THE STATE AS CHARADE: POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN TODAY'S INDIA

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Introduction

Several rather distressing characteristics seem to define India as she enters the fiftieth year of her Independence. Of these the most apparent is the triumph of capital; having maximised the advantages of the Nehruvian 'mixed economy', it has now entered into a new phase characterised by an increased leverage over both state and labour. No less apparent at the end of these fifty years is the demise of the idea of the state itself, absolutely central to which is the rise of right-wing religious fundamentalism. Even though the fundamentalists articulate their critique of the state in terms of religious oppression, as I will show below, that critique is actually wedded to a particular version of the neo-liberal project that meets the interests of Indian capital.

The event which most clearly marks the emergence of fundamentalism as a significant political force in India is the series of violent communal riots that occurred in the north Indian city of Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. Between the riots in 1992 and the national elections in May 1996, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the main political vehicle of the Hindu Right and the primary force behind the events at Ayodhya, continued its attempts to consolidate political power. Their efforts resulted in victories in a number of provincial elections, most notably in the country's two richest and most industrialised states, Maharashtra and Gujarat, and not surprisingly, these victories generated a sense of euphoria among the party faithful heading into the 1996 national election campaign. The anticipation of success was not entirely without foundation: the BJP (and its allies) received the largest percentage of the popular vote and won the largest number of seats in parliament, which put them ahead of both the Left Alliance and the Congress Party. However, the BJP failed to win an absolute majority. While it was invited to form the government, it was unable to bring together a viable coalition and was voted out of office within two weeks. The United Front government which was subsequently
formed consisted of a coalition of the Congress and the Left Alliance, where the members (often called the 'Third Force') share the common goal of resisting the rise of Hindu fundamentalism.

Despite its failure to form the government, the BJP continues to be an important force in India's political-ideological terrain, and whether it can eventually establish itself as the ruling party at the centre remains the most important question for Indian politics today. Indeed, in many circles there is a belief that the Hindu Right has appealed to an 'authentic' and long-suppressed Hindu religiosity that characterises the Indian masses, and for that reason, it will from now on claim its permanent – and indeed, legitimate – space in Indian politics. Marxists and liberals, on the other hand, disagree with the view that there exists such a repressed Hindu psyche; instead, they see the BJP's success as arising out of the same fascist tactics that characterise the rise of fundamentalisms elsewhere in the world today, namely, the portrayal of a common enemy – in this case, the Muslims. Despite the quite substantial differences between them, both these arguments see the element of religiosity as being central to the strategy of the Hindu Right, and in that sense, perceive it as constituting a sharp break with India's 'secular' political tradition.

I wish to argue instead that an analysis of the strategy of the Hindu Right must go beneath its apparent appeal to religiosity to uncover a tried and tested mobilisation strategy that has a long tradition in India. This strategy consists of two equally important components: (a) an appeal to the experience of social, political and economic oppression of the Indian people, and (b) a proposal for redressing that oppression that pre-empts any serious change in the existing relations of property. In other words, the success of the religious Right – or any political strategy for that matter – derives as much out of its appeal to the masses as its appeal to the elites, and more precisely, out of its ability to develop a narrative that precludes the necessity for a conflict between the two.

Let me clarify one point at the outset. In emphasising the processes through which support is mobilised by political elites, we must see these processes as dialectical: elites respond to dominant currents in the popular psyche as much as they seek to mobilise popular opinion along desired lines. As such, these efforts at mobilisation necessarily involve processes of co-optation, re-channelisation and even demobilisation of genuine and organic social movements that arise out India's deeply inequitable structure. Since I focus on these processes of manipulation, it might appear that I am depriving the 'subaltern' of its subjectivity and denying to it the ability to participate in the creation of their own objective situation. In my view, whatever epistemological position one adopts, it is impossible to sustain the empirical argument that the Indian subaltern classes are bereft of subjectivity and have been the passive victims of the elites. There are too
many instances in which the political consciousness of the 'unfed, illiterate Indian' has asserted itself against structures of power. That said, however, I must immediately insist that the subaltern's consciousness has been conditioned and manipulated by all types of elites and hence has to a large extent been denied the opportunity to create (or even objectively interpret) its own circumstance. Despite the potential allegation that such an assertion 'desubjectivises' the subaltern, I believe this to be a valid epistemological position. For, to impose subjectivity (or agency) on those who are confronted by fairly immutable structures of domination can easily lead us to an individualistic, anti-modernist, inegalitarian, neo-liberal position which requires the victim to accept unqualified responsibility for her misery. Such an unrelenting preoccupation with subjectivity, I will argue below, is untenable.

The BJP: History, Truth and Political Power

There are various explanations for the rise of religious fundamentalism in contemporary India. Let us begin with the most polemical of these, the one that is used by the political party of the Hindu Right, the BJP itself. Basically, the BJP contends that its popularity derives out of the deep frustration that the Hindu majority feels with respect to the pro-minority policies of the Indian state. According to this explanation, the allegedly 'secular' ethic that forms the basis of the Indian constitution has been used primarily as a tool to get the minority vote. In practice, Indian secularism has thus meant much more than simple formal equality and non-discrimination on the basis of religion (or caste), but has endorsed a form of distributive justice for the minorities. Yet, the argument goes, since it was the Muslims who had ruled India until the onset of colonisation, injustice could only have been inflicted by the Muslims on the Hindus. At the very least, Muslims have jeopardised all efforts by Hindus towards Hindu-Muslim unity and have retained the same separatist vision that led to the creation of a separate Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The conclusion the BJP draws is that it is necessary to end the 'charade' of the secular state.

