1978 may be a good vantage point from which to survey the development of dissent and opposition in the countries within the Soviet orbit. The blunder the Russians had committed by engineering the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries ten years ago produced in the whole of Eastern Europe an effect opposite to that intended. One of the aims of the utterly unimaginative men in the Kremlin was to stamp out once and for all the ferment of ideas which produced the Prague Spring. The shock of the invasion was at first stunning. Then, ostensibly, "normalization" followed, with the old orthodoxy once more imposed from above. And yet the ferment which the Russians had dreaded remained. Moreover, it has spread well beyond Czechoslovakia and has been in various degrees affecting the very depths of post-capitalist societies, now and again sending tremors up to the surface.

In East Germany it was perhaps Rudolf Bahro who most emotionally expressed the impact the events of 1968 had on him: "... the tanks, the intervention against this attempt to give socialism a new face—this changed something in me, irrevocably, fundamentally; from that moment on I became hard, intransigent." (West German TV interview, 23.7.77)

In Poland students demonstrated in the streets of Warsaw rhythmically: "The whole of Poland awaits her Dubcek!" In the Soviet Union the invasion politicized the Samizdat until then preoccupied mostly with freedom of artistic and literary expression. V. Turchin, the eminent theoretical physicist, exclaimed: "I cannot go on studying the flow of neutrons while in my country human rights are violated and while Soviet troops invade Czechoslovakia." A year after the invasion a call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops was addressed to the Soviet government by Gen. Grigorenko and I. Yakhimovich and widely circulated in Samizdat clandestinity. True, this action involved only a handful of people, but it is a fact that in the Soviet Union articulate dissent, let alone active opposition, is the business of individuals or at best very small groups only.

During the past decade the movement of opposition to the Soviet model of socialism has become widely differentiated. Various tendencies compete with each other. Closer contacts have been established with the West and an enormous literature by the dissenters and about dissent is being
In the present essay I shall have to limit myself to surveying the developments of the last decade in a few countries only. I shall also confine myself to considering the problems which preoccupy those groups of oppositionists who may be described, somewhat vaguely, as the "broad left"; that is those who, though rejecting the "Soviet model" do not reject socialism. Among many others, two main questions determine the tactics and the strategy of the opposition: which class or which layer of society should be regarded as the main "agent of change" of the so-called "existing socialism" and what role in the process of this change is likely to be played by the established Communist Parties. Nowhere, of course, can clear-cut and definite answers be given to these questions. But the perspective in which they are viewed in different countries and the emphases which underlie the discussions are interesting and significant.

The awakening and the activity of the Polish working class placed Poland in the centre of attention in 1970-71, during the wave of strikes which began in the Baltic ports and ended with the removal of Gomulka, and again, in 1976, when the striking workers within 24 hours forced the government to annul the decreed rise in prices of consumer goods. This demonstration of workers' power was not yet, as some wishful thinkers in the West declared, the death-knell of the bureaucracy. Nor was it, of course, just an outburst of "destructive hooliganism" as the "Workers' State" in its humiliation had at first tried to claim.

Although both in 1970 and in 1976 the revolt was sparked off by purely economic demands, it could not be classified as pure economism. In the course of the strikes new political and social factors influenced the struggle. The contradiction between the very idea of socialism and everyday reality became even more blatant than before. The proletariat, solemnly assured day in and day out of its "leading role", realized that it had absolutely no say in matters affecting its very life and that, far from "leading" anything, it had been led into conditions in which the ordinary workers could not make ends meet.

"About social justice, about equal distribution of the national income... can talk highly placed members of the party, pseudo-activists of trade unions, functionaries, militiamen, or members of the army, scientists and artists, who without any limitations can avail themselves of all material, cultural and social values. This narrow social layer, having no idea how the worker lives, has every reason to support the policy of the party and the government, because these people have been provided with nearly everything."3

Thus wrote a group of industrial workers from Poland. The sense of
injustice and the frustrations are all the greater as the worker feels helpless. With the state as the only employer and with the "pseudo-activists" of unions which have a corporate character and which embrace all employees, from the top directors to cleaners, the worker feels that his particular interests are not given due weight. In the heat of the strike he becomes ever more aware of social inequalities.

In June 1976 in the industrial town of Lodz the strikers demanded an application of new methods of wage and salary increases by absolute figures, which would narrow differentials, and not calculated by percentages which give greater advantage to higher paid earners. On another occasion voices were raised for a limitation of salaries paid to functionaries of party and state. Some sort of "Part-maximum", decreed by Lenin but long since forgotten, which would equalize the pay of the official with the average worker's pay, was loudly demanded. The call for egalitarianism was unmistakably heard.

Discouraged from showing any initiative at the factory bench—any improvement in production is the concern of technical and scientific staff—deprived of any say in the running of "their" factory, the workers demonstrated during the strike a surprising, hitherto unseen, capacity for organization. The setting-up of workers' councils, of strike committees, liaison and coordination of action between groups and factories were achieved with speed and efficiency; all democratic processes were also duly observed during debates on policy plans and in decision making. This common action, in which the workers became conscious of their own power and ability, increased their resentment at the shabby and disdainful way they had been treated by the high-ups. Together with economic demands and those for free trade unions—"our own"—indignant protests were also heard against the authorities' insulting language: "The government should react differently" the leaflet of one factory said, while in another tools were downed in protest against lack of information or plain misinformation by the national press.

If so much dignity, inventiveness and resourcefulness became released among the workers during their strike activity, how much more of it would come to the fore if it were directed towards positive aims, towards a truly socialist and democratic organization of labour by a free association of producers.

S. Horton, a Polish oppositionist whose Samizdat essay has been circulating in Poland since the beginning of 1977, characterized the events of 1970-71 as a "revolution of hope" and those of 1976 as a "revolution of hopelessness." How is it that so much courage and ability on the part of the workers, so many sacrifices and even bloodshed, brought only meagre results and blighted hope? Both strike waves involved considerable numbers, both frightened the rulers and shook the fabric of society; they were "won" in so far as some of the economic demands were met. In
1970-71 one discredited leader made his exit and was replaced by a new one whose fate may, in the end, be similar. But the essence of the regime with its rigid hierarchical structure, with centralized decision making at the top and orders executed without question at the bottom of the social ladder, remained unchanged.

