

REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS: TEN YEARS AFTER 1968

Tariq Ali

Describing the last tortured decade of Trotsky's life, his biographer Isaac Deutscher (paraphrasing Marx) wrote: "This was a time when. . . 'the idea pressed towards reality', but as reality did not tend towards the idea, a gulf was set between them, a gulf narrower yet deeper than ever."

1968 was a year when at least reality began to "tend towards the idea again." The explosions which shook world politics that year are ten years old. They have already become history, but their effects still remain. The French general strike, the Tet offensive of the Vietnamese communists and the brutal crushing of the Prague Spring demonstrated the validity of the central tenets of the revolutionary marxist programme. Revolutions were possible in the West. The working class remained the only agency of social change in the advanced capitalist countries. Prague demonstrated, even more clearly than Hungary in 1956 and East Berlin in 1953, that the spectre of the Soviet bureaucracy could not be exorcised by reforms from within. The battlefields of Vietnam demonstrated that the road to social liberation did not lie through the blind alleys of peaceful co-existence.

The result of all these amazing developments—they all took place within months of each other—was the emergence of a new layer of radicalised militants to the left of the traditional social-democratic and Communist Parties. Tens of thousands of young students and workers waited anxiously for the revolution.

Looking around Western Europe, Japan and North America today, one is confronted by a somewhat bleak political landscape. Virtually all these countries have witnessed important political and economic upheavals. Bourgeois political leaders have fallen prey to a diverse set of convulsions. After May '68 we have witnessed a pre-revolutionary crisis in Portugal and a wave of impetuous workers' strikes in Britain, which led to the fall of the Heath government in 1974. But ten years of struggles have not produced a revolutionary party. How can this fact be explained?

The novel experiences of 1968 are indisputable. The fact that the far left grew throughout Europe and emerged as a factor in national politics is undeniable. Ten years have produced a layer of workers inside the factories of Barcelona and Turin, Paris and Birmingham, who are responsive to the initiatives of the far left. True these are only a small minority of the working class. But their very presence marks an important

step forward.

But despite all this the sour fact is inescapable: no revolutionary party exists. The masses remain loyal to their traditional organisations. This dilemma continues to confront the "children of **1968**." Nor can it be resolved by the invocation of magical political formulae or by **Stakhanov**-que recruiting drives. Revolutionary parties are born when traditional workers' parties are confronted with a crisis from which no escape is possible. Wars and revolutions have, till now, been the most efficient midwives in this painful process. It took one revolution and two world wars to enable the Italian and French Communist Parties to become hegemonic working class organisations.

But are the reasons for the failure of even one small revolutionary party to emerge rooted in the recalcitrance of objective political conditions or is there an additional factor? Has there been no instance when a correct appreciation of the overall political situation could have enabled a far left group to take a qualitative leap forward? In our opinion there have been at least two instances where the far left failed the test. The extremely favourable situation which opened up in Portugal after the fall of Spínola and which lasted till the ill-fated putschism of the November Days in **1975** was one such period. The prolonged agony of Italian Capital, its institutions and parties was another. And yet it was in both Portugal and Italy that the far left proved incapable of offering a lead which would have an impact on the base of the traditional parties.

The two main ideological poles within the far left since **1968** have been Trotskyism and Maoism as well as mutations of both. The latter current was particularly strong in Italy in **1969**. The former had its strength in France, Britain and, more recently, Spain. The developments within the Chinese People's Republic aided in the disintegration of Maoism in the West. Except for a few semi-religious, Maoist sects, the political operas of Peking demoralised a large bulk of its supporters. The direction they went in was a combination of syndicalism and spontaneism. The three largest currents in Italy, Avanguardia Operaia, Lotta Continua and *Il Manifesto* acquired tens of thousands of members. They all produced a daily newspaper and AO had, in addition, two local radio stations. Today Lotta Continua no longer exists as an organisation. The other two have split and different components have merged with each other, but they are still incapable of offering a serious political alternative to the PCI. Their weaknesses and failures to map out a clear and coherent strategy have given rise to the crazy phenomena of the Red Brigades: a grim testimony to the failures of the revolutionary left in Italy. Italian Trotskyism collapsed earlier. Its refusal to grasp the changing political situation in **1967-68** and alter its tactics accordingly had led to it being reduced to a virtual rump. The Italian section of the Fourth International has no more than 400 members in Italy as a whole!