It is not only Muslims who have benefitted by this charade, according to the BJP. The state has also 'pampered' the lower castes and other ethnic minorities in the name of formal equality and universal rights. Such pampering of the lower castes was particularly favoured by Mrs Indira Gandhi, when she sought to 'include' members of the lower castes (and classes) into the units of local self-government. The momentum generated by this process was picked up by Mrs Gandhi's successor V. P. Singh, who tried to implement very aggressive affirmative action policies. In accordance with a rather controversial Report by the Backward Classes Commission submitted to the Singh government, 50 per cent of public
sector jobs were to be reserved for members of lower castes and other backward classes. These reservations led to the much-discussed urban upper-class 'backlash' in Northern India during which two college students coming from upper class families in Gujarat set themselves on fire. This incident, along with the generally tactless manner in which the problem of affirmative action was approached by the Singh government, secured a permanent place for BJP-led rightist, reactionary fundamentalist politics in contemporary India.

In addition to such 'wrongs' in the realm of political-economy, a second (and, within the Hindu worldview, even more offensive) use of the secular ethic against Hindus has occurred in the realm of culture and identity. In effect, it is argued, the Hindu worldview has been eliminated from the public realm by 'pseudo-secular' nationalists like Nehru. From the perspective of the 'classificatory and divisive' Western modes of thought upon which Nehru and others relied, India appeared as a patchwork of irreconcilable worldviews. The only way in which this complexity could be 'rationalised' according to the requirements of the 'modern state' was to banish these diversities from the public realm. This, the BJP alleges, resulted in the creation of a state based upon a fundamental denial of the one homogenous culture which 'truly' represents India, viz. Hindutva, i.e. the essence of Hinduism.

Now, how is one to assess the BJP's claim that its political support is rooted in the political, economic and cultural oppression of the Hindu majority by the 'pseudo-secular' state constructed by a Westernized elite? This argument has certainly resonated well among many sections of the Hindu upper and upper-middle classes who perceive themselves to the victims of government policy. Perhaps the most powerful class that felt victimised by the oppressive hand of the state is the landed elite. The grounds for their disaffection can be traced back to Indira Gandhi's encouraging of lower castes and classes to enter local government (a strategic move designed to establish a permanent Congress stronghold in rural constituencies). This shrewd politics of empowerment (unmatched by any material change), unleashed a demand for democratisation of feudal structures by lower castes (and classes). Throughout the seventies and eighties, the resistance from below became increasingly well organized. Initially led by and composed of low-caste Hindus who identified themselves as the proletariat, it attracted oppressed peoples from all religions and established links with various labour and peasant insurrectionary groups in different parts of the country. Known commonly as the Dalit Movement (Dalit literally means the 'downtrodden'), this upsurge was influenced by a combination of different strains of Marxism (especially Maoism) and an unusual variety of radical revivalism which structurally linked cultural, economic and gender oppression. Although the Dalit movement must be
credited with questioning the very basis of caste and class rule, it was not able to bring about any significant shift of power away from the landed elite. It did, however, provoke a backlash from the agrarian upper and middle classes. Like the agrarian classes, yet another key section that has felt 'oppressed' by the 'pseudo-secular' state was the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy who strongly resent the infiltration of the bureaucracy by 'semi-literate low class officials'. Their opposition has been especially manifest in the debate that has been sparked by the recent election of Phoolan Devi, the former 'bandit queen,' to India's parliament. Feelings of oppression may also correlate with age: young men between ages 16-40 from Hindu upper-and middle class homes have been most strongly attracted by the BJP's agenda. The reason behind this relate to the recent resurgence of an aggressive achievement orientation, which feels itself stumbling against affirmative action policies for lower classes. While the onset of economic liberalisation has stimulated the material ambitions of the middle-classes, opportunities for realising these ambitions have not progressed in any significant way. In this situation, the (lower caste and minority) beneficiaries of affirmative action provisions inevitably become the targets of wrath of the middle classes who feel themselves to be the victims of such policies.

Yet, while it is true that the BJP has garnered support among some Hindus who feel wronged by the secular state, three facts undermine their claim that their support is spontaneous and widespread. First, there is the fact that the base of their support tends to be limited to upper class and middle class Hindus. It is hard to sustain the claim that these groups have been oppressed by the state. Nor have the lower classes substantially benefitted by state policy. Any political 'empowerment' that has occurred among these lower classes has not been accompanied by any significant betterment of their living standards, and there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that any economic gains that have been won, have come about at the cost of the upper classes. Second, support for the BJP shows great geographical variance. In the rural areas, in the states of the south (especially in Kerala, where a majority of the populace is Christian), or in the eastern state of West Bengal (where a significant part of the urban populace is left-leaning), the BJP's exclusivist Hindu agenda has been received with little or no enthusiasm. This is even more true of the responses to the issue surrounding the Ayodhya riots of 1992. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the various political strategies employed by the BJP indicate its own awareness of the limitations of the class-biased nature of its religious platform. This is indicated most clearly by the fact that most of the BJP's political victories have come out of consciously forged alliances with local political parties which were led by and represented
Exploring the BJP's elitist and regional biases leads us to the puzzling problem of explaining the BJP's electoral success. Here, let me suggest first a somewhat obvious but critical point: casting the ballot does not necessarily reflect an acceptance of the party's political agenda. In this case, many of the electoral gains made by the BJP reflect losses suffered by the Congress, and in that sense, constitute a vote for the BJP only by default. Second, in the two Indian states with the largest Muslim population, namely West Bengal and Kerala, the BJP or its allies have made no dent in the voting behaviour of the general Hindu populace; it has, however, considerably influenced the Hindu upper and upper-middle classes, especially young males in urban areas. Third, since the BJP government fell at the centre, the party has suffered further losses in the provincial elections of October 1996, indicating a serious lack of ability of the party to sustain its electoral success. In Uttar Pradesh (UP), one of its strongest constituencies, the BJP has failed to win an absolute majority and lost 91 of the 177 seats it had won in the 1993 provincial elections. In Gujarat, the BJP government, which has been in power since 1993, had to be suspended and President's Rule imposed as violence marred parliamentary proceedings. Fourth, several important variables that may explain its electoral success are only now beginning to be researched. These include, but surely are not limited to: (a) an extensive cadre-based organisational machinery; (b) a series of pre-electoral populist measures (like soup kitchens and shelters for the poor); (c) the use of terror; and, (d) the resort to widespread conversion to Hinduism in the states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, in two of the five states where the BJP has made its electoral conquest. Even in their efforts to convert, it seems that the missionaries of the Hindu Right have shown an inordinate interest in converting the socially dominant and powerful Muslims, and not the 'lower' Muslim castes who form the majority of the Indian Muslim population.