If one looks into the history of the Polish workers' movement since the end of the war, one can see that much more was achieved in the first major confrontation way back during the exhilarating "Polish October" of 1956. Numerically the industrial working class was then weaker—it has nearly doubled within the last 22 years. But—as Horton rightly remarks—at that time in its striving for fundamental reform it had its allies in the anti-Stalinist faction of the party: the power bloc at the top was split, and the socialist urban intelligentsia was from the beginning providing active support and assisting in the formulation of a programme of political action.

In 1968 the government succeeded not only in isolating the workers from the intelligentsia, but even in turning them against the students in revolt; in 1970-71 the dockers and textile workers acted on their own, deprived of any allies; in 1976 the intelligentsia came to the rescue of the strikers after the main battles had been fought. The chief merit of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) lay precisely in breaking down the barriers separating "brawn" from "brain." It was a defensive organization, quite effective in protecting the strikers from the worst excesses of police terror and a vengeful judiciary, but it was too heterogeneous a body to provide a political framework which could, in competition with the official ideology, oppose successfully the sociopolitical control monopolized by party and state.

In the course of the year 1977-78 the Workers' Defence Committee transformed itself into a Committee for Social Self-Defence and has become an unstructured vanguard of intellectuals. It is from among these, mostly young writers and academics, that the staff of the so-called "flying universities" come—irregular, unofficial and much harassed groups, meeting in private homes and listening to lectures conducted outside normal and approved educational channels. Needless to say, the curriculum would not have met with the approval of the Ministry of Education.

The tradition of this kind of activity is still very strong in Poland and it goes back to the times of the struggle for national independence when it contributed to the preservation of Polish culture against the attempts at Russification and Germanization. Adam Michnik, the well-known historian and KOR activist and one of the most irrepressible of the founders of the "universities" explicitly refers to this national tradition. The students of the "universities" with some exceptions are said to belong to the working class, but, says Michnik, "It is the intellectuals who create independent public opinion and develop non-conformist attitudes."
The Committee acts as a pressure group and by various half-legal means tries to expose the violations of legality by the government and its agencies. The "violation of legality" and not only the "law" on censorship preoccupied also the last Congress of the Union of Writers. The President of the Union was charged with bringing to the attention of the Party Secretary, Edward Gierek, certain "irregularities" in the application of the law.

The law itself and the "irregularities" brought a result as paradoxical as it was unwelcome to the authorities. More and more writers whose works cannot pass through the eye of the censorship needle have recourse to the Samizdat. More of less ephemeral publications, like *Zapis*, *Puls* or *Opinia* contain writings which were never submitted to the censor and were not even meant to appear openly. Some of them have that freshness and spontaneity that comes with freedom from self-imposed constraint. Others reached readers after having languished for months or years in the drawers of the censors. Much of this Samizdat is only half-clandestine. In some cases the editors' names and addresses are provided and authors' names are concealed behind very transparent pseudonyms.

*Trotzky* once wrote that "without a guiding organization the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston box. But nevertheless what moves things is not the piston, but the steam."

What organization could play the role of the piston box? Could the Communist Party perhaps fulfil that task? To this question the answer of the main currents of Polish opposition is negative, though there are differences in emphasis in the treatment of the problem.

In Poland, perhaps more than in any other country of the Soviet bloc, the line between socialist opposition and opposition to socialism is blurred. "... the new opposition does not refer any more to 'true' or 'good' or 'democratic' socialism. It seems rather to turn towards certain traditions and towards the rights of man and citizen, rights which have already been won in many European countries" states in the preface the editor of *La Pologne: une societi en dissidence*, referred to before.

The Polish intelligentsia on the whole resents not so much the counterfeit brand of socialism imposed on their country as the violation of the country's sovereignty by the traditionally despised Moscovites, and the opposition, even on the left, has a strong nationalistic edge. Jacek Kuron (co-author with K. Modzelewski of the famous 1965 letter to the party), a co-founder of KOR whose courage is undiminished in spite of two longish spells in prison, is introduced in the book quoted above, as representing an extreme left Marxist tendency. In his draft of the Common Platform of the Opposition (p. 113) he stresses that he attaches equal
weight to the struggle for independence as to that against totalitarianism. His language is curiously reminiscent of the old all too familiar verbiage of the pre-war Polish establishment. We are reminded of the "substantial Polish contribution" to European democracy in the XV and XVI and XVIII centuries and "especially of the Constitution of 1791." We are also assured of the "congenital independence" of the Polish Catholic Church, the great defender of individual freedom which is a "fundamental concept of Christianity and our whole civilization." The "congenital independence" of the Polish Catholic Church is a myth, nor does it have much of a tradition in defending individual freedom in the pre-war Poland of Pilsudski and the Colonels. In a country which used to be described in pre-war history books as "the bulwark of Christianity", the Church has always stood for law and order. Since the war it has acquired new weight as the only tolerated centre of opposition. Some of this influence is undoubtedly due to the spiritual comfort it gives to people sorely tried by the horrors of war, by persecution, poverty and oppression.

The Church has, in these new circumstances, changed its tactics. Straight anti-communist tirades against the godless regime have been replaced by sermons about the rights of man, freedom of conscience and human dignity. This most hierarchical institution has come to speak in sociological terms about the working class and its right to strike. But when it comes to practical issues of, say, divorce, contraception or abortion, the Church remains as retrograde as ever. It is indeed difficult to understand Kuron's great trust in the genuine metamorphosis of this most immutable and dogmatic of institutions.

Adam Michnik in his programmatic statement "For a Strategy of the Polish Opposition", speaks much less about the church. He acknowledges the merits of the Catholic intelligentsia in the struggle for a greater degree of political and economic independence from the Soviet Union and in winning for the Church quite a considerable measure of tolerance and freedom. But, he says, the leaders of the Catholic Organization Znak have abandoned their own political line in exchange for an "entente" with the Party and thus brought their movement into disrepute. Michnik maintains that there can be no "entente" with the Party which has "deleted this very word from its political vocabulary." He is also of the opinion that the time when the opposition could, with any hope of success, address itself to the Party or to the ruling group and thereby influence it, has long passed. Those who had believed in the possibility of "humanizing and democratizing the system" by acting "within the framework of the party and the Marxist doctrine" had achieved nothing and would achieve nothing. Now, he says, it is time to speak not to the rulers but to the ruled. "Instead of suggesting to the power bloc how it can 'improve itself'," the opposition must teach society "how to act."

