NKRUMAH AND NKRUMAISM
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A Coup by a handful of police and army officers on the morning of 24 February 1966 overthrew the régime of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana while he was en route to Hanoi on a peace mission. To those who engineered, or supported, the coup it was the only means left, because all avenues of constitutional and peaceful change had long been blocked by which to rid the country of a despotism that had deprived its citizens of all liberties and reduced its economy to near bankruptcy. To Nkrumah himself, and to those supporting him, it was one more dastardly act of neo-colonialism which had seen fit to strike precisely at the moment when, having surmounted obstacles and survived difficulties created by imperialism and its Ghanaian and African agents, the socialist experiment in Ghana was about to succeed. But the basic question remains: not why the coup was staged, but why the old system so readily succumbed to the coup without a trace of resistance? An adequate answer requires an analysis of the origins, growth and failure of the Convention People's Party, in the light of both Nkrumah's leadership and his doctrine.

The history of a nationalist movement is inseparable from the struggle for succession—over the final disposition of power and its rewards once the colonial power quits the political stage—which accompanies it and in fact determines its pace and scope. Constitutional change in the Gold Coast after the First World War was increasingly governed by the colonial axiom that the indirect-rule chiefs and the "intelligentsia"—the term used locally to refer to the tiny middle class of African lawyers, doctors, merchants, businessmen—were the eventual successors to colonial rulers. Guggisberg inaugurated the change in the light of Lugard's theories of indirect rule already much in vogue. Guggisberg's main concern was gradually to enlarge the African share in colonial administration, both in the civil service and in the colony legislature. The composition of the latter was steadily so altered as to accord pre-eminence to the chiefs, regarded as the "true" and "natural" rulers and representatives of their people. Pari passu colonial authorities, through a series of native-authority ordinances from 1927 onwards, pruned traditional institutions of those
features which caused "confusion" and "instability" in the chiefdoms. Successive modifications of the composition and functions of the legislature were thus geared to traditional institutions so modified as to rid them of their comparatively democratic features. While originally bolstering up the chiefs, however, the colonial officials, and under their suasion increasingly also the chiefs, came in due course to recognize that the middle class, too, if only because its members possessed educational and economic resources necessary for administration and development, must be found a suitable political rôle. The 1946 Bums constitution was intended to seal the union of the traditional and modern elites under the benevolent eye of colonial officials.

In the meantime, during the inter-war period, in consequence of the increasing volume and value of its production and export of cocoa, gold and other metals and minerals, and timber, the Gold Coast economy experienced considerable growth and expansion, with its concomitant development of communications and education and urbanisation. Colonial officials saw this economic and educational expansion as the physical substructure of an incipient sense of nationhood. All that was needed in addition was a political superstructure—of the type devised and developed by Governors Guggisberg and Bums—which, coupled with a gradual and controlled Africanisation of the civil service, would train and integrate African understudies of colonial administrators, to whom the latter would in due course and peaceably hand over charge of the native population. In the thinking of colonial officials, there was but slight room for the paraphernalia of democracy. The limits of "responsible government" were very narrowly drawn. Transfer of power was viewed in terms not of its democratisation but of its Africanisation. The system of colonial administration was designed to exclude as much as possible both traditional and modern elements of democracy. The distant objective of self-government meant no more than that the system would finally be administered by Africans. African self-government was, in short, colonial administration by Africans.

This neat scheme of decolonisation, while supported by the educated and "responsible" Africans, had little attraction for that body of Africans whom economic and educational expansion and urbanisation had brought increasingly in contact with the crippling restrictions and disabilities of colonial rule but who found their way barred to the opportunities and perquisites of "self-government". This large body comprised elementary-school-leavers and teachers, clerks and messengers in government and commercial offices, petty traders and storekeepers, artisans and taxi- and lorry-drivers, small-scale contractors and businessmen, urban wage-earners and after the war, ex-servicemen. If only because in greater contact with towns—the congeries of
colonial rule—they experienced its frustrations more frequently and felt its humiliations more sharply. Because they had been to school and learned a modicum of English (or French), they regarded themselves as educated, and were so regarded by their own families in the countryside. Yet for their education Africanisation had little use: they were very nearly unemployable in white-collar jobs which they deemed their due. As small businessmen and contractors, they could not withstand the overpowering competition of European trading firms and of Levantine and Asian entrepreneurs. After the war, those engaged in minute import-export businesses could not secure the licences which, predictably, went to expatriate firms, nor credit facilities from British-controlled banks. Those who were labourers or junior clerks had to cope with small wages and high prices. As they flooded into the towns, they faced acute housing shortages. Although by comparison with the large majority of their countrymen they were reasonably well-off, they were interested less in a comparison with the plight of those in the bush than in the contrast between their condition and the affluence of Europeans and a handful of Africans. After the war the towns in all parts of Africa were the bastions of this petty bourgeoisie; they became the centres of anti-colonial agitation. Because the large mass of the petty bourgeoisie was, economically and socially, not yet completely detached from the countryside, it continually hovered between town and village and acted as the leaven of the nationalist ferment. The Convention People's Party (CPP), founded by Kwame Nkrumah in June 1949, was the first of many such movements in tropical Africa of this petty bourgeoisie.

It cannot be over-emphasised that the political superstructure devised by colonial officials for eventual self-government had found no place for this comparatively large class. The petty bourgeoisie saw little prospect of self-assertion and self-advancement within either the rural and traditional, or the urban and modern, set-up. The restructuring of traditional institutions was especially resented by the increasing number of literate commoners who saw the authoritarian and often illiterate chiefs, under the shelter of colonial authority, slight their particular abilities and skills. The urban petty bourgeoisie—cousins of the educated commoners of the native authorities—saw clearly that neither Africanisation nor (on given terms) self-government was going to make much difference to their lot: the former would benefit those with much higher educational accomplishments than their own, the latter mainly the chiefs and the middle class. Nkrumah was excluded from the new phase of constitution-making which followed the 1948 riots. This merely confirmed the "youngmen"—the petty-bourgeois rank and file—of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), of which Nkrumah was then general secretary (and the focus of their
support), in their suspicion that any constitution devised by the middle class and the chiefs was not likely to give them any major share in political power and its connecting economic opportunities. Their way to prosperity lay directly through power. They would need first to storm the gates of and capture the legislature. "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it." Nkrumah's maxim applied to the country as a whole, but his supporters saw it in less impersonal terms. His great achievement consisted in his ability to demonstrate the connection between political subjection and economic deprivation in personal as well as in general terms.

In consequence, the CPP was a repudiation not only of colonial rule but also, more important, of the hegemony of the African elite being trained as the understudy and heir-apparent of colonial rulers. The emergence of the CPP was in fact a new phase in the struggle for colonial succession. Because in the past the protagonists in the struggle were a very small number, and staked out their respective claims on the strength of either tradition or education and property, politics in the pre-CPP era was altogether a quiet and dignified affair. It was an exercise à la Burke in harmonising the interests and claims of the great estates of the realm, a disposition of functions and rewards among the "natural rulers" of society unencumbered by the multitude. Politics in the CPP era was by contrast a noisy and hectic affair; it was the politics of the market place and the election platform. Because the new pretenders were a much more numerous class, they found in numbers the strength denied them by tradition, education or property, and attached sacral authority to universal franchise, supremacy of the legislature, and the doctrine of majority rule. In the new battle the CPP was thus to have the advantage not only of numbers but also of its custodianship of the values and virtues of parliamentary democracy, which was more in line with native prejudices in England.

From the outset, therefore, the CPP leaders were concerned both to force constitutional advance along the road of full-fledged parliamentary government and to establish the political credentials of their party as the true representative of the "masses". The Positive Action campaign of January 1950 was the outcome of their efforts to apply to their claims the sanction of mass action, although until the very last Nkrumah appeared to be in doubt as to its necessity under the circumstances. Once begun, the campaign was relatively easily subdued by colonial officials, and indicated both a low level of political consciousness and poor organization. The Trades Union Congress, which by its strike action had precipitated Positive Action, was in the process completely disrupted, and the arrest of Nkrumah and a handful of other CPP leaders sufficed completely to demoralize the party rank and file.
But, at the same time, the colonial officials recognized that the CPP was a new and material political factor, and that Nkrumah must be induced to co-operate within the constitutional fold. There can be little doubt that they were genuinely anxious to accommodate the party in the new political scheme, to tame it. This could be chalked up against British realism, to be sure. But a more plausible explanation was broached by Richard Wright in his *Black Power*. Once the CPP was recognized as a political force of considerable strength—and if returned at the general election in sufficient numbers and invited to office—the CPP ministers would need and more readily accept the expert guidance of (British) civil servants, and should on balance prove more tractable than an alternate batch (for example) of UGCC ministers more educated and knowledgeable about public affairs and administration. Nor could colonial officials be in any real doubt about the willingness of the CPP under those circumstances to enter government.

The CPP’s election victory in February 1951 was spectacular, and confirmed it as by far the single most powerful political force in the colony. What the CPP triumph obscured, however, was the low level of political participation behind it, especially in the countryside. The percentage of the eligible electorate actually registered as voters, despite the concerted efforts of colonial and CPP officials, was only 32 for the Colony (including Southern Togoland)—and this, the most populous region in the country as a whole, continued to be solidly pro-CPP at subsequent elections—55.4 for Ashanti and, predictably the highest, 64.1 for the municipalities, where the petty-bourgeois support of the CPP was entrenched. But in the municipalities, even, only 47.2 per cent of the registered electors went to the polls. Illiteracy in the country was widespread. The election was the first in the colony’s history to be fought on the basis of a wide franchise. The CPP organization in many parts of the country was rudimentary. Admitting all this, the low level of popular participation (compared for example with elections in some other West African colonies) indicated in a measure the failure of the CPP politically to interest and engage the broad mass of the population and the lack of a truly democratic foundation for the movement.