All this leads us to question the claim that the BJP's electoral success reflects an 'authentic' resistance to a synthetic, Western secularism imposed illegitimately on Indian society by the post-Colonial state. The formula for its success should not, therefore, be sought in ability to articulate a general interest, but in its ability to articulate particular interests within a broader rhetoric of resistance with which it seeks to make the masses identify. In this respect, it tries to draw into its fold as many diverse groups as it can, viz., women, workers, caste minorities, Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), upper class Hindus, young men belonging to urban elite groups etc., but it is especially its link with the nationalistic bourgeoisie opposed to foreign capital that provides the key to understanding its strategy. This is what I will analyse in detail later in the essay, but first I
want to examine another explanation of the rise of the Hindu Right.

The 'Subalternists'

Writing from a distinctly postmodernist perspective, members of the editorial collective known as the 'Subaltern School' in India have raised the issue of Hindu fundamentalism in the larger context of a critique of the Western ideal of the secular nation-state. The basic premise of this subalternist explanation of the success of the BJP is that the modernist-universalist ethos inscribed in the secular nation-state is inappropriate for India." The source of this inappropriateness lies in an incorrect understanding of religiosity and the importance it has in the consciousness of the subaltern. The failure of Marxists (and secular liberals) to understand the significance of religiosity reflects not only an unquestioned adoption of the premises of the European Enlightenment, but an uncritical acceptance of the primacy of economic and political equity over all other kinds of equality. This refusal to problematise the notion of modernity is what is said to characterise the hyperliberal colonial modern. Given his inability to problematise modernity, the 'hyperliberal colonial modern' is unable to understand how the secular state is experienced by the masses as a violation of the right to religious freedom. It is this experience of an oppressive secular state, these postmodernists argue, that has led to a spontaneous eruption of popular support for the BJP.

In sum, the supposedly universal forms of the modern state do not meet the demands of cultural diversity and/or religious freedom in the Indian context (or that of other post-colonial states). Partha Chatterjee, for example, claims that the modern secular state is riddled by a series of anomalies due to the fact that its basic principles (viz., liberty, equality and neutrality) cannot be implemented without serious contradiction (and impingement on the rights of minorities). Instead of striving after an unattainable neutrality, the state should instead advocate tolerance." Thus, in place of the secular state and its uniform civil code, Chatterjee suggests that religious communities need to be given the political space to regulate their own practices. This would guarantee minorities the 'right against governability, i.e., a right not to offer reasons for being different,' and to expect tolerance of its 'unreasonable' ways. The major constraint which Chatterjee would impose on this right is that 'each religious group will publicly seek and obtain from its members consent for its practices insofar as those practices have regulative power over members.' What this means at the institutional level for religious communities, is that its 'institutions must have the same degree of publicity and representativeness that is demanded of all public institutions having regulatory functions.'

There are several rather serious problems with the general position
advanced by postmodernists as well as with Chatterjee's specific proposals for an alternative to the liberal-democratic secular state in India. We can begin with some of the institutional implications of this position and the likely effects which they would have. First, if one accepts the existence of incommensurate discourses and the corresponding 'right against govern-ability,' as Chatterjee advocates, then what we are left with is a minimal state. The basic concern here is that, if the decision as to what constitutes valid religious praxis is to be decided strictly within a religious forum, then this minimal state cannot legitimately protect its citizens from any 'abuse' done in the name of religion, since the state cannot legitimately define abuse. What this means is that such questions as whether a Muslim woman is entitled to alimony on desertion by her husband will be decided within a patriarchal religious forum dominated by conservative male theologians. While Chatterjee and others will argue that the oppression of Muslim women in India at the hands of chauvinist male theologians occurs only because of the lack of democracy and representativeness in the religious forums, this is not a solution to the problem. Rather it is to ignore the reality. Is one to accept democratic procedure in a religious forum which is governed by religious laws, where the power to interpret these laws is restricted? As the Indian experience has already shown, it is all too convenient for the state not to address such abuses even when it has the constitutional power to oppose them. Ceding the right to religious bodies to define such questions will only give the state further excuses for not intervening.

A second important institutional implication of the postmodern position is that by favouring religious communities, it inhibits and delegitimises attempts by other non-religious collectives (e.g., trade unions) to claim their democratic space. Thus, for example, if a Hindu 'religious forum' like the World Council of Hindus decides, on an 'authentic reading' of the Vedas, that lower caste Hindus are inherently more suited to manual rather than intellectual labour, then trade unions cannot intervene on the part of its lower-caste Hindu members—since the postmodern state will be unable to challenge such a ruling.

Underlying the unsavoury institutional implications of the postmodern position are some fundamental problems. The first of these is the general postmodern presupposition of the incommensurability of discourses across cultures. A second problem among subalternists like Chatterjee is a basic tendency to 'essentialise' the colonised consciousness as immutably and uncritically religious. These two factors account for the privileging of equal liberty for religions over equal political, social and economic rights for individuals and all social groups. In effect what is being argued is that while other countries might engage in 'democratic revolutions' which demand the same standards of equality for the coloniser and the colonised
(e.g., a liberal democratic state with a uniform civil code for all citizens), India must continue to derive its politics of equality from an essentialised politics of religious difference. In other words, the subaltern is incapable of learning from her experience as a political being: she is incapable of detecting manipulation by self-interested elites who act as often in the name of religion as in the name of secularism; in particular, the subaltern is incapable of deciphering how both these types of politics are inherently opposed to any serious change in the material conditions of her existence. The denial of this fundamental aspect of the subalterns' experience, and how that experience might enable a different, a-religious politics of equality, is what gives post-modernist politics its reactionary content. In this it bears an uncanny resemblance to the revisionist phase in the development of psychoanalytic theory in Europe: as Marcuse has so eloquently summarised in his epilogue to *Eros and Civilisation*, this revisionism helped in many ways to justify and diffuse the true colours of fascism in Europe.