In Portugal the far left had tremendous possibilities. The overthrow of fascism, the enthusiasm of the liberated working masses, the incredible interest in Marxist ideas, the growing awareness of sexual liberation all provided extremely favourable conditions for the far left. And yet, once again, it proved incapable of meeting the challenge posed by the Portuguese events. It allowed itself to be outflanked not just by Cunhal and the Portuguese Communist Party, but also by Mario Soares and the Socialist Party.

The fact that the last decade has not led to any major successes for the working class movement despite the continuing crisis of the capitalist order has led to a number of developments. The rightward shift of the Communist Parties has been seen most dramatically in the turn of the PCI: the "historic compromise" without doubt represents an audacious move away from any form of Marxist politics. Its tragic obverse has been the development of the Red Brigades. In France, Spain and Britain, the continuing impasse has led to the emergence of a "third position" whose most able exponents have been Fernando Claudin, Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband. But in rejecting the traditional Leninist recipes as well as the opportunistic formulae of Eurocommunism the "third current" has not so far produced any coherent codification of its strategy and tactics for capitalist Europe.

The question which is repeatedly ignored is whether a Leninist strategy has been applied by any of the mass workers parties in Western Europe over the last decade. If it has, and as a consequence has revealed flaws, then clearly there is a basis for trying to develop a "third position." But we would insist that there has been no application of Leninist politics by any of the major Communist Parties in the decade that we are discussing. This can be demonstrated without much difficulty, by briefly discussing three crucial events.

1. French Communism and May '68

How do we characterise the strategy of the French Communist Party in May 1968? Let us first remind readers of how the secretary-general of the PCF saw the situation. Waldeck-Rochet stated after the strike had been dismantled:

"In reality, the choice to be made in May was the following:

- Either to act in such a way that the strike would permit the essential demands of the workers to be satisfied, and to pursue at the same time, on the political plane, a policy aimed at making necessary democratic changes by constitutional means. This was our party's position.
- Or else quite simply to provoke a trial of strength, in other words move towards an insurrection: this would include a recourse to armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the regime by force. This was the adventurist position of certain ultraleft groups.

"But since the military and repressive forces were on the side of the established

authorities, and since the immense mass of people was totally hostile to such an adventure, it is clear that to take such a course meant quite simply to lead the workers to the slaughterhouse, and to wish for the crushing of the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party.

"Well, we didn't fall into the trap. For that was the real plan of the Gaullist regime."

So the choice for the PCF was immediate economic demands or an insurrection. By no stretch of the imagination could this assessment be described as Leninist. The rhetoric was similar to that employed by Kautsky and the Austro-Marxists. In reality, by excluding all struggles except those related to "immediate demands", the PCF sealed off the road to any socialist transformation. At a time when France witnessed the largest general strike in the history of capitalism, when what was needed was a political focus to the strike, the PCF insisted that no such focus was possible. What was posed by May '68 was the overthrow and dismantling of the Fifth Republic and the establishment of a workers' government based on the mass mobilisations of 10 million workers. The creation of local, regional and national Action Committees was very seriously posed. All the evidence suggests that had such a lead been given it would have been embraced by the French workers. The forces that argued for Leninist politics were not to be found in the factories in 1968 and the PCF marshalls ensured that no student Bolsheviks were allowed into the factories. In reality the PCF leadership was perfectly well aware of the dynamic of the strike. In a recent interview with the French daily *Rouge*, Roger Garaudy has revealed that there was a heated discussion on the party leadership at the time, with some leaders suggesting, albeit cautiously, that the strike could be taken forward, but this was rejected.

The removal of de Gaulle, the disbandment of the CRS, the creation of a new popular Assembly over the grave of the Fifth Republic could have provided the thrust needed to develop organs of power independently of the bourgeois state. But not one single step towards this was taken by the PCF. Instead the PCF leaders accepted the sanctity of Gaullist bourgeois institutions. The general strike was thus defused not by a frontal assault but by the PCF accepting the constraints of the bourgeois state. The historic memory of the French working class took them as far as organising the occupation of the factories (as they had done in 1936), but on their own they could go no further. The only party which could have taken them forward was engaged in constant negotiations with Gaullism to end the strike.

