NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul

In an earlier essay¹ we stressed the poverty of academic debate on the relevance of socialism to development goals in Tropical Africa and advanced the argument that socialism is, in fact, rapidly becoming an historical necessity in order to ensure the further development of the area. At the same time it must be noted that the quality of debate among socialists concerning the actual possibility of revolutionary, socialist transformation in Africa² in the present historical conjuncture also leaves much to be desired. Thus some circles on the Left have fallen back upon a form of "agrarian messianism", as one writer has characterized it; in this model a pure and undefiled peasantry becomes the major vector for progressive change in Africa.³ Other Western Marxists, in an attempt (legitimate in many respects) to counteract such tendencies, have themselves often taken stands which smack, in turn, of "proletarian messianism".⁴ If such extremes are to be avoided, and the intellectual bases for relevant strategies laid, greater attention will have to be paid both to the real nature of pre-capitalist African societies as restructured by capitalist penetration on the one hand, and to the processes of capitalist accumulation in the underdeveloped world under the present conditions of oligopolistic market structures and revolutionized technology on the other.

Another related aspect of such oversimplification has been an absence of sufficient differentiation between the component parts of contemporary Africa; to further minimize the dangers of too undiscriminating a set of analytical categories we must instead attempt to balance an awareness of such similarities as mark the structures of various regions, states and communities against an adequate understanding of the often more important differences between them. These similarities and differences become more readily apparent within a framework which focuses upon the various kinds of uneven development thrown up by capitalist penetration in Africa. For the underdevelopment of Africa as a whole relative to the industrial centres of the West has been accompanied and mediated by uneven development as between regions, states, tribes and races within Africa itself and this fact adds important dimensions to the class struggle in Africa and to the character of the resistance of progressive African forces to contemporary imperialism.
Not surprisingly the kinds of oversimplification already mentioned have tended to preclude a correct identification of the major forces underwriting the stability of the present continental conjuncture, while at the same time inhibiting an adequate assessment of those contradictions relevant to defining the possibilities for progressive action. We feel therefore that the general qualifications which we have introduced above urgently require clarification if such revolutionary potential as exists in Africa today is not to be wasted. It is in fact a sense of urgency which has prompted us to attempt a work of synthesis which the lack of relevant research on more limited questions makes difficult and tentative. We hope in this way to contribute to a definition of the problems that demand investigation and clear confrontation, though we are aware that the methods for their solution can only evolve from the revolutionary praxis of the African people.

Any attempt to identify the major determinants underlying contemporary African realities and, in particular, to identify those forces which provide the dynamic for uneven development as a continental process, must first assess the structure of western capitalism's interest in Africa; such a focus suggests in turn two hypotheses of crucial significance. First, there has been a broadening of Western capitalist interests in the underdeveloped world in general due to the more direct involvement of the multi-national corporations in such industrialization as takes place in the peripheries. This relative shift of emphasis away from the pattern of classic "extractive" imperialism (whose drive was postulated primarily upon the guaranteeing of supplies of raw materials and of outlets for the sale of manufacturing goods in the underdeveloped world) has been reinforced by the sharp decline in profitability and attractiveness of the agricultural sector of overseas interests.

Second, the factors determining the drive for export of capital from the advanced capitalist centres have themselves been shifting dramatically in the wake of the post-war technological "revolution". In particular, the exploitation of cheap labour overseas has lost much of its significance; instead the factor of overwhelming contemporary importance is the existence of a relatively developed and rapidly expanding industrial structure, as the latter ensures the smooth operation of capitalist manufacturing enterprises from the standpoint of outlets for their products and sources of factors of production. Other determinants, such as the aforementioned low relative labour costs, favourable political climate, possibility to export profits, and the like are also important but are highly imperfect substitutes for this dominant factor. The combination of these two novel aspects of capitalist development
on a world scale have come to define, in effect, a "second phase" of imperial predominance. Of course, investment in extractive industry retains much of its traditional centrality in relationship to the mining sector, but even here the dominant factors will be the presence and nature of mineral deposits and the degree of freedom accorded to the investing enterprises in pricing output, since this is the main device used by vertically integrated combines to transfer surpluses across political boundaries. One major exception is gold mining, where price is not subject to oligopolistic determination and for which, therefore, cheapness of labour retains much of its significance.

The above considerations suggest a hierarchy of capitalist interests in the various regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly, what we shall call the Southern Africa Complex, centred around industrial South Africa and Rhodesia and including South-West Africa, Angola, Mozambique and the quasi-Bantustans of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, is by far the most important region in respect of the above criteria, being characterized by a relatively developed industrial structure and exceptional mineral wealth; concomitantly the scope of Western capitalist involvement in the area is vast indeed. This is, of course, a familiar story and will bear only limited repetition here.

Britain, with over £1,000 million invested in the Republic of South Africa and some £200 million in Rhodesia, remains the major investing capitalist country in the area. Dennis Austin, a veteran British observer of African Affairs, has sketched the full scope of British economic interests in South Africa—banks, investments in manufacturing and mining, trade, access to gold—and, characteristically, blanched, as has the British Government on all occasions, at any prospect of rocking so profitable a boat. By 1963, South Africa had overtaken the U.S. and Australia as Britain's biggest earner of investment income abroad.

U.S. investment in South Africa is still a bad second to Britain's but its significance lies in its rapid growth. Thus U.S. direct investments alone rose from $50 million in 1943 to $140 million in 1950, $286 million in 1960 and $467 million in 1964 when South Africa accounted for almost 30 per cent of all U.S. direct investment in Africa. This rapid growth of U.S. direct investments, which are also being rapidly diversified into manufacturing, is not surprising in view of the fact that in 1964, the last year for which [Dept. of Commerce] figures are available, U.S. direct investments generated earnings of nearly $100 million, equal to 21 per cent in net worth, making South Africa the most profitable country for private investment in the world. In 1961 when the panic after the Sharpville massacre caused some investors to pull out it was perhaps their greater "calculating rationality" which encouraged the eighty American firms then involved in South Africa to stand fast. Indeed:
"When action came in 1961 it was concerted and direct. American firms increased their investments by $23 million (to about $442 million in 1962), and an ad hoc financial consortium advanced a $50 million loan to the Government, the First National City Bank putting up $5 million, the Chase Manhattan Bank $10 million, the International Monetary Fund $38 million, the World Bank, $28 million, and 'U.S. lenders not publicly identified' $70 million. The situation was saved. Since that crisis the number of American companies investing in South Africa's future has nearly tripled."

Needless to say, French, German and other interests have all been involved in the new gold rush.

Not surprisingly, despite verbal protestations, the activities of the American State have not diverged far from the logic of support for the South African status quo already witnessed in such private undertakings. Various observers have catalogued a number of striking instances of such American governmental activity but similar lists could be compiled for other capitalist powers. Item, the U.S. government contributed 4.9 million dollars or 29.77 per cent of the budget of an organization called the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration which by 1965 had brought 25,000 Europeans to South Africa, mainly in the vital skilled worker category. Item,

[Despite] widespread African fears and international speculation that uranium-rich South Africa may try to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, the American Atomic Energy Commission [has] trained South African technicians at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and loaned the South African Atomic Energy Board a reactor consultant (Thomas Cole of Oak Ridge National Laboratory) to whom the South Africans consider themselves 'largely indebted for the successful commission of Safari 1', their first nuclear reactor which was dedicated in August, 1965, in the presence of Dr. Alvin Weinburg, director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.14

Item, the many roles of "Citizen Eberhart", American representative to Gabonese and Zambian Independence celebrations, the prime mover of powerful Rand Mines and a director of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and of the Native Recruiting Corporation, confidant of Presidents described by Lyndon Johnson as "a humanitarian of the first order".15

The list could be extended indefinitely.

Of course, in addition to such a range of involvements in the Republic of South Africa itself, a wide variety of Western capitalist interests are also conspicuously active in the other territories of the Southern African Complex, like Rhodesia, South West Africa and Angola, although, particularly in the latter two instances, investment is there directed mainly to the exploitation of mineral resources.16

In sharp contrast to this situation, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, with its lack of an industrial structure, growing shortage of foreign
exchange (which endangers the export of profit), little developed capitalist relations of production and low density of population remains a region of relatively small comparative attraction for foreign manufacturing concerns. As a result that "broadening" of Western capitalist interests which has been observed in other regions of the underdeveloped world and which was referred to above, remains embryonic in tropical Africa. As C. C. O'Brien has suggested, the area considered as a whole still occupies something of a "reserve position in the international capitalist strategy". We shall return to this point in Section III, but it is important to note here that this conclusion does not fully apply to those few countries like Gabon, the Congo, Nigeria and Zambia endowed with known mineral resources of great importance to the world economy which are therefore of special concern to international capitalism. It should also be noted that countries like Kenya, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, which (owing to their relatively more structured economies) play or can play the role of peripheral-centres, are important in ways denied to more marginal economies. This is not to deny that such countries, which are those more directly impinged upon by the "second phase" of imperialist economic predominance mentioned above, will also find their genuine transformation constrained in the long-run by the logic of their continuing dependent relationship, however novel the terms of that dependency. But the differential patterns of growth involved are, nonetheless, among the most significant aspects of uneven development on the continent and can come to have important implications for differing internal situations as between various African states and for the kinds of inter-state relationships which are constructed on such foundations. Nor should independent Africa's relative unimportance be seen to preclude the possibility of the capitalist world's playing its trump cards when more subtle measures of control, generally successful in the present continental conjuncture, prove inadequate. Thus, in Gabon, French paratroopers intervened in 1964 to restore their tottering puppet Mba. America's logistic and military support for Tshombe in his suppression of the threat to his collaborationist government from the Eastern Congo in 1964 was equally graphic, though somewhat more nuanced was its support for Mobutu when the game (and American interests) took on a more anti-Belgian character. Certainly future strategic calculation must never underestimate the implications of such events.

Notwithstanding certain qualifications, however, it can be assumed that the retention within the international capitalist system of so profitable a field of investment and source of strategic raw materials as the Southern African Complex occupies the dominant position in the structure of Western capitalist interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. In consequence their main concern vis-à-vis independent Africa is to pre-
vent the growth of strong politico-economic systems independent of Western capitalist hegemony in the countries bordering upon the Southern African Complex (Congo, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania) which could, among other things, seriously threaten (through their support for the increasingly radical liberation movements) white rule in Southern Africa. International capitalism, as noted above, will further have more sectional but nonetheless important interests in controlling political-economic processes of development in those countries which we have singled out as peripheral-centres and (in particular) as centres of mineral exploitation. Interests in the other countries can be assumed to be mainly indirect, in the sense that whatever measure of control international capitalism may exercise over them will aim more at their retention as satellites of the peripheral centres or their use as pawns in increasing the strategic security of centres of mineral exploitation, than at securing fields of profitable investment and trade.

The implications of this structure of interests will become obvious as we proceed. We should however further clarify these interests by defining them in relation to issues which have traditionally been assigned crucial significance. To begin with, the intensity of conflicts over labour retribution between international capitalism and wage workers in the periphery has been considerably lessened. It is of course true that the immediate effect of a rise in wages and salaries is a reduction in profits. Yet, owing to the low labour intensity of productive processes controlled by the multi-national corporations, this effect is likely to be small and, given the oligopolistic character of such corporations, can be largely passed on to those classes and strata (in the industrial centres and especially in the peripheries) that are unable to protect their real incomes. In addition, under African conditions, higher wages can reduce significantly labour turnover, thereby raising productivity, particularly in those enterprises where the stability of the labour force is a requirement for imparting specialized skills. Obviously, this is a fact of the most crucial significance for assessing the likely role of the wage-earning sector in contemporary Africa, a consideration to which we shall return. More generally, the fact of rapidly rising wages and salaries, by introducing a bias in consumption and accumulation patterns in favour of imports, by weakening government finances (the State being the major employer of labour in most independent African countries), and by undermining the competitive position of local capitalist strata (if they exist at all), will be one more powerful force promoting the further political-economic integration of the modern sectors of the periphery with the advanced capitalist centres. That some of the latter results are also such as to sustain a general economic structure inhibiting the full extension of
those neo-colonial involvements which we have seen to be characteristic of "second-phase imperialism" is merely one of the more dramatic contradictions of international capitalism's presence in contemporary Africa.

International capitalism is inevitably antagonistic to the sorts of comprehensive planning which might definitively rupture such constraints upon the development process. Nonetheless, certain seemingly novel departures do become acceptable to, are even encouraged by, an international capitalism increasingly concerned to free some of the continent's potential for industrialization. Thus, a degree of state involvement in the economy, particularly in the non-extractive sectors, has not always seemed a great threat to a flexible contemporary international capitalism. As a matter of fact, partnership agreements or management contracts with African statal and parastatal enterprises are increasingly seen by the international corporations as effective ways of reducing or eliminating altogether entrepreneurial and political risks, while profits are obtained in the form of royalties, fees for "technical services", use of patents and brand names, and through sales of equipment. What is crucial to such a capitalism is the continuation of this stream of payments and therefore the orientation of such industrialization as may take place in Africa towards reliance upon the industrial capitalist centres.