Moreover, and here we return to our original question, ignoring key aspects of the subalterns' experience leads to an inadequate account of the rise of the BJP. By essentialising subaltern consciousness, postmoderns are not able to appreciate the fact that subalterns may support Hindu fundamentalism (to the degree they do at all) with a great deal of ambiguity and for much more complex reasons than a desire for greater religious freedom from the state.

**Toward an Alternative Explanation: Gandhi and the Hindu Right**

Marxists and other radicals have also sought to offer explanations of the upsurge of Hindu fundamentalism in India. These accounts have taken either of two forms. One strand, explicitly Marxist in its orientation, develops a political-economy analysis that indicates how mixed Hindu-Muslim communities that historically existed in more or less harmonious relations, have been made to compete with each other for increasingly scarce resources in order to stave off poverty. Thus, historical processes of pauperisation, destruction of village communities and the subsequent ghettoisation of the urban communities produced by 'predatory commercialisation' are held responsible for communal conflict. The other strand focuses on ideological critique. Within this strand, one explicitly Marxist theorisation has sought to explain the rise of the Hindu Right as the culmination of a long process of ideology formation which was consciously designed and executed by three related organisations (viz., the RSS, the VHP and the BJP). Another radical analysis, this one by critical feminists, has argued that the Hindutva doctrine's ability to abort the modernist-feminist project before its fulfillment lies at the root of its popularity.
third approach to ideological critique comprises an analysis of the 'myths' and 'histories' on which the Hindu Right bases its claims. This analysis, especially the version outlined by the eminent historian Romila Thapar reveals how, in keeping with its inherently fascist character, the ideologues of the Hindu Right have attempted to homogenise the essentially divergent character of Hindu myths and histories. As Thapar illustrates, the Hindu myths have traditionally taken on substantially different contents according to the different social contexts in which they are rendered, very often reflecting radical critiques of structures of oppression; central to these diverse renditions is a refusal to treat epics, myths or histories as immutable, given, or sacred 'texts'. Thapar argues that this is precisely what Hindutva attempts to emasculate, and purging it of its radical content — seeks to replace it with a single homogenous, conservative text that suits particular interests. Even though it is backed in this endeavour by the very latest developments in the media, its very efforts at homogenisation have restricted its political appeal.

In what follows, I will draw on some of these approaches to offer an integrated account of the recent rise of the Hindu Right in India. While agreeing with the view that its appeal has been restricted, I believe that the Hindu Right has appeared as a powerful ideological contestant in India. Central to the ideological appeal of the Hindu Right is its critique of the Indian state which in essence, is a critique of the failure of the state to respond to the particular needs of domestic capital as well as the needs of the new propertied classes that have been unleashed by the coming of neo-liberalism. In other words, I would contend that too much emphasis has been placed on religiosity as the distinguishing characteristic of the Hindu Right, and on the break it constitutes with India's secular past. I wish to argue that it is not so: the strategy of the Hindu Right, as unprecedented as it might seem, is characterised by a basic commonality that all mobilisation strategies hitherto have shared. In particular, the thrust of the strategies used by the Hindu Right derive out of similar ideological constructs developed by Mahatma Gandhi, who, as is well-known, is associated with a set of ideals quite substantially opposed to that of the Hindu Right. While Gandhi idealised non-violence, communal harmony and a secular state based on religious toleration, the BJP, using some of the very same strategies as the Mahatma, strive towards a theocratic state based on religious exclusion. How is this possible? These apparently opposed goals are actually united by their essentially anti-egalitarian ontology, central to which is a strategic measure to accommodate the needs of the propertied. The commonality between Gandhi and the Hindu Right stems from their mutual profound antipathy towards all modernist and especially Marxist principles of equity.

One fundamental parallel between Mahatma Gandhi and the Hindu
Right constitutes the fact that both see religion as the major instrument with which to de-radicalise popular consciousness. In Gandhi, the essentially conservative nature of his religious ideology is most evident in his conception of the 'ideal state' which he denotes as Ramrajya (literally, Rama's kingdom): a state based on religious-moral authority of the virtuous ruler. The Ramrajya is characterised by harmony – a harmony between religions, sexes, and castes, between capital and labour and between the landed and the landless. The model is one of an extended family: a 'naturally' constructed organic unit where each member is 'naturally' assigned a certain role in the unit. Moreover, exactly as in a family, society (or the state) is characterised by a certain hierarchy, a hierarchy to which every member of the family submits voluntarily. This emphasis on harmony and hierarchy feed, in turn, directly into Gandhi's model of 'trusteeship', which Gandhi proposed as an alternative to the socialist state. In this model, the rich would consider themselves as trustees of society, and offer their wealth for the use of those less fortunate. With such a moral regeneration of the propertied classes, Gandhi argued, there would be no need for the propertyless to demand justice through violent political means (e.g. confiscation, nationalisation or land reform as in Soviet Russia), except in the special circumstance where the trustees failed in their role.

