The upheavals of 1989, propelling a playwright to the presidency in Prague and intellectuals from Solidarity into ministerial offices in Warsaw, have revived the old question about the function performed by the intelligentsia in the societies of central and eastern Europe. The question is controversial, since this intelligentsia, generally considered as bullied, gagged and hence the main victim of the Soviet system, is described by, say, Alexander Zinoviev, as gutless, submissive and, actually, a pillar of the regime. For Konrad and Szelenyi the intellectuals are a class in the making on the road towards power, while for Rudolf Bahro they are the main agency for a possible transition to socialism. And these differences are not only the result of the ambiguity of the concept itself — the intelligentsia, in the narrow sense of the term, being perceived as an intellectual elite dedicated to a more or less radical transformation of society and, in a wider sense, as including all those whose labour is more mental than manual, those who went beyond the secondary school, the "educated tribe" to borrow Solzhenitsyn's rather contemptuous definition.

Thus, the subject is a complex one and we can only touch upon it here. We shall approach it through Russia not only because intelligentsia as a concept was conceived in the Tsarist empire, but also because what happens in the centre weighs heavily on developments in the periphery: without perestroika, without a Gorbachev giving up the Brezhnev doctrine, Havel would not have become president nor Mazowiecki prime minister. Once we have seen through the example of the Soviet Union that the intelligentsia, far from being uniform, can perform several roles, we shall stop for a brief spell in Poland, where the intellectuals first contributed to the revival of a labour movement and where they are now trying to resurrect the bourgeoisie. Finally, we shall try to see what lessons can be drawn from these upheavals here, in western Europe, where commitment was already out of fashion among intellectuals even before the funeral of Jean-Paul Sartre.

The notion of the intelligentsia as a separate social stratum appears
in the second and third decades of the last century. It is not surprising that this idea was born in the Tsarist empire nor that the concept became widely used there in the second half of the 19th Century. Whereas in western Europe there was a certain correspondence between the spread of education and the development of capitalism, in Russia there was an obvious discrepancy between the two. The newly educated, finding no outlets, were naturally enough inclined to question society, to seek models beyond national frontiers, to be non-conformist. True, Russia, too, had its doctors, its engineers, its mandarins in the service of the established order, its nostalgic writers and reactionary politicians. Nevertheless, the intelligent was generally perceived as a dissenter, a radical reformer and, with the turn of the century, as more or less socialist (the French equivalent, at least in terms of perception, leads from the dissenters at the time of the Dreyfus case to the intellectuels engagés of Sartre's day).

In 1917 the revolution revealed that reality was less radical than the reputation. If a fraction of the intelligentsia joined the Bolsheviks and another was ready to collaborate with them, the majority emigrated either literally or metaphorically. Yet it was under Stalin that the bell tolled for the old intelligentsia. Under his reign, to dissent was to commit suicide and the critical spirit, unconcealed, was a passport to Siberia. But, at the same time, Stalin needed badly plain engineers and not only "engineers of the soul". He eliminated the intelligentsia in the narrow sense of the term and mass produced it in the broad sense. In this second function he was only a link in the chain. The cultural revolution, inaugurated in 1917, altered the figures altogether. According to Soviet statistics, on the eve of the revolution, among people employed in the economy only 200,000 had more than a secondary education; by 1960 they were 12 million and to-day their number can be estimated at some 40 million, that is to say almost a third of the labour force. Thus to use the term intelligentsia, without further precision as to its definition, can be as misleading as the utilization of the "tertiary sector", or of white collar, is in some western analyses: the truly privileged and the real ruling class are conveniently dissolved within a loose mixture including millions of people having very few privileges and no power whatsoever. Besides, this huge body is put together using as a criterion the diploma and not the function exercised in society. Out of the 40 million mentioned above, roughly 23 million went on studying for a couple of years after secondary school: about half of them came out of technical colleges and work in industry; this biggest group is followed by teachers without a university degree and junior staff in management and accounting. Even if these non-commissioned officers of the army of
labour are excluded, the remaining 17 million are very far from uniform: about 30% among them are teachers, mainly women teachers and thus not surprisingly poorly paid, while over 40% are engineers and those among them who work in production only differ from the technicians because they do have a degree. But under the same headings one also finds academicians, heads of big firms, high-ranking technocrats and powerful party dignitaries. Still, while this diversity must always be kept in mind, the fact remains that the huge quantitative change has altered the social role of the intelligentsia.