Two critics of the regime who belong to the older generation,
W. Bienkowski and E. Lipinski, represent those who still want to "speak to the Party" and see the party as the main agent of the change.

Bienkowski had been a member of the Communist Party in pre-war Poland. After the Polish October of 1956, in Gomulka's best days, he became a member of his government. Now under a cloud and in opposition he analyses the tensions in post-capitalist societies labouring under the ossified "Soviet model" and hopes for the inner regeneration of the system. Couched in semi-Marxist terms, but published only abroad, Bienkowski's writings somewhat disprove Michnik's contention that "in present-day Poland Marxist-Leninist doctrine is nothing but an empty discourse, an official ritual." Bienkowski detects in the Party enough dynamism to reform itself and to resolve existing social contradictions which, he fears, threaten the very premises of socialism.

Professor E. Lipinski, an old Socialist, joined the Polish United Workers Party in 1949. His popularity and prestige in the country was considerably enhanced when he acted as co-founder and main spokesman of KOR. As an economist he calls for a loosening of economic structures and the introduction of some reforms on the line of the Russian NEP. In his Open Letter to Gieriek he tries to persuade the Party Secretary that "the replacement of the conveyor belt by team work in a Volvo factory" is "more important for the building of socialism than would be the nationalization of that factory." In the name of social peace, in the name of progress, he appeals to the party to admit plurality of views and plurality of parties. Unchanelled and unguided, social discontent may endanger the friendly relations with the USSR which her geographic position imposes on Poland. In his disarming naivete, Professor Lipinski does not seem to fear that precisely "plurality of parties" may endanger this friendship.

Underneath the wish to preserve "friendly relations" with the Soviet Union is the anxiety common to the party and the opposition lest Poland suffer the lot of Czechoslovakia.

* * *

Is the party then a "dead loss" which should be written off or are there still in it forces capable of embarking on the road of fundamental changes? Michnik does not deny that the party hierarchy is not monolithic, but contains various tendencies, often contradictory ones. But, he maintains, even its most progressive elements have no interest in democratizing the system or admitting a plurality of parties or any degree of self-management into the life of society. If they seem "progressive", it is only because in their pragmatic way they understand that a measure of collaboration with the democratic forces may be more effectual than brute repression. These "progressive" pragmatists, concludes Michnik, can there-
fore never become the "allies" of the democratic opposition, though they "may become its partners." The precise difference between "allies" and "partners" is not quite clear.

At the beginning of 1978 an unusual document came to light, a document testifying to the existence of "liberalizing" elements (or at least wishing to appear as such). The semi-clandestine Opinia circulated an Open Letter to Gierek insisting that this had been done without the consent of the signatories all of whom are well known public figures. Albrecht, Matwin, and Morawski were prominent Gomulka supporters in 1956; Ochab, at one time described as a Stalinist, had been the General Secretary of the Party, then became Head of State. He resigned in protest against the antisemitic drive of the late 1960s. The Letter is a plea for a "dialogue with the citizen", for democracy within the party and outside it. "\textit{The sources of our major difficulties are largely political. ... To them belong the undemocratic form of government and, first and foremost, the lack of a democratic exchange of opinions. ...}" says the Letter demanding "the activation of healthy forces in the party" stifled by bureaucratic control of the machine. Conditions must be created for the re-establishment of workers' councils, as well as for the "independence of the existing political parties" with their own "authentic positions" in parliament and local institutions.

This admirable "Platform of the 14" has not had much effect on the party. It was easy to dismiss it as the grumblings of a group removed from power at the time of the exit of their leader. It was even easier to recall that in their time of office not much was done either to "reactivate the healthy forces" or to "re-establish workers' councils" or enter into a "dialogue with the citizen." Now the citizens do not see any reasons to enter into a dialogue with relics of a not too glorious past. The "Platform" is known all over Poland, but it is so innocuous that no attempt has been made to penalize those who signed or circulated it. This kind of semi-institutionalized opposition has not found an echo in society. But this does not preclude the appearance of a more trustworthy splinter group whose appeal may meet with some success.

Returning to Trotsky’s metaphor, one could rightly say that what “moved things" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the "steam" enclosed in the "piston box" of the Communist Party. Only brutal intervention from outside stopped the process. Should one count on remaking the existing piston box or aim at building a new one on a different pattern? Much of the discussion among the present day opponents of Husak centres on this problem.

Though the trends in the Czech resistance are varied, the hard core is
undoubtedly socialist. One might say that in fact there are two Communist Parties in existence: one the ruling official party of Husak, and the other, diffuse, with hardly any organization and subject to persecution and harassment—the Party of the Expelled. It is a considerable force as it consists of half a million members of the CP who were deprived of their party cards after the 1968 invasion. If some of them, weary and disillusioned, fell by the roadside, the Party of the Expelled was strengthened by the influx of new and younger cadres.

The first major political act of the Czechoslovak resistance was to draw up the Manifesto of 28 October 1970 which in the form of leaflets was distributed all over the country. Formulated by representatives of various regions, groups and trends which managed to come together under cover of clandestinity, the Manifesto, with the Short Action Programme which followed later, was a basic programmatic statement of the Socialist Opposition. At that time, after two years of occupation, it became clear that not much could be salvaged from the reforms achieved during the Prague Spring. And yet the view that "the Party remains in spite of everything the forum from which the struggle for a renewal of socialism must be waged" was not completely abandoned. The adherents of this view could argue convincingly that the very initiative for the Prague Spring came from within the official party in spite of its murky past, in spite of the purges and mock trials. (Might not a sense of guilt and shame for these crimes have also helped in the spring awakening?) However, by 1970 opposition within the official party was wellnigh impossible, although by no means all of the one million card carrying and vetted members were enthusiastic supporters of the regime. Nor is the apparatus and leadership immune from conflicts which may lead to a new crisis.

The Manifesto was proclaimed not on behalf of a new party, but on behalf of the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens. The distinction is significant. The Movement is not a structured organization but a "political trend" with its roots in the socialist consciousness of society. It has "an intellectual centre determining the general political line and taking practical initiatives", but leaves a great deal of autonomy to socialist resistance groups which were spontaneously springing up among various layers of the population. The authors of the Manifesto explicitly renounced the setting up of any structure, any formal hierarchy with directives "from above", but placed reliance on loose links between groups which, within the common programme, would act according to local conditions.