II

It was during 1951–57, when the CPP as the movement and government of the petty bourgeoisie sought to entrench itself, that its character and orientation were permanently and indelibly fixed, notwithstanding Nkrumah’s later efforts. This was the period of Tactical Action. It was to mark the transition towards full independence. CPP leaders were required during this phase to maintain sufficient pressure...
on colonial authorities for the final transfer of power, so as to keep possible critics and militants within the party at bay and not to forfeit electoral support, while giving colonial officials, at the same time, unimpeachable evidence of their own moderation and "statesmanship", politically and economically. This latter entailed, briefly, the adjustment by CPP leaders of their objectives and policies to the over-riding need to preserve colonial economic interests and colonial structures, as the price for their finally gaining power and independence. Tactical Action was in fact nothing more than the label attached to the CPP's strategy of neo-colonial accommodation.

The ideology of Tactical Action was on its political side best formulated by George Padmore,9 and on its economic side best outlined by Arthur Lewis.9 It was the political and economic doctrine of pan-African democratic socialism first adumbrated by the 1945 Pan-Africanist Congress, which had also laid great stress on the need to organize the "masses". Pan-Africanism, which Padmore saw as "an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side and Tribalism on the other",10 was a three-fold doctrine: African self-government or nationalism, democracy, and socialism.11 In its international bearings, pan-Africanism was a "third force" equidistant from both East and West. It was opposed at once and equally to imperialism and communism, and its determination to shake off imperialist domination was tempered with its determination to ward off communist domination. Nationalism—opposed at once to imperialism, communism, and tribalism—both delineated and delimited the policies of the CPP. The party was pledged to develop Ghana "on the basis of Socialism" and to "serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic socialist society".12 Positively, the CPP socialism, while marking itself off from both capitalism and communism, was to use government and public resources in improving and enlarging the infrastructure and public services. Any major expansion and reorganisation of the economy, particularly with regard to industrialization, was left to the initiative of private (especially foreign) enterprise.

This ideology of pan-Africanism gave CPP leaders their necessary doctrine of petty-bourgeois nationalism, as well as ideally answering their political needs. If Tactical Action was to succeed, they had to secure its exclusive management, both to keep their supporters firmly in line and more generally to confine and control all political activity. They must create an integrated, disciplined party, a political instrument which would enable them squarely to meet and destroy all challenges to their leadership of the nationalist movement or to the CPP's monopoly of nationalism. (This was secured through emphasis
on "organization".) They must also guard against the risk of their pace, or hand, being forced by impatient or "wild" men within the party, and to scotch any tendencies or elements likely to question their leadership. (This was secured through "anti-communism"). Because both party leaders and supporters derived their newly found privileges from the party's control of power, the CPP leaders must crush all rival claims to political power and increasingly free the party of all limitations on its hegemony. (This was secured through the rhetoric of "nationalism" and "democracy"). The CPP leaders thus wanted a party whose rank and file would render them unqualified and unstinted support but in which, at the same time, they would enjoy complete freedom to take all decisions unencumbered by a party structure or by procedures likely to oblige them to share decision-making with the rank and file or the lower echelons of the party hierarchy. These considerations shaped the final form given the party organization by its leadership.

Nkrumah repeatedly intoned: Organisation decides everything. His emphasis on organization, coupled with his frequent use of Leninist formulas of organization, gave the impression that the CPP was organized along Leninist lines. Nothing could in fact be farther from the truth. Not only in its unrestrictive membership, which permitted all and sundry to flood into the party especially after it was well established as a profitable institution, but even more in its undemocratic procedures was the CPP organized very differently from Lenin's ideas. From the very beginning, the party central committee—the highest party organ, its "directorate"—was handpicked by Nkrumah himself, subject to nominal approval by the national executive. In the events culminating in the party's founding—and later, especially at the annual conference—the party rank and file took an active part in debates and decisions. But following the 1951 election victory—shortly afterwards Nkrumah became the party's life chairman—the general body of members came increasingly to have less and less say in the decisions taken on the party's behalf. From 1952–53 onwards, the party conference became little more than an annual jamboree, for Nkrumah to recount his achievements and for his audience to proclaim their faith in the life chairman's infallibility. The bulk of the petty-bourgeois rank and file and the middle-level leaders, admitted, were quite content to let the party leaders negotiate freely with colonial interests, so long as they were in turn left alone to transmute their freedom at lower levels into something tangible. Following reforms and elections in 1952, CPP supporters assumed charge of the machinery of local government all over the country. This was self-government at the local level, in line with self-government at the national level, and gave the rank and file the apparatus for duplicating on a smaller scale the
speculation and profit-making of their representatives and spokesmen in Accra.

Within months of the 1951 election, there were resignations from the CPP, and during 1952 a series of resignations and expulsions removed from the party a small number of fairly important members who were in some wise critical of Nkrumah's policies and methods, or feared his loss of enthusiasm for "self-government now". Democratic centralism, which was interpreted to mean that the minority must abide by the decisions of the majority or quit, proved a singularly convenient device for silencing all dissentient views within the party, and to secure party leaders unfettered freedom to decide and act as they saw fit. This went with their anxiety firmly to restrict the area of free political action both inside the party and in the country at large. Two minor but significant examples may be cited. Having in its election manifesto promised direct elections with no property qualifications whatever, the CPP government retained payment of the "basic rate", as "proof of civic responsibility", as one of the qualifications of electors and candidates. And Nkrumah himself refused to lower the minimum-age limit to 21 years for candidates (as well as electors, the lowering of age qualification for whom had materially assisted the CPP in its election victory).

In spite of his adoration of the "masses", he was notably sceptical of their or the party members' political sense or maturity. "The ideological development here is not very high", he confided to Richard Wright in 1953. "There are but two or three of us who know what we are doing". He did not think the party capable at that stage of developing "socialist consciousness", which could be dangerous if premature. Presumably, "socialist consciousness" would drive away the party's petty-bourgeois supporters, who were interested only in self-government and could have little use for socialism.

Anti-communism traced the outer limits of the area of free political action permitted the CPP by its leaders. It was the hallmark, of course, of their political soundness in the eyes of colonial officials, and during 1953–54 they took a series of measures to attest their ardent anti-communism. In October 1953 a prominent party left-winger, Turkson Ocran, was displaced as general secretary of the TUC by a more pliable, obscure trade unionist, J. K. Tettegah. Later in the month Ocran and Anthony Woode, another prominent trade unionist and party activist, were suspended from the party, for having attended a WFTU meeting in Vienna. In March 1954 the TUC renewed its membership of the ICFTU, from which it had disaffiliated (while still free of government control) in August 1953. The government ban on the importation into the colony of communist literature was reinforced in February 1954. Later in the month, Nkrumah announced the government's decision to bar employment of communists in the
country's public services. Anthony Woode and Pobee Biney, a leading trade unionist, were a few months later denied party re-nomination for the general election.

Anti-communism was not simply a matter of guarding the party against communist infection or infiltration, or of eschewing communist international affiliations. Nor was the CPP leaders' intolerance of left-wing views within the party explained solely by their anxiety to scotch any challenge to their leadership. At no time, indeed, were the militants in a position even remotely to challenge that leadership. The firmness with which they were handled was out of all proportion. This was necessary, especially after the deposition of the Cheddi Jagan government in British Guiana, partly to establish the "statesmanship" of CPP leaders before colonial officials. More fundamentally, however, anti-communism drew the line beyond which the social revolution which threw up the CPP—but which its leaders were now trying to contain and regulate—must not proceed; the line which the petty-bourgeois leaders, no more than colonial rulers, wanted crossed. The petty bourgeoisie had to establish and secure its hegemony at all costs. Trade union elements within the nationalist movement, if allowed to prevail, could sabotage the neo-colonial accommodation being essayed by CPP leaders and colonial interests. That was why those elements had to be subdued, and the trade union movement deprived of its autonomy and of its political capacity. The CPP government fully shared the anxiety of colonial officials to turn trade unions away from "politics". As well as controlling trade unions, the CPP drew other mass organizations into its orbit, in an attempt similarly to de-politicise them. This would enable CPP leaders to control and direct economic and quasi-political forces which might otherwise upset the political economy of Tactical Action, or prevent the leaders from negotiating the transfer of power at a pace and on terms of their own choosing. More important, it was an attempt to guard against an excessive democratisation or radicalisation of the party and of the nationalist movement which it increasingly encompassed, and to prevent the nationalist movement from developing into a total revolution. Objective conditions in the country hardly justified such fears, but CPP leaders were prepared to run no risks. By broadening the scope of the political revolution, they had out-maneuvered the chiefs and the middle class. In their turn they were anxious not to be outmanoeuvred by a broadening of the scope of the social revolution. The CPP was the party, not of social revolution, but of self-government. Insofar as its leaders succeeded in their objectives, the petty bourgeoisie won its victory at the expense of democracy, within the party and in the country as a whole, and of the autonomy of mass organizations.
III

By 1954 CPP leaders were firmly in control of the party, with the minute left effectively spiked. Party leaders, parliamentarians and supporters at all levels were busy translating power into wealth. The contracts, commissions, loans and licences which followed power reinforced the party's desire for unquestioned hegemony over its rivals. The only occasion for "gross indiscipline" within the party was provided by the selection of CPP candidates for the 1954 election. Parliamentary, even more than party, membership had become a lucrative prospect, and there was ruthless scrambling for party nomination.

Having created a strong but "disciplined" party, CPP leaders addressed themselves to undermining the surviving political threat represented by the chiefs and the middle class. Wherever necessary, the CPP leaders attacked the economic foundations of their rivals, the more so since that attack coincided with the safeguarding of colonial interests and further improved the CPP's standing with colonial officials. On the other hand, by the very nature of things, the attack could not assume revolutionary dimensions. The middle class, which had earlier enjoyed considerable political importance, lacked an established and clear-cut economic basis. Because all major sectors of the economy—mining, trading, banking—were monopolized by colonial interests, the African merchants and businessmen never became a capitalist class. Nor did the CPP, with its overbearing solicitude for colonial interests, give African entrepreneurs any material help. Nkrumah was all along determined to prevent the growth of an African capitalist class, which could prove a serious political threat. In the end, because the middle class was economically insignificant, it proved politically ineffectual. Similar was the case with the chieftancy. Outside of Ashanti, it was not intermeshed with feudalism. There was no landlordism and no serious land hunger.