With the first liberalisation after Stalin's death, the so-called thaw, the new intelligentsia recovered its former-function. In countries where diverse interests and aspirations have no directly political outlets, the intellectual in general and the writer in particular thus reappear as witness, spokesman or prophet. There is, however, a fundamental difference with the past. The intelligentsia is no longer necessarily progressive. Socialism having been identified with the established order, with the "really existing" regime, the intelligentsia, or at least a large part of it, is literally backward looking, hankering after an idealised capitalism or, nostalgically, after an even more distant past. During the Brezhnevian "era of stagnation" this tendency gained ground throughout eastern Europe and in Russia, too, as could be seen through the growing success of Solzhenitsyn. (Incidentally, to refer to the restoration of capitalism in that part of the world should not be taken to mean that these countries were previously in any way socialist.)

The second and crucial phase of liberalisation, the period of glasnost allowed the intelligentsia to play a progressive part. Only the true "watchdogs" of the regime — the censors, the prosecutors, the jailers, the keepers of the orthodoxy — were really opposed to the extension of the frontiers of freedom. Doubtless, an important section of the party apparatus wanted to prevent the Soviet people from recovering their memory because a reminder of Stalin's crimes was damning for the regime. Nevertheless, with a professional stake in the battle, the intelligentsia taken as a whole was in the vanguard in this struggle and in this first period expressed the superior interests of the entire society.

It is only at the next stage, the stage of the economic perestroika and restructuring, that the intelligentsia began to defend its own privileges and to fight for new ones; it is only then that it revealed its own inner divisions. The contrasting interests were only now being crystallised, the main protagonists still advanced in disguise and the various postures, therefore, remained ambiguous. Yet it was already possible to distinguish, admittedly in a rather schematic
fashion, three main divisions, or rather the three temptations, of the Soviet intelligentsia.

The first was linked with the apparatus. Gone were the days when important functions were filled by the so-called praktiki, workers whom the Party trusted and who were learning their trade on the job. Now the apparatchik himself had a higher education: most often he was a graduate engineer. In addition to the servants of the organs of coercion and propaganda mentioned earlier, the conservative coalition included the many functionaries of ministries and other bodies of the central administration who were directly threatened by dispersion as well as those among the industrial managers whose position and privileges were linked with the preservation of a system in which all the decisions flowed from the top. Finally, the majority of the party apparatus itself was for the preservation of as much as possible of the old system of management because the control of the economy gave to the party secretary the supreme command at all levels.

The spokesmen of that conservative coalition have rapidly grasped that it was not very wise openly to defend the interests of the nomenklatura. Hence, they now parade as the protectors of public property against the new robbers and, since their privileges are more discreet than those of the nouveaux riches, as the defenders of the downtrodden. Since the advocates of the market now take the West openly as the model, the conservatives play unscrupulously on the most jingoist Great Russian feelings which, incidentally, have not been stirred by perestroika but simply revealed by glasnost. This alliance between the unrepentant neo-Stalinists and the reactionary nationalists, sworn enemies of the revolution — a curse imposed on the Russian people by "cosmopolitans" (since one cannot really speak of the Bolshevik Revolution as a "Zionist plot") — is actually less paradoxical than it might appear at first sight.

The noisiest, though not necessarily the most numerous, is what might be called the potential priviligentsia. It includes, among others, factory managers and economists, high ranking engineers and doctors, successful writers and journalists. All of them treat perestroika as a transfer of privileges and power from the apparatchiks, whose main virtue was their faithful obedience, to themselves, whose main quality is allegedly their competence. This self-proclaimed meritocracy is, and even more was, allied to the reformist or Gorbachevian wing of the apparatus, which embarked on a journey towards a market economy without really knowing where it was going to lead.

To begin with, the priviligentsia, too, dissimulated its posture. It used average incomes, heavily downgraded by the low salaries of the
predominantly feminine staff in schools and hospitals, to prove the poor fate of the intellectual workers. By now, it has plucked up courage and asks openly for a very wide range of salaries, for different housing for the rich and for the poor, for a two-tier medicine or education. Admittedly, the frontiers are not clearly fixed and the foreign observer gets lost the more easily since this priviligentsia, represented in the Soviet parliament by the so-called Democratic Platform, is usually described in the Western press as "the Left". It is a symptom of the propaganda of our times that it is enough to be in favour of unemployment, of private property, of striking inequality to be proclaimed progressive. In the earlier phase, the priviligentsia could still be described as waging a democratic struggle for freedom. By now, the adjective has become highly doubtful. As privatisation and the introduction of a ruthless market meet growing popular resistance, the preachers of that school change their sermons. They now begin to advocate an authoritarian regime, at least for a transitional period until the market economy is consolidated (and this may lead to most unexpected shifts in alliances). Altogether, the priviligentsia speaks more and more as a class in the making, fighting not only for privileges, but also for power and property.