Is there then a danger that the "energy of the masses will dissipate like steam"? This objection which, say the Czechoslovak socialists, is in principle correct, cannot be automatically applied in all cases. The "intellectual centre" anticipated that in the process of the struggle the "loose groups" would acquire a degree of stability and gradually develop into parties or organizations with a clear and viable structure.
In Czechoslovakia, much more than in Poland or in the Soviet Union, an "intellectual centre" is able to address itself and speak directly to the people. The barriers between the intelligentsia and the working class, if they exist at all, are easy to cross. The Czechoslovak workers are to a high degree class conscious; the memories of social struggles as well as those for democratic rights in the pre-war Republic are still alive; and, last but not least, communism had been much more of an organic growth than an order imposed by the foreign conqueror as it was elsewhere. Also the fact that the core of the resistance is formed by the Party of the Expelled assures it a firm base among the rank and file. True, among the expelled there are more intellectuals than workers, but the Party of the Expelled has been able to preserve its former links and its influence in factories and plants. Even if the Czech workers cannot afford openly to register their disapproval of "normalization", they remain passively discontented. Independent trade unions and factory councils, which played a considerable role in management and in social life, were re-activated after the exit of Novotny and became a notable feature of the Prague Spring. Of such gains no advanced working class can easily be deprived especially by taskmasters who rule in the name of socialism, and were put in power with the support of foreign tanks.

Could the débâcle of 1968 have been prevented? The "errors" of the Prague Spring are still issues which agitate all the oppositionists in their search for a new political strategy. How to steer a safe course between the Scylla of the repugnant "Soviet model" of socialism and the Charybdis of an anti-Soviet bourgeois democracy with its ugly face of capitalism? In this search the Czech socialists see themselves as a vanguard of other forces in the Soviet bloc. "Ten years after the Prague Spring", says Jiri Pelikan, "the main questions are these: Could the Soviet intervention have been avoided? And how? These are not academic questions because the answers will be useful to oppositionists and dissidents in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and Berlin. . . The answer should be of interest to all those in the West who seek a socialist alternative. . . They should have no illusions: Any attempt to introduce 'a different socialism. . .' will meet the same hostility of the Kremlin's ruling group."

What are then the lessons of 1968? Had the leaders been unduly compliant vis-à-vis the Russians? Should they have mobilized the population instead of bargaining with the invaders? Should they have sent urgent SOS messages to Belgrade, Bucarest and Peking asking for support against the Russian tanks? The answer to these questions affects the character of Czechoslovak resistance and determines various trends within it.

While the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens expressed a definite political tendency, the movement for the Charter 77 was more diffuse and heterogeneous. Charter 77 was animated by the Helsinki spirit and geared to the abortive Belgrade conference on Human Rights. The
signatories represented nearly all left groups from the Radical Socialist Opposition (Peter Uhl) to Havel's National Democrats and Vaculic's Christian Democrats. The government was quick to condemn the Charter outright. It also tried to present it as a whimsical act of a handful of disgruntled intellectuals. But here it did not succeed. At huge meetings called in factories, workers refused to endorse the condemnation of a document they were not given a chance to read. In the event, the whole feverish campaign had to be called off, but only after the news about the Charter had spread far and wide and the authorities realized that they had acted as unwitting publicity agents for a "subversive" movement they were determined to extirpate. The courageous stand of the signatories evoked a considerable response; it caused embarrassment not only to Husak but to his fellow bureaucrats in the Eastern bloc as well as to the bosses in Moscow. It stimulated the demand for the observance of Human Rights among oppositionists in other countries with whom the Chartists succeeded in establishing contacts. They themselves condemned violation of these rights not only in the Soviet orbit, but also in the West, when they expressed solidarity with the victims of *Berufsverbot* in West Germany and defended Heinrich Böll against the witch-hunt of the German Establishment. They stirred the consciences of Western Communist Parties and enlisted the support of Western Trade Unions.

However, by the very fact of being al.-embracing, the Chartist movement contained centrifugal forces which grew stronger with the disillusionment brought about by the fiasco of the Belgrade meeting. Even at the very inception of the movement there were some activists whose courage and genuine socialist credentials could not be doubted, but who refused to sign the Charter. To these belonged for instance Karel Kosik, a Marxist sociologist, the author of *The Dialectic of the Concrete*, who, in 1968 had opposed all concessions to the Russians. It was not that people like Kosik did not have Human Rights at heart, but they feared that by eschewing political issues, the Chartists would contribute to the de-politization of the opposition, blunting thereby its combative edge. As the Human Rights campaign began to fade, these arguments acquired new cogency. However, if the solidarity of the Chartists has not been impaired, this was due perhaps more to the persecution by Husak's police which welded them even closer together than to the intrinsic cohesiveness of the movement.

Within the Socialist Opposition attempts were made to steer the Charter towards a more distinctly political and radical outlook. The pressure came mainly from the younger generation of dissidents. Many of them are grouped around Peter Uhl and his banned Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party. This movement dates from before 1968 when it was widespread among university students. Many among these "children of the Prague Spring" were later denied the possibility to continue their
studies as punishment for the sins of their parents who now belong to the Party of the Expelled. Often "proletarianized", they have close links with educated older workers as well as with apprentices now entering factories and political life.

Peter Uhl, a former research student, was tried for oppositional activities in 1971 and spent four years in prison. His prestige among all shades of socialist opinion had been growing through the years of occupation. This was so not only because of his undaunted courage and the firm ideological stand with which he faced his judges, but also because the past decade had shown how correct was the criticism of the "Dubcek solution" of the 1968 drama Uhl made at the time. Even those who did not approve of Uhl's "extremism" acknowledge that he gave proof of greater perspicacity than older and more experienced politicians. Uhl had no illusions about the good faith of the Soviet "negotiators." They, like Stalin before them, did not have the interests of socialism at heart, but were motivated only by their own raison d'etat. Uhl saw the fall of Novotny as a palace revolution: would it not have been better if his successors had the courage to take this revolution out of the "palace" or party headquarters, into the streets, schools, and factories. Why were Smrkovsky and Dubcek shy of proclaiming a general strike although a million metal workers had promised their support? The Czech leaders, argues Uhl, should have freed themselves further from their own Stalinist deformations, shed their distrust of the masses and aroused the whole population to action.