The CPP was the movement of the petty bourgeoisie, of a class which was comparatively privileged vis-à-vis the mass of the population. The petty bourgeoisie was divided neither from the middle class (essentially not a capitalist class) nor from the chiefs (essentially not a feudal class) by a fundamental conflict of interest. It was determined to capture political power (and to gain independence which would insure its control of power). It must therefore neutralize the chiefs and the middle class politically. But this entailed accommodation not revolution. The containment of the middle class, for example, was essentially a prophylactic exercise. It required no major reorganization of economic interests, but only obliged the CPP to preserve the colonial
pattern of the economy. Similarly the large majority of chiefs, although a social incubus, was economically and politically of little significance, and prepared for symbiotic accommodation with whosoever happened to be in power at a given time. A total revolution is therefore not necessary for the colonial petty bourgeoisie to secure its ends. Political power suffices for its needs. Anxious to capture power, but not required totally to destroy colonial interests and structures, the petty bourgeoisie travels the path of neo-colonial accommodation. Because the CPP safeguarded colonial structures, it was obliged also to safeguard traditional institutions and interests of pre-colonial origin selectively assimilated into the colonial system. Both the chiefs and the middle class were a part of that system. Once the CPP won out in its political contest with them, they were duly reconciled to being junior partners of the CPP, which in its turn accommodated them in the refurbished system and was glad to employ them politically and administratively.

While earlier Nkrumah had made the occasional rude remark about the chiefs, after 1951 he spoke increasingly of his desire to preserve chieftancy in the country. He only wanted chiefs to recognize that "chieftancy, in common with other human institutions, cannot remain static, but that it must in large measure adapt itself to the changing requirements of the present time." What that adaptation involved was spelled out by a number of CPP spokesmen. "The Government of the day is the CPP Government, and any chief who does not support the CPP Government ceases to be a chief." This was merely a new version of indirect rule. Once the CPP was firmly in power, the large majority of chiefs readily accepted CPP instead of colonial overrule. They lent colour to CPP rallies and held durbars in honour of the new party governors. In return the party chiefs sought to reinforce their political appeal by assuming traditional dignities and titles. A large part of the party's success its leaders owed, in fact, to their shrewd application of traditional-tribal symbolism in the organization of a secular movement. (Nkrumah's own oratory and charisma were compounded of Leninist formulas, Christian accents, and Akan symbols.) The quick adaptation of the chiefs to the new order was easily explained by the petty-bourgeois background of their secular existence—as traders, storekeepers, primary-school teachers—before being raised to the chieftancy.

It was in Ashanti that the CPP met the stiffest resistance in its efforts to control chiefs. This was less because, as the CPP leaders claimed, of the feudal character of chieftancy in Ashanti and more because many Ashanti chiefs were themselves cocoa farmers of considerable size and means in a region which in recent times had become the single largest producer of cocoa and thus the source of a large
portion of the country's wealth and the government's revenue. Although self-consciously deploying traditionalist arguments, it was insofar as the Ashanti chiefs were drawn into a modern money economy, and no longer restricted to traditional rôles and activities, that they were opposed to CPP policies inimical to their interests. Their quasi-feudal political authority was merely the scaffolding of their quasi-capitalist economic interests. The CPP neutralized them politically by undermining them economically.

During 1951–52, relations of the CPP government and cocoa farmers were cordial enough. In the first year of CPP rule the farmers received the highest price ever for their crop. But under the circumstances it proved an unnatural and short-lived friendship. In spite of the widespread and persistent myth of the cocoa peasant farmer: "cocoa farming all along has been a highly differentiated economic activity. A small percentage of farmers produced (and produce) a high percentage of the country's cocoa output. The large farmers were, moreover, the major source of rural credit, as well as trading on the side. On the other hand, CPP leaders and rank and file themselves were not cocoa farmers, in any important way. That was a source of wealth denied them and, given the fact that cocoa farming was already a long established activity with little scope for expansion or for major reorganization of cocoa land tenure, the chances of their becoming cocoa farmers were slight. The CPP could not therefore be a party of large farmers like, say, the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire in the Ivory Coast.

The first few years of CPP rule coincided with an extraordinary cocoa boom, much of which, in neighbouring Nigeria and French colonies, was diverted into the pockets of farmers. For the CPP government to channel most of the increased international price to the farmers would have meant not only the sponsorship of a policy from which its own supporters did not personally benefit but, in fact, the enrichment and strengthening of a class which, whether from within or independently of the CPP, could in fulness of time challenge the party's, as yet, tenuous hold on power. Knowing as well as they did the uses and opportunities of the political kingdom, CPP leaders could not but reject that prospect. They sought instead to devise a policy that would deny cocoa farmers full access to the soaring international price for their produce, and thus forestall the possibility of the farmers emerging as a major and independent economic and political force within the country. This they achieved by pegging the producer price well below the international price. At the same time, CPP leaders sought to create an agency that would yet enable the CPP to secure and retain the support of a large majority of small farmers through a judicious dispensation of economic favours, which
would also constitute an apparatus of patronage on a countrywide basis for party faithfulls, and which would also permit them to make small fortunes on the side. All these objectives the CPP leaders achieved through the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) which Krobo Edusei picturesquely described as "the atomic bomb" and as "part of the organization" of the CPP. In July 1953 the company moved in a big way into the loan business to enable small farmers to redeem their farms pledged to large capitalist farmers, until then the principal source of rural credit. In the weeks before the 1954 election, there was an unwonted spurt in CPC grants to farmers which doubtless partially explains the 72 out of the 104 seats which the CPP won in the new legislature. The Jibowu report inferred that a sum of £317,000 "was largely used for securing votes from farmers" prior to the election. The cocoa farmers thus found themselves denied monies which they believed their due by right, but which were in part doled out to them provided they pledged their political support to the CPP.

The various arguments given by government spokesmen for the decision to peg the producer price considerably lower than the current international price were all underpinned with one basic argument. Although anxious to do farmers justice, the government as the government of the whole country—and the CPP as the party of the whole people—had to subordinate the interests and claims of a particular section, no matter how great its overall economic contribution, to those of the population or the nation as a whole. This not only had the advantage of projecting the CPP as the peoples' party and as the custodian of "national interests". It had the advantage, too, of buttressing CPP leaders' maturity and sense of responsibility in the eyes of colonial officials, since most of the surplus funds skimmed off the cocoa boom by the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) were held as long-term low-yield securities in London. The funds augmented the country's overseas reserves considerably, which at the end of 1955 stood at £208.2m., and which formed an invaluable support for sterling, especially vis-à-vis the dollar, and an important source of Britain's own capital needs.

The CPP government kept back a substantial share of the cocoa funds by levying a heavy export tax on cocoa, which it used up in infrastructural expansion and in providing basic amenities for the population: in introducing, in Nkrumah's own words, "progressive socialist schemes like housing sanatoria, the establishment of workers' compulsory education for children of all classes, maternity and child welfare clinics, and other intricate and progressive social and economic schemes that will surely transform Ghana into a modern country."

Most of those "progressive socialist schemes" benefited people in towns, small and large, from where the CPP drew the bulk of its petty
bourgeois support. The party rank and file found those schemes, coupled with the government's pork-barrel development projects, sufficient evidence of its leaders' benevolence. With its cocoa policies, therefore, the CPP government scored in a number of ways. It reinforced its standing with colonial authorities. It rewarded the party rank and file in some measure for the latter's faithfulness. And it destroyed the economic basis both of an incipient Ghanaian capitalism and of the large farmer-chief's political resistance to the CPP's dominance.

Thus it was that Ashanti became the centre of the federalist agitation in the country. The agitation failed in the end because, while Ashanti was the richest region, it was unable to weigh against the combined population and pressure of other regions. The Ashanti chiefs and cocoa farmers, of course, found in the middle class—by itself too insignificant—willing partners in the battle against CPP "dictatorship". The middle class lent the National Liberation Movement (NLM) its intellectual resources, while the movement's financial and political resources were furnished by chiefs and by those CPP members who had failed to secure the party's nomination for the 1954 election. The chiefs hastened to enlist tradition on their side. They concluded that "the traditional constitution of Ashanti is federal in nature". The intelligentsia embroidered this view into a more contemporary pattern. It argued that traditional forms of government, whatever their shortcomings, were superior to British imports, by which CPP leaders set such great store. The latter attached supreme importance then to parliamentary democracy, since its electoral arithmetic was the basis of their grip on power. The NLM was traditionalist, the CPP modernising. After independence the rôles were reversed. CPP leaders justified their successive modifications of parliamentary democracy, and their incessant tampering with the constitution, as attempts to adapt the country's political system to "the traditional genius of the people", whether in defending preventive detention (1958), vesting extraordinary powers in the office and the person of (the first) president (1960), or in enstooling the CPP as the "national party" (1964). It was now the turn of the rapidly dwindling opposition to protest that that was not the African genius and tradition.

This underlines the utterly ideological character of the argument between tradition and modernity. CPP leaders, after neutralising the chieftancy politically, all too happily adopted the institution itself. They luxuriated indeed in its rituals and symbols, and its preservation became part of the oath of office taken by the new paramount chief—the president. During 1951–57 the CPP leaders were staunch modernisers, insofar as this served to establish the party's political dominance. During 1957–66 they were ardent neo-traditionalists, insofar as this served to reinforce the party's political monopoly. Nor was in that
respect the opposition any different. Both the CPP and the opposition wanted only as much modernisation, or as much tradition, as suited their purpose. Neither advocated, because neither stood to gain from, total change. Their conflict was over succession, not over revolution. Once the CPP had triumphed in the conflict, the middle class, if a shade less gracefully than the chiefs, reconciled itself to the position of a junior partner of the party in power. The higher civil service, the professionals, the businessmen, the judiciary, with few exceptions, gradually and in course of time fully accommodated themselves to receiving high rewards for their skills and services.

The ambivalence of the CPP’s attitude towards tradition and democracy, in line with its petty bourgeois orientation, was also characteristic of the party’s custodianship of nationalism. Its leaders claimed that theirs was the only truly national party in the country, since all other parties and factions were derived from, and limited in their appeal and support to, a particular tribe, region, or religion. This was a gross over-simplification of a complex situation which admirably suited their book.