Nor is contemporary international capitalism necessarily antagonistic to the development of larger politico-economic units and common markets. On the contrary, as the phase of import substitution in the light industrial sector draws to a close, the excessive balkanization of Africa becomes a serious constraint upon the extension of its continental role. Paralleling the attitude towards State involvement, it is only unification aimed at a process of autonomous industrialization (an historical necessity for the successful modernization of African societies) that would antagonize international capitalism. The latter can, on the other hand, be relied upon to promote African unification provided that it widens the scope for its own involvement on the continent. It is no accident that AID has placed a growing emphasis upon the construction of broader markets and regional groupings, that the Korry Report on Africa stressed that American aid to Africa should be increasingly geared to such units, or that this was also a point of emphasis in the recommendations of the Report of a special Sub-committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the United States House of Representatives.

The fact that the United States, more than any other capitalist power, is promoting the idea of larger economic units in Africa, is significant in another respect. So far we have not differentiated among national interests within international capitalism. Yet Western capital-
ism is no simple monolith and its national dimensions must be taken into account in any analysis of its structure. Neo-colonial relations continue to be mediated to Africa in diverse ways. By and large the most prominent remain those channels first established during the period of formal colonial dominance. This is particularly the case for those ex-French colonies who now find themselves entwined with the former metropole through the multiple mechanisms of the franc zone and Common Market agreements, and their economics thereby encouraged in the maintenance of integration with, and effective subordination to, their European counterpart: "through participation in formulating and financing African development plans, through the control of money and credit policies, and through tariff and trade agreements, France thus exercises a dominant and detailed influence over the direction of development". Similarly, but to a lesser degree, privileges for Britain and Belgium have been reproduced in the "de-colonization" process of their former colonies.

These national components of centre-periphery relations in Africa must however be analysed in historical perspective. It is undisputable, for example, that even in the French case, such a component has been significantly weakened, and that the major force behind this tendency has been the consolidation of United States hegemony within Western capitalism. For the U.S. has unquestionably established itself since the war as the world's pre-eminent economic force, a fact underlying its insistence upon a liberalisme absolu in the Third World which gives free play to its economic superiority in what Oglesby has termed the "free-world empire". Critically weighed within such a perspective, the winning of formal independence in Africa must be seen as related to the process of internationalization of centre-periphery relations. It is in fact evident that the complex of international capitalism, particularly when seen to be increasingly skewed in an American direction, had little reason to be hostile to the process. Formal decolonization had, in fact, the virtue of liberalizing economic access to the erstwhile colonies. If, as must have seemed a good bet, trustworthy indigènes were those likely to seize and hold the reins of power, a neo-colonial solution then seemed an acceptable answer to the growth of nationalist pressure in much of the continent. Even in places like Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories there is little doubt that this could be looked to as a viable solution by many of the interests involved, though, as will be apparent, there were additional complicating factors in these instances. Seen in this light, the mechanisms of French and other ex-colonial powers' control referred to above appear in large measure defensive in nature. As Barbe notes:

"Thus, as opposed to the thorough-going liberalism advocated by American imperialism, French imperialism tends to interpose a set of controls [un semi-
dirigisme], a practice better-fitted to its position of secondary importance [puissance de second ordre] (in spite of the pretentions articulated by our leaders)."  

To be sure, Africa has remained less central to American concern than other areas of the globe. In 1964 U.S. capital directly invested in the continent amounted to only $1,629 million or less than 4 per cent of total U.S. capital directly invested abroad. Further, the bulk of it (80 per cent) was accounted for by capital invested in South Africa and in a few oil producing countries. But throughout the continent there is evidence of a growing range of American involvements, as witnessed by the numerous examples collated by Vignes of American banks and companies expanding their interests and contacts. This growing involvement is not always congruent with the interests of, and is therefore resisted by, other Western actors. Thus, according to the former American Ambassador to Gabon, "in several African countries de Gaulle's government has been discovered, sometimes in little scheming ways and sometimes in ways not so little, to be working against the United States, to frustrate [U.S.] policies and diminish [U.S.] influence." In Gabon itself, Darlington suggests, the French intervention to restore Mba which was referred to above was as much directed to forestall further American aggrandizement as to realize any other objective. The reasons for this are self-evident to him: in Gabon "the French resented U.S. Steel's large participation in manganese and Bethlehem Steel's 50 per cent share in the iron ore. They were considerably disgruntled when Foley Brothers of Pleasantville New York obtained the contract from the World Bank to make the survey for Gabon's railway. . . ." And the "proxy fight" in the Congo during the past few years over mineral interests has also witnessed an expanding American involvement, presumably related to her expanded military and political role, which has led to overt conflicts between the United States and Belgian businesses.  

These conflicts are peripheral manifestations of intra-capitalist conflicts in the industrial centres and speculations on the particular manner (and the timing thereof) in which they will be solved are beyond the scope of our analysis. We shall simply assume that the present phase of relatively intense intra-capitalist competition will end with the "survival of the fittest" i.e. the American based giant corporations and those Europeans and Japanese based corporations which will succeed in attaining the size and efficiency of their American counterparts. As current trends already show, nationalities will, in the process, be largely transcended within the corporations themselves, which then tend to acquire a multi-national character. The relevance of this phenomenon for Africa is already apparent and can be gauged by following through the complex patterns of interlocking and overlapping
corporate structures traced in Nkrumah's book already cited. Strictly national interests become less clear in such a maze.

Thus, even if it is true that Western "monopoly capitalism" is no simple monolith, there are reasons to expect it to become increasingly so; its political-economic domination of Africa will accordingly be "rationalized". A first implication of this rationalization would be a strengthening of that trend towards capitalist sponsored economic and political integration in Africa which we discussed earlier, because the obstacles to such an integration traceable to the persistence of links with ex-colonial powers would be relaxed. A second effect would be a weakening of the bargaining position of the African ruling classes in their dealings with Western capitalism as much of what strength they can presently claim seems to derive from opportunities provided by the competition among capitalist powers. Such a "bargaining position" may have helped the Francophone African states to gain various concessions in the sale of their primary products to France (and her partners in the E.E.C.), the quid pro quo being privileged access by the metropole for the launching of various forms of investment. This was obviously not part of a development strategy designed to alter drastically the structure of the "colonial" economies but it did increase the possibilities for the ruling classes to gain a breathing space for themselves and their economies. More controversially, it has been argued that a state like the Congo could hope to obtain more significant leverage over the proceeds from its mining resources because of such competition. And Western aid, though it has in any event tended to serve the primary purpose of reinforcing development strategies reliant upon international capitalism, would be more forthcoming as long as the situation remained an ambiguous one for competing capitalisms. When also placed in the context of an abatement of intense East-West competition characteristic of the present period of peaceful coexistence, one realizes that such general phenomena as the increased difficulties experienced by African states in striking favourable bargains for their agricultural interests and the relative decline in available aid must be interpreted, in the absence of any significant attempts to break out of the overall neo-colonialist pattern, as merely reflecting the key trend towards increased subservience vis-à-vis a rationalizing international capitalism which we have been tracing.

We have already mentioned the centrality of Southern Africa to international capitalist concern; among what we might call the various "sub-totalities" of Sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by different class and power structures, it is immediately apparent that the Southern
African Complex is also the most powerful. The development of an organic industrial base in South Africa and Rhodesia which is a key dimension of the area's strength must be traced to the presence in these countries of a national bourgeoisie (the settlers) sufficiently strong to uphold a "national" interest vis-à-vis the metropolitan countries. This class, by promoting important structural changes in the economies in question, has in fact restrained that "development of under-development" which is a normal phenomenon in centre-periphery relations.

Mainly through the intermediary of the State, and often, especially in South Africa, in opposition to the short-term interests of less nationalist sections of the capitalist class, the settlers have managed to establish some basic industries and consolidate themselves as capitalists as one important element in the modern sector. Needless to say, these achievements were attained only at the cost of, and indeed through, the relative impoverishment of the African masses, this being a process which has produced an exceptional degree of inequality between European and African incomes. In South Africa the average per capita income of Europeans is more than $1,500, whereas that of Africans is in the order of $100 and in Rhodesia the corresponding figures are approximately £890 and £30.

Such gross income inequalities have important implications for the pattern of development of these settlers economies. In the first place they imply high saving rates. In the last 10-15 years gross fixed capital formation as a ratio of gross domestic product has been consistently higher than 20 per cent in South Africa and has averaged more than 20 per cent in Rhodesia. These rates are obviously exceptional for countries at similar levels of per capita income. But such gross inequalities also restrain the growth of the internal market and it is therefore not surprising that the relative importance of exports in absorbing the productive capacity of the economies in question has remained roughly unaltered for the last three or four decades.

This racial distribution of income is unlikely to change significantly in the near future owing to the determination of the ruling white classes to retain the existing dualistic structure upon which their power and privileges rest. Growth will therefore continue to depend on exports, a fact that raises some problems since the buoyancy of the latter requires a steady change in their composition in favour of manufactured goods in general and capital goods in particular. For these are the sectors which, as in most advanced capitalist countries, are currently providing the South African economy with much of its dynamism. Thus, with further growth, and in order to guarantee the continuance of that growth, internal pressures will be building up in Southern Africa for the expansion of external outlets for its manufacturing industries. However, the competitive position of Southern
Africa's manufactured goods in general and her capital goods in particular on the world market is likely to remain weak relatively to North American, European and Japanese manufacturers. It is therefore to black Africa—as the London Economist observes in closing a recent "optimistic" survey—"that the Republic must hope to sell most of its growing exports of manufactured goods: if black Africa is

To the extent that exports do not expand to absorb the growing productive potential of the Southern African economy a related tendency for investable surpluses to be exported can be expected to develop and has in fact already materialized. Its most dramatic expression is the emergence and expansion of the "Oppenheimer Empire", built in the first instance on the extraordinary mineral wealth of Southern and Central Africa but gradually losing its territorial and sectoral identity. Dominating this complex of over 200 companies are the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., with head office in Johannesburg, and Charter Consolidated, a new London-based mining-finance company in which members of the Anglo-American group are the largest shareholders. The market value of the former's investments was put in 1965 at £194.2 million and its reported profits after tax stood at £14.6 million. For the same year, Charter Consolidated reported profits after tax at £7.8 million and net assets at £171.6 million. As mentioned, the interests of this giant have lately been considerably diversified both geographically and sectorally. Through subsidiaries and often in partnership with European and American Corporations (Ferranti, Pennarroya, Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation, Imperial Chemical Industries, etc.) the "Oppenheimer Empire" has entered such diverse sectors as metallurgy, electrical and mechanical engineering, mining machinery, transport equipment, construction materials, industrial explosives, petro-chemicals, paper, textiles, beer, building, transport, banks, etc. Geographical diversification has been equally impressive: the interests of Charter Consolidated in 1965 were 39 per cent in the Republic of South Africa, 16 per cent in the rest of Africa, 23 per cent in North America, and 22 per cent elsewhere, while Anglo-American has important interests in Central and East Africa, Australia, U.S., Canada and Britain. Thus the penetration of the Southern African Complex on the part of European and American Corporations has been matched by the outward expansion of South African capitalism and a growing interconnection between the two.

Although, as can be gauged from the above, the "Oppenheimer Empire" has most of the characteristics (in relation to the local economies) of the "multi-national" corporations, its unique dependence on Africa as a basis of surplus accumulation makes its interests in the
region much more vital to it than is the case for any other section of international capitalism. For this reason it is possible that the group in question may be prepared, more than other interests, to diversify its investment pattern in independent Africa (particularly in the Eastern and Central sub-regions) with a view towards strengthening its grip on the political-economy of the area. Moreover this diversification would bring other direct benefits to the "Oppenheimer empire". For by moving into the diverse sectors mentioned above, it has wme to control directly or indirectly, much of the Southern African capital goods industry, and an industrialization, which it would also help to finance and continue to control, of strategically selected countries in Independent Africa could help in creating the external demand required for the continued expansion of that industry.49

We thus come full circle to the question of trade between white and black Africa and should briefly examine the possibility that the obstacle to such trade which is represented by the settler régimes' racialist ideology may be somewhat relaxed in the near future. Generally it must be admitted that there have been areas of genuine tension between such régimes and international capitalism, for the racialist ideology of apartheid does impede in certain fields the calculating "rationality" of capitalist interests.47 Thus, for example, job reservation which prevents skilled industrial training for black labour and the Planning Act of Carel de Wet which restricts the employment of Africans in urban areas, and the like, have led very readily to mis-allocations of manpower and other resources from a strictly economic point of view. Yet these conflicts are obviously non-antagonistic for one major reason. The white workers and national bourgeoisie derive their social and economic privileges from their control over the State apparatus, a situation which is the direct opposite of that of international capitalism whose political power is mainly based on control over economic structures. Thus the settlers have everything to lose from an African neo-colonial solution and have shown considerable determination in preventing it. Given their entrenchment in the political-economy of these countries, such a solution could be brought about only at the expense of the widespread disruption of the Southern African economic system. It is therefore naive utopianism to expect the forces of international capitalism, either directly or as mediated by various Western states, to risk a most profitable outlet for investment and exports for the sake of marginal improvements in the "logic of the market".48

But if radical "liberalization" must be ruled out, there are factors at work in Southern Africa that may lead to marginal or formal "liberalization". For one thing, differentials in skills, education and wealth between the races have been so deepened that market forces can increasingly be relied upon to maintain the existing racial
dualism even if some of the political constraints on inter-racial competition are relaxed or removed. In addition, the structural changes which have increased the importance of manufacturing in the Southern African economies and the spreading to the capitalist sectors of such economies of the post-war technological "revolution" are having a double impact on the contradiction between apartheid and economic growth. On the one hand, it reduces the overall dependence of the capitalist sector on African labour and therefore makes the Bantustan policy pursued in Southern Africa less inconsistent with rapid growth. On the other hand, it requires the stabilization of a small minority of the African population in the modern economy to perform that manual, but skilled, productive work for which white labour is not available. Thus limited "liberalization", by easing the absorption of advanced technology, will, pace The Economist and other neo-apologists for baaskap, make possible a stricter implementation of Apartheid vis-à-vis the vast majority of the African population.

