MASCULINE DOMINANCE AND THE STATE

Varda Burstyn

The speech from which this article has been developed was given at a session of the Winnipeg Marx Centenary Conference entitled 'Women and the Economic and Political Crisis'. That a crisis exists in the world economic and political order there can be no doubt. There can also be little doubt that there is a crisis in the organised Marxist movement—defined in general terms as composed of the far Left groups, the Communist and parts of the Social Democratic Parties, and important parts of the socialist networks which exist in mass movements and institutions. The causes of Marxism's crisis are both historical and contemporary. Historically speaking, Marxism is only now beginning any large-scale recovery from its Stalinist deep-freeze as far as its own capacity to generate the kinds of answers demanded by the questions posed by the class struggle today is concerned. In the meantime, its liberatory potential has been tarnished in the eyes of millions of people, and insofar as it continues its association with the bureaucratic regimes of the transitional societies, that potential will continue to be dulled. There are a number of contemporary problems which also present major obstacles to Marxism's overall capacity to provide revolutionary solutions. The one I want to single out in this discussion is the crisis between the genders that has hit and rocked the Marxist movement, from the smallest local study group to the largest workers' party, during the preceding decade and continuing into the eighties. These two crises are distinct problems, but they overlap in important ways historically, and need to be addressed together in the period to come. One of the most crucial areas of both anti-Stalinist and feminist concerns is the enormous set of issues regarding the nature and role of the state. In this article I want to tackle the general problem feminists have described when they talk about Marxist categories obscuring relations of masculine dominance by a specific discussion of the state, and the ways in which it acts as an organiser and enforcer of male supremacy. Socialist feminists have been developing a body of scholarship and theory over the last ten to fifteen years that has until now barely been engaged by most Marxist men. It is in the spirit of the positive gains that can flow from such an engagement that this article is offered.
INTRODUCTION

In the long-standing debate between Marxism as a whole (if one may still speak of Marxism in such unified terms) and the political science of the liberal democratic tradition, Marxism has from the beginning insisted that whatever the state may be, it is not a neutral arbiter, which mediates disinterestedly between different social groups, changing its laws and institutions according to a historically shifting consensus of the 'whole society'. Marxism has claimed that the state is both a reflection of actual social relations and the central set of institutions which maintain and perpetuate the privileges of the ruling classes—with their different fractions, sectors and parties—in all complex, hierarchical societies. For Marxists the state is a class state by definition, even though it may grant concessions to the dominated classes through a number of its institutions or functions. Such concessions are usually understood to be either necessary in some form to the growth and stability of the mode of production, or means by which the state can appease the oppressed, thereby reinforcing its hegemony through an appearance of justice and flexibility, or both. Thus for Marxists, the state in capitalist society is a capitalist state. It acts to administer, enforce and mystify the interests and needs of the capitalist system and the capitalist class as a whole. Its class character is expressed both in its policies and in its forms of power, as these are inserted into the economic, sexual, cultural and political life of the whole society.

Clearly, the term 'state', like the term 'mode of production' or 'class' for that matter, is a generalisation and abstraction. It sums up and schema-tises a system of relations, structures, institutions and forces which, in industrialised society, are vast, complex, differentiated, and as an inevitable result, contradictory at times as well. For example, one part of the state, in its capacity as legitimator of the overall system of privilege, may agree to fund a Marxist conference by way of showing its openness and neutrality. Another part of the state, say a part of the coercive apparatus, may then tap the telephones of its organisers. Or, to choose an example with somewhat more importance, one pan of the state may attempt on a local level to set up childcare facilities, rape crisis centres, community enterprises, and local decision-making bodies which involve non-elected representatives, while another level of the state, inevitably a 'higher', more centralised level, will cut off the funds for these projects, or declare them illegal, or otherwise swamp, contain or dismantle them. Because of the hierarchy of power in the state, moving from less at the local to more at the central levels, less in the department of legitimiation to more in the departments of economic facilitation and coercion, Marxists have stood their ground regarding the major functions of class domination played by the state in capitalist society. They have argued that for all its complexity, differentiation and even contradiction, the state works to
facilitate the appropriation and centralisation of wealth (which in capitalist society primarily takes the form of surplus value produced by the working class); to protect this appropriation through the means of coercion, both domestically and internationally; and to legitimate these two functions in the interests of social stability, which in turn creates optimal conditions for surplus extraction. Not surprisingly, then, for Marxists the state is an exceptionally important site of power in capitalist society. As the major set of executive and coercive instruments supporting the owning classes, though by no means the only site of the ruling apparatus, it has been targeted by Marxists as the most important strategic focus alongside of the collectivisation of the means of production in the larger socialist project, and rightly so.

The state is also crucial for Marxists because it is indispensable, in a transformed way, to the employment of resources and the organisation of large-scale public effort in the construction of a new society. Without public coordination of economic and social reorganisation at all levels—local, regional, national and international—new societies cannot be built. The state is not only an issue for Marxists because of its importance to the class enemy, but also because of the role that it must play in our own project of human liberation. Although Marx’s vision projected the ‘withering away’ of the state as a necessary condition to the end of social domination, in the transitional societies history has played an ironic and painful trick: we have seen the opposite development. In the absence of a free market and, in most cases, even the limited forms of bourgeois democracy, the state has become an even more ubiquitous and powerful source of economic, social and political regulation than in the capitalist countries. As a result, not only does the bureaucratic elite have privileges of power and material wealth which place them in the same league as their capitalist counterparts, but their very existence makes a mockery of any notions of workers' democracy based on these models. Indeed, the most powerful weapon capitalist ideology can wield against socialism today is the example of the political monoliths in the transitional societies. These developments present an enormous strategic headache to Marxism as well, both in terms of formulating the correct attitudes to these societies, and in terms of developing an understanding of state building and transformation which will fulfil Marx’s promise that communist democracy will qualitatively surpass the kind produced by capitalism.

Within the revolutionary socialist movement there have always been large minority currents—utopian socialists, anarchists and many kinds of Trotskyists—who have stressed that the construction of socialism requires the creation of forms of public authority which can challenge and break those of capitalist society and the bureaucratic transitional regimes. Occupying first place among these forms and principles are vehicles such as workers' and popular councils (soviets), and socialist pluralism in terms
of political parties and socialist governments. These kinds of vehicles have been thrown up and the democratic impulse expressed in the course of political struggle over and over again, and their use has enabled the people to find forms of unity which have mobilised the creative and strengthening possibilities of difference within the ranks of progressive movements. Their existence challenges political monolithism as a theory and as a coerced practice. Crises in various Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist groups over Poland, Afghanistan and other issues of nuclear disarmament and other questions of struggle indicate that more and more Marxists are beginning to open up to the issues and criticisms raised by these currents.

However, an outstanding problem remains. For the very categories that Marxism has developed—notions of the working class, the economy and the state for example—while illuminating one crucial set of economic class relations have also obscured, much as the use of the word 'Man' to describe humanity has obscured the specific reality of women, another set of class relations—gender-class. In what follows I want to explain my use of this term and to discuss the ways in which its major features are expressed at the level of the state. I will do this by looking briefly at some aspects of pre-capitalist sexual divisions of labour, and then take a more detailed look at the state in capitalist times, drawing on material from Britain, Canada and the US to illustrate the main points. Following that, I will explore in schematic terms some related aspects of state formation in industrialised transitional societies. I will conclude by drawing out some practical implications of this analysis and suggesting areas for further discussion.

Problems of terminology

In order to analyse and to act on the totality of a social system which is itself comprised of many interrelating sub-systems, we need conceptual tools and language which can enable us to see, describe and question aspects of our reality which have been rendered invisible by the dominant ideology. Indeed, the very notion of the dominant ideology, along with such concepts as the labour theory of value, the exploitative relation embedded in the wage, and alienation, for example, are concepts which had first to be articulated in language by Marx before much larger numbers of people could see many of the ways in which they were being stripped of the fruits of their labour by those whose sole relation to them was one of exploitation, and to understand the necessity of expropriating the capitalist class as a rock-bottom precondition to the ending of that relation. Within Marxist discourse today one need only say 'class' or for that matter 'state' to convey in shorthand form a complex, sophisticated set of meanings about appropriation, inequality, conflict and domination.

I hope that it is within this commitment to demystification and
革命性的澄清，我们才能处理问题。概念和术语的澄清对于表达和沟通性别之间的政治含义至关重要。问题在于，目前的术语如果像“国家”和“阶级”表示不平等、冲突和有组织的支配，那么“性别”这个词在反映两性作为一个整体时，并没有这样的语义或甚至语感。性这个词让人想到器官和激素的生物和生理特征，或者人类传播物种和/or寻求身体上愉悦的行为。没有逻辑上或必然地包含等级和政治的内涵，也没有将这种意义附着于它。而“性别”这个词也不好。虽然它被用在社会科学中用以区分文化上赋予的生物基质，但它带有一种‘角色’和‘适宜的分配’的含义，这种含义也没有包含必要的支配感。在自由主义和马克思主义的论述中，它可能包含了男性和女性在人际互动中的不平等，或者在资本主义生产方式中需要廉价劳动力的不平等。但是到目前为止，没有一个术语能够表达和沟通性别之间支配关系的程度。考虑到一些狩猎社会中的性别领域是独立且平等的，我不认为应该将“性别”作为唯一承载这些含义的术语。没有“性别”存在，在一个无性别社会？这个案件还没有定论。

“父权制”也是一个问题，因为马克思主义者和马克思主义女性主义者对它的一般使用的攻击，坚持它表示特定形式的男性权力和特权，而不是一种跨历史的安排。这种特定的形式被看作是贵族组织中的亲属和奴隶制度，最年长的拥有男性，也就是父权，作为整个生产与繁殖单位的首领。一般而言，这个术语可以用来描述统治阶级父亲在其他农业——特别是封建——生产方式中的统治。我自己对这个攻击的感觉是，在一些情况下，它达到了积极的目标和结果，深化了我们对男性权力和特权随着时间的推移而变化的方式的理解，并且因此强调了在将来性别关系改变的可能。在其他时候，这个攻击起到了一个不积极的作用，部分掩盖了对那些在许多狩猎和所有已知农业和工业社会中持续存在的男性权力和特权特征的分析——换句话说，攻击的未来。它虽是一个负面角色，但在一定程度上掩盖了对那些在许多狩猎和所有已知农业和工业社会中持续存在的男性权力和特权特征的分析——换句话说，攻击的未来。
validity of a notion of a system of gender hierarchy which has crossed modes of production. This is the sense in which the term partiarchy is used in much feminist discourse, and as such, I have no major objection to it. But the important thing is not to lose ourselves in false debates, and the objections to the use of the term have had sufficient impact that, at least in theoretical work which bridges the discourses, it is probably useful to use another one to signify a system of gender hierarchy which is no more and no less 'transhistorical' than class society itself, conceptually speaking, and which is quite clearly older than class society in chronological or developmental terms (as I shall soon explain). That is to say that it has appeared in a number of different guises at different times, but retains certain essential features which enable us to identify it as such throughout.