The NLM and the Togoland Congress (which was also, like the NLM, a party of cocoa interests) were all to self-consciously tribalistic. Their leaders sought to enhance their political appeal by dressing up their economic claims in flamboyantly traditional garments. The Northern People’s Party (NPP) was an attempt to insulate the north from the modernising forces at work in the southern part of the country. After a brief period in opposition, however, its leaders transferred their support to the government in Accra—the fount of development grants, but which promised not unduly to interfere with traditional institutions. On the other hand, the Moslem Association Party (MAP), which based its appeal on Islam, was mainly confined to the “Zongo” (immigrant) communities, originally from neighbouring French and British territories, settled in the major southern towns. If a part of the MAP’s support derived from fairly prosperous Hausa and other traders, much of it came from those who eeked out a meagre, uncertain living as labourers, miners, cattle drovers, house servants, watchmen, and who vaguely saw the MAP as a means of articulating their identity as underprivileged, unwanted "strangers" in the better developed and prosperous south. The Ga Shifimokpee (Ga Standfast Association)— whose founders were a driver, a teacher, a motor mechanic, a store-keeper, a bicycle repairer, and two clerks—was supported mainly by unemployed elementary-school leavers, by taxi-drivers and ex-service-men, and by the local farmers and fishermen, who saw the non-Ga accessories of the CPP government acquire properties and erect mansions in Accra, while they themselves experienced acute housing shortages and increasing pauperisation.
In these latter two cases, the particular hardships and grievances not yet informed by a common class perspective found expression through archaic social forms, party because the tribal (Ga) or the religious (Islamic) tie was more comprehensive than the purely occupational ones—and thus capable of generating political support and action over a wide area—and partly because the traditional order provided a ready-made framework of communication and leadership. On the other hand, the CPP leaders indiscriminately regarded all these movements, whether of protest or of reaction, as manifestations of "tribalism" or "Pakistanism". But while the NLM and the NPP borrowed CPP techniques, the CPP borrowed their appeals. To the Muslim Association (forerunner of the MAP) the CPP had opposed the Muslim Youth Congress. To the Ga Shifimo Kpee it opposed the Ga Ekomefeemo Kpee. It met tribalism with tribalism, regionalism with regionalism, religion with religion, all the while protesting its nationalism.

Tactical Action—the CPP's strategy of neo-colonial accommodation, serviced by its petty bourgeois nationalism—thus proved the most effective way of undermining the CPP's enemies, as well as securing the quickest possible transfer of power in the CPP's own favour. Its anti-communism and attachment to parliamentary democracy were sufficient for colonial officials to certify the CPP's political "maturity". Anti-communism served to neutralise the left-wing militants within the CPP and in particular to de-politicise trade unions from which most of the militants were drawn. Parliamentary democracy, coupled with anti-tribalism and anti-regionalism, served to quash the opposition of the chiefs and the middle class, both drawing their support from tribal and regional interests and outnumbered by the CPP. With its cocoa policies, the CPP continued to irrigate the London Stock Exchange and to support sterling—sufficiently so for colonial officials to certify the CPP's economic "maturity"; and it also continued to undermine the economic foundation both of cocoa farmers and of a presumptive Ghanaian capitalism, which could prove a political counterweight to the CPP's dominance.

As baneful as the CPP's petty bourgeois nationalism was its petty bourgeois socialism, which simply maintained and lubricated a fundamentally private enterprise economy dominated by colonial interests. The CPP's decision to withhold from cocoa farmers a large portion of the profits from the extraordinary, and inevitably short-lived, cocoa boom could have proved a most invaluable exercise in capital formation, had it not in fact channelled the surplus funds abroad and otherwise sought to establish its "soundness" in colonial eyes. The whole tenor of the CPP's economic policies was to preserve colonial interests. The 1959 plan was drawn along the lines of the 1951 "colonial" plan.
As Nkrumah himself was to state in April 1961, "our planning hitherto has been largely piecemeal and unpurposeful". Given the economic and political exigencies of Tactical Action, that was inevitable. Well until 1961, he and his colleagues frequently intoned the need to develop and modernise agriculture, to diversify the economy, and to industrialize. By contrast, during the first ten years of CPP rule, no structural changes of any note—not even a change of emphasis—took place in the country's economy. Almost as a ritual Nkrumah often spoke of the country's economic and social reconstruction, but without betraying the least understanding of the political connection between social reconstruction and economic progress.

The CPP government continually harped on the need to diversify the economy and to industrialize. Arthur Lewis, the reputed economist, was invited to advise the government on the country's industrialization. But his Report (1953), attaching top priority to agricultural development, was a catalogue of reasons why the Gold Coast should not industrialize and why, at any rate, the government must have nothing to do with it. "Even the Gold Coast Government, which seems rich to its citizens, is really very poor." He maintained that the government must restrict its expenditure to expanding public services—welfare and infrastructural—leaving whatever little scope there was for manufacturing import substitutes for the home market to private, in the main foreign, enterprise. The Nkrumah government wholeheartedly embraced this economic philosophy. It limited its "socialist" expenditure to providing social services, mainly in municipalities and market towns, and to financing an ambitious infrastructure—mainly communications, the Tema harbour, the Volta project—which in the immediate present only served the needs of an essentially capitalist economy.

On industrial development, the government's policy could be summed up as—Industrialization of the country, mainly by private foreign capital, and progressive Africanisation of the managerial cadres. While exporting Ghanaian capital, the government besought foreign capital for Ghana's development. In spite of all its speeches of welcome, however, all its inducements and blandishments, all evidence of its political moderation—keeping communists in their places—and of its sound economic sense—large overseas reserves and surplus budgets—the government, at the end of its first decade, had precious little to show by way of foreign investment and industrial development. "The Lewis strategy for Ghana's industrialization failed because its main preoccupation—establishing the government's conservative credentials—was only ancillary to the foreign capitalists' investment criteria." If the political accents of the National Liberation Council today are those of the United Party, its economic policies are those of the CPP during 1951–61.
Some data on the country's resources during that period makes instructive reading. In the period between 1947-48 and 1960–61, the CMB surpluses amounted to £87.4m. At the end of the year 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960, Ghana's overseas reserves stood, respectively, at £113.3m., 137.2m., 145.1m., 160.1m., 197.4m., 208.2m., 189.8m., 171.4m., 177.6m., 166.8m., and 148.6m. During the same period, excepting 1960, Ghana had a favourable balance of trade, and in 7 out of those 11 years she had a favourable current account balance. The sum of £38m., which Lewis had reekoned would need adding to the development plan if the government were solely to foot the bill for a moderate stimulus to manufacturing should not after all have proved so very difficult to find; and the modest industrial development it could thus have initiated would have furthered the process of economic diversification and laid the foundation of economic independence. By the time the government did decide to play a leading rôle in industrial development, the international price of cocoa—the economy's mainstay—was falling rapidly and sharply. In the meantime, the government had committed the country's available financial resources (which were presently exhausted) to creating an elaborate and extravagant physical infrastructure; and it had also developed a lopsided autarkic outlook: a national airline, a national shipping line, etc.—all of which were to remain grossly underused for want of major industrial development.

At the end of the CPP's first decade in power, then, Ghana had an economy in which all major productive sectors—cocoa, mining, timber—were in private hands. Trading and banking, as well as mining, were mainly in foreign hands. The government offered the virgin field of industrialization to private enterprise, too, but foreign capital lacked the will, domestic capital the means, for industrial development. In the meantime, the CPP had established a virtual monopoly of political power. The combination of these two interrelated factors—a fundamentally colonial/private-enterprise economy and an essentially single-party system—served to produce out of the petty bourgeois mass a substantial bureaucratic bourgeoisie entrenched in the state apparatus at all levels.

By 1959–60 Nkrumah began to acknowledge the dangers and limitations of a neo-colonial accommodation. The failure of the CPP's development strategy—which had been but a corollary of its successful political strategy—he read as a sign of the determination of imperialism not to let go of its economic grip on the newly independent states. As he discovered the limitations of the political kingdom, he stressed the need for continental unity, linking Ghana's "second
revolution" with an African revolution. His earlier conception of non-alignment—in which emphasis on Ghana's "affinity" with the West backed economic and political ties exclusively with the Western bloc—was modified by a more radical approach. In consequence of this, and in order fully to affirm Ghana's independence, the government developed economic and political ties with the Soviet bloc, alongside, and partly in place of, those already existing with the West. The wide-ranging changes which Nkrumah introduced during 1960–61 were thus geared to his reading of the imperatives both of Ghana's second revolution and of the African revolution (of which he saw Ghana as the vanguard).

A reorientation of Ghana's African and international policies was clearly of great importance to the success of Ghana's second revolution. Even more important, however, was the reorientation of her domestic policies. There were two essential political conditions of that success. First, the political structures must be fully democratised so as to draw the mass of the population into the reconstruction effort. Secondly, as a precondition of the first, the CPP bureaucratic bourgeoisie must be completely destroyed. Nkrumah recognized this, and the changes which he introduced were aimed at a total reconversion of the CPP and of the political system. But he never managed to transcend the limitations of his petty bourgeois outlook. He regarded the CPP as the axis of the new order, too. But the CPP which was to be the instrument of Ghana's socialist transformation proved, in fact, to be the major obstacle in the way of that transformation. All Nkrumah's changes proved insufficient to alter the CPP's fundamental character. Petty bourgeois nationalism which sufficed to win political independence was inadequate to the more fundamental task of social reconstruction. Because the petty bourgeoisie is capable of "liberating" itself without a total revolution, a nationalist movement generally falls short of a socialist revolution. The CPP, the instrument of neo-colonialism, could not suddenly become the instrument of socialism.

The cumulative result of the changes during 1960–61—whether in government, party organization, or ideology—was to concentrate all power in the person and hands of Nkrumah himself. The 1960 constitution provided for a highly centralised system of government with the president, the head both of state and of government, as its linch-pin. Because Nkrumah was the first president, and because the constitution contained special provisions to shelter and strengthen the position of the first president, it had clearly been designed to equip Nkrumah with an apparatus of government which he controlled at every step and at every stage. The real point of the new constitution was to rid Nkrumah of checks on his authority from within the government machine, so that he could administer the country as he saw best. Increasingly after
1957, he had in fact been using that machine in a highly personal manner. All that the new constitution did was to bring the constitutional theory in line with the political practice.