After the successful derailment of May '68 the PCF shifted French working class politics to focus exclusively on the electoral terrain. Its strategy on this front proved to be equally defective. In the months preceding this year's elections it placed its narrow party interests above the interests of the working class as a whole. Its sectarian attacks on the

Socialist Party prevented it from having any impact on the workers influenced by the SP. In 1968 it offered the working class the path of constitutionalism. In 1978 it acted in such a way as to ensure the defeat of the "Union of the Left." The cumulative impact of both events has led to serious division within the party.

The impact of the electoral debacle has led to fissures within the right and left of the party. Jean Ellenstein represents a rightward shifting, PCI-influenced opposition. The distinguished Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser is the central spokesperson for the left within the party. Ironically enough the debate is taking place not in the pages of *L'Humanité*, but in the columns of the bourgeois daily *Le Monde* and the Trotskyist daily *Rouge!* Althusser's devastating indictment of the PCF leadership was originally published in the former. What was significant was that these debates were not restricted to the party's intellectuals. They had a resonance in the factories. The opposition led by Althusser is making many points similar to the ones made by the Fourth International. Althusser's contention that: "The workers cannot conquer in the class struggle without the CP, but nor can they conquer with the CP as it is" is a clear indication that a political struggle within the party is vital. In fact the comparison between the structures of the PCF and the bourgeois state indicates that the philosopher is prepared for a long haul. The first major debate on the PCF and Eurocommunism took place between representatives of the PCF, the SP and the LCR (Revolutionary Communist League—French section of the Fourth International) at a *fête* organised by the latter's daily paper *Rouge*. This dialogue heard by twelve thousand militants is an indication of the changes that lie ahead. The ability of the French far left to relate to the debates *within* the PCF could well determine the future developments of revolutionary politics in that country.²

2. *Chilean Communism 1970-73*

It is not necessary to recount the tragedy of the Chilean development which led to the victory of Pinochet's gorillas in September 1973. This has been done in some detail elsewhere.³ But the question which is raised yet again is: was the Chilean CP applying a Leninist political strategy? Not even its most ardent defenders have so far put forward that position. The importance of the Chilean events was that it was utilised as the main reason for the "historic compromise" of the PCI.

One of the novel lessons of Chile was that we were able to perceive the functioning of a workers' government within a bourgeois regime. Clearly the significance of this for Europe where the French, Spanish and Italian Communist parties entertained similar hopes was obvious. The lessons learned by the PCI were that the very notion of a workers' government was of itself an ultraleftism which had to be avoided at all costs. What then is the purpose of exercising governmental power? If it is to administer the

capitalist state in a more humane fashion while "gaining hegemony" one can say, at the very least, that there is nothing new in this project. It is what Swedish social-democracy carried out for nearly three decades, and what British Labour is doing in this country.

What Chile showed was that the electoral victories of workers' parties created a certain disequilibrium. The existence of a workers' government unleashes a more far-reaching extra-parliamentary mobilisation of all classes than does a strategy of *direct* moves to dual power, short-circuiting the bourgeois-democratic regime. Thus the *cordones*, the occupation of over **1000** factories, the networks of local supply committees, were more advanced than anything seen in Argentina or Brazil or Uruguay. This situation itself was far more precarious than France in May **1968** insofar as the extra-parliamentary mobilisation of the bourgeoisie was much greater. It understood that the developing working class consciousness posed a real threat to the bourgeois order. Thus the desire of the Chilean CP to avoid the settling of accounts with reaction was a utopia. The offensive of reaction could have been contained much earlier. It was *not* inevitable that the Generals should have the initiative. It was the strategic mistakes embodied in the reformist project of Allende and the Chilean CP which, to use Waldeck-Rochet's phrase, "lead the workers to the slaughter-house."

The weakness of the Chilean MIR lay in the fact that it projected the line of armed struggle without relating it in any meaningful fashion to the evolution of Chilean politics under Popular Unity. The MIR were correct to stress that the state was not neutral, that a test of strength was necessary, etc., but where they failed was to project a political line capable of being understood and assimilated by the broad masses.