The term I prefer at this time for this cross-mode-of-production system is masculine dominance. The term certainly lacks elegance but it allows us to name both the relation (dominance) and the agent (the gender men). For the two opposing groups, I suggest the best we can do at this time is to call them gender-classes, because only the use of the term class can adequately add the dimension of appropriation and domination in such a way as to include automatically and by definition a full sense of the politics of masculine dominance. The adoption of this term requires that we specify 'economic-class' to characterise what Marxists have until recently called simply 'class'. I am aware of the very real problem in the relation between these concepts and realise that they opt to emphasise two distinct forms of social hierarchy rather than reach for one term which will collapse these two systems into one. But at this stage I think it is important to retain a vocabulary which allows us to express the distinct effectivity—to borrow Annette Kuhn's phrase—of these systems, in order to understand how the two do work together to create whole systems of domination. This choice does not preclude the possibility that an adequate term for the whole system of domination may be developed, when we better understand its structures and dynamics, and it certainly does not mean that work being done by socialist-feminist historians today using an emerging method which looks at the ways in which gender arrangements organise and reproduce classes and to a certain extent, vice versa, is not on the right track. I think this work is very important and points us in the right direction methodologically. Nevertheless, because of what I perceive to be a relative autonomy in the forms of economic-class and gender-class, I think we need to retain the theoretical distinctions which these two terms afford us, while continuing to strive for a more totalistic appreciation of their interaction.

Regarding the politics of masculine dominance and gender-class as they are expressed in the state, the first step is to explain how and why women do constitute a class in terms which Marxists can employ. If one accepts
the notion that the politics of class society are expressions of its economic contradictions, then the first crucial issue from the Marxist point of view is that of the economics of gender. The literature on this question is by now very extensive.' It covers historical periods ranging from foraging to advanced industrial societies, and everything else 'in between'. As all of the best Marxist historiography has been reminding us recently, the changes in people's ways of life under different modes of production, during different periods within modes and production, and in different regional or national social formations should be emphasised rather than minimised if we are to develop a refined understanding of the way in which people create and recreate their life, and their resistance to its most oppressive features. Nevertheless, such reminders have not served to invalidate abstract concepts and social realities such as 'the labouring classes' or 'the ruling classes', and we must be able to generalise at the same level of abstraction when looking at genderic relations. The criterion which defines the relation of subordinate to ruling classes in orthodox Marxist terms is the relation of appropriation of surplus labour. The labouring classes produce more than is strictly necessary for their subsistence according to a historically determined standard of living; the ruling classes appropriate that surplus and use it to aggrandise their own wealth and power. Does such a generalisation apply to relations between men and women across modes of production in such a way as to justify the use of the term gender-class? As I will now explain, I think it does.

Pre-capitalist roots
In the briefest possible of historical terms, anthropological and historical research suggests that in many foraging societies, especially prior to their contact with post-foraging populations, a sexual division of labour obtained between men and women which was not (and among the Mbuti, for example, still is not) characterised by the same forms of women's oppression that we find in many horticultural and post-horticultural societies. Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, working brilliantly with far less data than we have today, suggested that this discrepancy was explained by the way in which women's labour lost status as herds of domesticated animals, owned by men, created a surplus 'in which women enjoyed' but which they did not produce. In other words, Engels believed that it was women's lack of contribution to the sources of surplus which was in the final analysis responsible for their oppression. Since for Engels the creation and ownership of that surplus was identical with the process through which the differentiation of economic classes took place (in Engels's term, 'social' classes), women's oppression was a direct by-product of (economic) class stratification, and could only be resolved when such stratification had disappeared. For him and most Marxists following him, the most important steps to over-
coming women's oppression, in addition to general socialist activity, would consequently be subsumed under women's 'integration' into 'production', and the 'socialisation' of women's work. The actual sexual division of labour was not to blame in any way for women's oppression, and was thus not, for Engels or Marx, a target of specific concern as a site of political power or lack of it. From pastoral societies on, so to speak, it was entirely determined by the economic-class division of labour, of which its oppressive features were by-products. For Engels the sexual division of labour was 'natural' and 'primitive', that is to say unproblematic, as compared to economic-class divisions of labour, which were 'great social divisions of labour', distinctions between the haves and have-nots, the exploiters and exploited, the dominators and the oppressed.¹¹

Today, Engels's sanguine view of the fate of the sexual division of labour has been challenged and, to my mind, decisively defeated. Although many, myself included, agree that there have been societies with a sexual division of labour in which women are not oppressed, the consensus around the role of the sexual division of labour in economically stratifying societies has broken down, and different interpretations have been advanced to explain its vicissitudes. The one which I support, and about which I have written elsewhere,¹² is fundamentally different from that of Engels. I see the sexual division of labour very much as a 'great social' division of labour, likely the first such division of labour, and one which pre-, sub- and co-structures the division of labour of economic-classes.

In my opinion, the most useful starting place for tracing the sexual division of labour from its status of 'rough and ready equality' to an oppressive division between gender-classes lies in horticultural societies. Although one can see certain latent forms of masculine dominance in a number of foraging societies relatively unaffected by post-foraging populations¹³ (e.g. exclusion of women by men from the most sacred and decisive rituals of the band, greater prestige to men and to hunting than to women and to gathering, even when women produce the greater proportion of food and other means of subsistence), it seems to me that only with the development of certain kinds of horticultural societies are the relations of gender-class fully fleshed out. The development of horticulture—small-scale cultivation—is credited by the majority of anthropologists to women, who are thought to have begun cultivation as an extension of their involvement with plants as the major consistent source of food. Women are indeed the central productive workers in horticultural societies, and thus the major producers of most of the surplus accumulated. Under conditions of advanced horticulture, that surplus is very considerable, and it allows for a very advanced form of cultural and political life. But how that surplus is utilised and appropriated is not the same in all horticultural
societies. From the point of view of this discussion, the decisive difference regards whether that utilisation works through communitarian distribution of the surplus by those who produce it (as in Engels's favourite group, the admirable Iroquois, where women controlled the production and distribution of most of the means of subsistence) or whether it is appropriated and distributed through increasingly private means. If it is appropriated in this latter fashion, it will usually display the key element of gender-class: women's productive and reproductive labour will be amassed and distributed within family units of usually three generations in which men have the power to appropriate, control and therefore benefit from that labour internally to the family. The surplus thus accumulated will establish degrees of man-to-man ranking, and as a result, the position of men and women in the larger group will be determined by the relative status of their family in a constellation of families, as well as by their gender. Wives are the most important source of labour for surplus accumulation in such arrangements, and warfare for the capture of women is common once these conditions generalise. It is out of this latter arrangement that fully developed (economic) class society emerges. The former path has come to a series of dead ends in bloody confrontations which are scattered through history: societies exemplary of it have been overcome by the insurmountable might of populations in which the unequal sexual division of labour and commitment to surplus accumulation provided the fighting edge needed to overcome the generally more pacific and egalitarian groups.

There are several key features of this sexual division of labour which should be established here. First of all, the nature of women's labour must be clarified if we are to understand the nature of its appropriation, because it has always been different than men's. Women's labour has always had a twofold character and has consequently been embodied (congealed) in two different kinds of entities. The first aspect of women's labour is what has been called productive. Like men's productive labour it is congealed in things which make life livable: food, clothing, shelter and the like. Men's control over women's labour in cultivation, with domesticated animals, in craft production, has all been part of genderic appropriation in pre-capitalist societies, including in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The second aspect of women's labour is what has been called 'reproductive' and it is embodied in people. From the economic point of view the use-value of people is realised in their labour power; from the cultural point of view, of course, in many other things. In any case, first and most importantly these people are children. Men's control of children formalised in family authority patterns and masculine inheritance systems in pre-industrial (overlapping into industrial) societies is an essential form of masculine appropriation and control of women's labour. This is not to deny the important role which men played in the post-childhood pre-
paration of their male children for their gender and economic-class determined means of livelihood in such societies, but it is to stress the fact that early childhood care and the ongoing labour for family members in terms of daily sustenance were different and more time-consuming for women than for men in most post-foraging societies, and in all agricultural and industrial societies. The other people in which women's labour is embodied are men-as-a-group, who both as children and as adults benefit from the private service of women who take care of their bodily needs through the performance of domestic labour organised through the normative, legal and physically enforced relations of subservience. Finally, women's labour is embodied in the lives of the old and the sick, economically non-productive members of society who are enabled to survive because of women's care. Women's labour is thus different from and more extensive than men's, and men-as-a-group, in and across different classes, have appropriated that labour to themselves, even if the extent of the labour has differed for women of different economic-classes. Men are the leisured gender-class across economic-class lines, and across modes of production, as we shall see a little farther on.¹⁵

Second, the central mechanism for masculine control and appropriation of women's labour has been in the first place control over women's sexuality. As the Iroquoian example demonstrates, it is difficult to control women's labour when women control their own affective, sexual and economic unions, and their own children. To bring these essential things under masculine control, men had to find ways to regulate women's (hetero-)sexual activities and procreative issue. Engels understood the origins of what he called 'monogamy for women only' in this imperative, but he did not understand the connection between that and compulsory heterosexuality as the major psycho-sexual organising principle of gender-class society, with its attendant subordination of women's right to erotic pleasure as well as masculine control of children and property.¹⁶ Given the connection between sexuality and feeling, the element of control over the actual body of the labouring class in genderic terms is thus much greater than that element between members of ruling and labouring classes in economic terms, with the exception of some kinds of slavery. Thus while gender-class is a social construction because there is nothing biologically given about the division of labour between the sexes which it expresses, one of its central and most contested terrains is in fact the physical body of woman herself. What is at stake is how she will use that body in the service of her male kin, both in terms of her productive and reproductive labour, and will not use that body in the service of her own or her daughter's independent interests, need and desires. This terrain is divided and cordoned off according to rank and privilege between men, both de facto and de jure. De facto control is exercised through rape and coercion (what happens in the conjugal bed, what armies always bring in
their wake, what happens to unaffiliated or disowned women); de jure control through taboos, laws and eventually ecclesiastical and secular courts. Although in their capacity as dependent wives and mothers, women have passed on the norms of sexual chattelhood to their children, they have also as sexual and social beings resisted this status and rebelled in a myriad of different ways, from the women's 'crime' of adultery, to the more conscious choice of outlaw status by women who were once labelled witches * because they rejected the validity of men's claims on women through their lives and their medicinal work, to the mass epidemics of 'frigidity' which so preoccupied the late Victorians, the early psycho-analysts and sexologists. Genderic relations have been characterised by strife and conflict between the genders with outbreaks of resistance on the part of women, individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, throughout history.

This point brings us to the third feature of the sexual division of labour—and that is of course what men do within it that is so different from, exclusive of, and 'better than' what women do. Statistics presented at the 1975 United Nations Conference on women in Copenhagen set the stage for this aspect. They remind us that women form fifty-two per cent of the world's population, perform two-thirds of the world's labour, receive one-tenth of the world's wages, and own less than one-hundredth of its property. * Crossing modes of production, and so in a sense historical periods, these statistics throw into high relief important continuities in women's condition. What is as important to compute, however, is what is missing from the statistics: women form less than five per cent of the world's top governmental cadres and, if one calculates informally from a number of different sources, something like the same proportion, or perhaps even less, in terms of their presence in the upper echelons of the church hierarchies and the positions of authority within the military. Men are present in the sexual division of labour where women are absent, and those places are not the loci of productive labour, either in terms of petty commodity production, or full-blown capitalist production, or industrial production in the transitional societies. These places are at the top of the economic, religious, political and military systems of power in human society, and women's exclusion from these stratified and stratospheric realms is just as fundamental, historically-rooted and defining a characteristic as their relegation to primary responsibility for childhood caretaking and bodily sustenance of men and non-productive adults.