The day the country got a new constitution—1 July 1960—the CPP got a new structure. Approved at the 1959 party conference, the party constitution equipped the party with an elaborate national secretariat, comprising numerous bureaus and departments, which was both to integrate the party more effectively at all levels and to centralise its machinery. This was expected to tone up party organization and discipline and to enable the party better to discharge its vanguard function. The constitution also provided for "vanguard activists" who were to combat "ideological menace and factional rivalries" within the party. The party was to foster and further its alliance with the TUC and other mass organizations, which would "guarantee social stability throughout the period of Industrial Construction and provide the social climate for building an African Socialistic pattern of society in Ghana".

That alliance presently gave way to assimilation. From being the CPP's "allies" or "partners", the mass organizations had by 1960 become the party's "integral wings" or "branches". The TUC and UGFC general secretaries, as well as the CPP general secretary, were that year made ministers plenipotentiary, and assigned a place in the government apparatus. In May 1961 Nkrumah announced plans for "the membership integration of the various wing organizations of the party", by which separate membership cards for the TUC, etc. were abolished, and replaced by a single all-inclusive party membership card. He also announced that the regional commissioners—important party appointees who were the link between the central government and the regions—were to become regional party secretaries as well, with the present regional secretaries of the party, as well as of the mass organizations, redesignated as assistant regional secretaries of the party. These changes not only proclaimed the party's supremacy over both government and mass organizations. In fact they deprived the distinction between party, government, and mass organizations of all meaning. They also greatly enlarged the party bureaucracy and, by reinforcing and centralising its control of both branch and auxiliary organizations, promoted bureaucratism in the party. In May 1961 Nkrumah assumed the office of general secretary of the party (of which he was already leader and life chairman). This was a further stage in the centralisation, bureaucratisation, and personalisation of authority.

Since so much emphasis was laid on ideological education, clearly a new ideology was indicated—especially as the old clichés no longer worked—and Nkrumah set about cultivating one in hothouse manner.
Nkrumahism was "socialism based on the conditions, circumstances and peculiarities of our African life". Like the CPP itself, it was "built up from our own experiences, conditions, environments and concepts, entirely Ghanaian and African in outlook, and based on the Marxist socialist philosophy and worldview". Nkrumahism, "the ideology of the African revolution", was vaguely seen as the "adaptation" of Marxism to Africa. But what the precise adaptations were remained obscure. The road to Nkrumahism was paved with ambiguities and improvisations.

At its centre stood the conception of the party as the embodiment and custodian of "national unity". The workers (or farmers) were enjoined to overcome "sectional" or "parochial" interests supposedly inimical to national unity, which was clearly best guarded through uncritical obedience to the party leadership. The CPP and the government were "responsible for everyone equally. Farmers, merchants, lawyers and working men are all members of the same Ghanaian society. They may have different professions but they must all work for the common interest of the nation". This is not the time for unbridled militant trade unionism in our country. Trade union officials must shed their colonial character and their colonial thinking. They must "discard their colonial mentality and methods and remember that they are not struggling against capitalists". Such views argue the belief that to affirm class interests, which is to underline economic divisions and conflicts in society, is also to undermine national unity. Such affirmation was in consequence denied rights and means of self-expression. Democracy, whether in the party or in the mass organizations, was repudiated in the name of national unity. Socialism and nationalism are mutually ill-suited; the former rarely survives crossing with the latter. Certainly, they were not happily combined in the ideology of Nkrumahism. Its "national" Marxism—its doctrine of national unity and class harmony—was simply refurbished pan-African socialism, in line with its petty bourgeois parentage. Far from clarifying issues and problems and indicating general lines of development, Nkrumahism—nota product of general or genuine discussion but merely a personalised choice of slogans and formulas—increasingly became almost a fetish, a hopeless attempt to superimpose an apparent order over a mass of contradictions, neither perceived nor resolved.

Nkrumahism was very much Nkrumah's own doctrine, of course. He was "personally responsible for formulating Party ideology and for directing Party ideological education". He was the sole dispenser and arbiter of Nkrumahism, and all—party members, activists, leaders—were uncritically to abide by it. Ideology, like party and government, became personal to him. A new phase in adulation accompanied these developments. "Osagyefo is our Leader, our Father, our Teacher, our
Messiah and the Nation's Fount of Honour. It was but inevitable that the new idolatry should underpin the new constitution, the new party structure, and the new ideology.

V

The changes of 1960–61 proved mechanical and superficial. They failed to bring into existence political structures likely to engage the mass of the population in the reconstruction efforts, but only augmented the size and importance of the party bureaucracy. Those who were appointed to the many new openings at all levels were a mixed, indifferent bag. Some of them, like Tawia Adamafio (the party general secretary until May 1961), had earlier been in the opposition. Some others at an earlier stage in the party's history had been discarded for left-wing heresy, but were now back in favour. Others had but recently returned from abroad with a flair for socialist rhetoric which met Nkrumah's need for ideologues. They loudly proclaimed loyalty to Nkrumah, and became licensed vendors of Nkrumaism. The expansion and reorganization of the party could have succeeded in its objects only if "the new men" had come up from below, sprung from the soil, and been familiar with problems of mobilisation and development and brought into the mainstream of party organization through experience and participation in the party's affairs. Only by being themselves the products of democracy could they have become the nucleus of a wider and deeper democracy.

Given the past development and character of the CPP as essentially a vote-getting political machine, there was at hand no body of cadres at the grass-roots and middle levels which could be used to service and energize the new party apparatus. Insofar as the CPP had succeeded in its efforts to de-politicise the TUC, etc., it had scotched the chances of getting those cadres from the mass organizations, themselves crucial to any attempt or scheme to mobilise the working population. The new party structure was thus simply a heap of new career openings which were stuffed with persons without political experience or popular credentials but endowed only with an unusual capacity for singing Nkrumah's praises. Those persons were all too willingly drawn into the CPP's dominant ethos of self-seeking, careerism and corruption. They became critics of the party's "old guard" — the bureaucratic bourgeoisie — in the hope of displacing the latter from the state apparatus and of inheriting its economic rewards.

Nkrumah's direction of efforts to undermine the bureaucratic bourgeoisie again underlined his limitations. Although the old guard had been content for the most part dutifully to follow the leader, many of its members had over the years built a measure of independent political
support at the constituency level. Men like Gbedemah, Botsio and Edusei, clearly enjoyed considerable prestige with members of parliament and the party rank and file, whose petty bourgeois tendencies they typified to a degree. Before their removal from government, their public standing had to be destroyed. Thus began the attacks early in 1961 on the corruption and ostentatious high living of ministers and members of parliament. The attacks received Nkrumah's imprimatur with his Dawn Broadcast in April. Although the bureaucrats must have hoped finally to be rewarded for their services with seats in parliament and the cabinet, Nkrumah himself was much more concerned to destroy the independent political standing, in particular, of Gbedemah and Botsio. Botsio was readmitted into the Cabinet some time later (as, presumably, Gbedemah would have been, had he kept his peace), as part of Nkrumah's technique of counterbalancing diverse political interests and personalities so as to forestall any political combination likely to endanger his own pre-eminence. His main concern was not to annihilate the old guard altogether but merely to undermine it politically. As a result, amidst ceaseless cabinet reshuffles, the old guard continued its tenancy of the state apparatus, which was at the same time increasingly devalued and disabled through continuous mutilation and charges of corruption and nepotism in high places.

The old guard did not give up easily. Its fortress was parliament; that of the party bureaucrats, the press. And the press became the bête noire of the parliamentarians. During April–September 1961 the press and parliament were at each other's throat. The old guard lost temporarily, but recaptured the initiative a year later. This was after the attempt on Nkrumah's life at Kulungugu in August 1962, and following which some of "the new men" including Adamafio, their leader, were arrested for their alleged involvement in the crime. Once again, in September–October 1962, parliament rang with wild attacks by its members on the party press and bureaucracy. The most significant aspect of the counterattack by the old guard, in both 1961 and 1962, was the fact that it was led by men like Edusei, Aduhene and Abban who were in the past more bitterly hostile than others to both the chiefs and the middle class, who were ardent supporters of the one-party state and contributed handsomely to establishing the CPP's hegemony and power monopoly, and who were now loud exponents of "traditional socialism", parliamentary supremacy, and of the sacred right of private property. The dispossessed of yesterday were the privileged of today, and they were not prepared to brook any "foreign ideologies" likely to disinherit them once again. They lost the battle in 1961, but won the war in 1962. After Kulungugu many of the old guard were restored to office, thus rescinding whatever little success
Nkrumah had had in containing the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. They became the new retailers of Nkrumaism, which to them meant nothing more than loyalty to Nkrumah. They had office, if little power, which was sufficient for their needs, especially as the new economic administration, devised in order to push the country towards socialism and abounding in state corporations and controls, was prolific in opportunities for commissions and graft.

The strike by Sekondi-Takoradi railway and harbour workers in September 1961 had given Nkrumah the chance to dismiss and demote Gbedemah, Botsio and a few others of the old guard,55 and to clip "for all time the wings of the few reactionaries who sought to establish an exploiting class of a handful of comprador bourgeoisie cushioned by their foreign capitalist friends".56 But the strike demonstrated very clearly how little the refurbished apparatus was able either to cope with the increasing popular dissatisfaction over rising prices and unemployment, or to create viable democratic structures with which to engage the mass of the people in the country's reconstruction and development. The purport, and effect, of the new system of industrial relations introduced in 1958 was both to subordinate the trade union movement to the government and to unify and centralise on a country-wide basis the organization of individual unions (themselves part of a tightly knit TUC controlled by the party-government). This in turn enabled union leaders—their numbers and funds rapidly multiplying, and incorporated into the CPP bureaucracy—effectively to control their members. Strikes were in any case nearly illegal.57 The modest wage increase in 1960 was virtually cancelled within the year by spiralling price increases. "Certainly more than 10 per cent and probably nearer 15 per cent of Ghana's male wage-labour force is unemployed—or was at the time of the 1960 census. And 1960 was a good year in terms of economic activity."58 There was also severe underemployment.

The clash between the CPP's parliamentary and bureaucratic elites served to increase further the workers' disaffection with both the government's economic policies and their own union leaders, who were little better than government brokers urging the workers to produce more and consume less. And the austerity budget of July 1961 set that disaffection aflame.

