

GLOBALIZATION, IMPERIALISM, DEVELOPMENT: FALSE BINARIES AND RADICAL RESOLUTIONS

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The global expansion of European capitalism and the imperial conquest of peoples outside the western/northern centres of capital accumulation is a crucial dimension of the past several centuries of world history.¹ Moreover, the juxtaposition, in terms of power and prejudice, of 'the west and the rest of us', of 'North' versus 'South', continues to have significant implications for the fate of people, and, in particular, of the poorest of people, right into the current epoch. This essay will concern itself with the question of how best to conceive, and to act upon, the problem of contemporary global inequality that has been so closely, if complexly, linked to the world-wide history of capitalist imperialism. Amidst the complexities, however, there is one thing about which there can be no doubt: that is the fact of staggering inequality and the sheer scale of grinding poverty that marks so much of the present global scene. Indeed, in a more humane and just world it would be perceived clearly for what it is: the single most scandalous fact about the current period of human history.

Of course, we may feel slightly overwhelmed by figures indicating that 'a growing divide between the haves and have-nots has left increasing numbers in the Third World in dire poverty, living on less than a dollar a day' or that 'despite repeated promises of poverty reduction made over the last decade of the twentieth century, the ... number of people living in poverty has actually increased by almost 100 million [to an estimated 2,801 billion living on less than \$2 a day in 1998].'² Similarly, it is difficult to register fully the import of discovering (from the WTO) that the average American earned '5,500% more than the average Ethiopian ... a gap that will double in a century and a half at the current trend.'³

Or (from the UN) that ‘the world’s richest three men have more assets than the combined GDPs of the world’s 48 poorest countries’ and ‘the 225 richest men in the world have a combined wealth of more than \$1 trillion – equal to the income of the poorest 47% of the earth’s population, some 2,5-billion people.’⁴ Nonetheless, on the left, we do at least know that we should be doing something dramatic both to expose and to redress such inequities.

But doing what? In order to help clear the ground and to clarify what an appropriate answer to this question might look like, this essay will seek to explore a number of relevant theoretical issues. We begin with a critical reflection on the common tendency to offer diagnoses of global inequality in terms of false binaries – ‘the geographical’ vs. ‘the social’, ‘globalization’ vs. ‘the state’ (as well as ‘globalization’ vs. ‘imperialism’), ‘development’ vs. ‘anti-development’ – while suggesting just how unhelpful these are in establishing a target against which progressive struggle can be directed. The essay then turns to ask whether, even as we come to see more clearly what we are fighting against, we can also begin to define more pertinently just what we are fighting for in our efforts to overcome Third World poverty and exploitation. The word ‘socialism’ springs to mind here (not too surprisingly since what we are fighting against is indeed capitalism), but how far can this take us? For even if, as we shall see, the limited and contradictory nature of reformist alternatives presently on the global agenda encourages us to adopt a more revolutionary stance, there are real difficulties in establishing the precise meaning of ‘revolution’ in the contemporary world. An inventory and evaluation of world-wide resistances – already the subject of a growing literature⁵ – is beyond the scope of the present essay. It must suffice here to identify some of the categories in terms of which such an inventory and evaluation might best be carried out, while seeking to suggest the ways in which greater clarity regarding issues of site, agency and appropriate imaginary could help facilitate the building and sustaining of a revolutionary project of worldwide dimensions.

I. DIAGNOSES: FALSE BINARIES

(1) *‘The geographical’ vs. ‘the social’*

To start with: how, precisely, are the fact of imperialism as an historical phenomenon on the one hand, and the fact of gross pan-global inequality as a contemporary phenomenon on the other, to be linked analytically? The commonsensical understanding of the existence of some causal connection between the coexistence of a wealthy North and an impoverished South that once structured many understandings in both left and liberal circles has come under increased critical scrutiny. There are the even more visible discrepancies of wealth and power *within* the countries of both North and South that must be accounted for, for example. Moreover, the countries of the South are now seen to be far more heterogeneous economically than was once supposed. Indeed, so much less straightforward is a North/South mapping of inequality now said to be that a leading development theorist like Hoogvelt can suggest global

inequality to be now much more ‘social’ than ‘geographical’ in its coordinates: ‘The familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographical but a social division of the world economy’, she writes.⁶ As Arrighi and Silver have pointed out,⁷ Hoogvelt’s use of the term ‘social’ is misleading: the geographical hierarchy of nations that they themselves continue to emphasize is, of course, also a social relationship. Nonetheless, what Hoogvelt underscores is important: for her, a global division of labour, more centrally than ever defined along lines of class and (often) socio-economic exclusion that cut across national frontiers, has created both a dominant transnational capitalist class and vast outer circles of less privileged people, both North and South. Such a model helps, she suggests, to comprehend both the diversity to be found in the Third World (stretching from the NICs to the most impoverished zones of Africa) and growing inequalities within individual countries – these latter leading, in turn, to ‘chaotic disturbances, violence and conflict in the [social] periphery.’

But can we so readily displace from centrality the geographical coordinates of inequality? As Giovanni Arrighi has tirelessly documented, there is still a great deal about the global hierarchy that remains spatially-defined, and along lines that are also ‘largely a legacy of Western territorial and industrial expansion since about 1800.’ Thus, in a 1992 article on ‘the increasing inequality of the global distribution of incomes’, he demonstrated ‘a major widening of the already large income gap that fifty years ago separated the peoples of the South from the peoples of the organic core of the capitalist world-economy.’ His conclusion: ‘the nations of the world ... are differentially situated in a rigid hierarchy of wealth in which the occasional ascent of a nation or two leaves all the others more firmly entrenched than ever they were before’,⁸ thus exemplifying a ‘seemingly “iron law” of a global hierarchy that stays in place no matter what governments on the lower rungs of the hierarchy do or do not do.’ For in the absence of self-conscious correctives, the ‘oligarchic wealth’ achieved by the West always tends to draw the bulk of capitalist activity towards it, hence widening the gap. Arrighi, updating his argument in 2003,⁹ also emphasizes the extent to which aggressive Northern ‘neo-liberal’ policies deliberately reinforced this hierarchy when, in the 1970s, things seemed set to shift slightly in the South’s favour. He thus comes to precisely the same conclusion he had a decade earlier as to the persistence of a North/South hierarchy of income – and this despite (even because of) the fact that some degree of industrial convergence has indeed occurred.

It bears noting, if only in passing, that the implications of the picture Arrighi so sketches have led him to make quite different responses over the short span of a decade. Thus, writing at the beginning of the 1990s Arrighi saw the ongoing geographical polarization of global wealth as also linked to ‘systemic chaos’, to ‘the continual ... escalation of conflicts in the South and in the East’, and to ‘increasingly intractable problems of world-system regulation for the West.’ Only the prospect that ‘Western socialists will join forces with Eastern and Southern associates’ to facilitate the emergence of a ‘socialist world government’ capable of ‘promoting greater world equality and solidarity’ offered any hope to Arrighi

at that time.¹⁰ By the turn of the millennium, however, any whisper of socialism as best advancing the claims of ‘democratic wealth’ against oligarchic wealth has vanished from his writings. Now ‘for understanding the present and future of the global hierarchy [and for envisaging its “subversion”] it is the continuing economic expansion of Mainland China that may be the most important.’¹¹ In fact, this is the sole development, he and his co-authors suggest, that might have the potential (albeit one somewhat unspecified) to disrupt significantly the world-wide status quo. But note that this is a possible development that arises strictly from *within* the system of global capitalism.