Moreover these forces promoting marginal "liberalization" within Southern Africa will be the more effective the greater the chances that such "liberalization" can succeed in normalizing relations with independent Africa. The economic significance of this normalization has already been discussed. It is also important to emphasize its strategic significance. For the settlers' régimes increasingly realize the opportunities of supplementing the use of force and the threat thereof with the use of political-economic mechanisms in containing pressure from the North. In this connection, there is much evidence of South Africa's growing confidence in "neo-colonial solutions" as they have been exemplified to her in the former High Commission territories and Malawi.** Thus Vorster, in a 1966 interview with U.S. News and World Report, used words heavy with irony, whether intended or unintended, when he observed:

"We do not at all fear these developments—the establishment of African governments in these states. It is a natural development as far as we are concerned. . . . We want to work with them as independent black states, to their advantage and to our advantage. . . . In many respects we have, with respect to much of Africa south of the Sahara, a responsibility for assisting in development—comparable to the responsibility which the United States has undertaken on a much larger scale with respect to the underdeveloped areas of the world as a whole. Although we do not publicize it, we are already doing quite a lot in this field."

It remains possible of course that ideological factors in South Africa itself have acquired such a degree of autonomy that they may eventually prevent any type of liberalization and therefore hamper, among other things, the normalization of relations with Black Africa, a possibility which is also relevant to strategic calculation. Here it is sufficient,
however, to conclude that there are undoubtedly particularly strong economic and strategic factors at work within Southern Africa which are promoting the expansion of its presence in independent Africa at a time when, as we have seen in Section I, the relations between the latter and the advanced capitalist centres are likely to be increasingly internationalized. The chances for the continued success of this political-economic offensive can only be discussed in the next section after analysing trends in independent Africa.51

To this point we have not differentiated much between the various political units within Southern Africa; and this emphasis is in part validated by striking evidence of increased integration under South African leadership, both in economic terms and as regards defensive alignments against the thrust from the north.62 But it would not do to oversimplify the breadth of South Africa's writ in the area, for there are peculiar elements in the cases both of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories which are worth bearing in mind. Thus in Rhodesia, still formerly under British control, it seemed probable that some form of neo-colonial solution involving replacement of settler control by a sympathetic black government was deemed an active possibility by representatives of the wider capitalist world throughout the latter part of the pre-UDI period; moreover there too the settlers were often a nuisance because antagonistic to the full rationalization of the economic system in line with corporate interests. It was the political leverage and drive of the settler minority which have until now underlined that possibility: the activities of the settler minority and considerable support from South Africa itself, be it noted. Thus in addition to such considerations as concern for world and especially African opinion, it is in part a nostalgia for the latter option which has given the sanctions programme such teeth as it has had. Conversely it has been the very lack of interest, suggested above, in standing up to South Africa (along with lack of compliance by various private economic interests, often with tacit State support.) Whether this can become a division of significance between the various dominant interests in Southern Africa remains to be seen: on the one hand Britain has seemed willing to offer a number of compromise solutions to assuage settler fears, on the other South Africa, financially burdened by their assistance to Rhodesia and nervous at the growth of linked ANC and ZAPU guerilla activities there, has given some signs of pressing Smith and his colleagues to themselves make further concessions to minimal African aspirations.** Here South Africa's growing confidence in the "neo-colonial solution" might even bring her calculations into line with those Western powers for whom this has become a time-tested recipe. But this is merely speculative; much will depend, inevitably, both on the emerging character of the African forces who
seem most likely to take power in Rhodesia and upon the actions of the prickly band of Rhodesian settlers themselves.

The Portuguese territories present some further complications. Here links with Portugal itself have been rather more direct, intense and economically central to the "mother country" than elsewhere, facts which prompted Anderson to coin the phrase "ultra-colonialism" ("the most primitive, the most defective and the most savagely exploitative colonial régime in Africa") to describe the situation there.\(^5\) The contributions of agricultural and mineral earnings from Angola and Mozambique have long been central to the health, such as it is, of the creaking Portuguese economy and with bright prospects in oil and iron ore figure to be even more central in the future. Domestic manufacturing is also on the upswing, all these facts prompting Hance to observe that "Angola's potential for development is undoubtedly one of the best in Africa. Mozambique, while less impressive, is nonetheless comparatively favourable and its potential is also large.\(^5\)

Predictably, Western economic involvement in these colonies has been great and on the upswing; this is seen most dramatically in the prominent role of the Gulf Oil Corporation in the sphere of Angolan oil, especially as regards the recently opened rich Cabinda fields. But Portugal herself remains very much an active and interested element in the equation, reportedly having vetoed direct investment by South Africa in the new Portuguese-dominated Portuguese Exploration Company, for example. From such a perspective, it is certain that her strategic bargaining position would be weakened relative to other interests if she was to sacrifice direct political controls. Despite the cost of resistance to growing African pressures—Salazar himself gave the figure of £86 million a year and a force of 120,000 troops—there thus seems little likelihood that Portugal can afford to gamble on an alternative mode of guarding what are quite vital interests. Nor is there any real evidence that her Western allies have, for the moment, any alternative approach in mind: investments continue to rise as noted, U.N. resolutions are resisted and ignored, and, most important, Western arms flow to Portugal, ostensibly under NATO agreements,\(^5\) but with the result of freeing Portugal's hands for more aggressive colonial wars. South Africa too lends a helping hand, economically and strategically. The time for a "neo-colonial solution" has certainly not arrived, though some future turn of the wheel might increase the likelihood of such an attempt. But Portugal, on the other hand, is not strong and the costs of the struggle are high—Portuguese Africa may yet prove to be an Achilles heel.

It is in fact in the Portuguese territories that the armed struggle is furthest advanced, furthest of all in that Portuguese territory which lies quite outside Southern Africa itself—Portuguese Guinea or Guinea
Bissau. There an exemplary guerilla struggle, radical in its ideological premises and characterized both by considerable military success over two-thirds of the country and a markedly socialist transformation of the economic and social structure in the extensive liberated areas, has at the very least stalemated any Portuguese attempt to recoup lost ground. The area is rather marginal to Portuguese interests and therefore might at some point be easily dispensed with were this not to seem, as it inevitably would, a bad precedent. Moreover the possible Marxist orientation of the emergent state, the cadres for such an attempt being quite literally forged in the current struggle, is likely to be viewed, prospectively, as an even worse precedent.

Things have not come to quite so dangerous a pass in the other two territories. In Angola, after the initial dramatic successes of 1961, the struggle has levelled off into a long, hard and bitter grind. But the Africans have more than held their own to date and may well be winning the current war of attrition. Equally important, MPLA, currently the most successful movement operating in the area, is also articulating a more systematic political line as well as beginning to duplicate some of Guinea Bissau's social restructuring in its own liberated areas. FRELIMO, later into the struggle and with a leadership less coherent ideologically, has also made military advances of some significance, particularly in the northern parts of Mozambique. In Angola and to a lesser extent in Mozambique there is evidence that guerilla activities are linking up with a great many vectors of internal discontent, urban and rural, throughout the country, though no easy road can yet be prophesied. Even in Portuguese Africa, "revolutionary time" for Africa must certainly still be measured in terms of numbers of long years, rather than numbers of months.

Most important, the struggle itself is having an educative effect. The true dimensions of the Southern African situation are the more graphically apparent when the enemies' arms are standard NATO issue and the only sources of active military support for the liberation movements are to be found in the East. Anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist sentiments of a very different order and depth from those which characterized conventional African Nationalist movements are likely to be the result; already there is talk of the "dangers" of a "neo-colonial solution" among some activists in both Mozambique and Angola. Similarly, as one American observer had had occasion to note with reference to the struggle in Portuguese Africa,

"nationalist sentiments reflect a deepening reaction against the United States. The African revolutionaries denounce what they consider the hypocrisy of American lip service to self-determination as well as American racism at home and 'overkill' in Vietnam, and declare these to be the antitheses of the values they are fighting for."
Clearly if socialist consciousness rises and organizational forms are increasingly forged to express it and demand a more meaningful victory, the chances of a neo-colonial solution appearing a trustworthy one to international capitalism are by that very fact diminished. Indeed the reverse situation is the more likely, and the possible development of more subtle and intense forms of co-ordinated resistance by imperialist interests must therefore be expected.

The establishment of revolutionary governments in Angola or in Northern Mozambique would create an entirely new situation in the whole of Southern Africa. For this reason the struggle for their establishment and future consolidation is structurally linked with the struggle in the centres of the Southern African Complex themselves: Rhodesia and South Africa. This latter struggle is however qualitatively different from those which have been waged or are likely to be waged in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. We are not here referring to the fact, so obvious by now, that the pattern of "decolonization" characteristic of the situation north of the Zambezi is not going to repeat itself in South Africa, but to other crucial considerations. One such consideration of more long-term significance concerns the possible results of a successful liberation struggle in the centres in question. Given the central position they occupy in the structure of international capitalist interests in Africa, their advanced stage of industrialization, and their abundant resources, their seizure by revolutionary forces could have far-reaching implications for the whole of Africa. Particularly within the possible framework of a progressive Pan-Africanism to be characterized both by greater economic integration and more meaningful planning (some such form of unity being one prerequisite for genuine continental advancement, as we shall see) they could provide the cornerstone for a really effective development strategy. Indeed "only with the full liberation of the entire Southern and Central states of Africa can optimum division of interstate production be achieved". The likely character of the participation of such liberated territories in future continental economic organizations (as well as the actual degree of their control over their own economic decisions) is of course of essential importance to these speculations. Here too the Southern African situation provides some promise; a second consideration of more immediate relevance therefore relates to the unique problems and potentialities (relative to the rest of Africa) of revolutionary action itself in South Africa and Rhodesia, a uniqueness which also largely derives from the advanced stage of economic development attained by these countries.

For unlike the situation elsewhere on the continent, the African peasantry has been here effectively proletarianized in the sense that the balance between means of production outside the capitalist sector (mainly land) and the subsistence requirements of the African population...
tion has been severely and irreversibly upset: the latter can only to a very limited extent be satisfied within the framework of a peasant economy. This fact has some important implications. In the first place, the minimal aspirations of the African people cannot be fulfilled by a peasant revolution aiming mainly at land redistribution, reduction in the burden of taxation, and other "populist" objectives. These aspirations can only be fulfilled by seizing control over the industrial apparatus itself and its re-orientation towards the economic and social uplifting of the African masses. Moreover, contrary to what has sometimes been supposed, this re-orientation of the industrial apparatus clearly cannot be initiated by an African bourgeois "revolution" aiming in the first instance at removing the racialist component of South African capitalism. For one thing such a component is integral to South African capitalism and we have already identified as utopianism the expectation that international capitalism will provide its essential support for such a political transformation. More important still, the structural weakness of the African bourgeoisie and middle class in these societies, resulting from a pattern of development that has, in defence of the settlers' interests, systematically restrained the upward mobility of the African peasants and workers, prevents them from assuming a hegemonic role in the struggle. In conclusion, the revolution in South Africa and Rhodesia, if it is to come, can only be a proletarian and a socialist revolution and the liberation struggle will not succeed unless it is restructured in accordance with this premise.