3. *Portuguese Communism 1974-75*

If the PCF and its Chilean counterparts applied a political line which was remote from Leninism, was the Portuguese Communist Party closer to the mark? Even a cursory glance at the political tactics of the PCP is sufficient to dispel any such illusions. After the overthrow of Caetano the party was a bedrock of stability for the existing order. It attacked strikes, it raised the slogan of "social peace", it paraded under portraits of General Spínola and it paved the way for the massive growth of social-democracy. Even the *Financial Times* (18 June 1974) saw fit to note that "The Minister of Labour, Avelino Gonçalves, (PCP) nevertheless works hard at settling conflicts that seriously affect production, and it is extremely important to note that it is nearly only the Communists who are counselling caution in the use of the strike weapon at this time." This resulted in the Socialist Party being seen as a more combative organisation by many young workers in the early stages of the Portuguese upheaval.

The PCP regained some of its lost prestige by organising together with

the SP and the far left the barricades against the attempted right-wing coup of September 27, 1974. It was a united front par *excellence* and was seen as such by the masses. More to the point it succeeded and led to the resignation of Spínola and the collapse of his Bonapartist project for Portugal.

The situation which opened up after Spínola's ouster was tremendously positive from the vantage point of socialism. It ensured that the promised general elections (the first in fifty years) would be held on schedule. The Portuguese ruling class was extremely uneasy about the outcome of the 1975 elections as it feared that the CP and SP would gain an overall majority. Their fears were soon justified: in the April '75 elections the SP-CP popular vote was 56%! It was the highest vote gained by working class parties in any country since the Second World War. The election result was clear proof that the workers wanted their own government. Soares was opposed to having the PCP in a government. He preferred to govern alone on the strength of the SP vote which was 38%. The PCP was shaken by the large SP vote, but instead of mounting an immediate campaign for a workers' government pledged to socialist measures, it sought to develop links with leftists within the MFA. The military Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves was a sympathiser of the PCP. Accordingly the latter attempted to underplay the election results while they cemented their links with Gonçalves and sections of the MFA. At the same time the growing split within the army from top to bottom further accelerated the political crisis. Soares now emerged as the main defender of "democracy." With heavy backing from the Central Intelligence Agency a campaign of terror was unleashed against the PCP and its supporters. The only way to reply to both Soares and the right-wing campaign was by recognising the election results and agitating for a workers' government. For there was no other mass alternative. The popular committees did not organise the masses. True, the workers in Lisbon and its environs were for a revolution, but Lisbon was not Portugal and the task of winning the masses still had to be accomplished.

Neither Cunhal nor the largest of the far left groups could reply to the demagoguery of Soares. For the social-democratic leader said:

"What divides us is not Marx or the construction of a classless society. . . what divides us is Stalin, the totalitarian concept of the state, the all-powerful single party, the rights of man (sic) and the problems of freedom. What divides us is not 'nationalisations' or agrarian reforms but how these are to be controlled—by a bureaucracy dependent on centralised power, or by the democratic control of the workers wherever it spontaneously emerges. . ."

This rhetoric was effective precisely because Cunhal could not reply to it except negatively. The largest far left groupings—the MES and the PRP(BR)—thought that the questions raised by Soares were a diversion.

History was soon to teach them that this "diversion" would derail the entire revolutionary process.

It is an interesting paradox that while the French Communist Party diverted the general strike of May '68 by subordinating it to elections, the Portuguese Communist Party showed its contempt for the masses by attempting to bypass the much *more* democratic procedures for a Constituent Assembly in favour of bureaucratic manipulation of sections of the weakened state apparatus. In Portugal the Assembly was, for a period, a more accurate reflection of the overall relationship of forces than in Russia in 1917. It focused the hopes of the majority of Portuguese after five decades of fascism. It produced a constitution which claimed to be both democratic and socialist. Any development of soviets would have to be geared into the contradictions present in the Constituent Assembly and the "unfinished" character of the upheaval that overthrew Caetano. The PCP was remarkably blind to this fact. The far left was intoxicated with the scent of insurrection. A Leninist political strategy was to emerge with the strength of hindsight.

As far as bourgeois democracy is concerned, we have to recognise and grapple with the fact that illusions in it are still extremely strong amongst the overwhelming majority of the working class in Western Europe. We have seen evidence of this fact in France in May '68 (it is worth stressing that the growth of strong oppositions within the PCF emerged in 1978 rather than 1968: in other words after its *electoral* strategy was seen to be extremely counter-productive), in Portugal in 1974-75 and in Spain after the death of Franco.