Many will not wish to foreclose so readily the possibility of non-capitalist outcomes, of course. This is a point to which we will have to return. For the moment, it is sufficient merely to reject any implied contradiction between the ‘social’ (read: class, and class-related exclusion) and the geographical dimensions of global inequality that the juxtaposition of Hoogvelt and Arrighi’s emphases might seem to force upon us – and to register instead their irreducible simultaneity. Arrighi himself has no difficulty in recognizing the diversity of Southern capitalisms, for example, or the facts of income inequality internal to both North and South. But his continuing emphasis on spatial coordinates suggests the reason why notions of ‘the Third World’, ‘the global South’, ‘global apartheid’, and even ‘the post-colonial’ retain some efficacy in identifying the faultlines of global inequality. As writers like Smith and Cooper have observed, such notions can also be part of a language in terms of which global claims are staked and progressive mobilization is advanced in the South – even if they can also encourage a brand of ‘Third-Worldism’ that (especially when manipulated by local elites in their own interests) blurs the inherently capitalist/class nature of world-wide contradictions.¹² In addition, any movement that seeks to unite anti-capitalist struggles, North and South, cannot ignore the extent to which many in the North have both shared in the North’s ‘oligarchic wealth’ and been tempted by the racist premises spawned by the Western imperial project. If the legitimate claims of Southern peoples to global income redistribution, rights of migration, and freedom from high-handed military incursions are to be grasped and supported by potential allies of the South in the North, the latter will have to understand more clearly the facts regarding both the creation and persistence of a geographical hierarchy.

(2) ‘Globalization’ vs. ‘the state’, ‘globalization’ vs. ‘imperialism’

The temptation to falsely resolve ‘the geographical’ vs. ‘the social’ binary in favour of one pole or the other is in turn linked to another set of binaries that can with equal ease distort both the theory and the practice of challenging global inequality: the binaries of ‘globalization’ versus ‘imperialism’ (of ‘Empire’ versus ‘empire’, in effect) and of globally-focused versus nation-state-focused politics. Thus, it is no accident that Hoogvelt’s ‘social’ rather than geographic understanding of global inequality has been strongly influenced by the work of Manuel Castells. For Castells is amongst those who has most assertively argued the novelty of the current moment in the history of global capitalism, the epoch of

‘the network society’, of ‘timeless time’ and of the ‘space of flows’ (rather than of places).¹³ It is a world in which capital more generally, and the most dominant of capitalists more specifically, are said to have sprung free from their erstwhile moorings in nation-states and now dictate policies to all and sundry in terms of their now more forthrightly global interests. It is the world of Hardt and Negri’s ‘Empire’,¹⁴ of Sklair’s now predominantly *global* capitalist class,¹⁵ and of a situation in which, in Teeple’s strong statement of the argument, ‘capital [has] moved decisively beyond its historic political shell, the nation state and its associated mitigating forces and influences... [as] the consequent growing loss of national sovereignty over social reform and government policy began to become displaced by the imperatives of global markets.’¹⁶

There is something to this model, as thousands protesting against the inhuman toll of capitalist globalization have underscored in the streets of Seattle, Quebec, Genoa and in many other parts of the world in recent years. At the same time, as numerous critics of this particular take on globalization have observed, there is also something too neat about it – too apolitical to begin with. To be sure, globalists of right and left have underscored the saliency of emergent political institutions on the world-wide stage – the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO, and the like – but critics on the left have also been quick to point out that the system of global capitalism does not work quite so straightforwardly. Although capitalists (and their politicians) might be groping towards a kind of global ‘state’, real states are still there to do a lot of the heavy lifting on behalf of capital. Indeed, so much is this the case for authors like James Petras that they feel confident to argue that not really much has changed: what we have is still pretty much imperialism – western imperialism – as usual¹⁷: in effect, the all too familiar realm of historical imperialism (‘empire’) rather than Hardt and Negri’s centre-less ‘Empire’. And certainly the recent activities of the United States (and its military) – now more active than ever, in the wake of 9/11 and with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq – as self-proclaimed global policeman has focused attention on that particular reality, with anti-globalization protesters on the one hand and anti-war/anti-imperialist protesters having to work overtime to find a effective common language to tie together more precisely their obviously inter-related causes.

Leo Panitch has also emphasized the role of the state, criticizing much globalization literature for its ‘tendency to ignore the extent to which today’s globalization both is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing, rather than by-passing states.’¹⁸ In so arguing Panitch seeks, he suggests, merely to preempt any ‘false dichotomy between national and international struggles.’ Questions can be raised about his emphasis, nonetheless, for to some extent it could be taken to be quite complementary to the strong argument for the primacy of ‘globalization’. Thus, the role for the state that Panitch seems to foreground is primarily that of necessary agent for establishing the parameters of smooth integration of the countries concerned into the global capitalist economy – including, at such states’ most assertive moments, acting primarily

as agents for advancing the global aspirations of those of their own 'national capitals' that have chosen to go 'transnational' (cf. the Canadian case). At the same time, Panitch's argument is, with its careful balancing act, at some distance from a much more extreme form of the argument that insists upon continuing to see states as crucially active agents within the global economy – that exemplified by Hirst and Thompson.

Still, in dismissing much of the globalization literature, even the latter pair of authors depict states as being active almost solely in terms of their ability to advance the 'competitiveness', globally, of their own nation's principal economic sectors – presenting, in doing so, a 'refutation' of the globalization hypothesis that, ironically, comes close to echoing the position of the arch-globalist, Teeple, especially in its implications for the Third World. For even as they suggest the possible emergence, to frame such international competition, of various 'institutional arrangements and strategies [to] assure some minimal level of international economic governance, at least to the benefit of the major advanced industrial nations', they nonetheless argue that 'such [global] governance cannot alter the extreme inequalities between those nations and the rest, in terms of trade and investment, income and wealth.' For them, indeed, 'the issue is not whether the world's economy is governable towards ambitious goals like promoting social justice, equality between countries and greater democratic control for the bulk of the world's people, but whether it is governable at all.'¹⁹

So much for 'the bulk of the world's people', then. And just where does this leave states that lie beyond the pale of the 'major advanced industrial nations'? For present purposes, one can even assume, with Panitch, that states in advanced capitalist settings do indeed have more room for economic manoeuvre than the strongest versions of globalization theory might seem to imply. And we can also acknowledge the importance in the current moment of one particular state, for clearly it would be naive for anyone not to give great weight in understanding the present workings of the global hierarchy to the role of the American state. Nonetheless, the possible weakness of a state-centric emphasis becomes far more evident when one turns one's attention to the *Southern* state. In this context, there is considerable cause for scepticism about the potentially positive role of such a state as an active agent of national economic advance, a reality that has prompted so astute an observer as Leys to write, in his seminal overview of contemporary development theory, that, especially in the Third World, 'the era of national economies and national economic strategies is past'.²⁰

Of course, any such statement does bring us up, once again, against the fact of Third World diversity, from Asia through Latin America to Africa: it is no accident, perhaps, that Leys' major point of reference is Africa where he can list a series of measures that might, in theory, be adopted internationally to lift the weight of an inequitable global economy off the back of Africa and facilitate development while nonetheless concluding:

The problem with such ideas is that they have no attraction for those who currently own Africa's debt, buy Africa's exports or arrange official capital-

assistance flows. Such ideas could come to seem rational only in a world that was in the process of rejecting the currently predominant ideology of the market. While this world must come, it is not yet in place, and meantime the African tragedy will unfold.²¹