Much revolutionary energy has been wasted in the past in pursuance of reformist objectives and this has probably increased the sense of hopelessness felt by the masses in the face of a growing repressive apparatus. As in the Portuguese territories the struggle itself has begun to have an educative effect and the liberation movements have by now realized the non-antagonistic nature of the conflict between the liberalism of international capitalism and the racialism of the settlers' régimes. However, further energies and revolutionary potential may now be misdirected in pursuance of a peasant revolution. As we have already emphasized, the African peasantry in these countries has been effectively proletarianized, notwithstanding the persistence (encouraged by the settlers' régimes as part of their tacit or open Bantustan policy) of remnants of pre-capitalist relations of production in the African areas. The composition of the population in these latter areas is notoriously unbalanced, the majority of the able-bodied males spending most of their time in wage-employment in the European areas. Remittances from the latter are an essential component of the subsistence income of the children, women and the aged who make up the bulk of the population in the African areas. In consequence, unlike the peasantry of the Portuguese territories (Southern Mozambique excluded), still
largely self-sufficient for most of their basic subsistence requirements, the radically restructured peasantry of South Africa and Rhodesia can hardly be expected to start struggles which "build up to a crescendo over a [long] time, are capable of pinning down large government forces, and are maintained at comparatively lower cost", as Govan Mbeki suggests. The conclusion is further warranted by the fact that there are no reasons for expecting that large government forces will get themselves pinned down in the Bantustans, both because of the negligible economic importance of these areas as sources of public revenue or private profit, and of the ease with which they can be "sealed off" militarily, for relatively long periods, from the centres of industrial and mineral exploitation on which the wealth and power of the white ruling classes are based. This is not to deny the necessity of establishing guerilla foci in the rural areas as a means of building up morale and revolutionary consciousness among the masses and of "spreading the enemy thin": rural struggles can be important, particularly if they are also seen to include guerilla and terrorist activity in the areas of European farming. The point is simply that the decisive battles in Rhodesia and South Africa will have to be fought in the "cities" and that a failure to prepare politically and organizationally the urban masses for such battles will ultimately lead to the suppression of the guerilla foci. Put somewhat differently, it could be argued that, if the relevant model for the struggle in the Portuguese territories is perhaps some blending of the Chinese and Cuban experiences, the relevant model for Rhodesia and South Africa may be a blend of the Cuban experience and that of the Afro-Americans in the United States!

In the future in the cities themselves the steady absorption of advanced technology and growing importance of manufacturing may lead, as we have noted, to the full integration of a small section of the African working class into the wage economy. Yet at the same time it will tend to reduce the ability of the mass of the African workers to earn a subsistence from the sale of their labour (while their ability to do so outside the wage economy has long been negligible). The materialization of this tendency, which in South Africa has been counteracted by the rapid economic growth of the 60's, would therefore increase the already great revolutionary potential of these industrial centres. It is important to bear in mind however that, besides the subjective factors discussed above, any revolutionary action faces here a formidable repressive apparatus. As a matter of fact the high stage of economic development attained in these countries, while leading to the effective proletarianization of the peasantry, has also (owing to the exceptional inequalities in income distribution) enhanced the repressive potential of the white ruling classes by making available large surpluses for the steady expansion of a complex police and
military apparatus. Indeed, given the industrialized structure of the South African economy, the armament programme of the South African Government, which has raised military expenditures to £150 million in 1966 (six times the 1960 expenditure and 20 per cent of the budget) has had a stimulating effect on the economy. In Nelson Mandela's words there can indeed be "no easy road to freedom".

An elaboration of two important and related points will serve to conclude this section, the first concerning the interdependence of revolutionary action within the Southern African Complex itself. As noted, the "periphery" of the Southern African Complex (i.e. the Portuguese territories) is undoubtedly the "weakest link". If the struggle in these territories gains momentum the financial and above all the white man-power resources of the "centres" (South Africa and Rhodesia) can be considerably strained, thereby easing the more complex task of seizing power in the latter; if it succeeds, they will provide the Rhodesian and South African liberation movements with more reliable bases than are at present available. A revolution in the "centres" of Southern Africa, on the other hand, is probably necessary to guarantee the survival of revolutionary governments in the "periphery" or to prevent their bureaucratic involution. Fortunately some of these lessons too are being learned in the course of the struggle and growing contacts between ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO and MPLA, for example, give promise for the future. Thus perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the growing seriousness of the effort to light from outside the spark in the "centres" may be the military alliance forged in 1967 by ANC and ZAPU, and the assistance rendered by the ANC of South Africa during the course of the actual fighting of 1968 within Zimbabwe.

Equally important is a second point which emphasizes the relevance to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa as a whole of the emerging character of relations between Independent Africa and Southern Africa, discussed briefly above. If established Southern African interests are at all successful in obtaining further rapprochement, the already shaky support of independent Africa for the liberation movements would fade completely at a crucial stage of the struggle—this being one of the main objectives of the settlers' régimes in seeking "northern" contacts. In addition, as such "normalization" of relations would give new momentum to the growth of the industrial centres in Southern Africa (and might induce some marginal internal liberalization) it would at one and the same time restrain the deepening of internal contradictions and, possibly, revive the myths of the African "middle class revolution" and of peaceful transition from under the yoke of Apartheid. Inevitably, in the light of such emphasis, the necessarily continental character of revolutionary strategy in contemporary Africa becomes all the more apparent.
The decisive fact about contemporary Independent Africa is the continuance of its subservient economic position vis-à-vis the industrial centres of the West. This subordination originated, as is well known, in the pattern of trade and investment of colonial times, whereby Africa came to play, within the international division of labour, a role of supplier of raw materials and outlet for the manufactures of the centres of accumulation in Europe. It is important to re-emphasize that, as compared with other areas of the underdeveloped world, this "classic" pattern of extractive imperialism has remained relatively untransformed in Africa. Thus the exports of twenty leading primary commodities accounted for 65.7 per cent in 1960, and 70.1 per cent in 1965, of all exports from Africa (South Africa excluded); at the same time the imports of industrial manufactured goods accounted for 70.6 per cent of all imports in 1960 and 71.8 per cent in 1965.67

Nonetheless such shifts in the pattern of capitalist involvement on the continent as have emerged in the last decade have merely increased the structural dependence of the economies of Independent Africa upon the advanced capitalist centres. As we have shown elsewhere, such a pattern is characterized by the use of capital intensive techniques of production and low rates of re-investment of surpluses, especially in the capital goods sector, and results in a growing integration of the modern sectors of the African economies within the international capitalist system, and in a deepening of internal dualism.68 Under these conditions, attempts to step up economic growth soon result in shortages of foreign exchange which leave these countries wide open to a predictable variety of political pressures and to the lure of economic deals with foreign governments and private investors which, while possibly "buying time" in the short-run, ultimately strengthen their structural dependence on International Capitalism and the consolidation of a pattern of "perverse growth".69

The internal socio-political structure of independent African States is directly related to these trends and comes in fact to sustain them. The fundamental characteristic of such a structure, in contrast to the situation which we have observed in South Africa and Rhodesia, is the absence of a proletariat in the classical sense of the term and, at best, the likelihood that one will emerge only very slowly indeed. Owing to an overall absence of population pressure on the land in most African countries and to the capital intensive character of production, the wage-working class is polarized into two strata. Wage workers in the lower stratum are only marginally or partially proletarianized as, over their life-cycle, they derive the bulk of the means of subsistence for
their families from outside the wage economy. Wage workers in the upper stratum, generally a very small minority, receive incomes sufficiently high (say 3-5 times those received by wage workers in the lower stratum) to justify a total break of their links with the peasantry. This is a type of "optional proletarianization" which has little in common with processes of proletarianization resulting from the steady impoverishment of the peasantry. We feel therefore justified in considering wage workers in the lower stratum as part of the peasantry (which participates in the wage-economy through labour migration) and in including the upper stratum with the much more important "elites" and "sub-elites" in bureaucratic employment in what we have called the "Labour Aristocracy", notwithstanding the confusion that the use of this term may generate.70

The present pattern of growth is rapidly improving the lot of this Labour Aristocracy (stabilized in the wage economy and increasingly detached from the peasantry) which appears as the hegemonic class and the guarantor of the "neo-colonial solution". By emphasizing the centrality to the formation of such a Labour Aristocracy of the process of Africanization of the bureaucratic structures characteristic of colonial rule, we may further suggest that to this dominant group applies Regis Debray's characterization of what he calls the "progressive petit bourgeoisie" of Latin America:

"[It] does not possess an infrastructure of economic power before it wins political power. Hence it transforms the state not only into an instrument of political domination, but also into a source of economic power. The state, culmination of social relations of exploitation in capitalist Europe, becomes in a certain sense the instrument of their installation in these countries."71

There is some danger of oversimplification here. As Samir Amin has had occasion to note in a recent and most suggestive article, the phenomenon of a "national bourgeoisie" is by no means absent in contemporary Africa, though it has been inordinately weak in relation to international capitalism and thus unable to bring about structural changes which would restrain Black Africa's underdevelopment relative to both the metropolis and to peripheral centres where an immigrant bourgeoisie was present. In those parts of the continent where such a "national bourgeoisie" is most prominent it is to be found in the agricultural economy and in commercial roles, though seldom in the industrial sector. Thus Amin instances in the Congo "une nouvelle bourgeoisie commercante et riche" which has developed and which has "attained in a few years an exceptional degree of maturity". For "organized into a powerful professional association—APRODECO—the Congolese traders today represent perhaps 20 per cent of the total turnover of wholesaling and import-export trade—something which is unequalled elsewhere in Africa."72 Considerable evidence also exists, for
example, which suggests that, particularly in the case of pre-colonial
systems characterized by class differentiation, there was a greater
response to the stimuli to expand production for the market created
by colonial penetration. The reasons for this tendency were the assump-
tion by privileged classes of entrepreneurial roles and their utilization
of opportunities for extorting labour services from the underprivileged
groups: here then a rural bourgeoisie emerges at a faster pace.

The present pattern of growth may very well have the result of
further fostering the formation and consolidation of a "kulack" class,
for, as we shall see, it steadily increases the supply of cheap labour
for wage employment in agriculture. Amir easily (no doubt with his
own investigations of the Ivory Coast prominently in mind) assimilates
these and other trends towards rural differentiation to the major thread
which we have ourselves emphasized: "However, as a rule, the
Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie [la Bourgeoisie d'État] has never eliminated
the private bourgeoisie [la bourgeoisie privée], but contents itself with
co-opting it or fusing with it. There are certainly no reasons for
assuming any major conflict of interest between the Labour Aristocracy
and International Capitalism on the one side and the African National
Bourgeoisie on the other. Their relationship in production is more
complementary than competitive (the latter being concentrated in
agriculture and petty trade) and, as mentioned, the present pattern
of growth tends to increase the availability of wage labour in the rural
areas. It should also be borne in mind that the concentration of govern-
ment agricultural expenditure on the so-called progressive (i.e., wealthy)
farmers compensates the rural bourgeoisie for worsening "town-
country" terms of trade and urban biases of government expenditure.
More important still, the tendency observable in most Independent
African countries for the Labour Aristocracies to be drawn from the
"kulack" class and/or to invest in capitalist agricultural enterprises
can be expected to smooth over even the marginal conflicts which still
separate these classes.

In part, of course, differences of opinion over the proper emphasis
to be given in analysing these developments and the pace of the emerg-
ence of various groups and classes may result from the lack of differ-
tentiation, in much of the relevant debate, between the component parts
of independent Africa. Thus a heightened emphasis upon the role of
the African bourgeoisie (and of traditional authorities who have signifi-
cant private economic involvements, both urban and rural) is probably
not misplaced when West African countries are analysed. However
it is very much less significant an emphasis when the vast sub-region
of East and Central Africa (including the Congo) is being analysed.
In any event, regardless of the variations, the broad and converging
trends which underpin both the dominance of international capitalism
and the key position of mediation of the indigenous labour artistocracy (supplemented in some generally non-antagonistic manner by a national bourgeoisie) remains the core. Indeed the military coups which have pock-marked the continent in recent years signal the meshing of these external and internal trends and their ultimate apotheosis in a most dramatic manner; through them the labour aristocracy moves to take over power directly, no longer content to have it exercised by a cadre of residual "heroes" from the independence struggle.

That this is true may be suggested by the haste with which military leaders have moved to assure themselves of Western, and particularly American, backing in the aftermath of their various coups: "...the U.S. is now the major economic factor to be reckoned with, given the urgent and crude financial needs of the new régimes in pursuit of popularity". The almost mandatory expulsion of Eastern embassies becomes merely the prolegomenon to a round of visits to western capitals for chats with government ministers and "officials from various companies who may be interested in investing"; ever more attractive investment incentives are unveiled and the words of the IMF assume the status of Holy Writ. This pattern is most striking in those states where some effort to articulate more radical development strategies had been made prior to the takeovers, viz. Ghana and Mali, but it evidences itself at each turn of the wheel in even the most pliant of client states.

For in all areas such a pattern doubtless reflects the fact that the old guard of nationalist politicians have often seemed at best an inconvenient and irrational element to international capitalism. Military rule, usually stabilized with the full co-operation of the civil service, seems to offer the promise of "technocratic" transformation to eliminate the grosser forms of corruption and to rationalize the environment of economic penetration; what this amounts to in practice is, in fact, a "pattern of rule...military-bureaucratic in type, politically repressive, espousing conservative finance and free enterprise, culturally null". In addition, though an expression of the "labour aristocracy", such régimes are by no means hostile to the national bourgeoisie, and in many instances, as is again most apparent in Ghana, predicate themselves upon the removal of the latter's fetters. Writing about the reversal of Nkrumah's plans for a growing state sector, Markowitz notes that "what is striking as a group about the industries denationalized is their suitability for development by Ghanaian entrepreneurs, involving as they do ready markets and relatively small capital outlay". In general "the apparent overall effect of Ghana's new domestic policies is to foster the development of the fast rising Ghanaian commercial bourgeoisie as well as that of the civil servants, technocrats and careerists". But even if these systems were to be so streamlined
by such interventions, it remains clear that the military régimes, though more varied than can be suggested here, in general offer little other than an intensification of the pattern of structural subordination to international capitalism.