Peter Uhl, not having gone through the Communist Party School, has preserved the ability to speak in a bold and undiplomatic language. He openly describes himself as a Trotskyist (or "better still—a revolutionary Marxist") and, as an avowed member of the Fourth International, commits in the eyes of the authorities the double sin of heresy and insubordination. Addressing himself to the Western Revolutionary Left he rejects the "parliamentary and other junk of bourgeois democracy." He treats Euro-communism as the "latest component" of reformism and believes that only revolution not gradual piecemeal democratization will bring about socialism.

To-day Uhl and his friends represent the left wing of the Chartist movement. Without in any way weakening their bonds of solidarity, they are critical of its a-political character. Uhl has, however, no patience with the pseudo-radical in the bourgeois democratic West which often displays "an aversion to the defence of civil rights and democratic freedoms" even when it flows "from the often justified opposition to reformism." It is against this "aversion" that he defends the Chartists: "Charter 77" he explains,"is not a political opposition nor does it wish to become one... It is nonetheless the most significant movement in this country... and has had significant resonance amongst the workers. It expresses their interests,
even if not fully or directly. It is, however, true that within the last year or so the movement has not expanded or developed. It may have become just a little more "politicized" and this is reflected in the changes in the leadership: last October Vaclav Havel, who represented the National Democratic opposition, resigned as the main spokesman; his successor, Jiri Hajek, resigned from this position for reasons for health in April this year. The present chief spokesman, Jaroslav Sabata, Uhl's close friend and father in law, stands somewhat further to the left than his predecessors.

The more moderate wing of the movement came to the fore in the early spring of 1978 when it circulated a commemorative statement on "A Hundred Years of Czech Socialism." It is indeed difficult to see what objections the authorities could possibly have had to such a publication, except perhaps that it showed how far away from socialism Dr. Husak's government had taken the country. The statement or Manifesto was signed by 23 socialists, non-party activists and Church leaders, as well as by Fr. Kriegel and Jaroslav Sabata, the two party members who had most vigorously protested against Dubcek's conciliatory policy. Two letters with a desperate "cry for help" for the persecuted authors of the Manifesto were sent to Western leaders with whom they felt the greatest political affinity: Jiri Muller, the student leader who had already spent quite a few years behind bars, addressed himself to the Socialist International, while Rudolf Battěk, a representative of the "Committed non-party members" appealed to W. Brandt, Kreisky and Palme. The authors of the Manifesto, though all or most of them are also signatories of the Charter, asserted in this manner their own socialist and non-party current within the general movement. Its more radical wing would not in any way disagree with a document which did nothing more than "declare its allegiance to the century old traditions of the early Czech workers...", but it would probably not address its appeal to the leaders of the Socialist International.

All activists are persecuted, harassed, intimidated, arrested, released and re-arrested again. It would be invidious in this context to mention some names and omit others. Uhl and Kriegel, for instance, are under constant police surveillance and uniformed sleuths spend sleepless nights and boring days on checking all their visitors. However, in an amazing way both are from time to time able to evade controls. An Austrian journalist managed to interview Uhl, while Mundo Obrero, the organ of the Spanish Communist Party has published a conversation with Kriegel. On the occasion of Kriegel's seventieth birthday a spate of congratulatory telegrams arrived at his home. One was from the Spanish Party with which Kriegel has special ties dating from the time of his participation in the Spanish civil war. There was even an invitation to a dinner in Madrid to celebrate the occasion. What other mail did Kriegel find in his letterbox full of sincere good wishes? A few messages from Bohemia, of which one read: "We wish..."
you all the worst and spit on you, dirty Jew." Signed: "Patriots".12

Are these "patriots" Husak's allies or friends?

An Italian journalist succeeded in arranging a secret meeting with an unnamed oppositionist. To evade the police, he was led by a round about way to the place of the meeting by a friendly but rather taciturn guide: "Why don't you try to emigrate from your country where the conditions are so hard...?" asked the Italian. "My place is here", answered the guide. "And also did you notice that this morning we had snow and now a warm sun is shining. Here everything may change suddenly as it did ten years ago... in the Spring... All is not yet lost."13

The deeply felt isolation of the intellectual in a society of the Soviet type is poignantly expressed in a book which came from Hungary. Le Marxisme face aux pays de l'Est, by an author who signs himself Marc Racovski, contains a welter of ideas, only half clarified, and brilliant flashes, which seem to have been put down on paper as if breathlessly and in great haste.14 Racovski, who is a Marxist, tries to come to grips with the much debated question of the nature of the Soviet state. He sees it as neither socialist nor capitalist, nor a transitional mixture of both, but quite a new type of class society sui generis in which the party is the "dominant class." The fact which he himself recognizes, namely that the party itself is an "inter-class" organization containing a large section of the working class as well as various layers of bureaucracy in no way affects his analysis. Racovski does not say what proportion of workers constitute the "dominant class" in Hungary; in the Polish party, for instance, nearly 40 per cent are workers, according to the latest statistics."

This conglomerate of classes which is also according to Racovski, the "dominant class", is subordinated to the political elite vested with a monopoly of power. In such a type of society all institutions are integrated into a rigid hierarchical administrative structure which does not permit of organized expression of social contradictions or conflicting interests. Any liberalization of the regime can, therefore, be only very superficial and cannot go beyond the limits imposed by the "dominant class." True, changes may occur when a "crisis of maladjustment" breaks the unity of the party. This happened, for example, when Stalinist terror hit the party itself and a segment of the ruling bureaucracy, in order to defend itself, was ready to seek support of the masses. But the mere potentialities of such an alliance provoked a revolutionary ferment among the rank and file threatening the very foundations of the power of the "dominant class" and had to be brought under control by military means.

Racovski sees the situation in the East as completely static. The "new type of class society" is there to stay: no autonomous organizations
expressing conflicting aspirations and needs can come into being to challenge the monopoly of power of the single party, of the "dominant class", whose character remains, in the author's conception, extremely elusive.