And yet, even if Africa presents a worst case scenario of marginalization and non-transformative exploitation under global capitalism, it remains true more generally that the strand of development theory once premised on the presumed viability of national capitalist strategies to realize an expansive form of development sounds, in the wake of the Asian crisis and the free-fall of much of Latin America, quite dated.²² As the late Bill Graf has specified, ‘the Third World state is diminished, and more subordinate than at any time since the colonial era. Its elites are more externalized, and its hold on national sovereignty more tenuous than ever.’²³

And what of more left variants of the developmental state? The disappearance of most Third World socialisms (the ‘recolonization’ of Mozambique, for example, so well described by David Plank²⁴), and the apparent ease with which Mandela and Mbeki’s South Africa and Lula’s Brazil have been drawn into global capitalism’s web, are not promising auguries here. Does this throw us back, necessarily, on a ‘global politics’ as the key to unlocking the future for the South? Not everyone would so argue: there is, for example, Bienefeld’s powerful claim for the continuing primacy within left practices of nation-state-centred politics. As he puts the point, it is because ‘of the total inability to conceive, let alone construct, a meaningful political process at the global level’ that the requisite ‘global management of the competitive process, or of a socialist economy, must be built on sub global units, namely our “generic nation states.”’²⁵ Once again, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that this is an argument easier to make for advanced capitalist countries than it is for those lodged more firmly on the lower rungs of the global hierarchy. Still, thinking along similar lines, Graf himself manages to conclude his negative survey of the nature of the actually existing ‘state in the Third World’ with the argument that, nonetheless, only the state (albeit an alternative, still largely ‘theoretical’, state, in his phrase),

... can offer a feasible *agency* capable of aggregating the multifarious counter-hegemonic forces in the peripheral state. Only state-economic power in the South has any prospects of standing up to, negotiating with or countering the pervasive economic power of international capital ... no doubt too, only the state, in combinations with other states, can forge collective emancipatory projects directed against the hegemonic powers.²⁶

Here he explicitly echoes Panitch whose seminal article argues not only (as we have seen) the continued saliency of the state as ‘constitutive element’ of global capitalism, but also emphasizes ‘the Left’s need to develop its own strategies for transforming the state, even as a means of developing an appropriate international strategy.’²⁷ It is a strong case, and all the more so when one

juxtaposes it to the rather nebulous and all too unmediated politics inherent in, say, Hardt and Negri's celebration of the 'multitude' as their nominated agent to impose a humane logic on capital. Writers like Bienefeld and Graf force us to think more clearly about what are the actual mechanisms, beyond the drama of the demonstration, that might be capable on a prolonged and sustainable basis, of bringing real, effective power to bear on global capital – and on the imperial (American) state. And yet Negri and Leys are not wrong either: there is also a realm of global capitalist dictate that, through the actions of the IFIs and the WTO and international agencies and of the rampaging money marketeers and mobile investors, cannot readily be tamed by any one Third World state, however progressive, and that is not quite reducible to the actions of western states either, however important those actions may often be. The fact is that 'Empire' (the world of capitalist globalization) and 'empire' (the world of western imperialism) coexist: they structure, in not entirely coterminous ways, both the circumstances that produce global inequality (that is, the target of progressive activity for change) and the modalities of advancing such activity (that is, the most promising ways of 'naming the enemy' and crafting the struggle against it). Avoiding misleading binaries in this regard, even as we seek in real and non-rhetorical ways to link both the global and the national (not to mention 'the local', to which we will return) as appropriate sites of struggle, is one central thing that contemporary 'development theory' must be about.

(3) *'Development' vs. 'anti-development'*

Development theory? Here we confront another language that has conventionally offered itself to those who would deal with such issues: the language of 'development' (as in the binary 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries, albeit often specified in terms of quite diverse notions of the relative importance of economic growth, the material betterment of people's lives, and more expansive definitions of possible human fulfillment). Since so much sound and fury has been thrown up on both the right and the left of the political spectrum around this term, and since so much confusion continues to reign with respect to it, it bears reflecting upon here.

Although not without historical antecedents, the 'development project' was a product of the immediate post-Second World War epoch. It sought to evoke an 'intellectual universe and ... moral community' shared by rich and poor countries alike, built around the 'conviction that the alleviation of poverty would not occur simply by self-regulating processes of economic growth or social change [but rather] required a concerted intervention by the national governments of both poor and wealthy countries in cooperation with an emerging body of international aid and development organizations.' Eminently modernist (and capitalist) in its presuppositions, this developmentalist agenda (often articulated as, precisely, 'modernization theory') for the 'emerging nations' was the Third World twin of the Keynesian agenda then ascendant in the advanced capitalist centres. The critics of this mainstream model were no less 'modernist' and developmentalist, of course, with the most articulate of them grouping under the banner of a

‘dependency theory’ which countered that it was actually the existing hierarchy of rich and poor countries that comprised the chief structural obstacle to realizing positive outcomes for the global poor. There were variants, too, within this latter camp, some more reformist, others more revolutionary and overtly socialist (along both populist and Marxist lines) in their orientation.²⁸ Still, as events would soon demonstrate, what linked together both modernization theory and dependency theory – the imperative of willed efforts to materially transform people’s lives and the wisdom of utilizing the state as one key instrument in facilitating such a transformation (whether along capitalist or socialist lines) – was almost as important as what divided them.

But these shared premises would come under sharp attack from both right and left, a simultaneous assault that has created the murky terrain upon which (post-, neo-, anti-) development theory now finds itself. From the right came the neo-liberal ‘counter-revolution’²⁹ – one still largely ascendant in establishment circles – and, it would seem, launched as much or more against the capitalist theorists of Keynesian/developmentalist provenance as against any theorists and practitioners further to the left. This ‘ultra-modernist’ project (as Cooper and Packard term it) was advanced in the name of the ever more extreme liberalization of markets and the attendant premise that, if only the state and the ‘developmentalists’ would get out of the way, optimum results would follow for all, everywhere. Meanwhile, from the 1970s on, falling prices for primary products and rising prices for oil combined with the United States’ new high interest rate regime to push many Third World countries ever deeper into debt and to make them ever more vulnerable to external dictate. With such political avatars as Thatcher and Reagan to trumpet it, the new orthodoxy of ‘freedom’ swept through the IFIs, producing the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ that became so much a part of the common-sense of capitalist globalization, especially in the Third World, in the late twentieth century. For ‘free’, however, read ‘free-market’, the latter also presented as being the essential underpinning for the kind of ‘democracy’ (best defined, however, as mere ‘polyarchy’ or ‘low-intensity democracy’) that such capitalist revolutionaries have also sometimes advocated. True, others have sought to wrest the discourse of ‘individual freedom’ away from the free-marketeters for more humane purposes (Amartya Sen, for example³⁰). For many on the left, however, it is the claims of the social collectivity (these claims being freed, to be sure, from the negative and undemocratic practices too often associated with them in the past) that seem most in need of reassertion.

The reinvigorated strength of global capital and the American state, as well as the neo-liberal ideology that has now come to epitomize their project, has also placed the developmentalist left on the defensive – as has the defeat/failure of socialist alternatives as economic strategies and as vehicles for democratic self-expression. In this context an attack on the pretensions of previously-existing development theory also sprang up on the left (broadly defined), often linked to the wider claims of ‘oppositional post-modernism’, anarchism and

environmentalism, and calling into questions the ‘modernist’, ‘westernizing’ and undemocratic premises of the former orthodoxy, right and left. This is the discursive world of ‘development stinks’, one that finds the development project to be an overwhelmingly modernist and Eurocentric project that also, in its emphasis on growth and participation in a wider global sphere, primarily serves Western economic interests.³¹ In so arguing, many development-sceptics also underscore the extent to which the claims of women, the racially oppressed and the bearers of diverse cultures have been lost in the lofty abstractions of developmentalism,³² and the integrity and positive potential of many local initiatives steamrolled in the name of grand theory and the disempowering centralization of many so-called ‘counter-hegemonic’ struggles. Meanwhile, others stress the degree to which the language of development, with its productionist biases and its alleged Enlightenment arrogance, has blurred environmental concerns that are of crucial importance to the survival of the human race as a whole.