In addition to this general framework within which property was to be legitimated, Gandhi went even further to accommodate the ambitions of capital. On the one hand, the domestic bourgeoisie of his time sought freedom from the reigns of imperial capital. On the other hand, they actively searched for ways in which to suppress any radical structural change that could frustrate their ambitions of capitalist growth. Trusteeship, non-violence and insistence on familial relations between opposing classes (especially capital and labour) provided the ideological tools through which Gandhi sought to pre-empt thoroughgoing structural change, the demand for which had gained considerable momentum at that time. The indigenous elites, both the industrialists and the landed classes, were beginning to feel pressure and needed a strategy that would be able to legitimate a capitalist state. In the industrial sector, the Indian labour movement, which was fostered initially by colonial capitalism and grew steadily during the 1920s, gained a new momentum in the 1930s. The number of strikes increased, the number of unions and union membership rose steadily, while the two largest federations of trade unions initiated a process of gradual rapprochement from a previous position of antagonism. Growing labour unrest caused the Congress to lose seats in the provincial legislatures and eventually forced them to pass a series of labour welfare measures in 1937 at the meeting of the Congress Labour Committee. However, Congress was very careful 'not to hit the capitalist interests too
hard', while taking care of some of the immediate legitimation needs. Inquiry committees were set up to look into the question of wages, wage indexation, legislation on the settlement of disputes, and most importantly the question of representation of labour in management.

A similar situation prevailed in the farm sector. Demographic pressures on the fixed landed base greatly increased the number of the landless and the virtually landless, many of whom had been pushed out of subsistence farming. In the 1920s and the 1930s their situation was becoming impossible, being subject to the vagaries of an incomplete market system for securing a minimum supply of their basic needs. The situation came to a climax during the Great Depression, which, while temporarily providing them with wage bonuses, initiated a structural shift from permanent and patronage-based employment patterns to short-term, more casual, and insecure employment patterns. This growing misery of the rural poor resulted in a series of agrarian riots and violent confrontations with landlords. There was a 'perceived danger that not only would the agrarian elite not be able to hold down the countryside but that some of its members might even join and sponsor an attack on the extant state institutions.'

It was under the stress of these developments that industrialists like Birla generously agreed to finance Gandhi's nationalist movement, while Muslim landlords, who might have otherwise been troubled by the rising Hindu militancy within the Congress Party, renewed their ties with the Congress. In one of his letters to a friend, G. D. Birla wrote 'I need hardly say I am a great admirer of Gandhiji. In fact I am one of his pet children. I have liberally financed his khadi (cottage industry) movement and untouchability activities ... I wish I could convert the authorities to see that he is greatest force in the side of peace and order ... He alone is responsible for keeping the left wing in check.' Industrialists also began to indulge increasingly in charitable activities, as trusts for the advancement of education, healthcare, women, Harijans and the poor became the order of the day. Such activities, in addition to fulfilling the ethical obligations of noblesse oblige, helped to meet the most immediate needs of the lower classes and, thereby acted as an antidote to radicalisation amidst the poor.

On the question of freeing domestic capital from the reins of imperial capital, Gandhi's ideology was used in support of the Indian industrialists demand for an end to discrimination in favour of British capital. At one level, Gandhi's Swadeshi (Nationalist) movement encouraged the patronising of domestic firms and purchase of domestically produced goods, supplemented by a large-scale boycott of foreign goods. Here Gandhi invoked a full-fledged critique of imperialism, quite distinct from his other theses in its radical tone. At a deeper level, Gandhi invoked Swadeshi to symbolise the suppression of the indigenous by the invasion of the
'foreign'. ‘... But for me', Gandhi wrote, 'real freedom will come only when we free ourselves from the domination of Western culture... because this culture has made our living artificial... Emancipation from this culture would mean real freedom for us.'27

We are now in a position to see more clearly the similarities between the Gandhian doctrine with that of the contemporary Hindu Right. Of obvious significance here is their invocation of the contradiction between the 'indigenous' and the 'foreign': Gandhi invokes this contradiction as a rhetoric with which to resist British capital, whereas the Hindu Right, as we shall see, uses it for a more complex task of legitimizing a somewhat 'bastard' form of neo-liberal capitalism demanded by the contemporary bourgeoisie. Gandhi was faced with a relatively straightforward task of protecting national capital from colonial capital; for the Hindu Right, it is a more complex task of finding a rhetoric within which domestic capital can choose and dictate the conditions under which it interacts with global capital. In other words, the BJP wants to protect the interests of a domestic capitalist class that favours neo-liberalism to the extent that it reduces state control, but feels seriously threatened by those elements of neo-liberalism that open it up to foreign competition. The question that first needs to be answered, however, before going into this in more detail, is why after fifty years of secularism in an independent India religious ideology revives as a means of dealing with this problem for capital.

Indianising Neo-liberalism: From Secularism to The Hindu Right

In direct opposition to Gandhi's ideal of Ramrajya, Nehru and Mrs Gandhi established and consolidated 'a secular socialist Indian republic', where the role of the state was to integrate across all 'primordial' cleavages, projecting poverty as the factor that unified these 'different' groups. The primary political strategy was the promise of alleviating poverty, and it was in order to fulfill this strategy that the state undertook its developmental role. As is well-known, the developmental role comprised a politics of accommodation, played out through an elaborate mechanism of public economics. First, there were massive doses of public investment and soft financing to aid the development of capitalism. Second, there were huge subsidies to the farm sector necessitated by its rising militancy and political power that came in the wake of the Green Revolution. Even though an increasing amount of subsidies went to the farm sector (and continue to go even after liberalisation), agricultural incomes stubbornly remained outside the purview of taxation. Finally, there were subsidies, grants and transfers, public works programmes, and relatively high levels of social sector expenditures incurred in order to satisfy the political needs of 'legitimation'.

By the end of the 1960s, severe contradictions emerged in this secular
and state-led developmental strategy. The scale and content of the above programmes lent credence to the state's political promise—but it came with the growth of monopoly houses, gross inequalities in land reform, rising public sector losses, and ever-increasing poverty. This provoked, on the one hand, a resurgence of left forces and radical ideologies in different parts of India. On the other hand, it added new layers to the social stratification that already existed. Developmental planning directly increased the size of the urban upper middle classes (through the development of both public and private sectors), the petty bourgeoisie, and a nouveau riche agrarian class which was born directly out of the Green Revolution. While these new classes provided Mrs Gandhi with a new base of legitimation, at the same time their support discredited her claim to be a populist leader.