So far we have mentioned the two sections of the intelligentsia linked to the two fractions of the ruling class, the former apparatchiks and the new managers. The budding socialist opposition is the third section: it is potentially the most numerous and is the true heir of the old intelligentsia. One finds it in the clubs spreading in Soviet towns, in research institutes and universities. It is not put in the limelight either by Soviet propaganda or by western correspondents and, above all, it is still searching its own way. It tries to establish links with the proletariat, notably through the striking workers. It admits the need for incentives at work but would like to insert them in a fundamentally egalitarian project. For the sake of transparency it accepts the provisional necessity of a market, yet simultaneously refuses its tyranny. It wonders how to socialise state property and how to render planning democratic. In short, it must reinvent democracy at all levels to render its project realistic. If one adds that it is by now vital to insert the economy into nature and that the Soviet Union has a terrible lag both in this and in the movement of women's liberation, the task facing this New Left is tremendous. The new socialist opposition is, for the time being, no more than the embryo of a movement.

Which of the three tendencies is likely to find itself on the winning side? The intelligentsia linked with the old apparatus seems to be in the least comfortable position: if the party leadership finally
resigned itself to perestroika, it was because the former system of economic management, and hence of government, was no longer workable. The apparatchiks could, nevertheless, stand a chance should the so-called reformers, in their arrogance, precipitate a popular upheaval at a time when the socialist opposition is still unable to provide an outlet for such a movement. The priviligentsia, on the other hand, is clearly in the lead; at this stage, it dictates the pace of perestroika. But it runs the risk of being split into two. Gorbachev's followers favour a gradual, controlled transition. They wish to carry along as much of the party apparatus as possible and, above all, they want to avoid a confrontation with the workers, the inevitable first victims of the economic reform as it is conceived. On the contrary, most members of the Democratic Platform wish to rush the reform through and damn the consequences. They tend more and more to speak with the impatience and self-assurance of a future class-for-itself. Finally, there are the modern heirs of the progressive intelligentsia, handicapped by the discredit of the very idea of socialism, identified in the popular mind with the ancien régime. Their chance, on the other hand, is connected with the transformation of Soviet society, with the spread of education, with the connecting role, for instance, the technicians can play between the workers and the graduate engineers. The technical and professional intelligentsia is by now too numerous to be bribed in its entirety. Since it can no longer be tempted by the promise of "singing to-morrows", it must be given the feeling, like the workers themselves, that it is gaining a genuine say in shaping its destiny both at the workplace and in the society at large. A late starter, the socialist opposition is not necessarily a loser in this historical race.

History, however, is not predestined. It is a developing process. The nationalist stench emerging from the pores of east European societies infects the atmosphere and darkens even the image outlined here. Yet, essentially what I have been trying to convey is simply the intensification of the class struggle in the Soviet Union, the gradual crystallisation of conflicting interests. Even if these conflicts are still expressed in a confused and often ambiguous fashion, they are intense enough to break into pieces the myth of a united intelligentsia, revealing instead its deep divisions and its contradictory potentialities.

To follow the "organic intellectual" of a class in the making, it might be more helpful to turn to Poland where the conversion to capitalism is the openly admitted objective. Since, previously, Poland was the ground chosen for an alliance between the intellectuals and the
workers, it is worth studying the present position against its historical background, even if the latter is sketched here very roughly.

The collaboration between the intelligentsia and the proletariat was no Polish peculiarity given from the start. When in 1968 the Polish government beat up the students in Warsaw, the workers did not come to their rescue. Two years later, when the workers conquered in blood their veto power over the government's economic policy, it was the turn of the intellectuals to be absent: the students from the Gdansk Polytechnic symbolically refused to join the striking workers on the march. One had to wait until 1976 for all this to change. The government then tried to get back the concessions it had granted, but was forced to give up the idea by the scope and sweep of the workers' response. Thwarted, it nevertheless tried to seek revenge through repression. It was then that a small group of intellectuals offered to the victimised workers its financial, legal or journalistic help. The creation of the KOR, Polish initials for the Committee for the Defence of the Workers, marks a date. It shows how intellectuals, even when not very numerous, can play a historical role if they are linked with a genuine social movement.