But even granted the need for such a sensibility – in order to beat back the high-handedness of often-Western-serving development agencies and NGOs, for example, and to ground our understanding of resistance to the inequities of global capitalism more effectively in the demands of diverse localities, cultures and identities – this need not dictate the abandonment of any vision of ‘development’. Sutcliffe, for example, has argued convincingly of the need to bring environmental concerns together with a keen sensitivity to the facts of inequality on a global scale: ‘The conflict between the poor of today and the unborn exists to the extent that a real reduction in the negative environmental impact of the rich of today is not contemplated Thus, human development is in danger of being unsustainable unless there is redistribution; and sustainable development is in danger of being anti-human unless it is accompanied by redistribution.’³³ But this perspective has also carried Sutcliffe further, towards the strongest possible argument for the sustaining of an unapologetic (if circumspect) left-developmental-ism. As he phrases it,

The criticism of the standard development model seems at times too total. Because the old destination, which in the West we experience every day, seems so unsatisfactory, all aspects of it are often rejected as a whole. Along with consumerism out goes science, technology, urbanization, modern medicine and so on. And in sometimes comes a nostalgic, conservative postdevelopmentalism. In all projects, there is a danger of losing the baby when we throw out the old bath water. In this case the baby is the material, economic, productive basis of whatever satisfactory utopia can be, to echo Vincent Tucker’s suggestive words, imagined and democratically negotiated among the inhabitants of earth One way of rephrasing all these concerns would be to say that development and globalization are experienced in practice in conditions of profound inequality of wealth and power between nations (imperialism) as well as between classes and sexes (capitalist class exploitation and patriarchy). It is necessary to distinguish

which of the rejected aspects of development and globalization are inherent in these concepts and which come about because of the unequal circumstances in which we experience them. If we reject them completely because of the form in which they arrive we will always be struggling against the wrong enemy.³⁴

This is a position echoed, in my experience, by a great many Southern social justice activists themselves, and also by such theorists as Cooper and Packard who, in speaking positively of ‘the marvellous ambiguity of the word development’ suggest that ‘what at one level seemed like a discourse of control is at another a discourse of entitlement, a way of capturing the imagination of a cross-national public around demands for decency and equity.’³⁵ Similarly Frans Schuurman, who professes himself to be ‘not particularly sensitive to criticisms raised against the concept of emancipation because it happens to be a so-called Enlightenment notion discredited by postmodernism’, argues further that ‘a universal, yet context sensitive notion of justice is still far more attractive to reclaiming a normative and political progressive domain for development studies than any postmodernist-inspired attempt in that direction’:

The very essence of development studies is a normative preoccupation with the poor, marginalized and exploited people in the South. In this sense *inequality* rather than *diversity* or *difference* should be the main focus of development studies: inequality of access to power, to resources, to a human existence – in short, inequality of emancipation. There is no doubt that there is a diversity in forms, experiences and strategies for coping with inequality which deserves to be an integral part of the domain of development studies. There is also no doubt that globalization will contribute new forms of inequality and new forms of resistance. Nonetheless, it is inequality as such which should constitute the main focus within the explanation of development studies.³⁶

We need only complement such insights with Leys’ more explicitly anti-capitalist injunctions – articulated in concluding his own impressive overview of the current state of theorizing about development, cited above – in order to regroup a revolutionary left-developmentalism of great promise. As he argues, we must ‘revive development theory, not as a branch of policy-oriented social science within the parameters of an unquestioned capitalist world order, but as a field of inquiry about the contemporary dynamics of that order itself, with imperative policy implications for the survival of civilized and decent life and not just in the ex-colonial countries.’ Moreover, he continues, ‘if, as I fear, it seems that not much scope for change exists – especially for small, severely underdeveloped countries – without a radical subordination of capital to democratic control, development theory will ... have to be about this, and agents capable of undertaking it.’³⁷

II. RESOLUTIONS

(1) The limited variants of 'reform'

'A radical subordination to democratic control': this might be taken to represent a call to socialist revolution, a theme to which we will return in our concluding section. First, however, we must note that it has become apparent even to many of those who look favourably upon capitalism as an acceptable and defensible global system that, in its neo-liberal articulation, it doesn't work quite as well as might have been hoped, especially for the poorest of the poor. The terrain of proposed global 'reform' of this system has been trenchantly mapped by Patrick Bond in many of his numerous publications.³⁸ I will merely note here, by way of summarizing the topic, three rather differing 'reformist' responses from groups that have particular global resonance. The first group focuses on the social distemper (Arrighi's 'systematic chaos') that this failed system has produced on the 'periphery' – the fundamentalisms and xenophobias, the internal chaos and occasionally unpredictable dictators, that haunt such countries – and casts the resultant problem principally in terms of 'security concerns' (and especially the security concerns of the American state). Of course, the proponents of such a perspective do not view see this as representing the failure of global capitalism. For the practitioners of this neo-conservative security doctrine (as exemplified by the current Bush team) are in fact devotees of the virtues of capitalism, their own ties to the oil, military and construction sectors of capital being well-known.

Moreover, when their house-intellectuals conceptualize empire in the language of security they also invariably make a heartfelt, in largely unexamined, bow to the virtues of 'globalization' – with the global capitalist economy, as a kind of residual category, assumed to be churning away benevolently under everything else, its bounty to be fully realized once the various irrationalities of Third World politics are cleared away. For them, it is the peoples of the South who have failed capitalism, not the other way around. Sometimes this understanding is cast in quasi-racist terms, the celebrated work of Robert Kaplan being a case in point.³⁹ But whatever the rationale, the need to take action to impose order is the bottom-line, and the projection of this task can sometimes attain breath-taking proportions. Thus, for American security advisor Thomas Barnett, 'disconnectedness [from globalization] defines danger': 'Saddam Hussein's outlaw regime', he continues, 'is dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence.' It lies, in short, in 'the Non-Integrating Gap', in those vast stretches of the world outside 'the Core' which are simply 'not functioning'⁴⁰ – and that is why war against it 'is not only necessary and inevitable, but good.' More generally, Barnett continues,

a simple security rule set emerges: a country's potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity ... [I]t is always possible to fall off this bandwagon called globalization. And when you do, bloodshed will follow. If you are lucky so will American troops.

Note, however, that it would be unwise to see the assertive actions taken by such proconsuls and ideologues of ‘empire’ as being merely some direct emanation of the logic of capital. *Raison d’état* and moral/religious self-righteousness are important ingredients here in and of themselves and help determine that the kind of globalization they advocate – the brute neo-liberalism (paradox intended) of Bush and his cronies – comes most readily out of the barrel of a gun.