The strike began on 4 September. In Nkrumah's absence, then on his "pilgrimage to the East", the machinery of government was nearly seized. Throughout, the presidential commission kept moaning that they must await Osagyefo's return before anything could be done. The strikers' rejoinder could hardly be more sarcastic: "This is rather fantastic, since there is no country in this world that is governed by one man, except in dictatorial countries, which our beloved Ghana is not one."59 The blandishments and threats of party, government and
TUC leaders were of no avail. The strike was directed by middle-level or (later) rank-and-file leaders, who were bitterly anti-TUC. The official union leaders were ignored, or at any rate discreetly stayed in the background. Soon the doggedness of the strikers, particularly in Sekondi-Takoradi, took on the dimensions of an insurrection in the fevered imagination of CPP leaders. The *Evening News* (the party's organ) was at first sympathetic to the strikers, hoping to turn their grievances against the parliamentarians. But as the strike continued, appearing to threaten the whole system, the paper called the strikers "counter-revolutionaries" and warned, "We know who you are. . . . Remember your wives and children. . . . They will suffer for your misdeeds." Adamafio spoke of the strikers as "Western Rats" and presumably favoured measures appropriate to plague. When Nkrumah returned he was at first conciliatory, but when the strikers failed to respond he ordered them back to work on pain of dire penalties. Only then, when confronted with the full might of the state, did the strikers retreat. A few days later their leaders, both official and unofficial (as well as some opposition leaders), were detained.

In a subsequent analysis, the government viewed the strike as part of an insurrectionary plot to overthrow it, hatched by the opposition and some of the ex-CPP "comprador bourgeoisie", and aided and abetted by imperialist interests. The evidence on the strike having been instigated and planned by the opposition was rather thin. But there could be little cause for surprise that, once the strike began, the impotent and reckless opposition should have rushed in with advice and succour, hoping to ride to power on the workers' back. More to the point was the workers' unwillingness to use the facilities of the party-government-TUC complex to voice or seek redress for their grievances. They were bitterly suspicious of their union leaders and hostile to government policies. They were deprived of their traditional rights of strike and collective bargaining, in exchange, supposedly, for channels of free expression and full participation within the monolithic structure. But those channels were progressively clogged, disused and distrusted. The whole system was peculiarly vulnerable, and even a single successful strike, as Nkrumah realized, could be its coup de grâce.

The monolithic structure was increasingly centralised, and *person-* alised by Nkrumah. The inconclusive struggle between the CPP's parliamentary and bureaucratic elites inevitably made him the fount both of power and of ideology, more and more the court of first as well as of last resort, and loyalty to his *person* the sole basis and criterion of political and ideological legitimacy. That was particularly the case after Kulungugu, when the balance between parliamentarians and bureaucrats was restored, thus confirming the bureaucratic-
bourgeois character of the whole system. The principle of joint leadership, never very apparent, was after 1961 almost as a matter of principle never applied. It is significant that in Nkrumah's frequent recitals of Leninist formulas of organization—"democratic centralism," etc.—"collective leadership" rarely made its appearance. All his pronouncements began,"I have directed..."; those of his colleagues, "I am commanded by Osagyefo. . . ." In the end he had only subordinates, no colleagues.

Having equipped both party and state with its own elaborate and complex machinery, Nkrumah increasingly governed the country independently of either. More and more offices, functions and decisions were transferred to Flagstaff House, his seat of office. Ever more frequently, Nkrumah over-rove the regular machinery of government, rarely bothering to consult with appropriate ministers before taking, or even announcing, decisions on matters theoretically within their competence. Members of parliament unprotestingly rubber-stamped legislation and patiently bore with Nkrumah's frequent harangues on African and foreign affairs, in which they had little interest. As rewards for their loyalty they wanted only to be left with their parliamentary seats and ministerial posts. In return they were prepared completely to abdicate their functions and powers. Although parliamentarians were incessantly charged with corruption, etc., Nkrumah never considered the dissolution of the National Assembly in order to secure a "purer" one. The assembly elected in 1956 stayed on until 1965—the only body, housing the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, to survive all the changes during that period. The 1965 election (or non-election), with membership of the assembly increased from 104 to 198, gave Nkrumah the occasion to satisfy the parliamentary cravings of the party bureaucrats, as well as retaining in the new assembly the large majority of the "loyalists" from the old. Bureaucrats and parliamentarians, equally barren, were intermarried.

The party bureaucracy never took root. From the outset it was little more than Nkrumah's own personal machine. It never developed independent political standing—especially as the local party officials of an earlier, more militant, period were often arbitrarily displaced with those in favour in Accra—and dutifully relayed Nkrumah's message. The party conference, which met annually before independence, met only twice afterwards, in 1959 and 1962, and on each occasion was content to reaffirm its loyalty to the life chairman, but without discussing or criticizing his policies. The party constitution revised in 1962 was, in minor details, significantly less democratic than before. The central committee, greatly enlarged in size but reduced in importance, met but once, three years later, to ratify the list of party candidates for the 1965 election. Death of the party at the top was reflected at
the local level, too, where discussions and elections became increasingly rare. District commissioners, surely that part of the system which people hated most, were Nkrumah's personal appointees. They overrode both the local party organization and the regular machinery of local government. Their sole qualification was loyalty to and adulation of Nkrumah; their ignorance and ambition the surest guarantee of their total support and obedience. Preoccupied with his African and international rôle, and forced to cope with proliferating government routine, Nkrumah had little time or taste for party activities and affairs. He was content to take the party's health for granted on the strength of sheafs of telegrams of felicitations and loyalty from party functionaries across the country on certain specified days in the year. When the time came for that celebrated loyalty to be put to work, it was found to be ethereal. The "dynamic" Convention People's Party instantly evaporated.

VI

What conclusions may one hazard in the light of this analysis of an attempt to build "socialism in one country" in Africa?

1. Colonial rule inaugurated a measure both of political and economic modernisation and of Africanisation. Independence gave added momentum to this two-fold process. Gradually, it brought into existence a number of new elites—civil service, judicial, military, managerial—in addition to the political elite thrown up by the nationalist movement.

The new elites—highly privileged but without any substantial share in political power—play a crucial rôle in administration. Because most of their work requires some degree of trained intelligence, membership in the new elites is determined largely by possession of higher education of technical and professional skills. But that education and those skills are acquired mainly in the former metropolitan states, or in establishments shaped by and organically linked with those in the "mother countries". In consequence the whole orientation of those elites, their very raison d'être, is Euro-African—Anglo-African, Franco-African, Belgo-African—and predisposes them in favour of neo-colonial solutions and arrangements.

In the majority of African states—where "decolonisation" was but a euphemism for neo-colonialism—there is no fundamental conflict of outlook and interest between political and administrative elites, gradually fusing together as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Often, as in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast or Senegal, they have on the whole worked harmoniously enough. They are none the less competitors for power and privilege. Often therefore, when the political elite has been unable
effectively to govern the population, the administrative/military elites have seen fit to unseat the political elite. This is the background of several of the recent coups in Africa. It has been all too easy for the handful of officers of even a very small, ramshackle army to topple the government of the day, without a trace of popular resistance or regret in behalf of the disgraced politicians who earlier often enjoyed some measure of popular following.

In a few other states, on the other hand, where the political elite (or its leading part) has attempted a radical breakaway from the colonial past, its relationship with the administrative elites (and the intelligentsia) has proved a more complex problem. Even if in theory the administrative elites have professed political neutrality and pledged their willingness to carry out faithfully the policies and directives of the popularly based political elite, they have had to work in a political and ideological set-up, and been obliged to implement policies, which they have found increasingly uncongenial and which, in the light of their whole training and make-up, have appeared to them progressively subversive of "national interests". Civil servants are not "decolonised" merely by forcing them to attend courses at ideological institutes, given by "experts" whom they regard with superior contempt as little better than illiterate. Nor, of course, are the administrative elites wholly displaced overnight, or their functions and services dispensed with. In consequence, the more forcefully a political elite has tried to push on with its socialist design, the greater has been the resistance it has had to meet from the neo-colonial brake (as it were) built into the system. In Ghana, after 1961, as Nkrumah made less and less use of the party-state apparatus, he came to depend more and more on a small number of senior civil servants, domiciled in Flagstaff House, who were constrained to pander, but with dwindling conviction and enthusiasm, to what they regarded as his ideological whims and fancies. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie thrown up by the CPP was only too willing to use the skilled assistance of the administrative elites as well as of the intelligentsia, in order to foil the wild enthusiasms of the leader, whose patronage and protection were an essential condition of its privileges and prosperity.

The more ambitious and "nationalist" a political elite, therefore, the greater has been its passion for Africanisation—African nationalism is after all the ideology of Africanisation—and it has lived in the end to find itself impaled on the pole of Africanisation. The ethos of the new elites is marked by a notable contempt for the inefficiency and corruption of politicians, by a technocratic ardour for efficiency and order; by an impatience with "politics" and "ideology": and while waxing eloquent over liberty and democracy, allegedly destroyed by politicians (who did, as a matter of fact, enjoy a popular mandate of
sorts), the new elites work all too happily under the aegis of a military junta without any recognized mandate.  

2. A much more important problem than that of the institutional legacy of colonialism is, if the socialist experiment is to succeed, that of combining political control with democratisation of structures. In this Nkrumah's failure was total, and the personalisation of his rule was directly proportional to his failure. This failure graphically demonstrated the fatal limitations of the CPP's petty bourgeois character and of Nkrumah's petty bourgeois outlook. He failed in his efforts to dislodge the bureaucratic bourgeoisie from the state apparatus, and managed merely to render the latter ineffectual and unfit even for routine work. He failed in his efforts to democratise political structures, and managed merely to raise formidable barriers in the way of popular participation and mobilisation. Petty bourgeois nationalism which was enough to win the country its independence was not enough to transform it. Throughout, contradictions dogged Nkrumah which he neither understood nor overcame.

First was the contradiction between the open, unrestricted membership of the CPP and the party's rôle as the political vanguard during "the second revolution". Open membership dated from the party's origins as a nationalist movement. The passion for a large membership was unabated even after the second revolution formally began. Members of ancillary organizations were ipso facto members of the party. This extraordinary permissiveness in the matter of party membership was hardly compatible with the party's supposed vanguard role; and this vanguard function was in any case appropriated by the party bureaucracy, although never discharged by it.