Men's freedom from the necessity to care for their own bodies and those of children, the sick and the elderly, through men's appropriation of women's productive labour and men's access to women's bodies and control of their issue—that is, men's appropriation of women's reproductive labour—indicates that we are talking about class relations between men and women. But a fully-fledged class relationship has a politics of
domination, not simply a set of economic relations, and it is this politics of domination that can be illustrated by going back to the formation of the exclusive men's groups and networks in aboriginal societies and seeing how they evolved, through the stratification and complexification of society, into the institutions and networks of what Marxists have until now called simply class power, but which such an examination will reveal to be not only economic- but also gender-class power, culminating in the virtually exclusive masculine monopoly of the major positions of power in the world today. Masculine dominance has been a central organizing principle of economic class society, not by virtue of some historical accident which, as in Engels's view, gave to men the source of social surplus, but through men's conscious and systematic relegation of women into an increasingly domestic space and set of functions called in our time 'the private'; and exclusion from the social space and set of functions in which men have taken charge of the life of increasingly larger numbers of people, called in our time 'the public'.

In our own time, industrial society has greatly increased the numbers, kinds and relations of the ruling structures. Women are conspicuous by their miniscule or non-existent presence in the church hierarchies, the boardrooms of multinational corporations, the upper echelons of government bureaucracy, and professional associations and schools, the military, especially combat forces, and also, alas, from the top trade-union leaderships in many countries. The state itself is condensed, to use Zillah Eisenstein's term, out of these structures—the networks and systems of power. I want to move on now to look at how the politics of masculine domination have been and are expressed in industrial states. I regret that space does not allow for a lengthier treatment of pre-capitalist societies, and I am aware that I have tied together enormous spans of time and changes in modes of production, speaking in terms of economic-class. But the characteristics of the sexual division of labour which I have described are important in their fundamental outlines to this day, and the mode of masculine appropriation of women's labour from the family system of advanced horticulture to that of late feudal—early capitalist times does possess a central element of continuity, which is its organisation through the power, privilege and authority of the ruling-class father, replicated in miniature within the households of the labouring classes. While from the standpoint of economic-class there are several distinct modes of production involved, from the standpoint of gender-class I think it correct to term all these arrangements together as patriarchy, a particular form and organisation of masculine dominance. That form began very slowly to change with the emergence of capitalism and the full-scale development of industry, but masculine dominance itself has not disappeared. On the contrary, it has continued to reassert itself both by attempting to reassert the control of the father during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and by producing new forms since then. I want to close this section by saying that I hope I have made my preference for the term 'gender-class' over 'gender' clear at this point, and indicated its essential features. However, I am not attached to the term as such, and if another capable of better communicating the relations of appropriation, conflict and domination between men-as-a-group and women-as-a-group can be proposed, I would certainly welcome it.

MASCULINE DOMINANCE AND CAPITALISM IN THE STATE

In comparison with all previous modes of production, capitalism develops with dizzying speed, rushing in only a few hundred years through several distinct stages of development, and accelerating all the while. Each stage has had its own heavy impact on kinship and gender relations, the relative stability of which acted as a profound element of stability and continuity in and between different epochs in pre-capitalist times. For the proletarianisation of the peasantry and the primitive accumulation of capital, a period of a hundred and fifty or two hundred years, from early industrialisation to mature capitalism/imperialism, barely a century; from imperialism to the beginnings of anti-imperialist struggle with a socialist dynamic, less than half a century; from mature capitalism to late capitalism, again less than fifty years, and if one sees several distinct sub-periods within this larger one, the pace really quickens. Because capitalism is such a dynamic force of surplus extraction, it wreaks havoc with the ways in which people can arrange their lives in order to reproduce themselves on a daily and generational basis. Each new stage creates pressures and demands for particular kinds of labour, different in important respects from the labour of the preceding period, and often required in locations different from earlier places of work and residence. In pre-capitalist societies, men and women within household systems essentially raise their children to replace them in the economic and genderic divisions of labour. Not so for the generations who have lived at the starting or ending edges of the major stages of capitalist development. All the more reason why it is important to understand the role of the state during these times, to see whether it has been consistently genderic as well as distinctly capitalist. While the amount of material is not lavish, enough has been generated to demonstrate adequately that as each stage of capitalism has developed and been negotiated, the state has taken on the crucial role of mediation and regulation to advance capitalism's needs for a given form of labour power and surplus extraction in such a way as to retain masculine privilege and control—masculine dominance—in society as a whole. I will restrict myself to a few examples chosen to indicate major aspects of this behaviour through several developmental stages.

Women's oppression is expressed both in ongoing, living patterns
expressing deeply seated norms and genderic behaviour—in etiquette, feeling and ritual—and in formalised laws, encoded and enforced by institutions of social domination. In the transitional period between feudalism and capitalism formalised laws affecting women were encoded and enforced by both the church and the state. The church was in charge for the most part of reproductive aspects of gender-class relations: its rules pertained to the issues of marriage, divorce and sexual practice (adultery, sodomy and the like) and, as part and parcel of this function, the church was involved in maintaining explicit genderic authority. The regulation of property relations, on the other hand, usually devolved onto secular laws and courts. In the societies out of which capitalism developed, women were frequently denied the right to hold property in their own name, and to exercise the civic duties and rights that followed with such ownership for men. Women were, as a rule, legally infantilised, and able to exercise power in society only through whatever paths were open to them in terms of their masculine affiliations. In families of the land-owning classes and, for a considerable time in the transitional period, in the families of the urban middle-classes, that power could be considerable within the limited but important sphere of the manorial and/or domestic economy, insofar as women acted as managers of these enterprises in the upper classes and as manager-workers within the domestic economies of the bourgeoisie. In farm and peasant households, the necessity of women's labour is thought by many to have created within the domestic and perhaps village sphere certain norms of respect because of its in-dispensability. But women were proscribed from a host of religious, sexual and political rights which were reserved for men only.

As far as the state development is concerned, as capitalism consolidates in the nineteenth century genderic regulations lag well behind changes in actual life conditions. They do not seem to become visible until well into the nineteenth century in Britain, and if we can take the British case as a general model for key trends (allowing for variations according to uneven and combined developments in other national formations), we can discern at least the main lines of changing modalities of masculine dominance. According to Rachel Harrison and Frank Mort, there were two sets of changes in women's legal status as measured through changes in legislation, one having to do primarily with issues of women's rights to property and money, the other with women's right to divorce and greater sexual autonomy. The first set of issues received a lot of attention from the state during the latter half of the nineteenth century, under the impact of agitation on the part of middle-class women. That attention can be seen to consist in a set of extremely interesting state accommodations, each one attempting to juggle the demands of capitalist property relations (which require a much greater mobility of capital in comparison with landed property which requires stability and continuity of property) and
the evident need to maintain masculine control of those property relations with the need to make some concessions to the demands of bourgeois women who wanted to have full control of property in their own right. The concessions that were made in the nineteenth century in Britain had a clear masculinist character: they were made very slowly and only in degrees that allowed for inheritance from father to daughter while simultaneously favouring the appropriation of the daughter's property and capital by her husband. Women's right to hold and dispose of their own property was won very late (it is still being contested in many ways in the courts of capitalist countries to this day) and in the nineteenth century the legal victories were often no more than formalities since fathers and husbands continued to make their own arrangements, superceding the formal and rather shaky rights of the daughter/wife. Harrison and Mort argue most convincingly that these grudging changes are undertaken by the state only because they fit in with changes in inheritance and control of property necessary for the growth of capitalism. What is not addressed in their article is why the state, now a fully-fledged capitalist state, should not have wrought rather larger and more generous changes if, in Michèle Barrett's terms, gender oppression is not a 'logically pregiven element of the [capitalist] class structure'.25

The notion of a distinct genderic commitment as such on the part of the state would account for the conundrum. Such a commitment is even more strikingly revealed by state actions on the marriage and sexuality fronts. Again, drawing on the British example, changes in sexual and marriage law were not at all substantive or progressive during most of the nineteenth century. They consisted primarily in the transference of previously ecclesiastical jurisdiction virtually whole hog into secular jurisdiction in mid-century. In this way the capitalist state took on a set of genderic laws which can quite correctly be characterised as patriarchal, with respect to norms of marriage, procreation, and to ('deviant') sexualities. Major change on these issues has only begun in the latter half of the twentieth century, and even these are precarious. Again, while there is much to be said about these changes—or lack of them—what is essential from our point of view is that where capitalism did not require change in terms of the exigencies of its immediate economic development, the state retained and attempted to retrench masculinist and patriarchal privilege, in specific opposition by mid-century in the US and Britain to a developed and articulated feminist campaign for changes in this sphere.

Nevertheless, accommodation and refusal to change in property and sexual law respectively neither stopped important changes in the actual life conditions of the genders, nor contained women's opposition to their subservient status and oppression. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century in Britain, the United States and Canada, the state was confronted with a series of contradictions that were exploding as a result of the
effects of almost a century of industrialisation and urban proletarianisation. Although the numbers and concentration of women workers in large-scale factories differ according to regions as well as countries, and the pattern of women's employment in such industries is still a matter of some contention, there seems to be general agreement that the intense exploitation of women and children as well as working-class men had by that time undermined the capacity of the working class to reproduce itself adequately on both a daily and a generational basis. Such a situation was acceptable neither to the working class as a whole nor to significant sectors of the capitalist class. Chez les bourgeois, in stark contrast to the sweated conditions of working-class women, the ladies of the affluent classes had reached the nadir of infantilisation, pressured by their husbands and families to do nothing more than 'adorn' the domestic retreat from the hostile public world of capitalist business and politics, and turn a blind eye to the conditions of their working-class sisters—labourers, domestics and prostitutes—all working for their husbands and fathers. Such a situation was quite acceptable to bourgeois men, but not to many of the women, and it spawned the middle-class revolt which was eventually to give birth to the term feminism.

From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the first quarter of the twentieth, the masculinist nature of the state was clearly visible in two extended operations of genderic mediation. The first, primarily at the level of the economy, was the role the state played in enabling the institution of what has come to be called the family wage system as an ideological standard for the whole working class, and a reality for only its most privileged layers. As others have written at much greater depth, this system validated and attempted to generalise as normative within the working class a situation in which the husband/father of a nuclear family, emulating his upper-class counterpart, earned a wage large enough to maintain children and a wife who did not labour outside the home. While we know that many working-class women eventually welcomed this system, as many today still hearken back to it because of the terrible conditions under which women worked and work, we also know that many women resisted this system up to and including fighting pitched battles with men outside of factories and other workplaces to maintain their right to work for a wage, and an unequal one at that. The family wage system was not simply a clever economic-class manoeuvre to maximise worker productivity, although its normalisation did better correspond to capitalist needs for a more stable and healthy workforce, a continuing source of cheap (female) labour and larger, healthier standing and conscriptive armies. It was rather an arrangement elaborated, constructed and enforced by a cross-class masculine coalition—an operation of gender-class as well as economic-class—in which the state played a pivotal and decisive role. The state enacted a series of laws which excluded
women from most trades and professions (or supported such exclusions), which institutionalised unequal pay for work of comparable worth and effectively ghettoised working women of which a majority remained in a very limited number of low paying job ghettos. The state further structured social policy in such a way as to economically and socially coerce women into marriage, through welfare-state policies structured on the assumption of masculine labour and authority within the family, and social punishment for the transgression of sexual norms deriving from this arrangement. That the family wage system in fact hindered the development of revolutionary consciousness and struggle by economically atomising working-class people into isolated family units responsible for reproduction, and ideologically accentuating and reinforcing the working-class man's identification with the men of the bourgeois class, did not seem to trouble many of the 'class conscious' (read economic-class conscious) workers who fought for that system. From the working class in gender chaos documented by Engels in the nineteenth century to the 'bread-winner power' of the workingman in the first half of the twentieth, capitalism, with the essential mediation of the state, landed on masculinist feet.