A second group of ‘reformers’, perhaps best described as being, at least in the first instance, denizens of the world of ‘Empire’ rather than of ‘empire’ (although, needless to say, they are also strongly inflected in their policies by pressures from the American state and the interests behind it), are more polite and less inclined to favour the overt use of force. True, in practice they have been equally concerned to bat down, when necessary, the tendency of even the least corrupt of Third World states to intrude their unacceptable, ‘rent-seeking’ ways into the market-place. But for them – and for the sectors of capital, in the financial, technology and industrial spheres, that are least comfortable with the hard-ball politics of empire – discipline in the interests of capital can be expected to flow primarily from the ‘invisible hand’ of the market-place (a pretty effective system of power in its own right, of course). Much has been made of the shift of the IFIs, albeit more the World Bank than the IMF or the WTO, away from the baldest forms of free-market messianism. And one can indeed track the increased saliency of such non-economistic additions to the Bank’s preferred discourse as ‘poverty alleviation’, ‘local empowerment’, ‘social capital’,⁴¹ and ‘good governance’ (the latter, for example, seeking to recite the virtues of an more effectively ‘enabling state’ as necessary to the facilitating of capitalist activity⁴²). This battery of footnotes to neo-liberalism, the palest of reforms of the current system, is seductive to some, notably within the world of the NGOs, both Southern and Northern. But, in the end, such footnotes do little to qualify the extent to which the IFIs’ still-in-place ‘Washington consensus’ continues to see development for Third World countries as calling above all for debt repayment, the embrace of their ‘comparative advantage’ as suppliers of primary products and a limited range of industrial output, and the rendering of themselves as open and attractive as possible to foreign investment.

Just how much should we make of this distinction between Bush and the Bank, in any case? For neither possesses a vision designed to produce a capitalism any less parasitic, any more positively transformative, of the material lot of the vast majority of people of the South. From within the camp of ‘Empire’ there is, however, a third group, one which advances a more sweeping vision of possible reform – albeit a vision that, like the much more saccharine offerings of the World Bank, is primarily cast in economic rather than security terms. Not that members of this group are indifferent to the various political ‘irrationalities’ that now stalk the world of failed capitalism or even perhaps to the deepening plight of the global poor. But they are more preoccupied with contradictions felt to be internal to the capitalist accumulation process that the ascendant Washington consensus (whether dressed out in military mufti or in business suits)

now threatens, they fear, merely to exacerbate. For they wonder aloud whether policies flowing from this consensus can really hope to maximize the system's drive to realize itself as a transformative (and, in the long term, ever more profitable) engine of expanded reproduction. As Robert Biel has argued from the left, the problem centres on the tension between short-term profit and 'the long-term conditions (economic – the reproduction of labour – and socio-economic) for future exploitation.' Thus, from the late 1970s on, protagonists of neo-liberalism developed as a Southern strategy the use of 'the "debt" as a lever to break resistance there to the demands of the new accumulation system. But this leaves a big question: [Structural Adjustment Programmes] may have been good at destroying the old, but this does not mean they could provide a basis for a stable self-reproducing set-up even within the confines of the current accumulation regime.'⁴³ For it is the virtual impossibility of the present system – now driven as much or more by the speculative activity of holders of financial capital than by the pursuit of 'productive investment' – to act 'rationally' at the aggregate level that is crucial here.

Our third group expresses, but from within the world of capital, similar concerns regarding the current state of affairs. Master global currency manipulator George Soros provides an example here,⁴⁴ and Paul Krugman has also warned against the current salience of a 'depression economics' wherein, precisely, the possible means to plan, world-wide, the kinds of judicious interventions in financial markets and other spheres that might facilitate expanded reproduction have been dismissed on narrowly ideological (read: neo-liberal) grounds.⁴⁵ Moreover, such warning voices can also be heard from time to time within the IFIs themselves with respect to the dim prospects for the poorest of economies under the pressure of purely market-driven calculations: the views of Joseph Stiglitz,⁴⁶ Ravi Kanbur and Dani Rodrik have been significant in this respect (although we should also note just how quickly such figures are sidelined once the scarlet letter of Dissenter has been hung on them). However, even assuming for the moment the abstract potential of the model of disciplined capitalism that seems to drive such thinker/practitioners, what is the likelihood of their calls for latter-day quasi-Keynesianism being heeded, either nationally in the Third World or more globally? Not much, one suspects. For, on a global scale, the prospects are not strong for development of the political mechanism that could impose the (theoretically) expansive logic of capital on the largely destructive (from the point of view of the global poor) activities of multiple capitalists in real-life competition. Indeed, for the foreseeable future, the realization of any very meaningful form of 'global Keynesianism' must seem an even more utopian prospect than the realization of the least ambitious of socialist aspirations: actually existing global capitalism remains, as Przeworski once famously put it, profoundly 'irrational'.⁴⁷

There are, of course, Third World elites who also play on the edges of these intra-establishment divisions, arguing 'the Southern case' for a degree of debt forgiveness, calling on the North to live up to its own pronounced principles of

'free trade' (the latter's tariff walls often structured, ironically, to make the entry of Third World goods more, rather than less, difficult) and making the unlikely case for economic transformation based on more foreign direct investment. The response has been meagre to even the mildest of Third World-sponsored reform efforts by the powers-that-be in the global economy: the Doha Summit of the WTO in 2001 and the 2003 summit of the G-8 in Evian, France, are cases in point. So, too, are such items as the token Northern support for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), the unbending pressure on Southern countries (in the sphere of 'intellectual property rights', for example) to yield to intrusive WTO dictate, and the intense and continuing IMF directives against any form of control of exchange rates or capital movements. And yet, despite this record, initiatives like the capitalist-friendly New African Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), enthusiastically pushed by African leaders such as Thabo Mbeki (over the objections of many of their counterparts within 'civil society', be it noted), continue to be offered up.⁴⁸

It is true that, as in the case of NEPAD, such assertions seem most often a ruse, their mild progressivism masking the deep incorporation of these elites (and their own class interests) within the 'inner circle' of Hoogvelt's social hierarchy rather than representing any real attempt on their part to meet the needs of the masses of the population of the disadvantaged countries for whom they profess to speak. Nonetheless, many development theorists and many development agencies have aligned themselves hopefully with such initiatives and such elites (the recent move to the right of OXFAM-International providing a case in point). They do so, they sometimes say, in a spirit of *realism*: in order to facilitate cutting a better deal for the global South within what has become the only game in town. A grim and unpromising choice to feel compelled to make, if so.

(2) *The challenges of 'revolution'*

In sum, there is little evidence that the global capitalist system can or will be reformed in such a way as to deflect the spread of global inequality or permit any meaningful development for the vast mass of the world's population: instead, it seems destined to produce profits for the few alongside grinding poverty for the many for some time to come. Nor is there anything inevitable about the overthrow of such a system. Indeed, as the morbid symptoms of its unchecked power multiply (manifested in the South, for example, in fundamentalisms and xenophobicias of almost every variety) it is tempting analytically to see capitalism and barbarism as more likely outcomes, across the globe and in the foreseeable future, than socialism and development. Nonetheless, it is the task of the left to make such an understanding of the sorry pass to which the world has come on capitalism's watch as much a staple of the common-sense of people's thinking as possible. And we must also ask ourselves, finally, just what are the countervailing tendencies that might yet be expected to keep the struggle to transform the existing system of virulent capitalism on the agenda in the current period.

Perhaps some general direction can be drawn from the writings of Robert Biel, whose point of entry on these matters is close to my own⁴⁹ and is premised

on understanding the present global system as one that has sought to establish in the ‘Third World’ the ever more unmediated rule of global capital and the solitary imperative of capital accumulation. This is a system, he argues, in which policy has been downgraded merely to ‘a question of “adapting” a country in the South to fit into the system by creating local conditions (for example, reducing interference from local bureaucrats) so that capital could find its way without hindrance to the most promising sectors.’⁵⁰ At the same time, however, Biel suggests that this new system is also one that has created a fundamental problem for ‘the North’ and, since it has placed the legitimacy of the Third World state under such pressure, this is true not merely in economic terms: ‘The “national economy” is one of capitalism’s best inventions because it provides a good basis for social control’, he writes, and ‘the new form of direct rule which I am calling “post-neo-colonial” [is therefore] very risky.’ As he then elaborates the point,

The new vision may appear plausible to elites, since it presents the North and South as united within a single free-market economic model (in contrast to the division between Keynesianism for the North and development economics for the South which was characteristic of the post-war regime). But in reality the free market is an expression of profoundly unequal power relations, and the practical consequences of this are all too obvious to the masses: to give only one example, it leads to a virtual monopoly by the North of mass consumption.⁵¹

‘All too obvious to the masses’: would that things were so simple. But they are not completely hidden from them either, as the level of emergent world-wide contestation of the claims of global capitalism begins to suggest.