Does this mean that the bourgeois-democratic leopard has changed its spots? It is the case that there has been a *qzralitative* change in the character of bourgeois-democracy since Lenin wrote "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky"? We would reject any such thesis. Its strength, as far as the working masses are concerned, derives from one basic fact: no other system offers a *more* democratic alternative. The choice which confronts the working class in relation to existing regimes is not indirect bourgeois democracy versus direct proletarian democracy. It is bourgeois democracy or a bureaucratic and repressive dictatorship. In the above-mentioned text Lenin had been able to utilise his savage invective against Kautsky primarily because of one premise, which, in his own words, was the fact that:

"Proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic."

Lenin proceeds to explain in his inimitable style why this is so and he explains how in the purest bourgeois democracy the real decisions are made

by institutions over which the common people have no control: the banks and the stock exchanges. (One could add, in today's conditions, the International Monetary Fund and the multinational companies to that list.) Through soviet power, argues Lenin, the workers and the oppressed exercise direct power and can recall their representatives on a local, regional or national level if they so desire.

The Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe are not a *million* times more democratic than the bourgeois republics. As a matter of fact the working class enjoys more *democratic* rights in the West (and in India) than it does in the post-capitalist states. It has been the Stalinist model of "socialism" which has enabled illusions in bourgeois-democracy to persist and even from within the proletariat in the capitalist countries. It is for that reason that the experiments known as the "Prague Spring" which were beginning to democratize Czech society during the first six months of 1968 were viewed with immense interest by the workers' movement in the West. That is why we have always maintained that the future of revolutions in the West is bound up with the overthrow of the bureaucratic regimes in the East. Each will have a profound impact on the other despite the qualitative difference between their respective modes of production.

The fact that proletarian or socialist democracy does not exist in any of the states that have seen the abolition of capitalism whether through popular social revolutions (USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuba, Vietnam) or through the intervention of the Soviet armies in the wake of the Nazi defeats in 1944-45 (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania) or a combination of the two (Czechoslovakia, North Korea) remains a tremendous obstacle for the victory of socialism *in the West*. What this means is that socialist democracy must be institutionalised within the programme of revolutionary marxism. Of course this, in itself, is completely insufficient, but what it will indicate is a serious attempt of those fighting for socialism to learn from the tragedies of the workers' movement. It also has some implications for the sort of revolutionary socialist parties which the far left is currently engaged in building. For rooting these organisations firmly inside the proletarian heartlands of the West will require a mode of functioning which is thoroughly democratic. The experiences of Stalinism have already had a negative impact. However it must be stated that the internal regimes of a whole variety of far left groups in Western Europe (and not excluding those claiming the legacy of Trotsky) are as monolithic as a number of Communist Parties during the heyday of Stalinism; a clear reflection that the long period of Stalinist hegemony of the official communist movement did not leave some of its opponents entirely unscathed!

Nor is it sufficient to say that the writings of classical Marxism are *sufficient* in this regard. While elements of what would constitute socialist democracy are present in the writings of the old Marxist leaders they were

never institutionalised. We can take three examples which indicate that Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky were, in their different ways, fully conscious of the importance of this problem. In his polemic with Kautsky already cited, Lenin stated that the exclusion of the bourgeoisie from the soviets was not a matter of principle. It was contingent on the concrete situation, i.e. if they were waging a civil war to overthrow the soviet democracy:

"As I have already pointed out, the disenfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is not a necessary and indispensable feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And in Russia, the Bolsheviks, who long before October put forward the slogan of proletarian dictatorship, did not say anything in advance about disenfranchising the exploiters. This aspect of the dictatorship did not make its appearance 'according to the plan' of any particular party; it *emerged* of itself in the course of the struggle."

What *emerged* was the fact that the Cadets, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and their allies were participating in the Kornilov mutiny! Thus, according to Lenin, they paved the way for their own exclusion. Rosa Luxemburg's criticism of some of the actions of the Bolsheviks were couched within a revolutionary framework, despite the use made of them by reactionaries.⁴ She wrote in 1918: "Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party—however numerous they may be—is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because of any fanatical concept of 'justice' but because all that is instructive, wholesome and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its effectiveness vanishes when 'freedom' becomes a special privilege."