The working class is apathetic, worn down by the struggle for existence and hardly conscious of its own interests. It is also internally divided. This division is graphically described by another Hungarian writer Miklos Haraszti in *A Worker in a Worker's State*. Its original title *Piece Work* was perhaps more correct, as many aspects of piece work are as common in a "workers' state" as elsewhere. But there are also significant differences. Haraszti, who himself worked at the bench in a tractor factory, affords us a glimpse into the state of mind and behaviour of the factory crew. The main effort goes into straining every nerve to beat the invidious incentive system, but illusory victory turns into defeat as this results only in periodic increases of the "norm" which wipe out the hoped for gain.

"Everyone is on his own. Alone he pursued a daily battle against machines and time. Defeat cannot be shared: how could we want a common success?"

"... a brigade is not composed of workers involved with a single type of machine, but includes an assortment of borers, millers, and turners. This most effectively prevents members of a brigade from discussing anything in common, or from regulating the level of production to defend themselves against revisions of the norm—even if this were possible."16

There are also the setters, the rate fixers, the engineers, the quality inspectors who "are not there to make life easier for you." There are "good" jobs and "bad" ones, and the foreman decides who gets them. "The slightest suspicion of a secret understanding between two individuals, and his disapproval would at once be reflected in their pay packets."17 The net result is that "Football, beer, motor cycles, the house and TV programmes regain their rightful place. Other subjects... merit at most a few words now and then—but aren't worth an argument."

Haraszti, born in 1945, belongs to the same post-Stalinist generation as Racovski. A rebellious poet and song writer, twice jailed and released after a hunger strike, he was commissioned by the authorities to write about factory conditions. His assignment gave him an extraordinary opportunity to earn his living in a large factory on equal terms with his fellow workers. His embarrassing sociological survey, never published in Hungary, seems to illustrate Racovski's theoretical assumption that the working class is unable—nor does it aspire—to act as a coherent social force. It may be too rash, however, to draw such a sweeping conclusion from a sociological survey limited in scope and time.

Racovski's and Haraszti's, pessimism reflect perhaps the stagnant atmosphere of "Kadarized" Hungary. The highly sophisticated dissident philosophers of the so-called Budapest School like Agnes Heller, F. Feher,
M. & G. Markus and Mihaly Vaida have left Hungary, greatly to the relief of the pundits of the Politbureau. Somewhat younger rebels, Haraszti and Conrad are in West Berlin. Other critical intellectuals like Hegedus have been effectively deprived of any means of expressing their views in print, and completely "marginalized."

In which segment of society can any unorthodox ideas find an echo? According to Racovski, only among the numerically restricted members of the intelligentsia still young enough to delay the decision which they will soon have to face: either to remain on the margin of society or to join the "established intellectuals." This last category is, according to him, quite hopeless. In spite of their differences, they all, as he says, in a "polyphonic choir" reject any oppositionist activity. Their arguments vary: opposition needlessly provokes the authorities, makes any modus vivendi impossible and thereby endangers even further the progress of liberalization. Some go even so far as to denounce the protesters as "just bad writers", or resort to the time-honoured charge of all establishments and declare the critics to be "unbalanced" or "maladjusted."

It is of interest that Hungary is one of the few countries of the Soviet bloc where writers have not had recourse to Samizdat. It was only in September 1977 that two Samizdat volumes began to circulate from hand to hand. The first bears the title Marx in the Fourth Decade, edited by A. Kovacs. The second, Profile, a volume of 800 pages, apparently took ten years to prepare and consists of hitherto unpublished writings of 34 authors.

Officially there is no censorship in Hungary; though non-existent it nevertheless plays a cat and mouse game, and rejects manuscripts under all sorts of pretenses in such a way that an author only very rarely knows for certain that he has no chance to appear in print. The rejection formula is "Your MS does not fit our profile"—hence the title of the Samizdat—which does not deprive the author of the hope that perhaps, if he does behave, he might be more lucky with his next work or with another publisher.

Only a summary of the two Samizdat volumes has so far reached the West. Marx in the Fourth Decade contains answers to 21 sociologists between the ages of 30 and 35 to the question: "What is Marxism and what is your attitude to it?" and this makes a rather melancholy reading. The editor sums it up for us: "Not one of the contributors believes that any special advantage can be derived from thinking in Marxist terms as against any others. . ." and concludes: "What can be seen from the volume is the complete collapse of Marxism. . ."

Whether the 21 answers are representative of only one trend of thought, it is impossible to judge. The fact is that nearly all contributors now reject the "unofficial Marxism" which they had embraced some ten years before. There is also an aura of mysticism around their statements—a striking evidence of a search for the "purpose of life", for "human essence" and
religion. This seems to apply also to Haraszti, who found that genuine religion is more satisfying than Marxism as "it is tied to the absolutes of existence" while "Marx's absolutes are merely tied to the social entity..." It has been reported that Haraszti, now in West Germany, is on the way to adopting a Zen Buddhist Weltanschauung.

Lenin was once asked what he thought of someone declaring: "Socialism is my religion." Lenin replied that much depended on who made the statement. If a religious person made it, he was saying in effect that he was abandoning religion for socialism; if someone who considered himself a Marxist claimed socialism as his religion, he was abandoning socialism for religion.

It must be admitted that the "Kadarization" of Hungary was more successful and more beneficial to the population at large than was Husak's "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Kadar's "reign" is undoubtedly an improvement on that of his predecessor Rakosi, while Husak cannot but suffer badly when compared with the exhilarating though short-lived Dubcek experiment. Kadar's measure of economic decentralization has resulted in a rise in the standard of living and rendered everyday life somewhat easier. The authorities are aware of their "successes" and encourage the Hungarians to visit other countries of the Soviet bloc: even disgruntled citizens find that the comparison works in Hungary's favour.

For Racovski and his friends it can hardly be a consolation to learn that their fellow dissenters in Poland and Czechoslovakia consider the Hungarian situation so much better than their own. On the contrary, the awareness of the tremendous distance which separates other countries of the Soviet bloc as well as their own from genuine socialism can only deepen their sense of hopelessness. And yet Racovski's book should in itself be an antidote to his exaggerated pessimism. It is difficult to believe that his work is the only flower blooming in what he describes as an intellectual desert.