There are clues regarding the possible nature of such contestation in previous sections of this essay, and other pertinent literature has also been cited.⁵² As noted earlier, I will therefore limit myself here merely to suggesting some of the most pressing considerations regarding site, agency and imaginary that could help further define and advance effective radical resistance to global capitalist rule. As regards the most appropriate *site* (global, national, local) of struggle, for example, we have discussed some of the seemingly unavoidable tensions that arise between global and national scales in this respect, especially as regards Third World countries. In the current epoch, the emphasis is often put somewhat differently, however. Thus the liberal-left slogan ‘Think globally, act locally’ has proven to have considerable appeal for those who seek to challenge the global system more fundamentally. For it is struggles cast in local terms against the most proximate depredations – against the grossest of exploitation and raping of the environment, from the demands of the Zapatistas to the resistance to Shell Oil by the Ogoni people of the Niger delta – of global firms, imperial states and their local intermediaries that have captured much of the radical imagination in recent years.⁵³

Such activities – ‘militant particularisms’, in David Harvey’s evocative phrase – are then argued to be the building blocks of the most effective of global assertions. Yet even if this is the case, it is also true that some brands of emphasis on

the virtues of the local can be advanced quite negatively by the World Bank and its ilk as part of their highly suspect anti-state agenda. And a localist preoccupation can sometimes serve the most extreme versions of left anti-developmentalism as well, casting excessive suspicion on more large-scale, potentially hegemonic forms of anti-capitalist endeavour. Once again, the allure of false binaries must be avoided, just as they must be in thinking through the best ways of linking local assertions and national projects. On this latter issue, for example, South Africa's leading social movement activist, Trevor Ngwane, could almost be quoting the arguments of Bienefeld, Graf and Panitch as cited above when he asserts, on the basis of his own experience, that

... the issue of political power remains crucial. Some people attack the idea of targeting state power – the argument that globalization undermines the role of the nation state gets translated into an excuse for avoiding the fight with your own national bourgeoisie. But we in South Africa can't not confront the ANC and Mbeki. American activists can't not confront Bush. The COSATU leadership, the SACP, are happy to fight imperialism everywhere except here at home. Its been good to demonstrate against world summit meetings in Seattle, Genoa, even Doha, but there are problems with following the global elite around – it's not something poor people can afford to do The point is, we have to build where we are.⁵⁴

And, beyond the nation-state itself, there are also sub-global arenas of potentially progressive action, focusing resistances that manifest themselves at regional level (the African Social Forum, for example, and a range of parallel organizations in Asia) and even on a pan-Southern basis.

As regards the question of *agency*, those who most dramatize the purely globalizing nature of the current capitalist moment are also inclined to focus most exclusively on the sheer diversity of resistances, Castells in a wildly eclectic and unfocused way and Hardt and Negri in terms of an almost poetic invocation of the awakening strength of 'the multitude'. Others approach such issues more soberly, while similarly emphasizing the broad front across which diverse identities (in terms of race, gender, ethno-nationalism and religion) and localities are both negatively affected by, while also capable of acting to confront, the realities of global inequality as they impinge upon them in the forms of exploitation, exclusion and the rampant commodification of basic necessities. This humbling diversity of situation is said to find most effective expression in a rich diversity of 'social movements', with the latter in turn capable of comprising what Naomi Klein has termed 'a movement of movements', the (loosely) collective actor that surfaces in Porto Alegre and Seattle and also feeds more focused and cumulative global claims around issues of water, health, indebtedness and the like.⁵⁵ Certainly there is something to this, and, as I have pointed out elsewhere, Marxists and socialists would do well to heed the voices of diversity and of local definition of needs, possible modes of action and cultural integrity more effectively than they often have.⁵⁶

At the same time, the celebration of diversity and spontaneity (the revolt against oppression but also against the undemocratic modes of political practice that is too much the legacy of the left, not least in the case of various ‘Third World socialisms’⁵⁷) must not blind us to the need for an increasing measure of effective organization and clarity of ideological thrust in confronting so powerful a system – especially since, at every site, locally, nationally and globally, that system can rely, when necessary, on powerful states to reinforce the irrationalities of the market-place. Thus, as Leys has argued in emphasizing the necessary emergence, *qua* agent, of ‘unified’ and hegemonic projects:

Looked at in one way it will necessarily be a multiplicity of projects, in different sectors, nations and regions, [representing] the aspirations of different groups, movements and peoples. Yet unless these unite to confront the political and economic power of the transnationals and the states that back them, they will ultimately fail As a minimum it will require nation-wide movements and/or parties capable of exercising state power, and making it felt in supra-national institutions.⁵⁸

Nor should diversity obscure the crucial importance of a class-based comprehension of agency, actual and potential,⁵⁹ including the key role that Southern workers and their trade unions have continued to play in keeping anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist themes firmly in the mix of global resistance.⁶⁰ At the same time, we should also avoid the temptation to abuse Marxist categories by glibly incorporating the vast numbers of the unemployed and marginalized that populate the South into the category of ‘reserve army of labour’ in order to save the hypotheses of ‘proletarian revolution’ and of the emergent movement’s necessarily socialist vocation. As noted, such populations resist in terms of a wide variety of identities and grievances (even if they are also subject, in their desperation and in the absence of more progressive alternatives, to mobilization by the most self-defeating of fundamentalist and xenophobic ideologies). Nonetheless, some bridge to militant class awareness for the majority of Southerners might be found in the kind of expansive definition of class advocated some years ago by Post and Wright:

The working out of capitalism in parts of the periphery prepares not only the minority working class but peasants and other working people, women, youth and minorities for a socialist solution, even though the political manifestation of this may not initially take the form of a socialist movement. In the case of those who are *not* wage labourers (the classical class associated with that new order) capitalism has still so permeated the social relations which determine their existences, even though it may not have followed the western European pattern of ‘freeing’ their labour power, that to be liberated from it is their only salvation The objective need for socialism of these elements can be no less than that of the worker imprisoned in the factory and disciplined by the whip of unemployment. These prices are paid in even the most ‘successful’ of the

underdeveloped countries, and others additionally experience mass destitution. Finding another path has... become a desperate necessity if the alternative of continuing, if not increasing barbarism is to be escaped.⁶¹

Note, however, that even the kind of 'class consciousness' implied in this paragraph is something that must be won politically, not merely assumed.