In the necessary attention we devote to matters of economics during this period, we must not, however, forget what the state was doing in the most direct of political terms from approximately 1850 to 1920 in the United States, and from 1880 to 1920 in Britain: it was resisting the demand for women's suffrage with all its might. The breadth and militancy of the more than fifty-year battle for women's suffrage is well known, and need not be repeated here. What does need elucidation is the reason behind the generally masculine, specifically state resistance to these campaigns, if indeed women's oppression is not required logically by capitalism. Over and over again the position that women's right to vote would undermine women's appropriate role and work in society was articulated, indicating that even where economic-class considerations were very remote, masculinism retained its imperatives, its rules and its laws. The sexual division of labour under masculine dominance requires women's exclusion from political power, and the right to vote is the most basic and elementary component of that right in liberal-democratic societies. It is also, in and of itself, a very, very limited form of political power, as the bourgeoisie and men in general learned when the mass workers parties and large chunks of the women's suffrage movement capitulated to the imperialist war drive in 1914. It was no accident that women's suffrage was granted in the period directly after the one in which the limitations of electoral power within a capitalist society with an enfranchised workingmen's population were becoming so terribly clear.

From the point of view of genderic relations, the history train really moved into high gear following the Second World War. The family wage system, while it applied consistently only to the privileged layers of the
working class (and at that, differently than among the petty bourgeoisie and capitalist class) was nevertheless stabilised ideologically and materially prior to and following the First World War. Many women who had been mobilised for non-traditional occupations during that war were summarily returned to marriage and the family wage—hardly its consistent reality—were reinforced between wars. During the Second World War, the mobilisation of women into heavy industry and other non-traditional occupations was even more substantial than in the previous war—a mobilisation engineered, of course, by the state—and women’s consequent demobilisation in the name of men’s rights to well-paid jobs rankled much more deeply as a result. The demobilisation and its aftermath had the usual twofold character: it excluded women from well-paid, traditionally masculine proletarian jobs and it relegated them to low-paid, increasingly ‘feminine’ and extremely limited job ghettos. But these measures, engineered by the state in the name of preserving masculine dignity (read privilege) have not succeeded in re-establishing the previous breadwinner form of masculine dominance, for with the economic developments of the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties, the full contradictions between capitalism and masculinism have really begun to explode.

The explosion has a number of different fuses, each of which has been lit by developments in the last forty years. First, as has been endlessly documented, the post-war capitalist economy with its expansion of service sectors and clerical work to facilitate the workings of finance capital has created the need for many new workers, and has drawn women out of the home to fill these jobs. Thus women have taken their place in new sectors alongside of their traditional place in labour-intensive, low-paid jobs—for example, in the garment and cleaning industries. As has also been endlessly documented, whatever carrot was constituted by these opportunities was more than compensated for by the stick of inflation which reduced the power of the family wage and increasingly compelled working-class and even petty-bourgeois families to rely on two wages to maintain, and today to chase after, a previous standard of living obtainable on the basis of the earnings of the single male breadwinner. Because of the pharmaceutical companies’ search for profits, because of capitalism’s need for a smaller labour force, and because of women’s increasing unwillingness to drown in domestic labour, contraception became used on a mass scale, so that the life of the adult woman was no longer taken up exclusively with child-bearing, lactating and all the rest of it. These three developments alone were enough to blow the old genderic arrangements sky-high, but of course there is more. Not only have women had to take on work outside the home which is by and large more menial and boring, less remunerative (by 40 per cent) and socially prestigious than, but equally as exhausting as, men’s, but they have not been relieved
of any domestic labour in a qualitative way by men. In fact, through the
sixties and seventies, we can see an aggravation of women's condition in
her double day of labour within marriage on the one hand, and in the
increasing tendency of family units to dissolve, leaving women without
even the nominal aid of a husband and father, and more often than not
(something like two-thirds of men default on their support payments in
Canada and the US) without even financial aid for the children. These
trends have been accompanied by a masculinist ideological onslaught
which has two rather different prongs, each one lethal, but in different
ways: on the one hand, the movements of orthodox patriarchal retrench-
ment call for a return to the father-headed family and the 'non-working'
mother, the banning of abortion rights, pre-marital sex and homosexuality,
and the absolute right of parents (read fathers) over children. On the
other hand, movements representing new modalities of masculine domi-
nance argue implicitly and explicitly for the loosening of sexuality from
all relations of social solidarity and mutual aid, for the objectification and
commodification of women's sexuality, for the end of a special status for
childhood in psycho-sexual terms, and for support to abortion, birth
control and homosexual rights, as essential means by which men can be
divested of their responsibility for others within the context of an obsolete
and confining family 

These movements which represent new modalities of male supremacy
have greater affinity with certain aspects of late capitalism: above all the
sex industries per se (which, according to some estimates, outgross—so
to speak—all other 'entertainment' industries combined) and the advertis-
ing and the (non-directly sexual) film, television and video industries. But
while these represent new capitalist sectors, and seem to confront and
clash with the forces of orthodox patriarchal ideology, they should not be
understood as in any clear sense representing capitalism's resolution of
the gender problem and therefore vanguard paths which will surely be
followed by majority fractions of the capitalist class as a whole, and
supported consistently by the state. This is because while the new
masculinism seeks to subordinate women through erotic and ideological
control, and a further delegitimation of the family, in important ways it
aids the material disintegration of what Eisenstein refers to as the 'neat
distinction' between 'Man' and 'Woman' in the paid workforce, and by
direct reverberation, in the home. That neat distinction, while not very
profitable to the newer industries, is still exceptionally profitable to
other, older and more established sectors of the capitalist class (insurance,
banks, all finance capital whose labour force is massively female) and to
the state as employer of service workers; and tremendously important to
capitalism as a whole economic and political system which depends on
material and ideological divisions in the working class as a precondition
of maximum surplus extraction. Further, that distinction as it embodies
women's service to men is evidently very valuable to men-as-a-group, who show little inclination to give up their privileges, either in the workforce or in the realm of reproductive labour—what is usually called the home. In negotiating a way through these treacherous waters, the state has taken on a qualitatively new relationship with respect to the regulation of women's productive and reproductive labour: it has become for large numbers of women, especially mothers, drawn now from the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat as well as the chronically poor, the great collective father-figure, a new representative of men-as-a-group, but now a new kind of group, totally divorced, as it were, from these women in terms of kinship and mutual aid, a bureaucratic, impersonal pyramid of a group of men, who have taken the place of all those absent fathers. Women's labour and sexuality are the two most important things to control for any society of masculine dominance. Policies delineating everything from unemployment insurance benefits to daycare subsidies to the modalities of socialised medicine to the (lack of) abortion facilities to prosecution and persecution of lesbian mothers are all up-to-date expressions of a genderic state, in the process of developing new forms of masculinism corresponding to the really acute crisis and change in gender arrangements. These new collective modalities of control are also modalities of appropriation, to return to our first criterion of relations of domination between men and women. As women's previous functions in domestic labour become severed from individual men on a stable, long-term basis (from father to husband to the arms of death was the way the usual pattern read, with maybe a little fooling around in between), their so-called 'caring' role is replicated in the paid workforce. Far from being the road to liberation, as Engels's admonition to women ('Get a job') suggested, women's large-scale wage labour has resulted in what Nicole Laurin-Frenette has called a 'publicisation' of the previously privatised labour of women such that even women who live most of their lives as single are appropriated through the work they do in the paid labour force, or through their mothering work regulated through state welfare agencies, or through the nurturing kinds of functions they perform even in non-traditional jobs, or, and most likely, through all three forms of collective appropriation at some time or another. More work needs to be done on these new forms, and on other emerging manifestations of masculine dominance which are products of industrialisation and late capitalism, but it is important here to point out that the contradictions feminists have described between capitalism and the sexual division of labour intrinsic to masculine dominance are real contradictions, as real as the affinities the systems have with one another. These contradictions allow of no easy solution, not only structurally but also politically, since they have been creating an absolutely massive movement of resistance—the women's movement—whose
successive waves have spanned a period of almost one hundred and fifty years, and whose demands and forms of organisation have been given greater impetus by the widening gap between genderic and economic-class relations in the capitalist system, and which is now threatening to further the politicisation of the working class itself. If the state is the most important site of mediation of contradictions for gender and economic classes, we should find that its role in the regulation of women in the interests of continued masculine dominance increases rather than decreases. I think that the evidence for this is more than ample, despite what appear to be numerous concessions around divorce criteria, reproductive rights, equal pay and human rights legislation. Those concessions, like unemployment insurance or socialised medicine under different circumstances, were forced by struggle and/or threat of struggle from a state in great need of maintaining an appearance of some neutrality in the tense, politicised years of the late sixties and early seventies, but which is increasingly retrenching in the bleaker years of the late seventies and early eighties. Moreover, as in relation to the working class as a whole, so in relation to women, what the state hath given, the state taketh away. Reproductive rights legislation, representing the territory of women's bodies and men's right to control them, is under constant attack by important fractions of the ruling class with their petty-bourgeois and working-class troops rallied behind, and is even being carried out by social democratic governments. Ditto for equal pay legislation, which, when magnanimously legislated by one arm of the state, is subsequently subverted by the courts, labour relations boards, and police who protect the strike-breaking companies which have received a whole new lease on life as an enormous number of first-contract battles by women workers just beg to be crushed. In any case, for Marxists, concessions have never indicated a change in the class nature of the state—only the need for a refined understanding of the ways in which class states make concessions and reforms without disrupting, indeed at times positively reinforcing, dominant class rule. The same analysis needs to be made with respect to gender-class as it does with respect to economic-class, since capitalist states, like all other states, have functioned, in the final analysis, to preserve and in new ways extend masculine control, rather than to end it.

MASCULINE DOMINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

Although debates rage over any number of pertinent questions regarding the forms and functions of the state in capitalist societies, one question has not troubled Marxism as such: Marxists agree that the state is a capitalist one. This broad unanimity of characterisation breaks down dramatically as soon as Marxist discourse shifts to the political economy and the nature of state formation in those societies which I prefer to call
transitional, but which others call everything from 'actually existing socialist' to 'state capitalist'. Where there is great diversity of **characterisation** of the (economic) class aspect of these states, there is great silence with respect to their gender-class nature. Debates between major positions articulated by theoreticians like Ernest Mandel, **Hillel Ticktin**, Charles Bettelheim, Bogdan Krawchenko and many others who dissent from official Communist apologetics contain no consideration, let alone a sustained theoretical treatment, of the ways in which gender divisions operate in societies ostensibly attempting to evolve from domination to equality. These considerations are in fact extremely extensive and affect both separately and in their interaction all the essential spheres of life: the economy and the problems associated with the conditions of production, distribution and consumption; sexual relations and the growth of the new person (still called the new 'man' in most instances) out of conditions of psycho-sexual health; cultural life and the creation of vital, open and critical expressive and analytic work; and culminating out of all of these, political life and the creation of truly self-regulating and egalitarian forms of public coordination of all aspects of social existence.