There is no doubt that the departure of the "Budapest school of philosophers" has impoverished the Hungarian scene even further. Not without a touch of hypocrisy Imre Pozsgay, the Minister of Culture, deplored the loss of these "intellectuals of the highest level." Why then did they have to leave? "Between us and them—he said—there arose a grave conflict over strategic aims—though... these aims were largely identical with those of the Party—and over tactical questions... We did not demand unconditional surrender. We looked for a solution by way of a discussion. But this was not to be,"18

No, the authorities did not demand an "unconditional surrender"; they were even generous enough to allow them to publish abroad so long as these books did not deal with Hungary or with the "Soviet model" of
socialism. A dialogue was indeed hardly possible. These writers, complains Pozsgay, "offend against the political and ideological foundations of the system." Agnes Heller openly admits: "I do not criticize the leaders; I criticize the system itself", the system which does not allow "political pluralism, pluralistic democracy which are an integral part of socialism", such as is proposed by the Italian Communists and which she admires.

Agnes Heller and her friends do not see themselves as "emigrés of the traditional type." After a three years' spell abroad they plan to return to Budapest in the hope that some dialogue will become possible. In the meantime many changes at the top may occur. Perhaps after three years of intellectual stagnation even the most dogmatic apparatchiks may feel the need for a refreshing breeze of new ideas.

IV

The survey of the Soviet opposition has been placed at the end of this essay. This is not accidental. Hard as it is to part with preconceived ideas—and illusions—one has to face the fact that the movement of dissent with the Soviet Union is in a deep crisis. And the reasons for this are not far to seek.

First of all there is, of course, the relentless persecution by the state. Non-conformists and protesters are put out of the way, placed in psychiatric "hospitals", prisons and camps. According to some conservative estimates, two to four thousand restless souls are under lock and key. The threat of punishment hangs over many, many more and creates what V. Turchin aptly called "Inertia of Fear" which renders all activity practically impossible.

Besides, the method of disposing of the critics by sending them more or less forcibly abroad brought a double or even a triple benefit to "the system." While more savage persecution created martyrs, evoked compassion and spread disaffection even wider, those who left the country, even under strong pressure, were regarded with less sympathy, and, sometimes even with a shade of disapproval. The exodus of over 130,000 Jews, of whom many were either active or at least potential dissenters, has also weakened the movement. Incidentally, it helped Brezhnev to pacify somewhat public opinion in the West. Moreover, the "freedom to emigrate", so dear to American Senators, is not very high on the list of freedoms for which an ordinary Soviet citizen would be prepared to fall foul of the authorities. Nor can Amnesty International and the Human Rights groups have a wide appeal. Courageous as their few leaders are, their aims are narrowly circumscribed; they too have been weakened by trials, arrests, exile, internal splits and emigration. By transferring the opposition abroad, the government has rendered it to a large extent harmless. It is significant that Boris Weil, a "veteran of Marxist opposition", who after years of prison
and forced labour recently reached Denmark, avoids using the term "Soviet opposition", but speaks of the "movement of dissent." "We have found", he says, "a form of political existence... without organization, without programme, without statutes, and which somehow survives." It does, however, to a certain degree "destroy itself" by the sheer fact of emigration. On the other hand, adds Weil hopefully, the movement is "like a living chain of relationships: the authorities destroy some links but ever new ones seem to grow."\(^{19}\)

The most profound source of the weakness of the opposition should perhaps be seen in the fact that it proved unable to provide, even in the subterranean life of society, any ideology, broad, comprehensive and powerful enough to stir peoples' mind and emotions and to compete with the established and ruling orthodoxy.

One cannot gauge from London or Paris the numerical strength of active opponents of the regime. According to Roy Medvedev, who is on the spot, while at the beginning of the 1970s they could still be counted by the hundreds, now, towards the end of the decade, their number has declined to no more than one hundred. The opposition reached its high peak at the end of the 1960s. This was the period when, within the party and outside it, the opposition was mobilized by surreptitious or even open attempts at the rehabilitation of Stalin coming from the die-hards in the hierarchy. These attempts failed to a large extent, and the anti-Stalinist movement subsided. But these rather discouraging figures do not by any means allow one confidently to assess how widespread is the mood of dissent. The few who are active have around them sympathizers, co-thinkers and passive supporters; those who are languishing in prisons have left behind them a trail of sorrow, and their families and friends, though intimidated, are future potential subverters.

A great volume of literature of "dissent" appears now in the West and comes from the pens of political emigrés. Although it may possibly shed light on the state of mind of those who have stayed behind, it cannot serve as a reliable guide or an undisputable source of information. The emigres are often confused by the sudden confrontation with the unfamiliar bourgeois democratic order which they tend to romanticize; sometimes they are moved by an unconscious desire to ease their transition into a new milieu and effect a degree of osmosis with the prevalent opinion. Much of their energy goes into bitter polemics with fellow emigres.

One of the prominent dissenters who remains in Russia and whose writings are available in the West is Roy Medvedev. Moreover, he is also one of the very few who has remained firm in his socialist convictions. He has often been described—not without reason—by the Western Left as a 'Fabian', a social democratic reformist, distrustful of the masses and inclined to place too much hope in the possibility of the inner regeneration of the Soviet party. However, the information that he provides seems
accurate and his judgment so far has proved sober. It seems therefore that a few more words about his work and opinions would not be out of place here.

Judging the present situation not propitious for strictly political opposition, Medvedev uses his time and freedom for educational work. From his prolific Samizdat writings those who want to know can learn how tortuous and dramatic was the road which led from the high ideals of 1917 to the horrors of Stalinism, and, if they are not too traumatized by the Gulag revelations, they can also discover how profoundly wrong is the identification of Stalinism with socialism which Stalin so successfully imposed within Russia and outside it. Many Marxists in the West cannot always agree with his interpretation of Soviet history; many, whose anti-Stalinist credentials were established as early as the 1920s or 1930s must take issue with his evaluation of those Oppositions which preceded today's dissenters. All the same, for Soviet readers brought up in the Stalin school of falsification, the truth, which he reveals, even if somewhat slanted, is of immense importance.

In his view, the present dominant position of the CPSU is not generally contested. Though the "system" is not based on active consensus, it is given passive assent, tinged with resignation and apathy, by the overwhelming majority of the population. Moreover, "in the perpetuation of this system are also interested millions of party and State functionaries, managers, and a large part of the intelligentsia in the service of the State. For them it is simpler to live as before. A more pluralistic system would create too many problems." Medvedev does not, however, see the situation as completely static and believes that the fear of "too many problems" will not in the long run prevent the development of a pluralistic society.