The most important condition of the success of the socialist experiment in a newly independent state is the ability of the party-state apparatus actively to engage the broad mass of the working population in the country's reconstruction. Nkrumah recognized this. Where he went wrong was in his reading of the fundamental problem, which was not how to enlarge the party's political empire or to increase the party's membership but how to democratise the party's structures, procedures and leadership at all levels. For the people to accept sacrifices and hardships for the country's development not only required the complete elimination of those leaders and advisers who were themselves anything but self-sacrificing. It also required promoting widely an understanding, a direct awareness, of what was at stake. This could only be possible through active and continuous association of the people with political and economic decisions involved in reconstruction and development, especially at the grass-roots level, rather than through administering "ideology" and sermons from above. Political
and economic structures had to be fully democratised before the mass of workers and farmers could be fully mobilised.

Nkrumah's failure to perceive and achieve this was best seen in his handling of the relationship of the mass organizations—of trade unions, farmers, etc.—with the CPP. Their indiscriminate and unimaginative integration with the party served only to deprive them of their individuality and identity, and rendered them incapable of independent political and economic action. Trade unions, like those of railway workers, which refused to comply with this conception of integration were firmly, indeed ruthlessly, handled. That integration was purely at the level of bureaucracy with the swollen bureaucracies of mass organizations fused with the gargantuan party bureaucracy, and all imbued increasingly with the ethos of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. To enlarge the powers and functions of the party without democratising its structures and procedures is certain to expose it to the hazards of bureaucratic sclerosis, to which the CPP all too easily succumbed. To integrate mass organizations with such a party is to expose them, too, to a similar process of bureaucratization and to the same hazards of sclerosis, which is again what happened in Ghana. Integration, far from energizing and democratising mass organizations—a prerequisite of the full mobilisation of their members—resulted in fact in the very opposite. Had the trade unions been left alone, they might conceivably have provided Nkrumah with an independent political force with which to loosen the iron grip of a moribund party. The radical defect in Nkrumah's outlook, which proved fatal to his efforts to transform the CPP into a socialist movement, was his conception of the party as the embodiment and custodian of "national unity". Even while recognizing its limitations, he never overcame his petty bourgeois nationalism. In the end the fortifications which isolated him from his own people were ideological even more than physical.

3. The most creative aspect of the ideology of Nkrumaism is its analysis of neo-colonialism in Africa. Nkrumah saw socialism as the Ghanaian, and continental unity as the African, antidote to neo-colonialism. Yet his economic theories and policies during even the second revolution placed Ghana's socialist experiment increasingly at the mercy of the very system of imperialism and neo-colonialism, bounded by international capitalism, which he denounced. During the second phase, the state was to supply the administrative motor, foreign capitalists the fuel, for Ghana's industrialization. Nkrumah gave foreign capital the pre-eminence which, if the socialist experiment was to succeed, should have been given to the mobilisation of the working population. Both the political apparatus which he created and personalised and his failure radically to restructure society made this nearly impossible. Much of the "investment" in Ghana after 1961
was in the form of suppliers' credits—short-term hard loans—from private Western capitalists, some 68 per cent of Ghana's total external debts. The economic apparatus which Nkrumah created, given the political apparatus already established, simply multiplied the opportunities for the economic development of those manning the double apparatus. There was waste, inefficiency, corruption, and greater hardship for the population.

On the other hand, Nkrumah was unflagging in his attacks on imperialism and neo-colonialism. There was a patent contradiction between denouncing neo-colonialism and soliciting its aid, between condemning foreign private investment as a neo-colonialist weapon yet wanting more and more of it. Nkrumah's militant anti-imperialism was but the ideological ballast of a petty bourgeois nationalism trying to escape its own limitations and contradictions. When the United States broke off negotiations for American food aid to Ghana—in protest against Nkrumah's book *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, in which he had pinpointed the United States as the leading neo-colonialist power—he declared defiantly: "It is clear that food so heavily laden with strings would prove indigestible in Ghana." The minister of finance, in his budget statement two days before the coup stated that imperialist powers and interests were "out to destroy us by applying all forms of pressures, political as well as economic". He noted the "socialist countries"' "considerable appreciation of our problems and keen sympathy towards our aspirations and some willingness to help", and urged the IMF and the World Bank to forget "ideological differences" and similarly to help Ghana. The Soviet Union's and Eastern European countries' "willingness to help" lagged considerably behind their "appreciation" and "keen sympathy" for Ghana's "non-capitalist path of development". They were in no position either substantially to contribute towards Ghana's development or materially to alter the international economic setting dominated by Western capitalist interests within which ex-colonial, underdeveloped countries like Ghana had to move and manœuvre for better terms of trade for their primary products and for capital. Inaugurating the Volta project a few weeks before the coup, Nkrumah spoke of the friendship and co-operation between Ghana, "a small but very dynamic independent African State", and the United States, "the leading capitalist power in the world". "Like Britain in the hey-day of its imperial power, the United States is, and rightly so, adopting a conception of dual mandate in its relations with the developing world. This dual mandate, if properly applied, could enable the United States to increase its own prosperity and at the same time assist in increasing the prosperity of the developing countries." There is a bitter irony in the fact that a man normally given to Leninist rhetoric should have borrowed a
phrase from Lugard—whom, in a different perspective, Nkrumah saw as an ancestor of neo-colonialism—to justify a contradiction which (with others) proved fatal to his own vision and endeavour.

NOTES

1. Theories of indirect rule were a product of the imperialist phase of European penetration of Africa. The system of indirect rule best worked where, as in Northern Nigeria, traditional societies were feudal, and where colonial overrule added one more storey to the structure of feudal authority. Elsewhere, in semi-feudal societies and subsistence-economy segmentary systems, traditional institutions had first to be deprived of their democratic features, comparatively speaking, before they proved usable for indirect rule. Today the most ardent admirers of indirect rule through chiefs are to be found in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and in other strongholds of ultra-colonialism, whose white rulers prefer to deal with "responsible" chiefs, rather than with nationalist "agitators," "malcontents" or "communists" who presume to speak on behalf of the natives. The whole point of Bantustans and of Ian Smith's "consultations" with African chiefs is not only to deny African peoples the right of participation in a modern political system—which entails the ballot box, one man one vote, the principle of majority rule, and so on—but also to deprive the people of the controls over their chiefs secured them by tradition.


3. This impression is confirmed by the subsequent accounts given by the two leading colonial officials at the time—the governor, Arden-Clarke, and the colonial secretary, R. H. Saloway, in African Affairs (January 1958) and International Affairs (October 1955), respectively. Cf. Austin, op. cit., pp. 88-9.


5. Cf. Saloway's comment: "There was no alternative government to the C.P.P., none of whom had any training in public affairs. We had to build anew with what was then a crowd of agitators as our material." After 1951 the civil service became an increasingly important factor. Although the objective of Africanisation increased the proportion of Africans in the higher civil service, the overall civil service establishment was considerably expanded, partly on account of the increase in the government's "development" activities. There was in consequence an increase, in absolute numbers, in the size of the British contingent in the senior civil service. In 1950 there were 1,043 overseas officers in a total establishment of 1,990; on 1 February 1954 they numbered 1,490 in a total establishment of 2,560. During the same period the percentage of Africans moved from 10.4 to 38.2. The figures are from A Statement on the Programme of the Africanisation of the Public Service (Accra 1954), Appendix I.

6. The C.P.P. won all five municipal seats with overwhelming majorities and in 29 of the 33 rural electoral colleges (where the election was indirect). Nkrumah himself was returned with a massive vote of 20,780 out of a total poll of 23,152.
See Austin, op. cit., pp. 113, 141.

In his The Gold Coast Revolution (London 1953) and, especially, Pan-Africanism or Communism? (London 1956).

In his Report on Industrialisation and the Gold Coast (Accra 1953). Lewis is a democratic socialist and a pan-Africanist, as Padmore was. Decolonisation in British West Africa was inaugurated by the post-war Labour government, and in French West Africa by the socialist government of Guy Mollet in mid-1950s. Democratic socialism must surely receive its full measure of credit in any future history of neo-colonialism.

Padmore (1956), op. cit., p. 379.

Compare these with Sun Yat-sen's three "people's principles" of nationalism, democracy and socialism, with Sukarno's Panjasisila—belief in God, nationalism, humanity, democracy and social justice—and with Nehru's emphasis on nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism.

Appendix III in Padmore (1953), op. cit., p. 254.

See Austin, op. cit., pp. 166–70.

Ibid., p. 205.

Wright, op. cit., p. 63.


Legislative Assembly Debates (Gold Coast), 15 February 1954.

Ibid., 25 February 1954.

On the other hand, the central committee insisted on renominating Krobo Edusei, the C.P.P. strong man in Ashanti, in the teeth of opposition from within the party. Shortly before, a commission of enquiry had declared of Edusei that his conduct "falls below any acceptable standard for men in the public service, and it is strongly to be deprecated". Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr Braimah's Resignation and allegations arising therefrom (Accra 1954), p. 32. Edusei continued to rise higher in the party and the government without any noticeable improvement in his conduct.

For Padmore's criticism of Jagan's "revolutionary romanticism," in contrast with "the wise and constructive socialist leadership" of Nkrumah, see Padmore (1956), op. cit., pp. 344–6.

By his "statesmanlike" actions—as Colonel L. H. Bean, representing mining interests, bore witness—"the Prime Minister proved to the whole world that communism is a form of tyranny which the freedom-loving people of the Gold Coast will never tolerate." Legislative Assembly Debates, 2 March 1954.

At the beginning of May, a few weeks before the election, the number of claimants for the party's 104 nominations reached 1,005. This inevitably strengthened the central committee's hand in making the final selection of party candidates. Nearly half the total number of candidates were "independents," and well over half the number of "independents" were C.P.P. "rebels" to whom party nomination had been denied. 81 of these latter were expelled from the party, although many of them were presently taken back into the fold. See Austin, op. cit., pp. 210, 217–25.


W. K. Aduhene, in National Assembly Debates (Ghana), 16 March 1959. Also see Krobo Edusei's comments in the same debate.
More recently, the chiefs have demonstrated their ready adaptability by their wholesale and whole-hearted denunciation of Nkmmah and the transfer *en masse* of their allegiance to the new governors.