It was the deepening of these contradictions for which Mrs Gandhi returned to 'primordial' politics and again sought mobilisation along ethnic/religious/communal/caste lines. It was not surprising, then, that for a substantial period between this point in the late seventies and 1984 when she was assassinated, the "Punjab" problem (which eventually emerged as the Hindu-Sikh religious conflict) became her (and the nation's) major preoccupation. In addition, Mrs Gandhi attempted to shift focus away from the economic failures by focusing once again on a rhetoric of political empowerment of the lower castes and classes, especially in the rural areas. Thus, in order to maintain Congress strongholds in rural constituencies, she took up a policy of allowing increased access of these classes into units of local self-government. This provided the much-needed political vent for growing economic demands of the increasingly marginalised rural populace, and was quite successfully channelled into an aggressive 'lower caste politics.'

Indira Gandhi's successor, her son Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) continued with this style of particularistic politics, entering into special accords with each particular religious/ethnic/regional group that approached him with their demands. Symbolic of his preference for the decentralisation of excessive federal power, this particularistic approach helped Rajiv appeal to a common experience of oppression exactly as his predecessors had done: this time, the oppression of the Nehruvian state. Rajiv sought to address two aspects of this oppression (a) its restriction on private enterprise; and (b) its restriction on consumption, especially 'luxury' consumption, which was a direct outcome of its emphasis on the capital goods sector as the primary agent of development. Invoking the exact same rhetoric of Ramrajya as Gandhi, Rajiv now defined this ideal state as one characterised by free enterprise, high technology, and a consumerist middle-class. In order to encourage free enterprise, Rajiv embarked on a programme of liberalisation that not only removed the Nehruvian controls on capital, but also sought profitable linkages with global capital. In order
to promote the middle-classes, Rajiv's government negotiated one of the highest pay increases for the uppermost echelons of public sector workers (who provided the effective demand for the consumer goods 'revolution' that subsequently swept the country). However, the essential elitism of this approach needed somehow to be countered, especially because of the way in which the ideologues of Hindutva were already garnering support for a more 'indigenous', mass-based politics.

Again, in the exact same manner as his predecessors, Rajiv resorted to an appeal to communal sentiments in order to offset the inherently class-biased nature of his agenda. On the one hand, Rajiv overrode decisions of the Supreme Court (with respect to the rights of Muslim women) and passed a law that accommodated the conservative demands of Islamic fundamentalists. On the other hand, he wholly adopted the rhetoric of Ramrajya which was being used by the Hindu Right and participated actively in the ceremony for laying the foundation stone for the proposed temple at Ayodhya. With these twin acts, he opened up space for the kind of anti-modernist religious politics sought by the Hindu Right, at the same time that he catered to the needs of the bourgeoisie with-the policies of liberalisation. Rajiv's successor V. P. Singh (1989-90) continued to add momentum to the aggressive politics of the Hindu Right by putting into place a policy to reserve almost fifty percent of public sector jobs for lower castes and other minorities. This provoked an anti-secular backlash amongst the Hindu upper castes which not only helped justify the claims of the Hindu Right, but also deeply divided the populace along 'primordial' lines.

It was precisely through the backdoors of this amorphous and fragmented polity that both Hindutva and neo-liberalism entered the political space in India. Rajiv Gandhi's governments proved crucial in bringing about the marriage between the Hindu Right and neo-liberal economics, predicated as they were on the common rejection of the state intervention. In particular, neo-liberalism matched perfectly the Hindu Right's insistence that the Nehruvian model was 'too interventionist', obstructing not only free enterprise but also Hindu religion and culture. How did this apparently strange marriage actually come about?

For this we need to understand the shifting political preferences of Indian capital. While it lent strong support to the post-V. P. Singh Congress government headed by Narsimha Rao and his finance minister Dr Manmohan Singh for going even further than Rajiv in dismantling controls on capital, Indian capital quickly came to the opinion that they were proceeding 'too fast' with respect to inviting foreign capital in. At issue was the Congress government's policy to allow foreign companies to increase their stakes in their Indian subsidiaries by up to 100 per cent. As a result of this policy, most MNCs have managed to increase their stakes
in their Indian subsidiaries with minimal capital outlay. (Colgate-Palmolive, for example, has increased its stake from 40 to 51 per cent by purchasing shares at one-twelfth of the ruling market price.) Further, most of these 'restructured' subsidiaries have plans to enter the lines of business that are the most profitable and are growing at the highest rates: i.e. the consumer non-durables like beverages, cosmetics, fast food etc. Finally, instead of bringing fresh capital into the country, these MNCs plan to raise capital in the Indian stock markets, thereby threatening to reduce the availability of funds for Indian businesses.

It was no surprise, therefore, that the resistance by Indian capital to this 'foreign invasion' culminated in a 'revolt' by the Bombay Club, an informal association of the top industrialists in the country. The basic thrust of the Club's demand was that the Rao government should provide domestic capital with a 'level-playing field' vis-à-vis foreign capital. The Bombay Club's resistance to global competition has since reflected itself in the numerous proposals put forward by various chambers of commerce. For example, the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), which is one of the two major chambers in the country, has proposed that MNCs which enter with a majority holding in Indian companies be mandatorily made to disinvest after a pre-determined time-frame. Similarly, the President of the other leading chamber of commerce, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), has suggested the need for invoking Swadeshi in order to resist the onslaught of transnational capital. Most importantly, despite the government's effort to woo foreign capital, several highly acrimonious battles have occurred in the recent past between Indian business houses and MNCs looking to increase their stakes in those houses. As a result, the Indian corporate sector has come to resist rather strongly any universal policy change which make for an unfettered entry of foreign capital. Instead, it has articulated a preference for particular deals, joint ventures and financial partnerships the merits of which are to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