Under the circumstances, ideological styles which exemplify an "aspiration for solidarity" within the boundaries of the new nation-states themselves come to be manipulated by the ruling classes to paper over the social and economic distance emerging between themselves and the masses.77 "Nation-building", a concept transferred from the pages of American textbooks on political development, takes pride of place over "socialist construction"; just as American financiers are increasingly the world's bankers, so American social scientists are the ideologues of the epoch. To be sure, such reiterated "nationalism" is also in part articulated as a response to the fragility of political structures and identifications which results from the legacy of ethnic and cultural diversity in the states of Sub-Saharan Africa. But the alternative socialist option, by debouching upon actual strategies for meaningful development and by raising the level of consciousness in ways closer to the felt experience and exploitation of the masses, might be expected to more readily assault parochialism in any event. It would, however, involve striking in significant ways at the internal dualism which sustains the labour aristocracies' privileges and for this reason continues to be shunned.

Such nationalism can, of course, be a springboard for certain kinds of pressure at the international level. Here, in the world produce markets and the like, the African ruling classes would like to see market forces subordinated to political decisions in such a way as to sustain prices and make available more assistance of a useful variety. Similarly in individual countries, under propitious circumstances, an effort may be made to shift the terms of the bargain struck with international capitalism in a more favourable direction; the dominant groups are certainly not averse to increasing the revenues available to them within the established structure. It has been argued for example, that Mobutu's activities vis-à-vis Union Minière in 1966–67 represented a particularly aggressive and admirable exemplification of such a strategy. In this regard Semonin notes:

"... greater efforts should now be made to distinguish him from other African rulers brought to power through military coups. ... Under Mobutu the State functions as a differential gear within the context of limitations imposed by the country's continued economic dependence. His régime has attempted to expand the Congolese national 'space' within the interstices of competing corporate interests."

In the event, of course, despite a somewhat expanded role for such a firm as American Newmont Mining Co., "the Congo government
was forced to accept an agreement that returns essentially to the status quo ante,\(^7\) and the conditions for any confrontation, if such indeed this was, have further deteriorated since in the context of monetary problems. Zambia, too, has more recently moved to redefine certain of her "terms" by imposing restrictions upon the export of profits and by the nationalization of marginal enterprises, but under existing conditions of total dependence on International Capitalism for the operation of her productive apparatus the limitations of such tactics in contributing to the structural changes necessary for development have been obvious. More generally, government involvement in the economies of Independent Africa has been ambiguous in the sense already discussed in section I. Thus State enterprises are generally managed by the International corporations, with little, if any, attention being paid to broader problems of structural change and long-term development.

The lack of an industrialization strategy which is at the root of this phenomenon must to some extent be traced to the difficulty of envisaging full-fledged economic transformation taking place within the African political and economic units in their present balkanized form. The major strength of Nkrumah's efforts in the cause of African unity always lay in the vision of meaningful continental planning for development which accompanied them; this is a case which has been spelled out cogently in a recent book by Green and Seidman:

"The gravest barrier to African economic development becomes apparent at this point. No African state is economically large enough to construct a modern economy alone. Africa as a whole has the resources for industrialization, but it is split among more than forty African territories. Africa as a whole could provide markets able to support large-scale, efficient industrial complexes; no single African state nor existing sub-regional economic union can do so. African states cannot establish large-scale productive complexes stimulating demand throughout the economy as poles of rapid economic growth because their markets are far too small. Instead the separate tiny economies willy-nilly plan on lines leading to the dead-end of excessive dependence on raw materials exports and small-scale inefficient 'national factories' at high costs per unit of output. Inevitably, therefore, they fail to reduce substantially their basic dependence on foreign markets, complex manufactures and capital.

"The only way to achieve the economic reconstruction and development essential to fulfil the aspirations, needs and demands of the peoples of Africa is through a sustained shift to continental planning so as to unite increasingly the resources, markets and capital of Africa in a single substantial economic unit.\(^8\)"

In brief, existing dualism can only be eliminated by the subordination of market forces to political direction which could (through a planned reorientation of capital accumulation, technical progress and international and intersectoral trade) steadily reduce geographical and
functional imbalances. Most dramatically, of course, land-locked interior African states "can participate effectively in a continental economic system--either as producers or consumers--only if special attention is given to their problems as underdeveloped areas in an underdeveloped continent". The industrial location policy made available through planning "is certainly critical to the adequate provision of growth points for the poorest and least developed areas". But in the long-run, the continent as a whole will be the loser when circumstances dictate that potential "poles of growth" are not rationally distributed to encourage their maximum mutual reinforcement. Once again, the sting is in the planning; if, in fact, market forces are not subordinated to a strategy of long-term political-economic development and the formation of larger units is aimed at easing the further penetration of the African economies by the multi-national corporations whose profit-oriented calculations are thereby allowed to determine the pattern of accumulation and technical progress, then unification can only encourage further the process of growth without development which is already afoot. This brings us back to the essential question raised in Section I as to the likely purposes to be served by the realization of "unity" under differing conditions and it is surprising to find such a question blurred over even by some of the more radical spokesmen of the Pan-Africanist ideology.

Thus Kofi Baako, Nkrumah's spokesman in the hey-day of Ghanaian concern for Pan-Africanism, states that "to wait until a common ideology is reached will delay both union and solution to our problems. When Africa is united, problems will themselves call forth the best methods of solution"; and similarly, Green and Seidman, in an almost propagandist attempt to make their powerful intellectual case as palatable as possible to all concerned, argue with calculated blandness that "minimal thresholds" dictate only that "there must be African state—not foreign—control over internal economic decisions that affect the attainment of production targets in multi-state industries. The exact institutional pattern of ownership and management may vary from state to state, or from industry to industry within a state, so long as African state control is sufficient to implement continentally agreed policies and output goals". But in contemporary Africa this is a maximalist demand, of course, and Green and Seidman's failure to emphasize this fact is of a piece with their general lack of concern to articulate political strategies capable of assuring efficacious coordination in practice. Benot is clearly closer to the point in discussing Amin's own emphasis upon the need for economic integration, when he notes:

"Indeed, unity such as that conceived by Samir Amin, can only be the unity of countries who accept and apply the principles and methods of
a particular development strategy, that of rapid accumulation [accumulation accélérée] with all that that implies, that is to say, a profound socio-cultural revolution. And even then problems of doctrine would remain and doubtless continue to provide an obstacle".84

No meaningful continental or regional African integration such as that envisaged by Amir and Benoît seems possible therefore in the present historical conjuncture. For the whole complex of forces—economic, cultural-ideological, socio-political—which we have identified as defining this conjuncture undermines any thrust in that direction. As noted above, the narrow, self-interested and defensive nationalism of the labour aristocracies, coupled with the hostility to meaningful planning of both that group and their neo-colonial tutors, are likely instead to promote an integration aimed merely at giving new momentum to International Capitalist penetration which is increasingly fettered by excessive balkanization. It is in this perspective that one must in fact view the proliferation of so many regional groupings on the continent in recent years, groupings which reflect the growing interest of actual potential "peripheral centres" like Kenya, the Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, etc. to stabilize their access to an economic hinterland (although in the East African case there have been attempts, as yet of marginal efficacy, to balance benefits, present and future).

The quality of Pan-African co-operation on other fronts is of a piece with this experience in the economic sphere, and reflects the same underlying realities. Immanuel Wallerstein, in his book Africa, The Politics of Unity, has traced in some detail the development of Pan-African organizations, culminating in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity; in doing so he identifies two active elements or viewpoints relating to the scope and character of pan-Africanism active on the continent. There has been a radical element conceptualizing Pan-Africanism as a "movement" transcending "artificial" national boundaries and placing considerable emphasis both upon the threat of "neo-colonialism" (with its corollary, the centrality of the anti-imperialist struggle) and upon aggressive activities to assure the success of Southern African liberation and, at least on the rhetorical plane, upon real sacrifices of existent sovereignty to assure meaningful economic unity. In this effort a core of "radical" states—Ghana, Algeria, Mali, U.A.R., Tanzania, Guinea—have played a leading part in conjunction with the more radical of the liberation movements and a number of parties of militant opposition in independent African states. Increasingly opposed to such trends, a conservative reaction, springing in the first instance from Francophone Africa, has conceptualized unity merely as an "alliance" of existing states and in so doing has sought to drain off any and all radical dimensions from the
thrust of Pan-African sentiment. Wallerstein sees in the construction of the OAU itself in 1963 a major victory for the latter forces, a victory which has evidenced itself in even more striking form subsequently. Thus the radical bloc in the compromises of 1963 obtained verbal guarantees of staunch support from all concerned for the liberation struggle, chips which, despite (or because of) the subsequent establishment of a Liberation Committee of the OAU, have proven to be most difficult to cash. For their part the more conservative members saw to it that the OAU, in the words of the charter, guaranteed the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of states", thereby meeting their desire to strongly underwrite their own internal security; furthermore it provided for certain minimal organs of socio-economic co-operation of a confederal nature, cemented by assurances as to the acceptability of the "maintenance of economic assistance from the western world", as Wallerstein phrases it. As he further notes, this new structure "was in itself reassuring to Western powers, promising greater economic rationality without the threat of a political structure strong enough to attempt to transform world economic relationships. It is significant that it was two of the radical opposition groups in Francophone Africa itself who most clearly sensed the drift of events. Thus the UPC of the Cameroon in 1962 in its pamphlet "African Unity or Neo-colonialism" argued:

"There is an Africa of the peoples and one of the servants. . . . The road of true African unity is not that of the fusion of the groups of Brazzaville, Monrovia, Lagos and Casablanca. That would be a confusion which would profit only neo-colonialism and imperialism and which would induce African leaders to relegate to the background the fundamental problem of the struggle against neo-colonialism in order to amuse themselves with economic and social hocus-pocus."

And in 1963 Djibo Bakary, leader of the opposition Sawaba group in Niger, warned crisply: "... in no way must African unity become a sort of trade union of men in power who will seek to support one another to resist popular currents. It is safe to say that the worst fears of such men have been borne out amply in subsequent Pan-African practice. The institutionalization of Pan-Africanism, in particular through the OAU, has become the guarantor of defensive, conservative "nationalism" and a force for smothering significant challenges to the status quo."
nition and any proposed intervention by the OAU was rendered nugatory. Francophone states in particular "seemed to place the threat to their immediate security so high, either directly or through further revolution in the Congo, that the alliance of African states against the external world seemed a secondary consideration". Nkrumah, major publicist of an ideological stance which tended to discuss "subversion" in rather broader terms than his fellow heads of state and see its clearest exemplification in the category of "client-states" of western economic power, not unnaturally became a major target of contumely in the period. It is as yet unclear how far he himself actually posed and underwrote an active threat of more direct and potentially "progressive" subversion against such states but it is significant that by 1965 so strong was the pressure against any activity of the sort that he made "the extreme concession of agreeing to deport from Ghana all political refugees and their families opposed to the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger, such deportation being final". It seems probable that Nkrumah had in fact never fully worked out in his own mind the place of various possible forms of "intervention" into the affairs of other African states within an effective and radical Pan-Africanist strategy. It is, however, doubtful whether, under the circumstances, Nyerere, often a courageous spokesman for a more meaningful Pan-Africanism, comes closer to articulating a meaningful strategy when he notes:

"Like-mindedness even on major social and economic issues is not likely to be achieved even after unity; it will never be achieved before. To imagine a merger of sovereignties will automatically solve inter-African conflicts is to invite disaster. Unity will simply change the context in which these problems can be tackled. The socialist policies of our own countries must be safeguarded, the African-oriented policies of non-socialist/African/statess will also have to be safe-guarded."

Moreover, the conservative turn taken by Pan-Africanism and the "Congress of Vienna" atmosphere which has come to pervade the OAU can be expected to become increasingly evident in the attitude of Independent Africa to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, especially as regards the activities of the Organization which are focused through the African Liberation Committee. Already much dragging of feet over financing characterizes the policy of many African states in this sphere. And the continued paralysis of independent Africa in relation to the Rhodesian situation must be viewed as being particularly symptomatic of the general malaise.

The changing attitudes towards the régimes of Southern Africa will increasingly find a further rationale in some of the trends already discussed. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the present pattern of growth without development leaves independent Africa wide open
to political and economic deals with international capitalism which can sometimes help to shore up stability in the short run, and this will become all the more important a factor as the limits of growth are reached. In particular, it may create favourable conditions for that northward expansion of South African capitalism which we discussed in the previous section. Whether such expansion will actually materialize is an open question, though as Bowman has noted "there is evidence that South Africa is having some success in breaking out of her isolated position. . . . In Parliament on 31 January, 1967, Dr. Muller [South Africa's Foreign Minister] said that "those countries willing to co-operate with South Africa are increasing. Contact on different levels has increased day by day". The statement is at least partially substantiated by South Africa's trade figures with the rest of Africa. Although for political reasons South Africa does not break down her African trade on a country-by-country basis, there have been sharp increases in recent years." In part, the degree of success depends on the extent to which marginal internal "liberalization" in Southern Africa and/or the establishment of military dictatorships in independent Africa will relax ideological barriers. But the crucial determinant will be the strength of those social forces which can be expected, in the near future, to oppose neo-colonialism in independent Africa and capitalism in Southern Africa. The latter we have already discussed; to the former we must now turn.