In recent years an impressive body of much empirical and some theoretical work has been generated by feminists studying the condition of women in almost all of the transitional societies—from the USSR (which includes a number of diverse social formations within it) to the distinct societies of Eastern Europe, to China, Cuba, and now Nicaragua and the states of southeast Africa. The weight of the descriptive material is staggering in its stark and unavoidable conclusions concerning women's oppression in the transitional societies. These provide a truly fundamental challenge to the capacity of Marxist theory as it is presently elaborated to account for the situation of women in these countries.

By way of an introductory summary, this situation for women in the USSR and Eastern Europe and China may be described as astoundingly similar, both across national boundaries within these societies and to that of women in the West. Although married women's participation rate in the paid workforce is higher than in the capitalist countries, the patterns of women's employment are rather painfully similar: women are ghettoised into jobs where their work tends to reflect their roles as sustainer and drudge, in much the same way as noted above. While women have penetrated the ranks of previously male-exclusive professions in perhaps greater numbers, their concentration at the lower- and, in thinning numbers, mid-level of some of these professions, and their absence from the elite, speaks of an identical process of structural and ideological discrimination. Moreover, the social devaluation of currently female-dominated professions like medicine in the USSR indicates that the importance placed upon a given occupation has more to do with genderic prejudice than with the intrinsic merit of the job. (Just compare the status and remuneration of
doctors in the West with that of those in the East.) Most importantly, women's central condition is that of the double day of labour—the condition which we can with justification describe as the dominant form of masculinist appropriation of women's labour in industrial societies. It should hardly be necessary to add that, given the greater scarcity of consumer goods—from food and clothing to household appliances—women's second workday in the transitional societies is more arduous, not less, than that of their counterparts in advanced capitalist countries. In terms of women's presence in places of authority, that is in the ranks of the bureaucratic elite which spans top posts in all spheres and which is coterminous with both state structures and party membership, women form less than five per cent of ruling cadres, sometimes as little as zero per cent. Although their percentage in elected positions at regional or national levels is somewhat larger than that of women in capitalist legislatures, familiarity with the political systems in question reveals that these positions are symbolic, without real power, and chosen for their ideological value in enabling the elite to claim women's representation as a 'gain' of 'socialist' society.

From the point of view of orthodox Marxism, what is bizarre about these patterns is their similarity. If indeed differences in the development of the productive forces in the first place, and differences of national cultural life in the second place, really are the decisive factors in determining the position of women, how is it possible that the economic, social, sexual and political patterns characteristic of women's condition should be so strikingly, so depressingly similar, not only to women's condition in capitalist countries, but across a range of societies which include highly industrialised, 'advanced' political economies such as those of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and also quite agrarian, 'backward' political economies such as Uzbekistan, Mongolia and the like? If bureaucratic rule has no distinctly masculinist or genderic commitment, if it is precipitated independently out of the development of the productive forces in which there is no central and specific set of dynamics flowing from and reconstructing masculine dominance, if despite everything it should be possible to put politics in command to work towards the equalisation of the sexes—how is it that these remarkably similar patterns of masculine dominance appear so uniformly across these societies? Marxist explanations which grant no autonomous and major effectivity to masculine dominance cannot, even with the most sophisticated of bureaucratic-deformation elaborations, account for these patterns. Feminists' contention that Marxist positions on women in fact obscure the relations of masculine dominance rather than reveal them has been borne out by the experiences of these societies both with respect to the role of the state and with respect to the emergence of important forms of opposition.
All discussions of the role of the state with respect to any given problem must begin with a grasp of its ubiquitous and, when confronted with any sort of opposition, sinister and repressive presence in all spheres of life—from the factory creche to the factory manager, in the schools, offices, hospitals—in a word, everywhere. The state is everywhere, and as the chief organiser of life in these societies, must be held accountable for the policies and forms which it adopts. The patterns of women's condition I have already summarised speak directly to its policies in a number of crucial respects, and I refer the reader to the extensive material detailing these conditions country by country, stratum by stratum, nationality by nationality. Here I want to discuss briefly how the orthodox Marxist theory of women's oppression, in its capacity as the official ideology, has sewed to obscure and perpetuate masculine dominance and gender-class with respect to women's labour and sexuality, and then to look at the relation of this to the issue of anti-bureaucratic struggle.

Marxist ideology has formulated the goal which would embody the answer to the 'Woman Question' as one of equality between men and women. This in turn has been seen to depend on Engels's prescriptions to 'integrate women into production' and to provide some socialised services to relieve women of domestic burdens so that they may partake of that integration. Between 80 and 90 per cent of able-bodied women do work outside the home in the industrialised, transitional societies, and indeed that percentage has been achieved through a much larger network of childcare centres, and in the case of China through collective eating centres and laundries which have enabled women to find eight hours a day, six days a week, without the immediate responsibility of children, to work outside the home. But in fact the limitations of this 'socialisation' are products of a purposeful choice, not only of struggling and beleaguered economies, because the companion piece to 'equality of men and women' in the ideological set is 'the family as the building block of socialism'. These two major planks are fraught with problems. First, the notion of equality for women rather than the notion of women's liberation denies a transformative dynamic to women's struggle. (This is of course a problem socialist and radical feminists have pointed out with respect to bourgeois feminism in capitalist countries as well.) It implicitly but firmly sets the life-ways and goals of masculine existence as the standards to which women should aspire and against which official estimates of their 'progress' will be made. It poses the problem as one of the women's 'catching up to men', rather than as a problem for women and men to solve together by changing the conditions and relations of their shared lives—from their intimate to their large-scale social interaction. The commitment to the 'family'—in that case the mostly two but sometimes three generational non-extended biological kinship structure—as the central means through which responsibility and labour for daily and
generational reproduction takes place seals off this necessary transformative dynamic, because it assumes women's unpaid labour in performing domestic tasks of a physical and managerial nature, and men's relative leisure and freedom to pursue extra-domestic goals and activities. If the results of a study conducted in the Soviet Union some years ago are in any sense typical, and informal reportage indicates they are, the tendency to this masculinist sexual division of labour is accentuated, rather than the other way around, as one goes up the social scale. In her investigation of Soviet data Gail Warshafsky Lapidus found that of the groups of men likely to 'help' their wives with the housework (no group assumed that housework was anything other than the woman's main responsibility), non-politically active industrial workers scored highest and upwardly mobile or already established party members lowest. Here is very disturbing evidence of a mechanism which reproduces the genderic division of labour in reality regardless of official notions of equality and sharing, and insofar as the standards of the privileged strata become standards for the whole society, reinforces masculinism ideologically as well. 'Equality' coupled with the commitment to the 'family as the building block of socialism' have served to reinforce, legitimise and reproduce the genderic sexual division of labour, not to change it, while at the same time mystifying its reality and its potential solutions.

If we look at this issue in relation to sexuality and procreation, at first glance it may seem the hypothesis won't hold. After all, millions upon millions of abortions are performed in the transitional societies, and in China women's mothering labour will soon be reduced to a minimum if the one-child-per-couple campaign really gets off the ground. But the real issue is not abortion as against the lack of it, or children as against sterility, but of who controls fertility and erotic relations and how the standards for that control are established. Because there are a number of very different needs as perceived by the ruling elites of the transitional states, policies concerning things like abortion and sterilisation, economic incentives and penalties around children, and questions of erotic relations differ from country to country. Several key features are continuous, however, and prove the principle of masculine control. First, demography has a very high place as a branch of social science and social control, and demographic policy is discussed and decided upon at the level of the politbureaus (less than two per cent women). Second, and ideologically justified by the demands of the first, women are not considered to have the right to control their own bodies and reproductive capacities, rather the state is considered supreme in this matter. So long as this is the case, of course, there can never be an equality even of access to non-domestic activity because women will, as a group, have to cope with the major obstacles which child-bearing and rearing constitute to full public participation when reproductive labour is their sole responsibility. Third, the
availability and quality of contraception (preventive measures which give women far greater real control than the horrendous, but government-controlled, recourse to high numbers of abortions) is appallingly bad. In the Soviet Union, for example, diaphragms, cervical caps and birth control pills are virtually unavailable (except for women affiliated to the elite) forcing resort to condoms whose reliability is a pan-national joke. In the capitalist world the struggle against abortion rights represents an attempt to preserve the relations of masculinism on a face-to-face level, between men and women, because of the reluctance to allow the state the kind of control it exercises in the transitional societies. In the latter countries, however, the mass, grotesque reliance on abortion represents masculine dominance just as much as Western variants, but in a different—a collective—form. Fourth, and related to this, the repressive nature of the availability of information and education about sex itself, and the masculinist heterosexist bias of that information, is extraordinary by Western standards, especially so in China but not only there. (Recent personal communication described some Chinese family planning information as completely lacking the word for penis, because this is considered taboo for public discourse in certain regions!) And finally, erotic freedom in choice of sexual orientation is viewed primarily as a social crime and sign of bourgeois decadence. The harsh and repressive maintenance of compulsory heterosexuality is a very powerful component of genderic power. These ideologies and policies throw all the responsibility for change onto women, absolve men of any need to change in either private or public life, and completely subvert the possibility for real change, as they further entrench masculine privilege.

The oppression of women in economic, sexual, social and political spheres acts as a massive block to the transition to socialism, and constitutes an immense pillar of bureaucratic dominance in a number of crucial ways. Women's atomised labour in nuclear and less-than-nuclear (mother-children only) units blocks the ways in which the contradiction between the socialised production of the social surplus and its private appropriation can be overcome, the most important economic contradiction in transitional societies according to Ernest Mandel. Women's labour in the home and in the female ghetto jobs of the paid workforce blocks the transformation of the content of and relationship between production, distribution and consumption. As long as reproductive labour is performed privately by individual women and collectively by groups of women in under-remunerated and overcentralised social services in which men refuse to work, domestic labour cannot be socialised in a way that equilibrates the balance between heavy industrial and military production on the one hand and consumer goods and services on the other, for structural and social reasons. Structurally, the funds for quality services and consumer goods will remain tied up, and women's unpaid and low-
paid labour will continue to maintain the society at a low standard of living. Socially, people will remain isolated from each other, a horizontal process of social bonding, community organising and political planning prevented by the single-family-to-central-state relationship. New values which truly do put the needs of human life—that is, in another vocabulary, the needs of reproduction—first will not develop because of the genderic divisions which both derive from and maintain this form of isolation.