And this is precisely what the BJP represents in the party political arena. Interestingly enough, this particularistic approach to foreign firms is especially favoured by one faction of foreign capital looking to invest in India, viz., the non-resident Indians (NRIs). They see a rather unique possibility for gaining special treatment by the Indian state and Indian capital and have preferential access to the Indian market and the cheap, yet relatively skilled labour force. From the point of view of Indian businesses, the NRIs provide a way to establish linkages with global capital without having to succumb totally to uncertainties of unfettered foreign competition. This fortuitous coincidence of interests was probably first noted by Rajiv Gandhi, the official author of post-Nehruvian political-economy in India; however it is the BJP, along with its cultural outfit, the World
Council of Hindus, which have been actively trying to build bridges between the NRIs and their motherland. In fact, a new organisation called the *Overseas Friends of the BJP* was formed to launch the Saffron Vision 2000 in the US. The aim of this project is to educate NRIs in the US about the economic policies of the *BJP*.39

Two main elements of the BJP's economic policy are particularly appealing to capital: privatisation and protectionism. The philosophical roots of this protectionism are derived from a synthesis of Gandhian socialism and the thoughts of a lesser known nationalist ideologue, Deendayal Upadhyaya, both of whom emphasise *Swadeshi* and self-reliance.36 In line with the idea of self-reliance, the BJP's economic policy recommends restrictions on the entry of foreign capital into consumer goods sectors and only qualified entry into other sectors of production. This is where the BJP most sharply distinguishes itself from the Congress, and thereby draws support from the largest faction of Indian domestic capital. Further, the BJP also endorses a policy of preferring investment by NRIs over other types of foreign capital. In the states governed by the BJP and its alliances, explicit policies have been pursued to attract NRI investment. Between 1991 and 1995 about Rs.4 billion (approximately $119 million) of NRI investment have flowed into Gujarat, which is one of the richest and most industrialised states in India ruled by the *BJP*.37 This impressive inflow of capital is a result of the Gujarat government's special incentive package for the NRIs, which a special branch of the Ministry of Industries of the Gujarat state has been set up to administer. The incentives include priority in allotment of cash subsidies and loans from financial institutions, as well as special allotment of resources like electric power and land. At the national level, NRI investment constitutes 44 per cent of the total foreign direct investment in 1995-96.38

Apart from this preferential policy with respect to NRI capital, the rest of BJP's economic policy is unqualifiedly neo-liberal. It favours, for example, a total deregulation of all kinds of control on Indian industry and recommends drastic cuts in deficit spending. It also suggests steady privatisation in all areas, including sale of state-owned land in rural areas, the proceeds from which are to be used to retire national debt. In terms of its trade policy, the BJP's primary aim was to limit imports of consumer goods. In 1993 for example, some BJP stalwarts planned a 'boycott' of goods manufactured by *MNCs*, which was to be initiated with a public burning of foreign goods that would replicate the occurrences during the nationalist struggle. The BJP had also planned a negative list of sectors where foreign investment would not be allowed and imports were to be restricted.39 This mix of protectionism and privatisation in favour of domestic capital amidst globalisation is something that has in general been far too much ignored, by no means only in India.
Conclusion

This essay has contended that there is a certain continuity between past strategies of political mobilisation in India and those of the Hindu Right, however disparate they may seem at the first instance. This continuity lies in the way in which the Hindu Right embodies the class politics of its time, and attempts to protect the interests of property from whatever immediate forces may seem to come in conflict with it. To stress the discontinuities between the Hindu Right and the past trajectory of Indian politics is to ignore the increasing triumph of property that comprises the very essence of this trajectory. It is in this specific sense that I see distinct similarities between the Gandhian model of communal harmony and the exclusivist theocracy of Hindutva, and between the developmentalism of Nehru and Mrs Gandhi and the neo-liberalism of Rajiv Gandhi. Essential to all of them is not only the desire to capitalise on the democratic consciousness of the Indian people but also the perverse ability to co-mingle apparently contradictory forces and structures, and thus in the end, to stall any serious crisis of legitimacy that might unleash a serious demand for structural change. Placed within this 'meta-narrative', it is not clear that the Hindu Right's ideological onslaught can be fought only at the realm of ideology, i.e. by either invoking the secular values of Gandhi and Nehru or by advocating toleration that pre-empts non-religious communities. This is precisely why one needs to celebrate the whole array of creative and genuine resistance, that oppose, in whatever meagre way possible, the oppression of capital as well as that of manipulative politics.

NOTES

1. Ayodhya is the supposed birthplace of Ram, a popular and much revered Hindu God. According to the BJP's representation of history, the Mogul ruler, Babur, had constructed a mosque on Lord Ram's birthplace. The BJP wanted the mosque destroyed and replaced by a Hindu temple dedicated to Lord Ram.

In its efforts to mobilise public opinion, especially in Northern India, the BJP organized a huge procession through the heart of New Delhi in which party stalwarts, dressed up as warrior-gods set out towards Ayodhya in order to 'set history right'. Organised brilliantly with the help of their dedicated cadres, the BJP was highly successful in increasing its visibility throughout India through such theatrics.

2. For the purposes of this paper I will be referring to the Hindu Right as the main analytical category. The Hindu Right in India comprises the RSS (The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha, i.e. the National Organisation of Volunteers), the VHP (The Vishwa Hindu Parishad, i.e. the World Council of Hindus) and the BJP (the Bharatiya Janata Party). The RSS claims to be a cultural, and not a political organisation. It is the principal ideological apparatus of the Hindu Right. The BJP (and some of its allies like the Siv Sena which currently rules the state of Maharashtra) are political parties of the Hindu Right. The VHP is an international organisation that provides a common forum for Hindus all over the world.


5. While both upper and middle classes disapprove of affirmative action for minorities, the resentment of the middle classes is much stronger, since middle-class youths compete more directly for government jobs and seats in educational institutions and are more dependent on these for the fulfillment of their material ambitions than upper-class youths.