For the C.P.P. to attempt to reorganize the existing cocoa land tenure in favour of its own leaders and supporters—quite apart from the very violent resistance which any such attempt would meet from the cocoa farmers—would have drawn the government willy-nilly into the much more hazardous enterprise of reconstructing agrarian relations and the related traditional institutions as a whole. For that, of course, C.P.P. leaders were not prepared.

*Legislative Assembly Debates, 3 March 1954.*

*Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company Limited* (Accra 1956), p. 41. The report, which was sharply critical of Nkmmah, Gbedemah as well as of other and lesser party figures, forced the government to wind up the C.P.C. The company's active personnel were presently engaged in setting up another shady enterprise, N.A.D.E.C.O., created solely in order to finance the C.P.P. The report, after noting that Nkrumah had failed to act on the highly adverse judgment made by the C.P.C. chairman on the company's managing director, A. Y. K. Djin (also then chairman of the C.P.P. finance committee), declared that Nkrumah "failed to erase from our mind the impression that he had unfortunately placed himself in such an embarrassing position in relation to Mr Djin that he could not take or cause to be taken steps which might displease or be unpleasant to Mr Djin." This was a reference to Nkmmah's indebtedness to Djin, from whom he had borrowed money for a Cadillac. In 1960 Djin made a hapless Ghanaian ambassador in Leopoldville, and later a disastrous Ghanaian minister of trade.

See the minister of finance's speeches, in *Legislative Assembly Debates, 10, 13 August 1954.*

See Tony Killick, "External Trade", in Walter Birmingham *et al.*, eds., *A Study of Contemporary Ghana I* (London 1966), pp. 359–60. Later, Nkrumah himself put the losses incurred by Ghana, on account of "the injudicious manner in which some of our sterling reserves have been invested for us in the past", at £15m., for which he blamed the British government. See *National Assembly Debates, 4 July 1961.*


See Austin, *op. cit.*, p. 264; also p. 277 for an extract from a statement by the N.L.M. and its allies.

*Cf.* this statement from the N.L.M. newspaper: "The N.L.M. is diametrically opposed to the view of the C.P.P. The N.L.M. insists and maintains that we are Africans. The N.L.M. insists that we as Africans must add something to the world's culture by formulating a constitution that is based on our own way of life and manners, traditions and culture. The N.L.M. maintains, and rightly so, that we must not and cannot blindly copy European models." And more in a similar vein; quoted *ibid.*, pp.
Some years earlier the Asantehene, referring to the demand for self-government, had "deplored the intention of the youth to import a foreign system of government, instead of improving upon our own which foreign powers might envy. It might have been tainted with barbarism but it was not beyond polishing." *Ibid.*, p. 80.


See Nkrumah’s two statements: *Legislative Assembly Debates, 1 March 1954; National Assembly Debates, 3 September 1958*. The government’s partiality for foreign capital, of course, evoked protests from Ghananian capitalists, who complained of discriminatory treatment by the government (and the banks) in favour of foreign investors. A C.P.P. businessman, W. A. Wiafe (later a ministerial secretary), for example, said in the National Assembly on 5 March 1959: “The African businessmen in this country are threatened with competition by foreign capitalists who have millions of pounds sterling at their beck and call. Instead of the Government protecting the indigenous businessmen they have let the field loose for foreigners to exploit.” The position of Ghananian businessmen is analysed by Fitch and Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, chapter 5. Whatever their complaints against the government, of course, the businessmen were on the whole pro-C.P.P., because it was only from the government that they could secure licences and contracts. From the outset, small traders were keen supporters of the C.P.P.; many C.P.P. candidates were traders by profession. Trading gave them a measure of economic independence comparable to that given the intelligentsia by the profession of law. Many of the C.P.P. trader-parliamentarians were after 1951 to become businessmen with considerable interests and means.

Fitch and Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 93.


*The Fight on Two Fronts: A Speech by Osagyefo ... on May 1, 1961* (Accra), pp. 2–3.

*Laying of the Foundation Stone of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute: An Address by Osagyefo ... on 18th February, 1961* (Accra), pp. 2, 7. Brezhnev was in the audience.

Speech delivered by Osagyefo ... at the Opening of the Hall of Trade Unions, 9th July 1960 (Accra), p. 2.

Broadcast to the Nation by Osagyefo ... on April 8, 1961 (Accra), p. 3.

*Osagyefo in Kumasi: Four speeches by Osagyefo ... in March 1962* (Accra), p. 17. The minister of justice told the National Assembly on 24
April 1961 that the T.U.C. must make the workers realize that "they are part and parcel of the family, and that they are not a class by themselves." For a civil service view, cf.: "Socialist thinking in a developing country like Ghana ought to move over from the concept of class conflict and increasingly emphasise the concept of nation-building through the joint efforts of all the citizens. We are using chiefs and other leaders of village society in laudable programmes of community development. Our political theory should not be based on the assumption that the chiefly class is an antagonistic class." J. H. Mensah, "The Relevance of Marxian Economics to Development Planning in Ghana", in the Economic Bulletin of Ghana IX (1) 1965, p. 15. Mensah was then executive secretary to the office of the planning commission.

The Spark, No. 116, 5 March 1965.

National Assembly Debates, 6–7 September, 4–5 October 1962. In one of these debates Tachie-Menson, one of the leading men of the old guard, suggested that many of the recently exposed ideologues had in the past been associated with the Ga Shifimo Kpee, and that these "Ga supremacists" had tried to fool the president by flattering him and by talking ideology." Apparently, the country had barely survived an attempted comeback by "tribalism" via "socialism"!

A sample of statements by C.P.P. ministers and ministerial secretaries during a two-day debate in April 1961: It was the party parliamentarians "who helped to entrench the Party in the constituencies"; they were "the real people who are the bulwark of the Party". "The fact that Parliament elects the President of the State shows clearly the supreme power of Parliament." "Members of Parliament are like the apostles who were spreading the Gospel." "We are in a socialist state already and there is no need for any more socialism." They had their "own traditional system of socialism" long before the French and Russian revolutions; "we are a socialist country, traditionally" and "Nkrumaism is merely going a step farther than our traditional socialism". "Socialism is Nkrumaism"; "Nkrumaism is Christianity". And Nkrumaism could not "be interpreted to mean an ideology which is against ownership of property". Nkrumaism could not conceivably oppose private ownership of property, two ministerial secretaries reasoned, drawing attention to Nkrumah's own numerous cars and houses. National Assembly Debates, 24–25 April 1961.

Statement by the President Concerning Properties and Business Connections of Ministers and Ministerial Secretaries (Accra), pp. 1–3. The statement, dated 29 September 1961, declared that no minister or ministerial secretary should own "(a) more than two houses of a combined value of £20,000; (b) more than two motor cars; (c) plots of land (other than those covered by (a) above) with the present total value greater than £500." (The Ghanaian pound is at par with the pound sterling.) Business connections and activities, while in the government, were also disallowed.


For an outline of the new system, see Tony Killick, in Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 142–7.

Ibid., p. 149. See also the wage index for unskilled workers in Accra, p. 141.

M. Carter, ed., Politics in Africa (New York 1966), p. 84. This paper is a detailed study of the strike. The Evening News quotation is on p. 94.


61. To describe this development as "totalitarian," however, or to imagine an affinity between Nkrumahism and fascism (as some Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian writers have recently done), is to discount altogether the actual political conditions in Nkrumah's Ghana which give the lie to such foolish and bizarre comparisons. It is, moreover, to introduce an utter irrelevancy. Totalitarianism—of which an advanced technology is the essential and irreplaceable motor—is a label that can hardly stick to pre-industrial societies.

62. The party constitution was again revised at a meeting of the party's national executive in December 1965. Nkrumah took up most of the time with a long speech. As the meeting was winding up, someone referred to the new constitution they were to have discussed and approved. Someone else rejoined that, as the document was drawn up by the general secretary himself, it hardly called for discussion, "those for, raise hands," and the hands were of course raised. The writer was told this, some months after the coup, by a senior cabinet minister and long-time associate of Nkrumah's.

63. The same source as cited above stated that the final list was drawn up by Nkrumah with the help of his parliamentary manager and of two senior civil servants. If true, this would indicate the extent to which Nkrumah looked upon elections to parliament as, in the main, an administrative exercise.

64. I am not suggesting, of course, that African governments should discard or reverse the policy of Africanisation, but merely indicating one of the numerous and complex problems which attend and follow the attainment of political independence.

65. The ethos of the new elites coincides with the recently discovered enthusiasm of many Western liberals and democratic socialists for "the special role" of the military in modernisation and nation-building in Africa and in other underdeveloped societies. Cf.: "In West Africa, as in some other parts of the world, the army is likely to be a progressive force, so long as the officers retain control. . . . The officers are better educated than the politicians; deeply committed to modernisation; and unimpressed by demagoguery." W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London 1965), p. 87. Lewis sees the army as the great hope for democracy and progress in Africa, against the single-party system. Those who imagine the army to possess some mysterious insight and capacity denied the luckless politicians would do well to study Nigerian developments since January 1966, to say nothing of the experience of South American countries which have had the blessings of militarism for much longer.

66. A lot of unsavoury material about those in leading positions under the old régime has been unearthed by numerous enquiries set in motion by the new. Recently, Martin Appiah-Danquah, general secretary of the disbanded United Ghana Farmers' Council, told a commission of enquiry that his properties included four houses, seven farms, three cars, two large-size radiogrammes, two television sets and three refrigerators. (Ghanaian Times, 15 November 1966). He has, in subsequent testimony, disclosed
further properties owned by him, as well as those belonging separately to his wife. One of the most puzzling aspects, indeed, of Nkrumah’s personality was the extent to which he allowed a notoriously wealthy and unscrupulous character like E. Ayeh-Kumi, long his principal economic and financial adviser and in charge of Nkrumah’s private bureaucracy in Flagstaff House, to play such a central and vital role in a "socialist" administration.

67. These policies are comprehensively analysed by Fitch and Oppenheimer, op. cit., chapter 8.


69. The Great Tasks Ahead: Message by Osagyefo . . . to the Nation on December 31, 1965 (Accra), p. 5.

70. 1966 Budget Statement, op. cit., pp. 4, 18, 23.