The consequences of all this are political in every respect. From the point of view of the creation of a socialist mass psychology (or consciousness, if one prefers the term), the bifurcation of human qualities into gender-appropriate behaviour, characteristics, activities and spheres creates the classical authoritarian personality incapable of the full range of human activities, unable to be truly self-regulating and therefore always inclined to look to some to lead and decide from above, and to others to serve and submit from below. Overlaid on or intertwined with or even regardless of this mass psychology, the present gender arrangements lead parents, and especially mothers, to reject the whole notion of socialised domestic labour and childcare because it seems a mechanism for their super-exploitation economically, and their impoverishment emotionally, socially and politically (for example, this is expressed in the second of Solidarity's 'women's demands': extension of maternity leave—note, not parental leave, but maternity leave—to three years). These psychological and practical conditions create the living basis for a cross-class gender coalition which divides the working classes along gender lines in ways most profitable to the elite. In the Soviet Union, the incidence of women's physical and emotional demoralisation, men's alcohol-induced domestic brutality, and all-round sexual misery for both sexes is of tragic proportions. Imploding discontent and alienation prevents the full development of resistance, which is especially important in a society where the elite benefits very little from the kind of ideological hegemony of capitalist states. The kind of alienation between the sexes so many have reported in the USSR seems worse than in other transitional societies—and this makes sense insofar as gender relations are part of the overall reality of atomisation and repression. But the general points are valid for all transitional societies—and in China, where we do not have the same kind of atomisation, we still hear of female infanticide, and very sexist practices and customs among party members and intellectuals who, like their Soviet male counterparts, benefit from the personal services of their wives.

Masculine dominance has reasserted itself and remains a fundamental organising principle, constitutive element and political commitment of the bureaucratic regimes of the transitional states, but never named as such even by Western Marxists. Even more problematically, it has largely been ignored by the oppositional currents, inside and outside of these societies, despite the fact that the privileges it actually delivers to the
men of the working class are miniscule when compared to the liabilities. The quality of life which masculine dominance degrades in economic, sexual, social, cultural and political spheres—in short, everywhere—affects men as well as women. The majority of men stand to gain everything from renouncing its norms, customs and relatively speaking miserable rewards. Perhaps this explains why the elite continues to reinforce masculine dominance so consistently.

PERSONNEL

When we discuss the state as a manifestation of social relations, as a relation of production, as the major organiser of class hegemony, as the site of conflict mediation, we are using conceptual terms which enable us to express real attributes and functions. But these terms, though absolutely necessary, also tend to depersonalise the state, to hide the fact that it is created by, made up of, and maintained by real people who are not simply cogs in an inexorably rolling wheel but active, conscious human beings—more active and more conscious, it is probably safe to say, the closer one approaches the central seats of power. Until now I have been arguing the genderic nature of the state on the basis of its policies and interventions into society, not on the basis of its personnel. But the two are related, and while the former considerations need to be established, perhaps in the first place, they are completely bound up with the latter. In terms of state personnel examined from the point of view of masculine dominance, it is important to understand who makes up state structures, how they got to where they are, and how they manage to stay there. One of the most useful publications to date with respect of the purely political cadres of industrial states is The Politics of the Second Electorate, an anthology which covers women's electoral fortunes (participation and representation) in all the advanced capitalist countries, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The articles contained in it provide invaluable empirical and descriptive material, but for the most part decline to undertake theoretical elaborations. Perhaps rightly so, for fuller generalisations need to look at the relation and interaction between the elected, the bureaucratic, the legal and coercive repressive systems and follow this with a further examination of how all of these interact with the other ruling structures—among them the professional associations, the schools, and, in various places, the top bureaucracies of the unions and even (as in the transitional societies) state women's organisations themselves. Nevertheless, since I am of the opinion that the central state systems do represent a massive condensation of real power and do act quite instrumentally—to use a deliberately controversial term—in constant, recurring ways to enforce class domination, I think it valid and necessary to understand something about their personnel as well as about
MASCULINE DOMINANCE AND THE STATE

For the purposes of this article, I am going to take as given that the people at the top of these systems are not as a rule children of the working class, nor do they for the most part represent the interests of the working classes in their decisions and activities. What I want to talk about here is that the people at the top of these systems also tend not to come from the female sex and have the same record with respect to women's interests that they have vis-à-vis those of workers.

First, with respect to the question of elected representatives in the capitalist countries: women are most highly represented in local and municipal governments where elections are not dominated by political parties. When local politics are organised along party lines women's presence drops, and continues to diminish with each 'higher' level of centralisation, until they are hardly to be found in the rarefied atmosphere of government benches and cabinet meetings at all. Up to the present it has been acceptable to suggest that women's absence from these levels was due to their 'socialisation', the burden of domestic responsibilities and the sexism of the electorate. But with the publication of recent material, scholars have been forced to conclude what any politically active woman has known all along: the primary responsibility for women's absence lies with none of these factors, although they play a sometimes important secondary role. It is found, first, foremost and most importantly, in men's conscious exclusion of women from positions of authority and responsibility.

In liberal democracies, governmental teams are made up of elected representatives of a number of political parties, and it is within these parties that the most important systematised exclusion primarily takes place. It happens through several related mechanisms. First there is the most blatant form of the sexual division of labour, still institutionalised in all the major capitalist parties and in most of the worker's parties to this day: the separate organisation of women into women's 'committees' or 'sections' or 'auxiliaries'. These organisations are charged with and actually do perform the majority of daily party maintenance work, such as meeting organisation, local fundraising, secretarial functions, envelope stuffing and electoral canvassing. Unfortunately, the performance of these duties appears for the most part not to qualify persons for positions of party responsibility. Research (and experience) shows that these positions go to the people who control the funds and make political policy and alliances; people who are almost always men freed from much of the organisational nitty-gritty by the women's support work. (Note that appropriation structures political party relations as well.) Thus in the mixed gatherings of party life where political policy, strategy and selection of candidates is formally decided, the men predominate and dominate. Candidate selection itself is a process which has various modalities in
various parties, but is usually decided upon with the criterion of party service uppermost—the criterion reflecting priority to those with experience in the masculine side of affairs.

There have always been women who have refused the sexual division of political labour, and sought to be politically active in the fullest sense of the term. But the sexual segregation of the mass parties has worked against them, and against their ability to represent women. In cutting them off from the majority of women in the parties, it has deprived them of a feminine base of support and forced them to seek the approval of the male party membership and leadership. This has so effectively undercut their capacity to speak out aggressively on behalf of women and against masculine dominance that we can find almost no strong feminists among the women who have reached the apex of party power in industrialised societies (Margaret Thatcher being the quintessential example of those who have)." For women who do evade the sexual division of labour and/or are strong feminists, major parties have a back-up, highly effective form of discrimination which usually works where others have failed: these women are simply denied winnable constituencies. It thus requires a major mobilisation of women and sympathetic men in the constituency associations (where these wen have supreme power of selection) to obtain such candidacies, and these in turn require a great deal of time and money, two things that women, who in general are less affluent and more over-worked than men, have in scant supply. Sexual segregation and masculine control of candidacies then set a series of catches in motion which guarantee that few women and fewer feminists will make it to the top. Non-political party positions mean no good candidacies; no good candidacies means irregular legislative experience at best; this in turn means no cabinet participation, which means no real power, in and outside the party. Finally, for those women who manage to get elected and to get appointed to cabinet posts, there is the final catch. They are assigned primarily to portfolios which are concerned with matters relating to 'women and the family'—health, education, community services, culture (leisure, arts and sports)—and restricted from the high-powered departments such as transport, finance, foreign affairs and the military.

These extremely blatant and powerful mechanisms of masculine control by no means exhaust the list of ways in which men order and keep unto themselves political associations which are in name representative of both sexes. The routines of party life, the skills which are valued, the extraordinary double standard of behaviour for men and women, and the priorities and values of programmatic elaboration have all been analysed and shown to embody masculine dominance in a series of ways ranging from the most overt to the most subtle. I think that these are as important as, for example, the issue of selection of candidates. Indeed, as far as the crisis of the far Left is concerned, these other forms of masculine power
are more important than the issue of candidatures per se. But I have become increasingly convinced that internal party power, while in and of itself protected jealously by men as a group (sometimes unconsciously, especially on the Left), is profoundly connected to the notion of power that will eventually be held in society as a whole, and that it is the deeply rooted genderic exclusion of women from governing, authoritative positions as well as the protection of position, petty privilege and brittle egos, that is working against women within party structures, and in the name of which the internal divisions are perpetuated and reinforced. Men have been raised to experience their masculinity—inseparable in any meaningful way from their identity—as defined by their political control over women. Women's appearance as full-scale political beings is the most threatening phenomenon of all vis-à-vis the genderic division of labour. If women adopt the forms, values and standards of masculine dominance (as the majority of top-level women politicians do today), they are much more easily assimilable, although even then they are as scarce as hen's teeth. When they challenge those forms and standards, they are either summarily excluded, as in the parties of the conservative Right (the Tories in Britain and Canada, the Republicans in the US, and the more conservative wings of Canadian Liberals and American Democrats), or exploited and contained, as in the parties of the Centre (the British Social Democratic Party, the American Democratic Party, the Canadian Liberal Party). In the reformist mass workers parties the relationship between masculinism and feminism is more complex: feminism tends to be both exploited and contained for purposes of party recruitment and electioneering, respectively, but the ideology of commitment to the underdog opens up a political space for women and men who want a more serious approach to the issues of masculine dominance, and thus enables a far more real process of protracted political struggle to take place than in any of the bourgeois parties. In the groups of the far Left, the problems are in some ways worse: a more rigid ideology than that of the opportunistically pragmatic mass parties means, ironically, a greater resistance to the theoretical and programmatic elaborations from a feminist point of view; and the same is true with respect to organisational innovations. Moreover, and most crucially, the marginalisation of the far Left in this historical period denies its women and sympathetic men members a mass base amongst sectors who not only want to see progressive change in the relation between the sexes but see those changes as desirable for and in the far Left groups.

The other system I want to address here is the government bureaucracy, the non-elected army of workers and managers who run the administrative machinery of state. The by-now-familiar pyramid pattern is in evidence here as well, with women making up the vast majority of clerks and secretaries who type, process, file and retrieve the mountain of forms and
letters on which the upper echelons rest. At the top we are once again in a men's club. As in the political parties, the de facto sexual segregation of the work force at the bottom of the pyramid is the single most important factor in determining who will move up it, and we need spend no more time elaborating on that. But since the goals of bureaucratic upward mobility can be achieved only through formal promotion, not election, and since promotion is a process in which those from below are selected by those from above, with little room for the kind of alliance-making that goes on in political parties (you deliver x, I'll deliver y, etc.) the mechanisms operating for female exclusion are a little different in form, if not in substance. The woman who now heads a small federal department in the Canadian government called Status of Women Canada, and who is de facto occupying a deputy minister's position (she is the only woman at this level in Ottawa, and her title is, despite the job, director, not deputy minister) says, as does a growing body of research, that the differences in men's and women's job performance works against women in the following way: women tend to spend more time on the substance of their work. . . and less on the different kinds of activities which will move them up the bureaucratic ladder. For when it comes to actual personnel selection, the men at the top tend to choose those with whom they are most 'compatible' and with whom they can work most 'comfortably', those whose 'performance' and 'style' they've come to 'know and like'. The jargon may be different in London or Washington, but the effect is the same. Women who do not organise their worklives the way men do—from the connection-making to the odd hours for important meetings (like dinner-time, Saturday mornings and Sunday nights), who do not identify with the goals and methods of the male-dominated bureaucracy—will by definition not be seen as 'compatible' with the men, and the very few women, who do. Of course, as with party politics, women who seek upper-level appointments not only accept these conditions of work and the havoc they play with personal life, they must also cope with the resistance which the very construct 'masculinity' puts up to their presence in the male realms. This is expressed by a rather more rigorous, if sometimes circuitous, weeding-out process of feminist civil servants than of those women who accept the masculinist modalities. Sexual harassment plays an important, if little understood, role in keeping strong women down as well, and the double standard of evaluation and behaviour also comes sharply into play, with women being judged not only more harshly but on the basis of sex appropriate behaviour which in itself creates an insurmountable obstacle: women who are aggressive, verbal and decisive are judged negatively and rejected for breaking gender rules, yet upper echelon positions demand aggressive, decisive and literate qualities in their members. And on it goes. The sexual division of labour which relegates women to sustaining roles at home and in the paid workforce,
and assigns to men responsibility for large-scale social decision-making on the basis of their freedom from such labour, is reproduced within the government bureaucracy as well.

