-vaunted 'unity of theory and practice' can indeed become a reality, and can embody what Ernst Bloch so memorably termed 'futurity' (das Zukunftige).

The Marxian enterprise, I am suggesting by way of conclusion, was in the fullest sense of the term apolitical enterprise. The Manifesto in particular gave expression to a wish that the scope of politics, and of theory, be extended, given more meaning and greater resonance than politics or theory had ever had heretofore. Only such an expansion, we should still remember, can render the 'revolutionary unity of theory and practice' anything other than an empty phrase or Redeweise. Such a unity of the theoretical and the practical, the Manifesto could also remind us, cannot be an arbitrary juxtaposition, but only a genuine convergence or confluence of forces that could otherwise remain as antagonistic in perpetuity as they still are today.

NOTES


3. Marx, Later Political Writings, edited and translated by Terrell Carver, Cambridge

Umgehen in, according to Cassell's German Dictionary, means to go round, to revolve, to circulate, to circumvent, to make a circuit or detour, to approach in a roundabout way, to associate, to have to do with, to be occupied with, to have dealings with, to handle, manage or have in mind. Only then does Cassell's render umgehen in as to haunt' (or to walk around, elude or evade). My point is that none of these meanings, not even 'to haunt' itself, has any necessary connection with the revenant as such, and that umgehen in can almost always be rendered by verbs of motion or (re)location. 'Haunt' can in any case mean frequent (häufig besuchen); infect, overrun, afflict or punish (heimsuchen); plague, vex, torment or annoy (plagen); or pursue, follow, trail, persecute or prosecute (verfolgen). That all these renderings of to haunt' precede umgeben in in Cassell's proves nothing, but suggests a kind of multivalence that Derrida's revenant, if anything, tends to foreclose. My contention is that Marx, for his part, was and must have been aware of the various meanings and senses of the German verb he saw fit to employ, all of which tell us something about the effect on the reader he wanted it to have.

I prefer the more orthodox 'holy' to Carver's 'sacred' (see Marx, Later Political Writings, p. 4) for reasons that are evident in my text.

Later Political Writings, p. 1.


Bull, passim.

For 'compelled to face with sober senses', Carver gives us 'finally forced to take a down-to-earth view'; (See Later Political Writings, p. 4); the difference seems trifling.


The German Ideology, p. 197.


The German Ideology, p. 135.

Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 140; The German Ideology, p. 470.

See Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air. The Experience of Modernity, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1988, esp. pp. 87–129, for a dazzling interpretation which can be faulted only by the observation that the supposed quote from the Manifesto in Berman's title isn't there in the German-language original. I am grateful to Seyla Benhabib for being the first to point this out to me. Carver
renders it, again correctly, as 'Everything feudal and fixed goes up in smoke'. See Later Political Writings, p. 4.


19. Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists and Alien Politics, passim.


22. Later Political Writings, p. 30.