We have already noted the polarization of wage-workers in Africa into two strata and we should now further clarify the differential roles of these strata within the current pattern of development. Those wage-workers who have been fully integrated into the wage economy and have cut their links with the peasantry partake of some of the privileges enjoyed by the "elites" and "sub-elites": not only do they have incomes (especially when they are employed by the State and by multi-national corporations) which compare satisfactorily with those of the latter but, in addition, they benefit from the developed overhead capital of the urban areas (educational and health facilities, transport, water, electricity, etc.). They thus tend to become partners, albeit junior partners, of the dominant power bloc in the post-independent context. The short- and medium-run costs which the stratum in question would have to bear in the event of a radical restructuring of relations with international capitalism are too high relative to the likely benefits for one to expect much revolutionary initiative to come from this source. To be sure, worker demands have occasionally triggered off movements with real menace for the dominant circles: one thinks of the Sekondi-Takoradi strike in Ghana, and the near general strike in Nigeria in 1964. Yet only in Congo-Brazzaville has such worker agitation seemed an unequivocally progressive force, becoming, as it
did, a major instigator and prop of the progressive régime which emerged there for a time.92

Our assumption may seem to conflict with the fact that certain African labour leaders have in the past been among those articulating the most aggressively radical philosophies on the continent, a force finding its broadest expression in trends within certain Pan-African trade union organizations, notably the AATUF. This may in part merely evidence the relative ideological autonomy of the labour leadership from the interests of the upper stratum of the working class, but it may also reflect the presence within such organizations of elements belonging to the lower stratum of the wage-workers. This lower stratum, consisting of workers and unemployed who retain strong links with the peasantry, has in fact interests which are antagonistic to the present order. For the very pattern of capital intensive accumulation which is restraining the absorption in the wage sector of the migrant workers who seek employment to supplement the meagre rural incomes of their families. This phenomenon is an important aspect of the impact of the current pattern of "perverse growth" in the peasant societies of independent Africa, a pattern strengthening external linkages at the expense of internal linkages and thereby limiting the peasantry's opportunities to improve their lot through participation in the labour and produce markets." In consequence, while growing income and wealth differentials between and within "town" and "country" steadily raise the desire of the peasantry to participate in the money economy, its ability to do so is being restrained and, as population pressure on the land builds up, it increasingly loses its economic independence and tends to be transformed into a rural proletariat or an urban lumpen proletariat.

Given such realities, it is evident that considerable attention must continue to be paid to the emphasis of Frantz Fanon who placed his hopes for significant transformation in post-colonial Africa upon the peasantry's outrage at widening economic and social differentials, especially as between the mass of the population and the new "middle-class" (between, in effect, the rural and urban worlds), and upon their consequent dramatic insertion into the political equation.94 However, the depth and likely impact of this contradiction must not be misconstrued. For on a continental basis the general absence of population pressure on the land and the relatively unrevolutionized nature of traditional rural economic systems—family centred with many communal constraints upon the full play of individualism—mean that the range of pressures characteristic of either full-fledged feudal or capitalistic exploitation are much less in evidence. As Benot puts it:
"Because of the importance of the subsistence economy and of self-sufficiency, because of the importance of social structures marked by residual communalism and parochialism, because, too, of the fact that [in Africa] the same complex of gerontocratic and familiar traditions and customs encompass the exploited and the exploiters alike (who are, so to speak, often relatives), because of all these things the class struggle of which Sekou Touré speaks does not manifest itself within present-day African society as an internal conflict (affrontement interne) but as a conflict with the State, which remains a far off abstraction, unconnected with felt experience—a conflict with which everyone can eventually identify himself in some vague way."

Thus in the absence of immediate and wide-spread exploitation at the level of the mode of production (which has, however, begun to emerge in some areas, as mentioned earlier) politically relevant consciousness of the gap separating the peasantry from the labour aristocracy tends to be truncated and may merely lead to apathy and parochialism.

Not that this is the sole response conceivable; certain moments in Africa have suggested more progressive possibilities. Thus much of the turbulence in the Congo around 1964 seemed to take on the characteristics of a peasant resistance to the sorts of exploitation characteristic of a situation of dominance by a "new class" such as we have been describing; in particular, Mulele's rising in the Kwilu may be accurately characterized as being, primarily though not exclusively, "a revolt of impoverished and exploited peasants for whom the enemy was not only the foreign colonialist but above all those Congolese who had monopolized all the fruits of independence, and also those policemen, administrators and even teachers who served the new class and sought to imitate its style of life". Other areas of the Congo, deprived of leadership of the quality of that provided by Mulele and his associates, were able to articulate their grievances rather less coherently, but some such elements of "class struggle" were apparent in many areas of the country and may simmer still, despite military defeat.

Less satisfactorily the resentment thus directed towards the "elites" can be utilized to underwrite further mystification in a national context and, of course, similar strands of resistance could, in the absence of sustained political work, even frustrate future radical development efforts. For it must be underscored that the spreading of progressive political consciousness among the peasantry of independent African countries meets formidable obstacles. Though the politically relevant boundaries and major arena of self-aggrandizement for the elite have increasingly become those of the states of contemporary Africa, for the peasant rather narrower tribal and sub-tribal affiliations may still be the most prominent social horizon. To be sure, the latter is not solely a superstructural phenomenon but rather reflects, in part, the uneven development which capitalist penetration in colonial times has as a rule promoted not only among African territories but also
among tribes. It can therefore become a reality to be manipulated by the elite itself to fragment growing mass consciousness or to provide the basis of pawns to be played in intra-elite competition; Richard Sklar, for example, in drawing upon his intensive Nigerian investigations, suggests that under such circumstances it is far from unusual for "tribalism [to] become a mask for class privilege". Moreover, as Fanon himself recognized, even in times of heightened general tension, which evidence some potential for radical change, "what can be dangerous is when [the African people] reach the stage of social consciousness before the stage of nationalism. If this happens, we find in under-developed countries fierce demands for social justice which paradoxically are allied with often primitive tribalism". In other words, protest itself, instead of giving rise to a critique characterized by socialist content, may be so mediated and thereby inflected into narrower and usually self-defeating channels. In such a situation some sort of achieved nationalism may become a precious commodity. For, in its absence, "mass discontent against the new class [in the Congo] was in many ways diverted into tribal wars often initiated by traditional chiefs intent on restoring ancient kingdoms" even in Kwilu there are clear signs that the Mulelist movement itself contained backward-looking dimensions which tended to become more prominent as the level of tensions inherent in the Congo situation rose.

These ethnic dimensions must figure prominently in any African balance sheet as they give hostages to unwelcome international pressures. The blend of tribalism, oil and opportunistic intervention by various rival capitalist and Great Power concerns which has characterized the Nigeria-Biafra war is a case in point. Nor should the possible ways in which the availability of such leverage can link up with other dimensions of the continental struggle be ignored. The tribalism fostered in Zambia by intra-elite competition has, for example, become the main entering wedge in the Southern African regimes' attempts to tame Kaunda's support for the liberation movements, and one of the accomplishments of Portuguese aid to Biafra was the defection of a prominent (now) Biafran, seconded to the headquarters of the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam, who surfaced eventually in Lisbon bearing information of strategic relevance to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

Uneven development has also created contradictions among various African states, especially between the peripheral centres and those countries which form their periphery. These contradictions are still embryonic but can be expected to deepen, especially if the wave of capitalist sponsored economic liberalization discussed earlier in the paper becomes an even stronger one; in this context, for example, the recent decision of a country like Chad to impose customs duties
on goods entering the country from its former partners of the Central African Customs Union assumes more general significance. But in such instances (as with the more serious clashes which may emerge in the future) any progressive potential inherent in such an implicit critique of continental imbalances will, for the reasons which we have discussed, be vitiated in the absence of alternative strategies designed to complete a break with international capitalism at home.\textsuperscript{102} Under existing circumstances it is probable, in fact, that these conflicts, and the "nationalist" sentiments they may arouse, will merely be manipulated by the ruling classes in the countries concerned to further fragment and mystify mass consciousness on the continent (while at the same time making available another possible instrument for use as leverage by outside [including South African] interests).

In conclusion, class contradictions in independent Africa are less dramatic than in Southern Africa and many areas of the under-developed world. Moreover they are blurred by racial, ethnic and nationalist dimensions which hamper the development of subjective conditions favourable to radical change. The development of a rural proletariat and of an urban lumpen proletariat will steadily restructure this situation but for some time to come class antagonisms are unlikely to contribute in a determinant way to the internal dynamics of independent Africa. This very under-development of revolutionary social forces further underscores the potentially important contribution both of intellectuals, who might play the role of generalizing protest and raising it to a level of significant revolutionary praxis, and of disciplined political movements which can over time turn discontent into, a drive for radical change. Though some African students especially when in the metropoles, have been among the most articulate radicals (a radicalism exemplified in the militancy of a number of their organizations, most prominently the Paris-centred FEANF) it is nonetheless true that with education classically so prominent a factor in recruitment into the "labour aristocracy", the intelligentsia has tended to be a central prop to the unbalanced African power structure. Here too, however, there are reasons for expecting change. When the eclipse of the easy opportunities inherent in replacing the European colonial establishment has been coupled both with the expansion of educational opportunities and much slower expansion of positions concomitant upon a bankrupt development strategy, we may expect a growing frustration of that segment of the intelligentsia (understood in very broad terms) which the increasingly exclusive top levels of the labour aristocracy are unable to absorb. Such frustration may simply lead to an intensification of the manipulation of the masses in the service of intra-elites struggles. It might however lead to a genuinely revolutionary vanguard if, in line with other changes,
the instrumentalization of the masses is subject to increasingly diminishing returns.

The potentially important contribution of a radical leadership is in some respects corroborated by the Tanzanian experience where a transformation of the consciousness of the very ruling strata which inherited power at independence has been attempted under the creative leadership of Julius Nyerere. Here "self-reliance" vis-a-vis foreign capital has become rather more aggressively than elsewhere the order of the day and State ownership has been extended to a sizeable segment of the modern economy. To be sure, the ambiguities of state ownership without a radical development strategy, mentioned earlier, are far from being resolved in Tanzania and it is by no means clear that the mass base that must underwrite the attempt can be generated. Yet the nationalizations have fulfilled a basic precondition for such a strategy to emerge, and the power of the labour aristocracy and international capitalism to inflict social transformations in a neo-colonial direction has been contained. But even if this remains a situation of some continuing promise it has arisen from a peculiar concatenation of circumstances—involving, among other things, a low degree of direct involvement, historically, on the part of international capitalism, a slower crystallization, in a setting of extreme "backwardness", of the interests and the consciousness of the nascent Tanzanian "labour aristocracy" relative to many other African situations, and the presence of a leader of great tactical skill and genuine commitment who could take considerable advantage of the breathing space thus allotted him—the moment for which, if it ever existed, has probably passed unused in most other African states. In much of independent Africa root and branch challenge to the incumbent regimes is the relevant historical necessity, however difficult the task.

The picture which emerges from our discussion is not bright. International capitalism, under the hegemony of the United States, seems about to rationalize its domination of Black Africa, a trend which may be supplemented by an economic and diplomatic offensive from South Africa. The bankruptcy of Independent Africa's development policies in the last decade has, at the same time, prepared a favourable environment for the success of both such moves. Thus the victorious "nationalisms" of the fifties and early sixties which seemed the crystallization of an effective challenge to imperialism must now be generally reinterpreted, in the light of independent Africa's "false decolonization" (in Fanon's suggestive phrase), as no real defence but rather as so many myths designed to legitimize the dominant position of the new
ruling classes. Similarly Pan-Africanism, originally drawing upon a living tradition of racial and cultural themes and a sense of shared grievance, is itself being transformed from a radical force seemingly capable of offering real resistance to the further subordination of Africa to western capitalism, into a conservative alliance guaranteeing the stability of existing neo-colonialist structures. Moreover, though some among the African countries (especially the peripheral centres) find themselves bound into the imperialist system in ways which provide (in the short run) more of the illusion of development, ultimately all are effectively constrained by such a continental pattern. In sum, the "Latin Americanization" of independent Africa is well underway.

The social forces which might be expected to underpin any drive to reverse these trends are, generally speaking, either absent (as in the case of the proletariat proper) or ideologically and politically fragmented (viz., the peasantry). Moreover, given the present pattern of capital intensive development, the proletarianization of the peasantry will be too slow and long drawn out a process on which to base hopes of revolutionary change in most of the area. In time the fruits of bankrupt development strategies—impressed upon lumpen elements in the urban areas, sections of the peasantry, and some members of the "intelligentsia", for example—will come to define real contradictions, but in the short run greater authoritarianism, occasionally complemented by "mass" incursions into politics whose regressive and parochial character reflects the fragmented and mediated consciousness which we have mentioned, is a more likely outgrowth of tension than any concerted revolutionary activity.