This collaboration grew. Four years later the same drama was re-enacted on an incomparably wider stage when, in front of an amazed world audience, the strikers of Gdansk conquered what at the time seemed unthinkable in a "communist" country, namely the right for the workers to have a genuine and independent representation. There again the intellectuals were in the service of the workers within an experts' committee already presided over by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the future prime minister. This relationship between the intelligentsia and the proletariat was to persist throughout the first phase of Solidarity, when the new labour union represented nearly 10 million members.

When in the autumn of 1981 there was a question of compromise with the authorities what was at stake was a project recognising the current political imperative of geography, and granting therefore to the Communist Party the control of the Lower House, but allowing at the same time for a Senate dominated by the workers, representing on the national scale the self-management committees encouraged at that time by Solidarity.

This idea of dual power came to nothing. The Polish CP was ready to share power with the Catholic Church, not with the proletariat. Its reply came on December 13th with the military coup of General Jaruzelski. Technically a success, this coup broke the resistance in the factories, though not sufficiently to drag the workers into an economic reform. When after seven years a new series of strikes began, the authorities grasped the vanity of their efforts and, with
Gorbachev now in power in Moscow, resigned themselves to a
dialogue. In the meantime, however, while the power of Solidarity in
the factories was being broken, press, propaganda and, hence, the
intelligentsia were playing an increasing part in the resistance move-
ment. When it came to talks and elections, in 1989, the relationship
within Solidarity was thus turned upside down. This time the
intellectuals claimed to express the "superior interests" of society and
the workers were treated as electoral fodder. This change was rapidly
reflected in the programme of the new government headed by
Solidarity. The self-management slogans and the egalitarian aspira-
tions were quickly forgotten and replaced by a primitive gospel of
capitalist accumulation. To reduce the rate of inflation and stabilise
the zloty, the new Minister of Finance did not hesitate to precipitate a
slump, to cut real wages drastically and allow unemployment to soar.
If privatisation did not proceed any faster it is because one cannot sell
off the whole of Polish industry to foreigners (who, in any case, are
not particularly keen); because domestic buyers must still be somehow
created and profitable firms prepared for the market. The political
revival of the bourgeoisie precedes its economic restoration as a class.

The intellectuals are not the only ones to blame for what is
happening. The whole leadership of Solidarity must take its share and
none more than Lech Walesa. The IMF-sponsored programme of
transition to capitalism at breakneck speed was introduced by
Solidarity in office but backed by Solidarity — the labour union.
True, the workers were bewildered and even ready for sacrifices. Yet
had they fought simply for the right to be more exploited, were they
ready for sacrifices without any counterparts? It took a man they
trusted to convince them that there was no alternative and this is the
sense in which Walesa is more responsible than Mazowiecki for the
distortion of the class struggle in Poland. Now that he has been
elected President, he will no longer be able to put the blame for the
trouble on the government. It is to be feared that he will try to divert
mounting discontent through McCarthyist witchhunts, the search for
scapegoats and other irrational solutions.

The worst is never sure. More generally, it seems less useful to
speak once again of betrayal than to ask oneself why a Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, once a left-wing Catholic (connected with the then
relatively progressive review, Esprit), became the Prime Minister who
introduced Thatcherism into Poland; why Jacek Kuron, the veteran of
so many battles, was his alibi as a Minister of Labour; why Lech
Walesa himself, once a symbol of the fighting revival of the working
class, is now the champion of its non-resistance? Stalinism is no longer
sufficient to explain all this metamorphosis. This final ideological
descent, this complete acceptance of capitalism as the only possible
alternative, giving up the search for any other way — all this coincides with the last phase of the so-called “era of stagnation” and the beginning of the perestroika.

In Poland all this brought about an interesting transition. The rejection of "communism" is total and it ensured the victory of Solidarity in 1989 and the election of Walesa as president the following year. Popular gratitude towards those who had delivered them from the ancien régime was such that the Mazowieckii government could proceed with its ruthless economic policy for about a year without major social upheaval. But already then the workers were no longer treating Solidarity as a trade union defending their interests; at its congress, in April 1990, the organisation claimed 1.9 million members, roughly five times less than its membership at the height of its power nine years earlier. True, the memory was sufficiently strong for Walesa to be elected president. Yet how long will the workers consider even his government as their own?