The implications of masculine power within these two systems of the core state apparatus are important to understand from a strategic point of view, and I will briefly return to this in the concluding section. Here I want to add a few more general points about the reproduction of masculine power within state apparatuses more generally. First of all, it would be useful to have detailed and exact understandings of the way in which masculine dominance reproduces itself in the other central apparatuses, and the differences between apparatuses in local, regional and national formations. It would also be very helpful to understand the impact that a growing number of women are having on these apparatuses—from the political parties to, say, the legal system where, in parts of the US and Canada for example, graduating classes in law school are now composed of almost one-third women. What will be crucial to a mapping of that impact is a clear sense of the distinction and relation between feminism, capitalism and socialism. For, as we have seen with the so-to-speak renegade sons of the working class, it is not only or so much one's background but also one's present and future orientation that determines one's position in the overall scheme of things. If we have whole female generational cohorts adopting the modalities of masculine, as well as capitalist, politics, aspiring collectively to the Thatcher role-model, this will not constitute a qualitative step forward. I think such a uniform development extremely unlikely, but what is probable is that some important segment of the seventies cohort will adopt the positions and functions of masculinism and capitalism, just as important cadres thrown up by working-class organisations adopt social-democratic, and worse, liberal and conservative policies and positions. One's sex will be no more a guarantee of progressive politics than one's class origins.

It is also important for Marxists and feminists to familiarise themselves with the information regarding the reproduction of masculinist power in the apparatus of transitional states. Many of these are of course identical, in terms of face-to-face interaction, sexual divisions of labour, sexual harassment and coercion, double standards of political and sexual behaviour and the like. But it is important for strategic reasons to understand the peculiarities of these systems as well, including the traditions and modalities of the respective national Communist Parties, and special power bases of the male bureaucracy in heavy industry, the centralised seats of political power, the overt repression of explicit feminist forces, and the relation between symbolic functions and positions of real authority and power. Such an understanding would lay the basis for targeting the necessary changes, practically speaking. Theoretically speaking, it helps to bring into even sharper focus the autonomous effectivity of masculine
dominance as an organizing principle of state formations.

Last, but not least, is the serious and essential question of the coercive and repressive apparatus of industrial states, capitalist and transitional: the military, para-military and intelligence operations which constitute such enormous positions of the state as a whole, and whose power is both massive and ubiquitous. Marxists have always seen standing armies as instruments of naked ruling-class power within capitalist state formations, and have accorded them important study and weight in the political life of transitional societies. But nowhere to my knowledge has there been any speculation or sustained consideration of the consequences of the masculinist composition and traditions of armies in this most masculinist of all systems of power. In capitalist countries, armies organise men into a men's society in which the rules and conditions which affect one's well-being are entirely severed from those with reflect, even if in partial and stunted terms, the needs of women and children—in other words, the productive and reproductive needs of the species. This principle works in less extreme, but nevertheless clearly discernable terms in police forces and intelligence services as well, and thus characterises the whole of the repressive apparatus. In transitional societies, with pre- and post-insurrectionary periods, there is potential for the army to play more progressive roles insofar as it plays a major role in mobilising the population for the process of social reorganisation and reconstruction. But as the insurrectionary period recedes, the army loses its nature as a force of liberation, a chain of rank and command independent of the control of the troops becomes institutionalised, and the armies of the transitional societies come to look and act more and more like those of the capitalist states. Invariably this process brings with it a new retrenchment of masculine dominance in every sense of the term.

The lack of Marxist discussion concerning the relation between masculine dominance and militarism, in fact the resistance to this discussion among many men Marxists, is in my opinion one of the most serious problems in Marxism's inability to come to terms with and grow from the feminist contribution. Feminists argue that there is in masculinism an orientation to conflict resolution trapped within the modalities of brute force; a system of ranked command which abstracts and absolves its members from responsibility for life, a lack of connection with the conditions of life (human and biospheric) so profound as to mystify the material limits of it; a sense of the need for the endless exploitation and domination of nature rooted in the masculinist orientation to life itself. I am aware that as I write these words I have left behind the vocabulary of Marxist discourse, but like many other feminists, I am profoundly convinced that it is Marxists who must learn to understand the meaning of these perceptions and the theoretical and empirical material which has generated them. For if it is true that some of the feminist analysis has
obscured issues of economic class and imperialism in more general discussion, it is equally true that the Marxist analysis has obscured issues of gender-class with even more disastrous results.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Having argued very hard for a conceptualisation of the relations between the genders that involves systematic appropriation, inequality, conflict and domination, it is now necessary to add one mandatory point: I have no wish to obscure economic-class differences between women by insisting on the category of gender-class. Obviously not all women are equally oppressed, and women affiliated to ruling-class men are as a rule less oppressed than working-class women. Class privilege has always softened and continues to ameliorate the conditions of life for ruling-class women and even to buy them off from feeling and expressing solidarity with their working-class sisters, whose labour they also appropriate, directly and indirectly. But I do not think that this dynamic is qualitatively different from the way in which gender-class has organised cross-economic-class masculine privilege, and bought off labouring men who have opted to retain their gender-class privilege rather than unite in struggle with their working-class sisters against the oppressors of the ruling economic-class. In other words, class divisions of both kinds cut across one another, but this makes them no less real, just more complicated. The situation is complicated further still by the fact that gender-class relations are lived in different ways than the relations between economic-classes because women and men have, for the most part, depended on one another for mutual, if unequal, aid, and have shared for the most part a mutual, if unequally free, sexuality. Genderic relations of stable mutual aid are breaking down very fast in capitalist society, but not to any great sense of joy or liberation as 'free' men and women with children confront the expanse of masculinist capitalist chaos on their own. Likewise, the old sexual arrangements are in process of profound turmoil and change, with the women's and gay movements representing the socially positive poles of possibility, and the commodification of sexuality representing the negative. Gender-class relations need to be understood in terms of the ways in which every human being feels and experiences them, as well as in terms of the way that impersonal states manipulate them, if we are to find humane and liberatory means of transcending them. They cannot be 'smashed'—they must gradually be dismantled and wither away. Gender relations are passed on generationally and interiorised within the personality at a profound level, but with all the inevitable contradictions that must exist as a result of, among other factors, the lack of fit between what we learn as children and what we must live as adults. The intrapsychic and social experience of such contradictions is a pool of potential transformative
consciousness and desire, but also of painful and terrified reaction which when mobilised acts as a massive brake on social change. Again, strategically, we must address ourselves to the political problems posed by the crisis of gender relations and the existence of masculine dominance.

Thus a revolutionary strategy which aims at real transformation must have feminist as well as classically socialist principles. Socialist-feminist or feminist-socialist, it needs to help those seeking progressive change to learn to draw the feminist line much as up till now it has helped people to draw the economic-class line. Because of the non-economically centralised nature of masculine dominance and because of men's and women's mutual sexuality, we cannot speak of the need to 'expropriate' the dominant gender-class. But if the power men possess in political life (based on their appropriation of women's labour and women's exclusion from politics) is not both shared and transformed, socialism will be blocked just as surely as if no capitalist expropriation had occurred. Thus we must speak of displacing, over time and through processes of qualitative change, at least half of the masculine cadres who now rule society on a planetary basis, and of changing the whole relation of the genders to political power and reproductive labour. The path to socialism can only travel through the transformation of gender as well as economic relations if social relations really are to lose their character as matrices of domination. The practical implications of this position are as extensive as are the programmatic, strategic, tactical and organisational aspects of common work and struggle, and are expressed at all these levels simultaneously.

To tackle these we need to work at change on each distinct but linked level in which unequal gender relations express themselves: the intrapsychic, in which each individual man and woman must take responsibility for overcoming the legacies of sexism; the interpersonal—in couples and families and close friendship groups; in social and political associations in which we work or which we alternatively construct to express and organise our public life as a species. We must, as many feminists argued during the British debate on the Alternative Economic Strategy, change the values that guide our efforts in these associations, and place the values which stem from the reproductive aspects of our lives at centre stage. The existence of human life depends on its actual, day-today, bodily reproduction, and on the existence of a biosphere of which it is a part and without which it cannot survive. Because of the genderic division of labour the principles which guide the masculinist state are those based on an abstraction from and a denigration of those aspects of existence, a smash-and-grab attitude to the world, a rape of nature, an endless plunder and greed for domination.

Until now, Marxism has not seen this problem, for two important reasons. First, Marxism itself is a product of what Mary O’Brien has called male-stream thought, a stream which has taken the sexual division
of labour for granted as natural and unproblematic. Its categories have assumed and therefore mystified that division of labour, and Marxism’s organisations have reproduced it, adopting forms of functioning and power which have been labelled proletarian and revolutionary, when in reality they have masked significant forms of masculine privilege, values and priorities. Second, and not unrelated, Marxist men (the majority gender in the Marxist movement) have benefitted from women’s reproductive and nurturant labour just as much as any other men, and they have been tremendously reluctant to give it up. The reasons for this reluctance are similar to those of men outside the movement. Practically, it is much harder to go to meetings, organise campaigns, run for parliament or write complicated, demanding theory if one has to wash socks, cook meals, clean house, nurse sick relatives, do homework with the kids and spend a lot of time figuring out how to mediate between the conflicting emotional and material needs of family members and/or close friends—all of which women do, and all of which are absolutely indispensable labours to human existence. Additionally, connectedly and no less compellingly, Marxist men are socialised like other men and share with them deeply felt values of masculine identification, the negative aspects of which require (unless worked through consciously) certain forms of ritualised as well as practical subordination from women. (It is not only time-consuming but also ‘unmanly’ to do many aspects of reproductive labour; it is definitely a blow to one’s masculinity to be rejected in favour of a woman for a political position, or for that matter as a sexual partner.) The problem is that all these masculine investments serve the camp of the class enemy, and make it impossible to build the kinds of alliance between socialist men and women that we need.