Trotsky survived both Luxemburg and Lenin. He could thus observe the functioning of bourgeois democracy from closer quarters and in his writings on Germany, probably the most brilliant analysis by any Marxist of a political conjuncture, he spelt out the tasks that lay ahead if the victory of fascism was to be averted. In the process of doing so he explained that:

"In a developed capitalist society, during a 'democratic' regime, the bourgeoisie leans for support primarily upon the working classes, which are held in check by the reformists. In its most finished form, this system finds its highest expression in Britain during the administration of a Labour government as well as during that of the Conservatives. In the course of many decades, the workers have built up within the bourgeois democracy, by *utilising* it, by fighting against it, their own strongholds and bases of *proletarian democracy*: the trade unions, the political parties, the educational and sport clubs, the co-operatives, etc. The proletariat cannot attain power within the formal limits of bourgeois democracy, but can only do so by taking the road to revolution: this has been proved by theory and experience. And these bulwarks of workers democracy within the bourgeois state are absolutely essential for taking the revolutionary road."

We have cited these quotations not in a religious spirit, unfortunately far too common on the left, but to demonstrate that the strands of socialist democracy were present in the writings of all the classical leaders of revolutionary Marxism. The victory of Stalinism in the Soviet Union sealed the fate of proletarian democracy in that country. Equally tragic was the fact that this led to institutionalising monolithism and theoretical absolutism within the Communist Parties for a whole period. And even though the Sino-Soviet split has taken place the mode of functioning of both states, despite their different origins, is not dissimilar.

The "Theses on Socialist Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" produced by the Fourth International in May 1977 constituted both a synthesis and systematisation of the strands within classical Marxism on this subject, but also went beyond it in order to take into account the concrete problems posed by fifty years of working class struggles for socialist democracy. The theses presented a revolutionary counterposition to the leading theoreticians of Eurocommunism by arguing that a proletarian pluralism was necessary not just after the victory of socialism, but needed to be institutionalised within the workers' movement today. Moreover it did not require any accommodation of bourgeois democracy. Far from representing an "adaptation to bourgeois democracy" as some far left spokespersons maintain, the theses suggest the best way of overcoming bourgeois democratic illusions within the workers' movement.

As the official Communist Parties in Western Europe continue to take their distance from Lenin and Leninism (the PCE has actually dropped the word Leninist from its constitution) it is essentially the revolutionary left which today defends a Leninist political strategy. We have attempted to indicate that such a strategy was absent from the practice of the Communist Parties in France, Chile and Portugal over the last decades.

Given the developments in some European countries, it is equally necessary to stress that the activities of the Red Army Fraction in West Germany or the Red Brigades in Italy is even further removed from any of the conceptions not just of Lenin, but of classical Marxism. The idea that a revolution will be made by the "heroic actions" of small minorities carrying bombs is not only a disservice to Marxism. Its objective impact is to aid in strengthening the repressive features of the bourgeois state apparatus. Its "theoretical" basis, namely that the more repressive the state becomes, the closer workers will move towards socialism would be amusing if it did not lead to tragic consequences.

The central political lessons of the last ten years can be summed up in a sentence: A socialist revolution in the West will either be made with the consent of the majority of the working masses or it will not be made at all. And unless the revolutionary left recognises this fact and inserts it into its strategic and programmatic aims it will have become a part of the problem rather than the solution.

NOTES

1. I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929-1940*, p. 510.
2. For Althusser's assault on the leadership of the PCF, see *New Left Review*, no. 109. In an interview with the Italian newspaper *Paese Sera*, he extended his attack to the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties. Extracts from the interview were published in *Socialist Challenge*, 1 June, 1978. For a more detailed account of France in May 1968, see Tariq Ali, *1968 and After*, Ch. 2.
3. See Ralph Miliband, "The Coup in Chile", in *The Socialist Register*, 1973; Rojas Sandford, *The Murder of Allende*, and Tariq Ali, op. cit., Ch. 4.
4. This theme is developed by Norman Geras in *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*. Geras's painstaking precision and clarity have rescued Luxemburg from the dubious clutches of liberalism. In another useful text, "Lenin, Trotsky and the Party", *International*, Autumn 1977, Geras discusses the limits and strengths of the portions of the two Russian revolutionaries on the character of the party.
5. A recent example is Duncan Hallas, the chairman of the Socialist Workers Party in a review of one of Ernest Mandel's latest books in *Socialist Review*, no. 3.