Medvedev is above all anxious to assure a smooth transformation of the present regime into a modern democratic socialist state. His evolutionary temperament and Weltanschauung make him look to the party, and to think that if only it were to reform itself—and this is a big "if" indeed—it could still contribute to such a transformation. "In this struggle [for democratization] the political pressures from 'below' do not a priori exclude a direction 'from above'. . . a correct control over the process of democratization by the supreme organs of the Communist Party and the State could even guarantee that the struggle would be conducted with a minimum of disorder and within the framework of legality." The dangers threatening the process of democratization come from two quarters: from the still powerful Stalinist forces entrenched in society as well as in the hierarchy "above" and from the pent-up discontent and anger of the masses which may burst out and destroy the existing social structures without being able to replace them with new ones. This "fear of the masses" can be detected in the writings of many oppositionists, even those
who adopt a much more radical stand than Medvedev.

In the supreme organs of the Party, the die-hards of Stalinism are still quite strong. And, what is perhaps worse, the Stalinist frame of mind still persists among a considerable layer of the intelligentsia. Ominous echoes of undisguised Stalinism were heard at the end of 1977, when the notorious Union of Soviet Writers organized a great public literary meeting. From the platform paeons of praise were lavished on the "authentically" Russian literature of the late 1930s and 1940s. It was stressed with a great deal of satisfaction that the promotion of this "authentic Russian" literature had put a stop to the despicable avant garde of the earlier period when, due to excessive intellectual freedom, all kinds of "non-Russian elements", decadents, cheats, and frauds like Meyerhold and Babel, had flourished. When Efros, the much harassed theatre producer, rose to defend the memory of Meyerhold, he was prevented from speaking, attacked for his "impudence" in busying himself with Chekhov and Gogol, the truly Russian classics, and advised to create his own "national", that is Jewish theatre.

It was not an accident that the meeting took place on 21 December, the date of Stalin's birthday.\(^\text{22}\)

The working class of the Soviet Union still remains the great unknown. But all observers, no matter what their political complexion, agree that it is largely "dormant." "There is no workers movement in the Soviet Union" states with unusual bluntness Leonid Plyushch.\(^\text{23}\)

It is a sad paradox that in the country which was the first to accomplish a proletarian revolution, the tradition of class struggles has by now been largely forgotten. Collective memories are short. The history of the Great October in its Stalinist version, not only outrageously falsified, but also decked out in turgid bureaucratic verbiage, can hardly act as an inspiration for a new revolt against autocracy. The very concept of a strike as a legitimate weapon of working class defence has been largely erased from the mind of the Soviet proletariat.

The strikes which do break out in various parts of the country are sporadic and uncoordinated, and the authorities, not hesitating to use troops and firearms, all too swiftly succeed in crushing them. V. Belotserkovsky, who had, as a labour correspondent of the Soviet press, more contacts with the workers than perhaps any other member of the Soviet intelligentsia, recalls some incidents in which desperate courage was followed by heartbreaking helplessness. The lack of safety precautions in many industries, the social injustices, the incompetence and bungling of the management with its complete disregard of the human factor—all this drives people to desperation. In their anger, they resort to
violent acts, the results of which are quite out of proportion to the sacrifice involved. A wave of strikes broke out in 1962 in Novocherkask where a real insurrection occurred. The troops refused to fire and for two days the town was in the hands of the rebels. Other strikes took place in Tula, Odessa, Vladivostok, Dniepropetrovsk and other centres. All were crushed under the iron heel.24

The initiative of V. Klebanov and his comrades was, at the beginning of 1978, greeted in the West—somewhat prematurely—as a sign of the awakening of the Soviet proletariat. Klebanov, a former coal miner, collected a number of signatures under a protest against corruption and unfair dismissals from among workers who had met accidentally in the waiting rooms of one of the governmental "Complaints Offices." They could, of course, obtain no satisfaction from their officials, and so launched a moving appeal to the West "for moral and material support" in face of repression: "On the one hand, the Party and Government call upon citizens to correct violations wherever they occur: in industry and in the life of society. On the other hand, the authorities come down with special brutality on those who respond... by speaking out in the interests of the enterprise"—they remark. Confronted day in and day out with this "organized hypocrisy", Klebanov and his group applied to the International Labour Organisation with a request that it should recognize the group as a "free trade union." For this they claimed the support of some 200 workers from places as far apart as Kiev, Chelyabinsk, Odessa, the Caucasus and Moscow.

It was reported that at one stage Klebanov turned to Academician Sakharov for help in publicizing the protest. Sakharov apparently refused to get involved because he feared that the signatories "did not understand the risks of open dissent."25 Incidentally, this warning seemed gratuitous, because Klebanov had already spent considerable time in a psychiatric "hospital" for his previous activity. Sakharov's refusal may be seen as another instance of the gulf that separates the intellectuals from the workers. Even the most courageous of the former show no concern for the most vital preoccupations of the latter.

At the time of writing most members of the "free trade union" are confined to prisons and psychiatric establishments. Could there be a more tragically ironic diagnosis: one of the patients is said to be "suffering from nervous exhaustion brought on by her quests for justice."26 What an indictment of a system in which "quests for justice" lead into a psychiatric ward!

Depressing as the Soviet scene seems to be to-day, there will undoubtedly come a moment when the ruled will not be able to live as before and the
rulers will not be able to rule as before. The present Soviet leadership cannot for much longer cling to power. The average age of those on top is well over three score and ten. Changes must come. The party's monolith is a thing of the past, yet it still presents to the country and to the outside world a facade of unanimity; the various strains within it are prevented from coming to the fore. But any crisis at the top may crack this facade further and release forces more susceptible to the pressures from below and less able to withstand them. And this must considerably affect all societies within the Soviet orbit.

NOTES

5. Ibid., pp. 99-111.
6. Ibid., p. 169.
17. Ibid., p. 66.
20. *Intervista sul dissenso in URSS*, op. cit., p. 76.
23. *Pouvoir et opposition dans les sociétés post-révolutionnaires*, op. cit., p. 44.