The intelligentsia itself, despite the presence of its representatives in office, is not in a comfortable position either. While the price of paper climbs and state subsidies vanish, the writer, the artist, the actor, fed up with the bliss of party monopoly, discover the virtues of the cultural market at its most savage, without the cushion provided by prosperity and the fat of the foundatijons. It is the turn of the professional and technical intelligentsia to experiment with the burdens of insecurity. How much time will be needed for all this to have political consequences?

The restoration of capitalism, not to be confused with a few privatisations in England or France, is an unprecedented venture and, in any case, it is unwise to extrapolate without reflection. Each country has its peculiarities. All that can be ventured for the area as a whole is that an entire new period of awakening and disillusion will be required before a resurrected Left is strong enough to cast aside the hackneyed beliefs which are now paraded as the latest gospel. All that I would dare to suggest is that this confrontation with budding capitalism is more likely to take place earlier in the birthplace of a genuine revolution than in countries where it was an imported product. Meanwhile, both the collapse of these regimes and their clever identification with socialism allow our propaganda at its most triumphant to proclaim that capitalism is eternal.

In the long or even medium run the upheavals in eastern Europe may well have the opposite effect from the one presently expected. The final dismissal of the absurd identification of socialism with the
Soviet tank or the Russian concentration camp, the ultimate collapse of a "model" that has for many years been no more than a bogey, the need for the western labour movement to face its own problems and the impossibility of accusing western rebels of being "foreign" agents — all this should contribute to the resurrection of socialism. Maybe it is this prospect which drives our propaganda to insist so heavily on the absence of any alternative and on capitalism as the end of history. With, for the time being, a great deal of success.

In France the last twenty years will figure in history books as marking the spectacular elimination of the influence of Marxist thought (of which a good part, under the impact of Stalinism, was, it must be admitted, sterile). But they will also confirm the wisdom of the Marxist maxim that the ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. Who could have imagined, on the morrow of May 1968, when the established ideological structure seemed shaken, that twenty years later France would have two million unemployed and virtually nobody would question the validity of the capitalist system? Doubtless, the nature of the economic crisis, attacking the strongholds of the labour movement, had a crucial impact on this evolution. But the ideological battle itself was not without influence and, within its framework, the so-called operation gulag carried out by the nouveaux philosophes.

Not because of its intellectual content. The very idea of these latter-day Christopher Columbuses discovering the Soviet concentrationary universe in 1975 was perfectly ridiculous. The dish they served was entirely imported: a drop of Hayek, a few slices of Popper, a good dose of Solzhenitsyn and the whole seasoned with the anti-totalitarian sauce. The only French contribution was that of its hawkers (to compare the rubbish produced by the Glucksmanns and other Bernard — Henri Lévy with The God That Failed, published thirty years earlier, is to realise that the passage of time is not always the equivalent of progress). As a political and advertising campaign, however, it was quite a different matter. It was important that imagination should not get involved with power. It was necessary to persuade the young generation that, while to rebel individually might be just, to act collectively in order to change society can only lead to the gulag. The "thirty glorious years" of capitalist expansion over and unemployment revealing once again the true face of capitalism, it was vital to prove that any alternative was "concentrationary". Such a message would not have been accepted at the time coming from, say, Raymond Aron; "children of May 68" were needed to do the dirty job. Sponsored massively by the media, the message got through. It helped the regime to consolidate. It contributed to the failure, or rather the abortion, of the attempt by the Socialists to tackle the
foundations of existing society. (The French Left got back into office in 1981 without the backing of a vast social movement and at a time when the Right had gained complete ideological hegemony.)

This inability of the western Left to carry out a "break" has, in turn, influenced the political climate in eastern Europe, strengthening there the conviction that between capitalism and "really existing socialism" nothing can be invented. Historians will show one day how the reactionary currents in the two halves of Europe reinforced one another. The operation gulag, destined mainly for western countries with strong Communist parties, looks very modest when compared with operation "end of history" now being performed on the world scale to convince everybody that there is no way out of capitalism. Admittedly, a spectacular collapse of several regimes lends itself better to such exploitation than a book by a witness, however eloquent.