6. This was necessary because the very nature of the BJP's agenda restricted its appeal to the Hindu elites in the Hindi-speaking areas of the country where the Hindu myths (especially that of Ram) were the most popular. Paradoxically, this is also the region where the Muslim minority is concentrated and where caste and class oppression by the Hindu landed elites is the starkest. Logically, therefore, these were also the areas where Indira Gandhi's *empowerment* politics was most actively received and seized upon by the victims of oppression. As such, the BJP had no other option but to forge alliances with parties that represented lower-caste interest. In these cases the BJP legitimised itself through its anti-Muslim agenda. One must note, however, that most of these 'alliances' were simply deals struck between opportunists seeking to consolidate their political-ideological territory.

7. 'Amidst total chaos and unruly conditions leading to physical removal of all Opposition members from the Gujarat Assembly, a few of them beaten up mercilessly, the Suresh Mehta Ministry claimed to have won the vote of confidence today, after the sudden *hospitalisation* of the Deputy Speaker, Mr Chandubhai Dabhi. Journalists boycotted the proceedings after a press-police confrontation. While nothing was audible in the din, an *official* spokesman of the Government claimed that 93 members, including the Acting Speaker, Mr Dolatbhai Desai, and two independents, voted in favour of the confidence motion with none against, clearly establishing the Ministry's majority support in the House of 179 members.' *The Hindu*, 11 October 1996.

8. See Sumit Sarkar, 'The Fascism of the Sangha Parivar,' *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 27, no. 5, 1993 for a comparison between the the BJP and its alliances like the Siv Sena and the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, especially, in terms of their resort to open *terror*. Particularly important in the Indian case are the seemingly unconnected incidents like the murder of Shankar Guha Neogy, leading labour leader of unusual zeal, the beating up of journalists, the bombing of the Bombay Stock Exchange, each of which have occurred within the BJP's territory. The use of terror in order to whip up communal conflict amongst Hindu-Muslim communities which have co-existed perfectly harmoniously over long periods of time have been eloquently portrayed in a number of documentaries.

9. 'Muslims in many parts of India live in constant fear of attacks by Hindu mobs in which, especially in recent years, the police is known to have played an extremely partisan role, often actively assiting the Hindu rioters'. In 1994, the *VHP*, the ideological outfit of the Hindu Right that actually performs the conversions, claimed to have converted 20,000 Muslims in Gujarat and were eyeing the 500,000 strong population of Muslims in central Gujarat. Most of these Muslim groups that the Hindu Right seeks to convert are actually low-caste Hindus who had converted to Islam to escape the tyranny of the caste system. See Y. Sikand and M.Katju, 'Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims', in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20 August 1994, pp. 2214-2219.


15. These democratic revolutions include not only the bourgeois revolutions of the west, but more importantly, the socialist revolutions in various parts of the world which contested 'Western' liberal-democratic principles of equality. In most of the Third World, it is precisely these revolutions that have challenged colonial and neo-colonial relationships, and more generally all forms of oppression that arise out of structures riven with inequity. Ironically, some of the earlier works by these same subalternists had demonstrated this 'radicalised' consciousness, especially peasant consciousness, which had developed as a response to feudal-colonial oppression and had been in existence in India prior to intervention by the nationalist leaders like Gandhi. Some subalternist studies had also demonstrated the co-existence of this radical-revolutionary element with the religious element, and how each had sewed a function in resisting oppression.

16. This proposition, that the subaltern is essentially resistant to modernist principles of equality, one may argue, is simply empirically unsustainable in the Indian context. Several movements that have been more representative of the subaltern's view than the Hindutva movement have clearly demanded equity in the modernist and, indeed, Marxist sense. The Dalit movement, the Naxalite upsurge, the current movement against the American MNC Enron, are all clearly demonstrative of a demand for actual structural change. The denial of these realities as constituting the subaltern's psyche reflects, I believe, not only the essential anti-modernism of this particular brand of subaltern studies, but also its ontological opposition to Marxism.

17. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a full-fledged critique of the notion of coloniality, I am tempted to make one observation. It seems that contemporary subalternists' anti-enlightenment position is based, paradoxically, on the very same 'colonial' assumptions that it critiques. For, the subalternist seems to accept the colonisers' belief that religiosity and communalism are so deep-rooted in the mind of the colonised that its needs for equality cannot be sewed by the 'modern' state. Thus it is not the modernist position but the anti-modernist position that actually concurs with the colonisers' perception of the colonised. The concurrence is with respect to the following proposition: the 'culture' of colonised is essentially different from the colonisers'; so different that it negatively affects the former's ability to grasp (and much less institutionalise) the notions of political and economic equality that inform the colonisers' world; it follows therefore that the colonised must continue to be ruled by institutions that are premised on 'different' principles of equality.


21. The empirical examples of this are many. Gandhi's intervention in the Ahmedabad mill-workers' strike, in the proposed rent-strike in Awadh, are all examples of his anti-radical stance.

22. ‘By political independence', wrote Gandhi, 'I do not mean an imitation of the British House of Commons.... We must have ours suited to ours. I have described it as Ramrajya, i.e., sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority. It means the rule of dharma.' M. Gandhi, The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi (vol. 3), Raghavan Iyer, ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987).


24. In the Shadow of the Mahatma (New Delhi), p. 46.

26. Ibid., p 287-289. See especially the piece entitled Imperialism, Exploitation & Freedom. At the same time, however, he constantly reassured the British that there was no possibility of an armed revolt, and that it was his belief that imperialist exploitation could be righted through moral considerations.

27. Ibid., p. 234


29. Ibid., chapter 6.


31. Ibid., ch. 7.


33. 'FICCI Moots Mandatory Disinvestment by MNCs', Press Trust of India, New Delhi, October 6.


36. Basu et al.