And what, finally, of 'imaginary' and the terms in which on-going struggle can best be conceived and advocated? An emphasis on the range of 'disparate forces' and 'multiple particularisms' from which more cumulative struggles of radical provenance must be built has placed the issue of 'democracy' firmly on the agenda of the contemporary left. Often the contrast with the past practices of ostensibly working-class-based parties and national revolutionary movements is self-consciously underscored in doing so. Moreover, the democratic imaginary will be especially attractive to those who must confront, as is so often the case in the Third World, the immediate reality of authoritarian state oppression (not to mention the lack of transparency of most of the global institutions whose decisions have such a pronounced impact on people's fates). This, then, is certainly a language of potential empowerment well worth clawing back from those, especially in the North, who manipulate it so unscrupulously. At the same time, any temptation on the left to develop its project of resistance to oppression exclusively in terms of it – à la Laclau's notion of 'radical democracy' – should be resisted, I think.⁶² For, as important as such an emphasis is, and as responsive to diversity as any emergent movement for radical change must be, a project cast in terms solely of democratic claims (however 'radical') is risky: it courts unfocused eclecticism and a blurring of the target of capitalism, of global exploitation and commodification and of imperialist military and cultural assault that we know to be so central to global inequality and underdevelopment. Beyond democracy, 'naming the enemy', at minimum, in firmly anti-capitalist terms provides an imaginary that is accurate and is, in any case, both implicit and explicit in much Southern practice. It also has the potential of driving an ever greater growth and consolidation of movements fighting commodification, fighting exploitation, fighting exclusion and operating at various sites and scales: 'For all but a handful, capitalism has failed. For the rest of us, anti-capitalism remains our only hope.'⁶³

But what, one might ask, can this mean more positively, in terms of both vision and promise? Some have argued effectively the need to complement 'anti-capitalism' with a militant demand for 'social justice', for example.⁶⁴ And there is also, I would suggest in conclusion, a continuing claim to be made on behalf of the socialist imaginary – both as a plausible point of reference for struggles against capitalist globalization and imperialism and as a feasible liberatory practice for advancing Southern claims against inequality and for genuine development. To be sure, the saliency of this once potent project has been downgraded in the eyes of many because of the internal weaknesses it has revealed and the defeats and/or failures it has suffered in recent decades. Yet it will prove neither possible nor wise for radicals in the South (or indeed anywhere else) to

refuse, as diagnosis of current problems and guide to future practice, the promise of what Greg Albo has termed ‘realistic socialism’ – a project which, in his discussion of the current parameters and likely prospects of global political economy, he has effectively contrasted to the claims of what he calls ‘utopian capitalism’.⁶⁵ True, any such programme of ‘realistic socialism’ will not be realized quickly, in the form, say, of some kind of revolutionary ‘big bang’, as too often advocated rhetorically and abstractly on the left.⁶⁶ It will also have to be specified – globally, nationally, locally – not in terms of some pre-existing blueprint but by such social forces as mobilize themselves to place more progressive demands on the agenda. And, of course, it will not happen until even more people than at present, both in the South and in the North, embrace the fact that the existing market-dominated global order – driven by ‘a minority class that draws its wealth and power from a historically specific form of production’ – is (in Albo’s words) ‘contingent, imbalanced, exploitative and replaceable.’ Nonetheless, Albo’s broader premise – that positive outcomes ‘can only be realized through re-embedding financial capital and production relations in democratically organized national and local economic spaces sustained through international solidarity and fora of democratic co-operation’⁶⁷ – seems a necessary starting-point.

NOTES

- 1 Although never quite given the prominence it deserves in most standard history books, this process has, nonetheless, been dissected effectively by a number of prominent western historians who provide their books with various suitably ironic titles: see Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982; V.G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind: Yellow Man, Black Man and White Man in the Age of Empire*, Boston: Little Brown, 1969; Sven Lindqvist, *Exterminate all the Brutes*, New York: The New Press, 1998; Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building*, New York: New American Library, 1980. Of course, this has also been done by ‘Third World’ scholars themselves (who tend to have a similar gift for to-the-point titling): Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us*, New York: Vintage Books, 1975; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1972; Eduardo Galeano, *The Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973; and Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978; there is also, more recently, Sophie Bessis, *Western Supremacy: Triumph of an Idea?*, London: Zed Books, 2003. Unfortunately, such history now stands in increased danger of being whitewashed and recycled for purposes of rationalizing the United States’ own current bid for imperial legitimacy, one particularly worrying example of this trend being Niall Ferguson’s *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the*

- Lessons for Global Power*, London: Allen Lane, 2002, itself linked to a successful television series.
- 2 Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002, p. 5.
 - 3 From the WTO's 1999 report, *Trade, Income Policy and Poverty*, as quoted in David McNally, *Another World Is Possible: Globalization and Anti-capitalism*, Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2002, p. 92.
 - 4 'Three men own more than 48 countries', *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), September 23, 1998, reporting on the annual Human Development Report of the United Nations; as that UN document continues: 'It is estimated that the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic education for all, basic health care for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for and safe water and sanitation for all is roughly \$40-billion a year. This is less than 4% of the combined wealth of the 225 richest people'.
 - 5 See, for overviews, the 'Afterword' (entitled 'Sustaining global apartheid' to Patrick Bond, *Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance*, Second Edition, London: Zed Press, 2003, Peter Waterman, 'The Global Justice and Solidarity Movement' (draft manuscript: forthcoming) and, for a range of diverse examples of concrete struggles, both McNally, *Another World* and Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, Second Edition, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2000, esp. ch. 7, 'The Globalization Project and its Counter-Movements'. See also Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
 - 6 Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, Second Edition, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. xiv.
 - 7 Beverley J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, 'Workers North and South', in *Socialist Register 2001*, London: Merlin Press, 2000, pp. 56-7.
 - 8 Giovanni Arrighi, 'World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism', *New Left Review*, 189, 1991.
 - 9 Giovanni Arrighi, Beverley J. Silver and Benjamin D. Brewer, 'Industrial Convergence, Globalization and the Persistence of the North-South Divide', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38(1), 2003; the same issue of this journal includes an exchange between Alice Amsden and the authors which serves, I think, to reinforce the latter's case.
 - 10 Arrighi, 'World Income Inequalities', p. 65.
 - 11 Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 'Industrial Convergence', p. 26; a similar chasm, albeit one defined over a much longer period of time, separates Arrighi's prognosis for Africa in the 1960s, when, with the present author, he asserted that 'socialist construction is a necessary means to the end of development in Africa' (in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973) to the much more limited possibilities for change he now envisages for the continent in his

- 'The African Crisis', *New Left Review*, 15, 2002.
- 12 See, importantly, Brian S. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, ch. 1, 'The Idea of the "Third World"'; John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, Second Edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, ch. 1, 'Is the Third World Still There?'; and Fred Cooper and Randall Packer, eds., *International Development and the Social Scientists*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997, 'Introduction'.
 - 13 Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, in three volumes, Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, 1997, 1998.
 - 14 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
 - 15 Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
 - 16 Gary Teeple, *Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform*, Aurora: Garamond Press, 2000.
 - 17 James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century*, Halifax: Fernwood Books, 2001.
 - 18 Leo Panitch, 'Globalisation and the State', *Socialist Register 1994*, London: Merlin Press, 1994, p. 63, and many of his subsequent writings.
 - 19 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, London: Polity Press, 1996, p. 189.
 - 20 Colin Leys, *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*, London: James Currey, 1996, p. 23.
 - 21 Colin Leys, 'Africa's Tragedy', *New Left Review*, 204, 1994, p. 46.
 - 22 The most symptomatic works in this vein have been written by Peter Evans, as, for example, his *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, and numerous articles.
 - 23 William Graf, 'The State in the Third World', *Socialist Register 1995*, London: Merlin Press, 1995, p. 159.
 - 24 David Plank, 'Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(3), 1993.
 - 25 Manfred Bienefeld, 'Nation State in the Dog Days of the Twentieth Century', *Socialist Register 1994*, London: Merlin Press, 1994, pp. 122-3.
 - 26 Graf, 'The State in the Third World', p. 159.
 - 27 Panitch, 'Globalisation and the State', p. 63.
 - 28 There were also other Marxist theorists of 'underdevelopment', of course, some of whom chose to see – along classical lines – an unfolding process of global capitalist development that was necessary to produce genuine proletarian-based struggles in the longer run (Bill Warren's 'Chicago Marxism', as Fred Bienefeld once termed it, being a central point of reference here).
 - 29 This 'counter-revolution' (to both 'Keynesianism' and orthodox 'structuralist developmentalism') has been well described in John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development*, where he skilfully evokes the roles played by the likes of Harry Johnson, Peter Bauer, Deepak Lal, Ian Little and Bela Belassa.