Hopes must instead be focused upon the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the implications of which are bound to have truly continental dimensions. In the "centres" of Southern Africa the peasantry has been effectively proletarianized and the social structure produced by a pattern of development in which the white settlers play the hegemonic role leaves little, if any, room for a neo-colonial solution. Moreover, in the periphery of this region (the Portuguese territories) the neo-colonial solution has been blocked by the "ultra-colonialism" of Portugal and the peasant revolution which has ensued is creating subjective conditions for socialist transformation which are generally absent elsewhere in independent black Africa. The intensification of the struggle in Southern Africa, drawing South Africa out of its own fortress (and perhaps eventually drawing the United States and others ever more overtly into the fray), can in turn have an educative effect upon receptive circles in independent Africa. Much more important, a successful socialist revolution in Southern Africa would radically restructure neo-colonialist relationships on the
whole continent since, after a necessary (and admittedly difficult) period of reconstruction, it would act as a powerful pole of politico-economic attraction for the less developed and less wealthy nations of Tropical Africa. Our discussions should have dispelled any illusions concerning the nature and short-term prospects of the struggle in Southern Africa. Yet, at the present historical moment, this provides the main, if not the only, leverage for revolutionary change in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It follows that the countries bordering upon the Southern African Complex deserve special attention as their support is crucial to the liberation struggles, especially those in Rhodesia and South Africa where, as we have seen, the peasantry cannot provide a sure and sustained base for revolutionary action. In this regard the Congo and particularly Malawi have already been effectively neutralized by the neo-colonial control of the United States and South Africa respectively; this has in turn enhanced the strategic significance of Zambia and Tanzania. In assessing the present and likely future contributions of these countries to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa it must be stressed from the outset that the constraints upon the development of revolutionary consciousness within their own borders are formidable; the combination of forces which we have seen to be promoting the entrenchment of neo-colonialism are present also in these countries. In addition Zambia, like Malawi, finds itself in the unique position of having an economy closely integrated with that of South Africa, its links with Rhodesia having been reduced since UDI largely through greater dependence upon South Africa and the Portuguese territories. This situation obviously narrows further the options open to the Zambian nationalist leadership, which, in addition, has been rather less coherent and radical than that of Tanzania in conceptualizing the problems of its country’s development.

Yet, given this situation, the consolidation in power of the present leadership there and in Tanzania, and the retention by such leaderships of their present attitudes towards the liberation movements, is the most favourable trend that the liberation movements can expect—though the confrontation with Southern Africa in its various dimensions (involving the backing by the white régimes of internal opposition groups, as in Zambia, the tacit encouragement by those same régimes of the expansionist ambitions displayed by Banda and, of course, the direct military intervention exemplified most graphically to date by Portuguese border raids into Tanzania and Zambia) may have a further radicalizing effect on both countries. For this trend to have any chance to materialize it is necessary, however, that the Zambians succeed in reducing the integration of their economy with Southern Africa to a much greater extent and at a faster pace than they have to date. In this connection the further rapid expansion of various
links with Tanzania, particularly in the field of communications and trade, would represent an important development, and one is therefore tempted to look upon the success or failure to execute the projected Tanzam railway project, to be financed and built by China, as a major indicator of future trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. In any event, developments in Zambia will be closely related to those in Tanzania. Of course, the long-run success of the latter country's bid to escape the neo-colonial pattern of development could in and of itself begin to have some educative effect upon the rest of the continent. More immediately relevant to our purposes here, however, is the fact that its failure would almost inevitably lead Zambia to join Malawi and the Congo in surrendering completely to internal and external neo-colonialist pressures. We have already mentioned some of the positive features, as well as some of the continuing ambiguities, of the Tanzanian experience; we will here add only some brief mention of the important implications of Tanzania's integration into the regional East African economy. For Tanzania has traditionally played the role of an economic satellite vis-à-vis Kenya, which state, owing to the pressures of a European and Asian national bourgeoisie, had acquired many of the features characteristic of the settler economies of Southern Africa. Prominent among such features was a relatively developed productive structure which, together with Kenya's total subservience to the West, has made that country the "natural" base for international capitalism's operations in the whole of East Africa in the post-independence era. It is not surprising therefore that Kenya is one of the countries where United States presence has become most marked. Under these conditions, and irrespective of short-term advantages, the participation with Kenya in what seems to be primarily a neo-colonialist sponsored common market could severely constrain meaningful planning in Tanzania at the very moment when she begins to sense the need for a coherent domestic industrial strategy. On the basis of our earlier general argument it should be clear that Tanzania's efforts would benefit greatly from participation in larger economic units characterized by rational and equitable planning. But it is equally evident that some forms of unity, whether continental or regional, can be more damaging than none at all for many of the participants.

Such a consideration provides one reason why radical change in Kenya would significantly ease the way for the ultimate success of the Tanzanian policy of "self-reliance". It is therefore relevant to recognize that the prospects for such change are marginally brighter in Kenya than elsewhere in Black Africa. For another feature which Kenya has inherited from the colonial period is a class structure similar to that of Rhodesia and South Africa, which is to say that the
Kenyan peasantry has been more deeply proletarianized than the peasantry in most other African countries. For this reason class conflicts are likely to emerge as a dynamic factor as soon as the limits are reached in the current Africanization of the settler economy, this latter process having created considerable consensus for the present régime but having also assured the consolidation of Kenya's black "labour aristocracy" in a position of gross privilege even more graphic and exposed than is the case in other parts of the continent.\textsuperscript{108} Admittedly fragmentation of consciousness along tribal lines is a deep-seated problem, but there is also a living tradition, in Mau Mau, of peasant violence to redress socio-economic grievances which can be drawn upon.\textsuperscript{109}

Here, too, such realities may merely lead to greater authoritarianism and are in fact doing so. But if adequate subjective conditions will have been created, grievances generalized, and the basic tasks of organization begun, Kenya could at some future date underwrite a qualitatively different situation in East Africa and, through the repercussions on Zambia and the liberation movements, in Southern Africa. Finally, certain parallel points might be made about potential developments in the strategically important state of Congo (Kinshasa), for the character of its integration into the Southern African mining complex and the degree to which its rural structures were shaken up by the Belgians' own version of "ultra-colonialism",\textsuperscript{139} also give its socio-political system a certain unique volatility. This has been best exemplified by those post-independence peasant outbursts mentioned in an earlier section which are without ready parallel elsewhere on the continent—though here again, as noted, subjective factors undermined much of the creative potential inherent in the situation.

We are here moving towards the realm of the merely speculative for in fact the possible permutations and combinations of events and their likely timing are vast in number. It is enough in conclusion to take note of two main elements that are readily apparent in the preceding argument. On the one hand a concluding focus upon the important interconnections between the various states and liberation movements in the "battle area" serves to re-emphasize the necessarily continental sweep of strategic calculation in contemporary Africa. On the other hand, the importance of the development of subjective conditions which has been noted reinforces the concern expressed in our introduction for increased clarity of analysis and a deeper understanding of the forces involved on the part of all concerned.

The former point raises a number of difficulties, of course, for the sets of priorities which should be adopted by states, groups and individuals in Africa in defining their revolutionary praxis are by no means self-evident. Benot has raised some relevant points in his dis-
cussion of Nkrumah's Pan-African strategy, arguing that much of the latter's emphasis on this issue led to an unfortunate dispersion of vital energies; he concludes in fact that:

"...a state embarked upon the difficult struggle for development and economic independence is of necessity forced to consider the demonstration through its own achievements and its own progress of the real possibilities of independence as the crucial contribution which it can make to the liberation of the continent."

Nationalism, so potentially mystifying an element on the African scene, can in certain contexts be revitalized, used (and controlled) as a progressive instrument providing the rationale for struggle and/or the framework within which social reconstruction proceeds. But nonetheless, for reasons which we have indicated, it must certainly be balanced by a continental concern, though not one cast in the conventional mould of the present day. Indeed what must be a most pressing necessity is to recapture in new terms the vital spirit of continental division which characterized the hey day of the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs. This will involve calculations of particular relevance to the socialist states which may emerge from the liberation struggle (though it should probably be of increased immediate concern to a state like Tanzania, for example). For links among the like-minded will become particularly important as such states move to sustain each other and to spread their influence. Clearly the ground-work should now be laid by African revolutionaries for consideration of the full range of possible activities in the next stages of continental evolution.

Needless to say, answers to the questions raised in the course of such calculations are dependent upon the clarity of vision whose necessity was introduced as the second major element of our summary above. Only when concepts of "nationalism" and of "Pan-Africanism" are fully demystified and liberated from the cultural grip of the ruling classes and their ideologues can they be put to progressive use as political instruments. It is then too that a patently two-edged sword like racial consciousness can realize its full progressive potential—when, in other words, it is related to (though not submerged by) a growing realization on the part of African radicals that their revolution is part and parcel of a world-wide anti-imperialist struggle. Of course, as Roger Murray has cogently observed, the demands for both intellectual probity and intellectual honesty to be made upon "metropolitan socialists" can be no less severe, and must lead them to transcend such "misinterpreted application of revolutionary responsibility and commitment" as has led to "the general default of meaningful and critical solidarity" with the Third World in the past; his injunctions in this regard should be required reading and need not therefore be paraphrased here.
Many parallel points might also be made with reference to the role of the socialist countries for whom collaborationism with "national democracies" is a temptation and opportunism, as exemplified in the Nigerian case, an ever present danger. Partly this may spring from an atmosphere of "peaceful coexistence" which all too often means merely a retirement before the sort of aggressive global "rationalization" by international capitalism whose African version we have elaborated upon above. And even where more fruitful involvement is the rule as in the struggle in Southern Africa the division between the Soviet and Chinese wings of the socialist camp can, in its crudest expressions, have a most deleterious effect. Yet the contribution from the East can and must be great, not only during the stage of the liberation struggle itself, but also as socialist states struggle to emerge on more secure bases than was the case for the first wave of radical states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Often isolated (as would be the case for an independent Cabralist Guinea, for example) and inevitably in need of meaningful short-run assistance (as in contemporary Tanzania), these should be the foci of concentrated effort. In the current continental conjuncture, characterized by a graphically uneven development of revolutionary possibilities, there is little to be gained from spreading one's efforts thinly and uncritically.

In sum, for all concerned outsiders of radical persuasion anxious to maximize their contribution, more sophisticated theory and analysis and clearer insight into African realities are almost as important as for the new African revolutionaries themselves. Too little advance has been made beyond the situation described in 1960 by Amilcar Cabral, among the most admirable of African militants, when he identified what he chose to call "a crisis in the African revolution":

> It is not a crisis of growth, but mainly a crisis of knowledge. In too many cases the struggle for liberation and our plans for the future are not only without a theoretical base, but also more or less cut off from the concrete situation in which we are working."

NOTES


2. We have limited our inquiry to Sub-Saharan Africa despite the fact that, for many important purposes, this artificially excludes North Africa from the continental balance-sheet which we attempt to sketch. A more adequate account would have to pay particular attention to the often radical role played by North African states (the UAR and Algeria in
particular) both within various continental organizations and vis-à-vis the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.


Thus Ledda (op. cit., p. 580) emphasizes the central importance of "the emergence of a working class, made up essentially of wage-earners—industrial, agricultural and tertiary proletariat—in the cities and rural areas; and it is this class that will form the backbone of a revolutionary movement" in Africa.


6. Alavi, op. cit.
7. This hypothesis is of course consistent with the fact that there is a net outflow of private capital from the periphery to the industrial capitalist centres. Cf. Alavi, op. cit.; H. Magdoff, "Economic Aspects of U.S. Imperialism", in Monthly Review, Vol. XVII, No. 6, 1966; and J. P. Vigier and G. Waysand, "Revolucion Cientifica e Imperialismo", in Pensamiento Critico, No. 13, 1968.


10. Austin, op. cit.
In this article we shall distinguish between "peripheral centres" and their "satellites". For the development of capitalism on a world scale has not only produced the relative underdevelopment and subordination of the "periphery" as a whole (the present underdeveloped world). It has also led to uneven development within the periphery itself, where some countries, regions and communities play the role of "peripheral centres" and others those of their "satellites". Cf. Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1967).

See Samir Amin, *Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris, 1967), especially the conclusion. Difficulties similar to those described by Amin for the Ivory Coast are also becoming apparent in Kenya.

It is along some such lines that one might hope to pursue Roger Murray's goal of "a much finer discrimination of the variant forms of a 'neo-colonialism' which embraces much of the world; and which therefore has to be liquidated as an autonomous category" (in Roger Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana", *New Left Review*, No. 42 (March-April, 1967), p. 39.) On this subject, most definitively, further work is needed.

As noted earlier, this assumption does not apply to concerns engaged in gold mining.


Arrighi and Saul, *op. cit.*


The main manifestation of these conflicts is probably the series of international monetary crises which Western capitalism has been undergoing lately. Cf. M. Kidron, Western Capitalism Since the War (London, 1968).


See Paul Semonin, "Mobutu and the Congolese", The World Today (January, 1968). We will return to this theme in Section III, below.


For example, B. J. Oudes in his article "OCAM Comes of Age", Africa Report (February, 1968) strongly emphasizes the weakened bargaining position of the African leaders vis-à-vis the E.E.C.