May be the campaign is too triumphant. There are signs that some of its more subtle promoters are changing their tactics, partly because they can now afford it and, partly, because they are themselves troubled by the wave of jingoism, xenophobia and antisemitism rising in the East. To accept that the capitalist market, if needed, be introduced in an undemocratic and even authoritarian fashion is one thing; our freedom-loving press knows only too well how to look away in the circumstances. Yet, without a serious threat of revolution, one does not take a Le Pen for ally. The second reason to correct the range is that too heavy a fire runs the risk of being counter-productive. The pseudo-hegelian creed of Francis Fukuyama — presenting capitalism as the culmination of history — sounds like a provocation, a challenge. It may be preferable, now that the main message has been spread, to play more on the subconscious, to speak less of capitalism, to stress the possible democratic improvements in our market economy and law-abiding society. The accent, if not the policy, may be to-morrow closer to social-democracy than to Thatcherism. It is this middle-of-the road appearance and semblance of objectivity that we must now prepare to unmask.

While myths collapse, names change and the confusion is at its highest, it is not easy in the West either to define what the Left stands for to-day. The Left can only be rebuilt around a new project. It is better off without models, particularly without one it should never have accepted as its own, but it must also draw the lessons of the bitter heritage. It must rebuild its project in the light of present reality, taking into account the new structure of the working class (with its many women and immigrants), the growing number of white collar workers, the new role played by science in production. The Left must reinvent democracy at all levels if it wants to speak of planning once
again. It must remember that, absorbed by the electoral map, macho in mood and productivist in outlook, it has proved unable to understand and to integrate the three movements which in this last quarter of a century have fundamentally questioned our world: the revolt of the students, women's liberation movements and the green growth of the ecologists. And we could continue with the challenge of nationalism or the internationalisation of the economy on the world scale. Hence the task is as immense as it is urgent. And yet there is a prior duty. All projects will come to nothing if the bulk of the people become convinced that one cannot change, merely refurbish, our society. In the Kulturkampf now being fought all over the globe the dividing line among the intellectuals is clear. On the one side are the upholders of the established order who, whatever their labels, accept capitalism as the ultimate horizon and, on the other, the heirs of the intelligentsia in the original sense of the term who, resisting the tremendous offensive, are preserving the Promethean spirit. One side stresses the eternity of capitalism, the other — the permanence of revolution.

NOTES


2. The word itself appears in the 1860s, probably for the first time in the writings of the novelist P. Boborykin. The literature on the subject is rich. For a recent study of the Soviet intelligentsia see B. Kagarlitsky: The Thinking Reed, Verso, London, 1988.


4. American readers could see a perfect example in an article published in The NY Review of Books on August 16, 1990. Entitled "Dangers of Democracy" it was written by Gavriil Popov, the new mayor of Moscow. In it, the darling of the liberals complained that "... now we must create a society with a variety of different forms of ownership, including private property; and this will be a society of economic inequality. There will be contradictions between policies leading to denationalization, privatisation, and inequality on the one hand and, on the other, the populist character of the forces that were set in motion in order to achieve these aims. The masses long for fairness and economic equality. And the further the process of transformation goes, the more acute and the more glaring will be the gap between those aspirations and economic realities." What lessons does he draw? "The first conclusion from the analysis I have been making is that we must speed up changes in the forms of ownership. The second is that we must seek new mechanisms and institutions of political power that will depend less on populism."

5. Mazowiecki paid the price in the presidential poll, where he came a poor third in the first ballot behind a completely unknown Stan Tyminski, a local boy who allegedly had made a fortune in America. Mazowiecki's defeat was not due to his honesty. It was due to the consequences of his economic programme, but also to the ideology coupled with it. If your main message to the people is "enrich yourselves", no
wonder that some of them then vote for a hero from a soap opera and Stan Tyminski was a figure from a poor man's Dallas.

6. Must one first clear the ground? Some of us thought that there would be no socialist resurrection without the destruction of the Stalinist model and no socialist or revolutionary revival in France without the destruction or the total transformation of the French CP. The negative, however, does not necessarily give birth to the positive.

7. The theoreticians of totalitarianism claimed that the "empire of evil" and its satellites were immutable, that it was a hell from which there was no exit. Instead of self-criticism they have produced a transfer: it is now capitalism which is a system from which there is no exit.

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