- 30 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, New York: Anchor Books, 1999.
- 31 See, *inter alia*, Jonathan Crush, ed., *Power of Development*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, esp. ch. 11 by Arturo Escobar, entitled 'Imagining a Post-Development Era'.
- 32 For a strong statement of the weakness of much development theory in terms of gender see Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995; see also Chandra Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses' in C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991 and much subsequent literature.
- 33 Bob Sutcliffe, 'Development after Ecology', in V. Bhaskar and A. Glyn, eds., *The North, the South and the Environment: Ecological Constraints and the Global Economy*, London: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- 34 Bob Sutcliffe, 'The Place of Development in Theories of Imperialism and Globalization', in Ronaldo Munck and Denis O'Hearn, eds., *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm*, London and New York: Zed, 1999, pp. 150-2.
- 35 Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, p. 4.
- 36 Frans J. Schuurman, 'Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Regained? Development Studies in the Twenty-First Century', *Third World Quarterly*, 21(1), 2000, p. 14. See also Gillian Hart, 'Development Critiques in the 1990s: *Culs de Sac* and Promising Paths', *Progress in Human Geography* 25(4), 2001.
- 37 Leys, *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*, p. 43.
- 38 See, *inter alia*, Patrick Bond, *Against Global Apartheid* and Walden Bello, *Deglobalization*, London: Zed Books, 2002.
- 39 Originating in his article, 'The Coming Anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994 and spun out as several subsequent books.
- 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett, 'The Pentagon's New Map: It Explains Why We're Going to War, and Why We'll Keep Going to War', *Esquire*, March, 2003. But this popular article is merely the most public face of this industrious Naval War College-based Doctor Strangelove whose career as consultant to policy-makers can be traced at his web-site: <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrules/ThePentagonsNewMap.htm>.
- 41 Ben Fine, 'The Development State Is Dead: Long Live Social Capital?' *Development and Change*, 30, 1999.
- 42 See Gerald Schmitz, 'Democratization and Demystification: Deconstructing "Governance" as Development Discourse', in D.B. Moore and G. Schmitz, eds., *Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995 and David Moore, "'Sail on, O Ship of State": Neo-Liberalism, Globalisation and the Governance of Africa', *The Journal Of Peasant Studies*, 27(1), 1999. The often authoritarian and corrupt Third World state is, of course, a problem; it is just not the kind of problem that the IFIs prefer to see it is as being.

- 43 Robert Biel, *The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradiction in North/South Relations*, London: Zed, 2000, esp. ch. 11, 'Permanent Subordination? Structural Adjustment as Control', pp. 231-2.
- 44 George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*, New York: Public Affairs, 1998 and 'The Capitalist Threat', *The Atlantic Monthly*, 279, 1997, p. 48, where he argues the existence of a 'capitalist threat' that is causing 'intolerable inequalities and instability'. Indeed, he writes that 'unless [the doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism] is tempered by the recognition of a common interest that ought to take precedence over particular interests, our present system... is liable to breakdown'.
- 45 Paul Krugman, *The Return of Depression Economics*, New York: Norton, 1999.
- 46 See Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, and for an even more advanced statement as to the need to 'start from scratch' in rebuilding more democratic and effective global financial institutions, see the report of Stiglitz's views in *Financial Times*, August 21, 2002.
- 47 Of course Przeworski (in his *Capitalism and the Market*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 122) goes further, adding to his claim that 'capitalism is irrational' the disempowering reflection that 'socialism is unfeasible, in the real world people starve... the conclusions we have reached are not encouraging ones'!
- 48 For a searching critique of NEPAD, and of the role of the new South African political elite in promoting it, see Patrick Bond, ed., *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, Trenton and Cape Town: Africa World Press and AIDC, 2002.
- 49 Biel, *The New Imperialism*; I have also drawn on these arguments by Biel in developing a more detailed analysis of the possible revolutionary prospect for Africa in my article 'Africa: The Next Liberation Struggle', *Review of African Political Economy*, 96, 2003.
- 50 Ibid., pp. 232-3.
- 51 Ibid., pp. 242-3.
- 52 See, *inter alia*, the titles listed under footnote 5, above.
- 53 For an example of where an extreme emphasis on the appropriateness of a local focus can lead the development theorist, see the 'Conclusion' to Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Post-Colonial World*; but contrast Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke on the weakness (and possible cooptability) of such a tendency in their 'Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism', *Third World Quarterly*, 21(2), 2000.
- 54 Trevor Ngwane, 'Sparks in the Township', *New Left Review*, 22, 2003.
- 55 See Naomi Klein, *Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate*, Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2002.
- 56 John S. Saul, 'Identifying Class, Classifying Difference', *Socialist Register 2003*, London: Merlin Press, 2002.
- 57 Cf. John S. Saul, 'What is to be Learned? The Failure of African Socialisms and their Future', in Robert Albritton, John Bell, Shannon Bell and Richard

- Westra, eds., *Beyond Market and Plan: Toward New Socialisms* (forthcoming).
- 58 Colin Leys, 'Colin Leys Replies' [a reply to Jonathan Barker, 'Debating Globalization: Critique of Colin Leys'], *Southern African Report*, 12(4), 1997. I have explored at greater length some of the issues raised in this section of the present essay in my 'Africa: The Next Liberation Struggle'.
- 59 Cf. Neil Smith, 'What Happened to Class?', *Environment and Planning A*, 32, 2000.
- 60 See Ronald Munck, *Globalization and Labour: The New 'Great Transformation'*, London: Zed Books, 2002; Beverley Silver, *Forces of Labour: Workers' Movements and Globalization*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; and the various essays in *Socialist Register 2001: Working Classes, Global Realities*, London: Merlin Press, 2000.
- 61 Ken Post and P. Wright, *Socialism and Underdevelopment*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 151-2.
- 62 I have elaborated this point in my 'Identifying Class, Classifying Difference'.
- 63 J.C. Myers, 'What is Anti-Capitalism?' in Joel Schalit, ed., *The Anti-Capitalism Reader*, New York: Akashic Books, 2002, p. 34. On 'anti-capitalism' see also McNally, *Another World*; working along related lines, Amory Starr, in her *Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization*, London: Zed Books, 2000 emphasizes an 'anti-corporate' problematic as particularly appropriate for deepening the terms of popular struggle and coordinating radical activities.
- 64 Cf. Sam Gindin, 'Social Justice and Globalization: Are they Compatible?', *Monthly Review*, 54(2), 2002.
- 65 Greg Albo, 'A World Market of Opportunities? Capitalist Obstacles and Left Economic Policies', *Socialist Register 1997*, London: Merlin Press, 1997, pp. 28-30 and 41.
- 66 Drawing on the work of André Gorz and Boris Kagarlitzky on 'structural reform' I have sought to chart a possible course between 'mere reformism' and jejune 'revolutionism' in my *Recolonization and Resistance: Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993, chs. 4 and 5.
- 67 Albo, 'A World Market of Opportunities', p. 30; Albo himself suggests, for starters, the need for 'more inward-oriented economic strategies' and the devaluation of 'scale of production as the central economic objective' (p. 28).