Cf. Frank, op. cit. The phrase "development of underdevelopment" is used to emphasize that the underdevelopment of the peripheries must not be viewed as an "original state" but as the "joint product" of the historical process which has brought about the development of the advanced capitalist centres.


Ibid.

"The Green Bay Tree", The Economist (29 June–5 July, 1968), p. xliv. The sub-title of this fifty page special report by the Economist's deputy editor is, significantly, "A survey by the Economist of why South Africa is getting richer so quickly, and of why it is almost certainly to everybody's advantage that it should continue to do so".

A/6686/Add. 1, op. cit.

It should be noted that as regards these trends the Oppenheimer group is only the most far-sighted and aggressive of a number of actors in the Southern African economy with similar interests.


The classic instance in this regard is Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: crisis for the west (London, 1964); for an alternative prognosis see G. Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", op. cit.

The Malawi case is a particularly striking one; for a succinct analysis see "Introduction to Malawi", New Left Review, 45 (1967).

Cited in Z. Nkosi, "South African Imperialism", The African Communist, 30 (Third Quarter, 1967), p. 35, which presents a number of revealing statements by important actors in the South African political economy on this subject; see also The Economist (op. cit.), p. xlvi;
"Vorster's Political Deception" in *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), November 4, 1968; D. Austin, "White Power?", *The Journal of Commonwealth Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (July, 1968). Nkosi also mentions, for example, that "Dr. Robert Gardiner [a Ghanian], executive secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, on his return to his headquarters in Addis Ababa from a visit to the Republic last March called for 'an agonising reappraisal' of how Black Africa should approach the problem of South Africa" (p. 37).

Nor should one ignore, in the last instance, the threat of direct South African military action against the north: "Three months ago Mr. Botha [South Africa's Minister of Defence] declared that South Africa regarded assistance given to the guerrillas as an act of provocation—'provocation can lead to hard retaliation in the interests of self-respect and peace'. Significantly he drew the analogy of Israel's raids against al-Fatah bases across the Jordan". ("In the steps of Dayan", *The Economist* [3–9 August, 1968]).

Dennis Austin is very much to the point when he argues that "particularly interesting are the joint development undertakings in Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola, including the very large hydro-electric projects on the Orange, Zambezi and Cunene Rivers. One can also list a growing number of mining ventures and industries directly financed by South Africa in Botswana, Swaziland, both the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia and Malawi" (in "White Power?", *op. cit.*). Clear evidence of the military and logistic presence of South Africa in the Southern African struggle beyond its borders is best situated by Botha's remark: "True friends do not need signed treaties. South Africa has an interest in what is happening in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique" (quoted in "In the steps of Dayan", *op. cit.*).


For evidence of more direct American involvement see David Welsh, "Flyboys for the CIA", *Ramparts* (December, 1966).


Donald Barnett, "In the liberated areas of Angola" (interview with Spartacus Monimambu) in *Guardian* (New York), issue of 27 April, 4 May, and 11 May, 1968; Roy Harvey, "Angolan liberation group confers" in *Guardian* (New York), issue of 19 October, 1968.

J. Marcum, "Three Revolutions", *Africa Report* (November 1967), p. 22. Similarly this "educative effect" helps to facilitate the transcending of tribal consciousness and other forms of parochialism; some of the possible ambiguities inherent in peasant political involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed at greater length in Section III.

Nonetheless Marcum is no doubt grossly premature with his argument (presented in a most "respectable" American Journal of African affairs) that "the possibility of U.S. intervention to preserve the status quo hangs over the three revolutions in Portuguese Africa like summer smog over Washington" (*ibid.*).

Parts of Southern Mozambique are, of course, particularly tightly in-
tegrated into the South African economy and a variety of further complexities may arise from this important fact.

Green and Seidman, *Unity or Poverty?* (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 149 (footnote). For example, in their catalogue of possible sectoral growth plans for a rejuvenated economic unity in Africa Green and Seidman cite, among other instances, the fact that "Continental policy in iron and steel would particularly benefit from the liberation of Southern Africa. South Africa and Rhodesia have the first and third largest iron and steel industries respectively in Africa and virtually all the coking coal. Along with Swaziland—whose deposits are now being opened up for the Japanese market—they possess a very large share of the high-grade iron ore reserves. Finally production of pig iron and basic steel products in this area to serve the steel (and iron ore) deficit of Asian countries appears to be one of the logical entry points for Africa into intermediate and manufactured products for export to world markets”, p. 245 (footnote).

63. Cf. Frank (*op. cit.*) on the relationship between capitalist development and feudal relations of production in Latin America. In our opinion, however, Frank over-simplifies the problem of the coexistence of different social relations of production under what he correctly identifies as capitalist systems.


65. It has, however, been argued that this has recently given rise to dangerous inflationary pressures, *cf.* Martin Legassick, "The Consequences of African Guerilla Activity for South Africa's Relations with her Neighbours" (unpublished paper).


70. We would welcome a term other than the "labor aristocracy" for the group which we have in mind should any be forthcoming; the genesis of a much clearer conceptualization of the African class structure must, in any event, be an immediate priority. For a discussion of the "elites" and "sub-elites" of Tropical Africa see P. Lloyd (ed.), *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (London, 1966), especially the introduction by the editor.


73. Amin, *ibid.*, p. 117; see also S. Amin, *Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (*op. cit.*) (Our translation).

74. Roger Murray, "Militarism in Africa", in *New Left Review*, 38 (July–
August, 1966), p. 56. This is much the most valuable analysis of the wave of military coups which has yet appeared.

Ibid.


Cf. John S. Saul, "On African Populism". op. cit., especially Section III.

Semonin, op. cit., pp. 27, 29. Compare this emphasis, however, with that of Murray: "American penetration into the Congo (Rockefeller, etc.) is such that one can assume that Mobutu, in his dealings with Belgium, is playing the American card" (op. cit., p. 56). This latter seems in many ways to be the stronger hypothesis.


Green and Seidman, op. cit., p. 22. While we broadly agree with the views expressed in this quotation we feel uneasy, to say the least, at the lack of concern shown by the authors for the problem—which we consider central to a strategy of economic development in Africa—of evolving a technology better suited to the task of mobilizing productive forces in Africa than that imported from the advanced capitalist centres. Cf. Arrighi, op. cit.

Green and Seidman, pp. 255-6. Wolfe has also stressed the extent to which division undermines a strong continental bargaining position, arguing, for example, that the Congo's failure to effectively renegotiate its copper position foundered on this reef: "The African states, weak as they are individually, have not methodically utilized what resources they have for enhancing collective influence vis-à-vis the developed centres" (op. cit., p. 19).

Quoted in Green and Seidman, op. cit., p. 229.

Ibid., p. 230.

Benot, ibid., pp. 54-5. (Our translation).


Both these quotations appear in Wallerstein, above, p. 63. The latter thought was echoed some three years later by President Boumedienne of Algeria when he observed that "there has been since [Addis Ababa] a certain decline of African solidarity. . . . We must avoid at any price the danger of this trade union [of heads of states] which would hold back to the necessary evolution of our people" (quoted in Wallerstein, p. 106).

In fact the Francophone states have in the past not always trusted the OAU to play this role and have relied as much or more on their own defensive alliances (viz. OCAM).

Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 93.

Ibid., p. 101.

Quoted in Green and Seidman, op. cit., p. 350 (emphasis added). It is from a speech delivered to the U.A.R. National Assembly, 9 April, 1967.

Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 3 (September 1968), p. 254. He also paraphrases a report from the Times (London) of 25 June, 1967 to the effect that "Dr. Muller . . . attended the Independence Day
celebrations in both Lesotho and Botswana where he met African leaders from all over the continent. He subsequently reported that in 1966, fifty
African Ministers passed through Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg
and that South Africa sent eight official or semi-official delegations to
African states in 1966". In recent years the South African government
has also proven willing to "liberalize" certain marginal elements of
superstructural apartheid (e.g. restrictions concerning accommodations for
diplomats) in order to avoid offending the sensibilities of prospective
new black allies. See also Nkosi, op, cit.

Murray (op. cit.) has in fact generalized the potential significance of the
Brazzaville pattern in the following terms: "The 'egoistic' oppositional
action of urban wage-workers (and peripheral semi-employed) can debouch
into a genuine critique of the power system of post-colonial clientage—
if the confrontation is sufficiently sharp and sustained and if it is relayed
by groups with a wider social vision and programme (revolutionary
intellectuals)" (p. 46). Yet he himself reckoned the possibilities of such a
development to be "admittedly dim" with reference to several other
situations which he discusses. Further work on this important subject
should also avoid eliding consideration of the likely involvements of the
two strata of wage-workers as Murray has done here. Even in the
Brazzaville case, insufficient data is presently available to assess retro-
spectively the exact roles of such strata, for example.

G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, op. cit.

Frantz Fanon, op. cit.

Benot, op. cit., pp. 52-3 (our translation).

J. Gkrd-Libois, "The New Class and Rebellion in the Congo", The

Thus Andrew Ross cogently argues that in Malawi Banda has moved
skilfully to manipulate the crudest sort of "populist" resentment in
order to consolidate his popularity and his position in power, while
inflicting it away from any broader critique which might challenge
his own ultra-collaborationist policy. See his article "White Africa's
Black Ally" in New Left Review, 45 (September–October, 1967), 85.

In his article "Political Science and National Integration" Sklar takes
the view that "tribalism should be viewed as a dependent variable
rather than a primordial force in the new nation" (The Journal of
evidence to support this notion.

Fanon, op. cit., p. 164.

Gkrd-Libois, op. cit., p. 272. See also R. C. Fox, W. de Craemer and
J. M. Ribeaucourt, "The Second Independence: A Case Study of the
Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo". Comparative Studies in Society and

The recent Zambian election (December 1968) saw the opposition ANC
making gains in key areas of the country, particularly in the strategically
important south and west. This was done in part by encouraging and
playing upon growing tribal tensions, but it is significant that Nkumbula,
the ANC leader, spoke openly of seeking extended economic ties with
South Africa. Cf. "UNIP emerges only truly National Party", The
Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), 31 December, 1968; "New Threats of
The Chad decision was reported in the Tanzania Standard (20 January, 1969); as shall be noted below, Tanzania's own involvement in the East African Community, and the tensions which have arisen upon occasion in that forum, are rather less easy to characterize because of the latter country's attempts to articulate a more radical domestic strategy.

To date the few investment projects carried out, or in the process of being carried out, with Chinese assistance—with their emphasis on labour-intensive and agriculture-oriented industrialization—seem to be the main signs of a radical development strategy that nonetheless still awaits sustained and sophisticated elaboration.

For a more detailed analysis of these and other aspects of the Tanzanian experience, see John. S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: the Tanzanian Case", to be published later this year.

Interestingly, in a recent Newsweek article ("Profits From Africa", 20 January, 1969) devoted to the African investment offensive of the ubiquitous Lonrho Corporation (a company which works, in the words of one of its directors, "through personal contacts with ministers and heads of state") attention is drawn to that corporation's intention to construct a railway link to Zambia through the Congo which, "would thus pose a massive threat to the Communist Chinese-backed plan for a 1,000 mile railroad running the other way".

"Already some 61 U.S. firms are operating in Kenya with an investment reported to be about $85-100 million and employing over 5,000 persons", Ann Seidman, unpublished manuscript on foreign capital in East Africa. See also the revealing report by the National Christian Council of Kenya entitled Who Controls Industry in Kenya (Nairobi, 1968).

Cf. Seidman, op. cit.; on some of the limitations of the mechanisms designed to readjust the imbalances created and sustained within the community by the free-play of market forces see D. Rothchild, "Experiment in Functional Integration", Africa Report, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April, 1968).

See the speech in The Kenya National Assembly (3 September, 1968) delivered by M. Muliro, a KANU M.P., veteran of the nationalist movement and by no stretch of the imagination a radical: "Today, sir, politically we have a wind of change in Africa. . . . The respect the people have for [President Kenyatta] is the only thing which is keeping us together. . . . The danger in concentration of population in Nairobi lies in the threat of revolution. It will explode one day. . . ."

Cf. D. Barnett and K. Njama, Mau-Mau From Within (New York, 1966); L. Cliffe has, however, stressed the continuing importance of the process of Registration and Consolidation, originally launched by the colonial government to undermine Mau Mau, in stabilizing the rural situation in some vital areas of potential discontent, at least in the immediate future (oral communication).


Cf. R. Debray, op. cit.: "... the existence of separate American nations, even mutually hostile ones, is an irreversible fact, and revolutionary struggle today can only be a struggle for national liberation. To require of national revolutionary processes in South America the previous con-
dition of continental unity is to postpone them to the Greek Calends" (p. 20). There are clear differences between the South American situation and that of Africa, of course, but Debray's powerful insistence that "South America is not yet a continent" is an equally important emphasis there.

113. Cf. J. Mohan, "A Whig Interpretation of African Nationalism", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 3 (October, 1968); in reviewing the recent writings of Ali Mazrui, Kenyan Professor of Political Science at Uganda's Makerere University College, Mohan suggests that the latter "is a representative of the intelligentsia, a spokesman of elite nationalism, and an ideologist of the ruling class in Africa" (p. 408).