But, and this is why so many feminists are engaged in this debate with Marxist men, Marxism is also the most radical of the world views to come out of the male-dominated epoch of human history, and many of us still think that it carries within it the possibility for the correction of its internal omissions and distortions, and the practical transcendence of its internal weaknesses. The commitment to a human society free from domination and the implacable opposition to ideological mystification put Marxism as a theory and a movement in a qualitatively different position vis-à-vis feminism than any other male-stream social theories. This is not simply a rhetorical point: there is evidence for it in the superior performance of workers parties, even of the most reformist nature, on issues affecting women when compared to those of the bourgeoisie, and in the fact that some of the most important strategic discussions about the actual making of a non-sexist society take place through and around women and men who are Marxists, or Marxist-feminists. But these positive achievements are too small and partial in comparison with what is demanded by the reality of masculine domination and more must be done.
The challenge for Marxism is to help bring the so-called feminine values into the public sphere, and to help guide political life on that basis. Marxism must break from its Stalinist and masculinist heritage by learning to work with modalities of self-activity and self-organisation that take into account the gender division of labour in the working class and other oppressed social strata. There must be a conscious commitment on the part of Marxist men to take all appropriate means at all times to dismantle that division of labour, whether in mass campaigns and parties or in local politics, study groups and smaller political organisations. Through affirmative action in all political and social associations, we must all attempt to implement the inverse law of masculine domination: a greater presence for feminist women the more centralised the level. Men need to meet in workshops within all manner of political and social associations to discuss together the questions and problems they encounter in dealing with sexism and masculinism so that they can begin to hold each other accountable. This will set the precondition to their being able to set goals with women in what must be, at many crucial levels, a mutual battle to overcome masculine domination. And insofar as Marxist theory per se has a useful role to play in the longer and larger process of social transformation, Marxist men must begin to engage as seriously with feminist political theory as feminists have done with Marxist political theory. If we really do want to constitute forms of public coordination and cooperation which maximise the creative potential in both individuals and collectivities, Marxist men really must engage with feminism at all levels, to see what can be learned and changed, so that we can go forward together towards human liberation.

NOTES

1. Marx Centenary Conference, Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, March 12–15, 1983. For their special concentrated contributions of intellectual stimulation and practical help, I want warmly to thank Suzanne Findlay, Jackie Larkin and Pamela Walker. In addition, since this paper comes out of a long process of thought, discussion and practical work, I want also to thank Deirdre Gallagher, Roberta Hamilton, Meg Luxton, Heather-Jon Maroney, Wally Seccombe, and at a somewhat greater distance from my day-today life, Zillah Eisenstein and Nicole-Laurin Frenette, for the important contributions they have made over time to its production. Of course, I take sole responsibility for the contents of this paper.


4. There is no one term which is satisfactory to describe all the societies in which
some sort of collectivisation of the means of production has occurred. But I do not agree with the term state capitalism, and certainly not with 'actually existing socialism'—transitional societies seems preferable to me.


The term 'genderic' was coined by Mary O'Brien, op. cit. It is used here and throughout to indicate the relations characteristic of gender-class. As expanded on below, and adapted from Ehrenreich and English, op. cit., the term 'patriarchy' will be used to refer to pre-industrial forms of masculine dominance and 'masculinism' to new ones characteristic of advanced industrial societies.

Frederick Engels, op. cit.

10. See Varda Burstyn, 'Economy, Sexuality and Politics: Engels and the Sexual Division of Labour', Socialist Studies, University of Manitoba, July 1983 (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of Engels's text and an elaboration of the summarised interpretation given here.

11. Ibid.


Cited in Greta Nemiroff, 'The Empowerment of Women', *Alternatives* (Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, Spring 1982)


Exceptional women of the ruling economic-classes have at times played important roles in mature state formations. But in virtually all these cases we are either talking about women administering a masculine-dominated state in the interests of the men to whom they are affiliated by kin, class or ideology in most cases (up to and including M. Thatcher) or, as in the case of women like Theodora of Byzantium, of even rarer cases of women trying to use the state to ease women's lot—an attempt that has met with the same fate as the social democratic effort to use the capitalist state to better proletarian fortunes. Even in these cases, up to the twentieth century, these women's access to the machinery of state was determined by their masculine affiliation and not by their own rights.

For definitions of public and private in this context see Mary O'Brien, op. cit.; Stacey and Price, op. cit.; Eisenstein, op. cit.


Frederick Engels, op. cit.; Meg Luxton, 'Women, Work and Family', in Heather-Jon Maroney and Meg Luxton, eds., *The Political Economy of Women* (working title; Toronto, University of Toronto Press, forthcoming, 1984); Fraser Harrison,

27. Fraser Harrison, op. cit.; Lori Rotenberg, 'The Wayward Worker: Toronto's Prostitutes at the Turn of the Century', in *Women at Work*, op. cit.


32. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, Dell Books, 1963); Hymonwitz and Weisson, op. cit. For interesting discussions about the way in which this demobilisation was experienced (and aided) in one important area of cultural life in the US, see Molly Haskell, *From Reverence to Rape: The Treatment of Women in the Movies* (New York, Penguin Books, 1975), chapters 4 and 6; Marjorie Rosen, *Popcorn Venus: Women, Movies and the American Dream* (New York, Avon Books, 1974), chapters 3–6; Joan Mellen, *Big Bad Wolves: Masculinity in the American Film* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1977). A number of feminists have argued that this present wave of the women's movement has developed at least in part because its organising cadre are the daughters of their mothers' emotional and ideological revolt, which was absorbed along with and in contradiction to the renewed patriarchal and masculinist ideology of the fifties. I share this analysis of ideological roots.

33. This term is borrowed from Wally Seccombe, op. cit. For discussion of its collapse see Varda Burstyn, *Feminism in the Political Arena*, Part I (CBC Transcripts, Box 500, Station A, Toronto, Canada M5W 1E6); Zillah Eisenstein, op. cit.


Women's earnings average out to a little more than $10,000 a year each—nowhere near enough to support a single in a swinging lifestyle, much less a single mother and her children. For most women the obvious survival strategy has been to establish a claim on some man's more generous wage, i.e., to marry him. For men, on the other hand, as *Playboy*" writers clearly saw, the reverse is true: not counting love, home-cooked meals, or other benefits of the married state, it makes more sense for a man to keep his paycheque for himself, rather than to share it with an underpaid or unemployed woman and her no doubt unemployed children. A recent study by Stanford University sociologist Lenore J. Weitzman suggests the magni-
tude of men and women's divergent interests—upon divorce, a woman's standard of living falls, on average, by 73% for the first year, while the standard of living for her ex-husband rises by 42%. For men, the alternative to marriage might be loneliness and TV dinners; for women, it is, all too often, poverty (pp. 14–15).


36. By the sex industry per se, I mean prostitution, massage parlours, gay and heterosexual gathering places (i.e. steam baths), live sex shows, peep shows, telephone fantasy services, pornography of the film, video, magazine and literary varieties, and sexual aids from lingerie to whips and chains. The commodification of sexuality is not restricted to these phenomena, but forms a part of many other (not directly sexual) enterprises.

37. This statement is made with the full knowledge that under the impetus of feminist union leaders and strong women's organising in important sectors of the trade-union movement, we have begun to see important instances of men workers striking and otherwise supporting the demands of women in their unions, and even, very occasionally, in other unions. The issues have ranged from equal pay to maternity leave to abortion to sexual harassment, and this support is perhaps the most heartening single feature of the beginnings of visible change within the male membership of mass movements and organisations. But these struggles are still few and far between. For each instance of support, we have far too many of indifference or resistance. For each time a complaint about sexual harassment is taken up by a union, we have hundreds, thousands of instances of harassment and assault on the streets, at work, in the home. Side by side with growing support for feminist demands we have the growth of the sex industries. For every initiative to win abortion rights, we have counter-initiatives to deny them again. And for every successful interpersonal struggle between a woman and a man to share the responsibility for domestic and emotional labour, we have—how can we even measure the number?—endless defeats: separations or a return to the sexist status quo being the most common variants. We would benefit very much from post-seventies studies showing the extent of masculine participation in domestic labour—perhaps a breakthrough invisible to my own eyes has occurred during this most important of all decades. But I doubt it. The victories in the paid workforce and in the home are certainly to be welcomed. But they are too scant to mask the saddening reality of continuing masculine dominance.

In June 1983, the New Democratic Party government of Manitoba presided over the violent police entry into an abortion clinic organised and supported by the Women's Movement, where doctors, nurses, and clients were all arrested. The Attorney General's Office is planning to press charges.

From 1970 to 1982 Suzanne Findlay worked in developing what was called 'the Woman's Programme' in the Department of the Secretary of State in Ottawa; she headed that programme and also served as Vice-President of the Advisory Council on the Status of Women—a body designed to advise cabinet on issues and policies of concern to women. In two unpublished papers she has taken an in-depth look at those experiences in terms both of existing political theory and its ability to account for the experience of feminism within the state and the lessons the women's movement and the Left need to draw from those and similar experiences. Suzanne Findlay, 'Lobbying Our Way to Revolution', 1982, and 'Struggles Within the State: The Feminist Challenge to Hegemony', 1983. That challenge, it should be noted, was unsuccessful, but her study of the ways in which the bureaucratic apparatus as such dealt with that challenge is most instructive. Both essays are being developed for Luxton and Maroney, eds., op. cit. (forthcoming 1984).


Wolchick and Lovenduski, in Hill and Lovenduski, op. cit. For recent information on women in Eastern European and Soviet elites, see Lovenduski and Hill, op. cit., ch. 13; for China, see Barbara Wolfe Jancar, op. cit.

As the feminist saying goes, 'Women who strive for equality lack ambition'. See Gail Warshofsky, op. cit. Stern, op. cit.; The Women in Eastern Europe Group, op. cit.; Roman Laba, in a paper presented to the Marx Centennial Conference, March 1983, writes,
produced irregularly. In Poland such devices have been available only in special shops for the last few years. One unforgettable scene of the Solidarity movement was Solidarity and Politbureau member Zofia Glemp being taken to the factory bathroom by the Lodz textile workers who wanted to show her what they used during their menstrual periods. Although Poland had the 11th largest GNP in the world, such devices never made it into the plan. In their place is a very liberal abortion policy. Another aspect of the sexual politics is the disastrous housing situation. An average of 25 years waiting for an apartment. This situation has worsened since the crisis began in 1980. The Sex-Pol movement awaits a reincarnation in Eastern Europe.


The Women in Eastern Europe Group, op. cit.; Tatyana Mamanova, personal communications.

For a number of discussions on the 'instrumentality' of the state or lack of it, see, for example, Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class (London, Verso, 1978); Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau, New Left Review 95, January/February, 1976; Corrigan, op. cit.; Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (New York, Schoken, 1978).

Stacey and Price, op. cit.; Hill and Lavenduski, op. cit.

See Varda Burstyn, 'Feminism in the Political Arena', part II (CBC Transcripts, Box 500, Station A, Toronto, Ontario, M5W 1E6) for a detailed look at women and political parties in the United States, Canada and Britain; interviews with senior women party activists and parliamentarians, a discussion of party power structures, and other considerations of ways in which masculine programme formulation and norms of comportment and organisation express themselves across 'political' (read economic-class) lines from the Centre to the far Left.

Hill and Lovenduski, op. cit.; Burstyn, ibid.

Burstyn, ibid., Parts II and III, for a discussion of the case of Lise Payette, feminist ex-cabinet minister in the Parti Quebecois government, by her senior political adviser, Lorraine Goddard.


Burstyn, 'Feminism in the Political Arena', Part II.

Ibid., see also Suzanne Findlay, note 41.

Alina Heitlinger, op. cit., ch. 18.

Tatyana Mamanova and her feminist colleagues were threatened with arrest if they did not cease publication of Women and Russia. Some, like Mamanova, chose exile and ongoing solidarity work. Others remained in the USSR and
were harrassed, arrested and eventually imprisoned by the authorities. In Poland too, a group of feminists organised around Warsaw University in 1980-81—and it too has since been disbanded. In East Germany, a group in Leipzig was also disbanded by the state and its members threatened and harrassed.